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INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY: 

A FAMILIAR EXPLANATION 



NATURE AND OPERATIONS OF THE HUMAN MIND. 



FROM A LONDON COPT. 



EDITED BY REV. SILAS BLAISDALE. 



SECOND EDITION, 






BOSTON: !^^ 

LINCOLN & EDMANDS, 59, WASHINGTON STREET. 
CINCINNATI : HUBBARD &. EDMANDS. 

1833. 












Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1832, 

By Lincoln & Edmands, 

In the Clerk's office of the District Court of Massachusetts. 



/j^'^j 



PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION. 



As all our knowledge, and all our enjoyments, are mental, the 
Philosophy of the Mind is more worthy of our attention than any 
other branch of science. So far, however, from being studied gen- 
erally, or with the care it deserves, it is a subject, with which but 
few are intimately acquainted, and on which the majority, even of 
educated persons, are not well informed. 

It may seem difficult to assign any reason for the general indiffer- 
ence of mankind to the very subject which it most eminently behoves 
them to know, not only as lying at the foundation of their happiness 
in this world, but as an indispensable link in the complete establish- 
ment of their hopes of immortality ; but the cause may be the intrica- 
cy of the theories, and the obscurity of the language, in which the 
science has been wrapped up. 

In this work, great care has been taken to simplify the truths of 
the science, — to remove the incrustation of metaphysics, and shew 
that the phenomena of the immortal spirit are not only more inter- 
esting, but more accessible to the study of all, than those of matter. 
Technicality has been avoided, as equally inconsistent with the con- 
versational form of the work, and a clear view of the subject) and 
though no previous arrangement has been copied in a servile manner 
that of the late Dr. Thomas Brown, of Edinburgh, has been, to a cer- 
tain extent, followed, as the most simple, and most accordant with 
the approved methods in other departments of Philosophy. 



NOTICE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 



Intellectual Philosophy has heretofore been studied with but little 
success even in our highest schools. The present work professes to 
be an introduction to this subject in a simpler and more familiar form 
than anj'^ other treatise, which has been presented to the public. 

The Editor would briefly remark, that his intention in adapting 
questions to this work is not so much for the assistance of instructors, 
as for the advantage of pupils, by giving them a clue to the leading 
topics, the train of reasoning, and the incidental remarks of the au- 
thor; and thereby fixing the attention and awakening an interest, 
which otherwise might be wanting. 

^acon observes, that ^'some books are to be tasted, others to be 
.swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested." This book 
is one of the '^ some few." From the nature of the subject, it can- 
not be understood by a slight perusal. Though written in a familiar 
style, and illustrated by frequent reference to the common concerns 
of life, it must be studied in order to become interesting, or to be 
made profitable to the learner. 

The Editor, in preparing this second edition, has revised the ques- 
tions, added a few notes, and in some instances transposed and cor- 
rected the text, where it seemed to be obscure. As an elementary 
treatise, or " First Lessons in Intellectual Philosophy," he knows of 
no book so well adapted to answer the purpose as this. And no one, 
he presumes, can rise from the careful and thorough perusal of 
it, without having acquired a relish for the study of Intellectual 
Philosophy. 

The questions, which have been added to this edition, are printed 
without being numbered, in order to prevent any inconvenience 
that might result from the use of this and the former edition in the 
same class. 

Sanderson Academy ^ 
Ashfieldj Mass. 1832. 



CONTENTS- 



LESSON I. 

Nature, Importance, and Extent of Intellectual Philosophy — 
Mind alone can possess or extend Knowledge ; and, therefore, 
the Study of it must improve all the Sciences — Necessary for 
Religious Belief — Can be studied by all Persons, under every 
variety of Circumstances, 9 

LESSON n. 

Divisions of the Subject — Man considered as an Individual — as 
social — as moral — and accountable — The Mind mustbe studied 
in its own Phenomena, which are all that we know, or can 
know, respecting it, --------29 

LESSON III. 

Power — Force — The Succession of events in the relation of 
Cause and Effect — Similarity of the Mode of Procedure in the 
Philosophy of Matter and the Philosophy of Mind, - - 61 

LESSON IV. 

Hypothesis and Theory — Use and abuse of them — Mental Analy- 
sis, only virtual, not real, like that of Matter, - - - 79 



VI * CONTENTS. 

LESSON V. 

Consciousness and Conscience, only states of the Mind — Me- 
mory — Sameness — Mental Identity — Must not be confound- 
ed with Personal Identity — Existence and Mental Identity, 
Truths which cannot be denied — Intuitive Belief, - - 92 

LESSON VI. 

Arrangement of Intellectual Phenomena — The External Af- 
fections — Internal AiFections, 115 

LESSON VII. 

Sensation generally, the Corporeal Process of Sensation — 

Smelling— Tasting, - - - . - - . - - 125 

LESSON VIIL 

Sense of Hearing — Limits of External Sensation — Musical 
Sounds — Language — Instinct of Man compared with that of 
the Animals — Superiority of Reason over Instinct, as re- 
gards Space, as regards Time, 141 

LESSON IX. 

Senses of Touch and Vision — Particular Phenomena of Touch 
— Tactual Qualities discovered by Resistance, or Interrup- 
tion of Motion — Touch, or any of the Senses alone, could 
not give us any Knowledg-e of External Things — Origin 
of External Knowledge — Knowledge of Space and Time — 
Phenomena of Vision — Sensation may be heightened by 
Desire — Desire, with confident Belief is Will, - - 169 

LESSON X. 

Internal Affections, are eithfer Mental States or Emotions — 
Mental States are the return of former Knowledge simply, 
or the comparison of one State with another — Succession of 
^ Suggestion the same as that of Cause and Effect— We can- 
not will or control it, 200 



CONTENTS. Vll 

LESSON Xf. 

Laws of Simple Suggestion — Its general Nature depends on 
the Habit of the Individual — Circumstances that produce 
Suggestions — Feeling mingles with it — Sympathy — Joy in 
Adversity, Torture in Prosperity, may come in Suggestion, 
if their Antecedents be in our past Experience — Dreaming 
— Particular Causes of Suggestion, 216 

LESSON XII. 

Suggestions of Relations — Relations in Space — in Time — 
They are the only means by which we can acquire Knowl- 
edge — Generahzation precedes the use of General Terms — 
Errors on this Subject — Danger of mere verbal Knowledge, 252 

LESSON XIII. 

Limit of general Names — Circumstances which suggest Com- 
parisons — Philosophy of Education — Invention and Dis- 
covery — Examples of the Process of Reasoning — by co-ex- 
istent Comparisons — by Comparisons in succession — Talent 
and Genius, 274 

LESSON XIV. 

EmotionsTT-Emolion antecedent to Knowledge, and the Cause 
of it — Emotions are simple, or moral — They are immediate, 
or retrospective, or prospective — Cheerfulness, Melancholy, 
Wonder, Astonishment, 299 

LESSON XV. 

Emotion of Beauty — Deformity — Sublimity — Ludicrousness, 314 

LESSON XVI. 

Feeling of Moral Distinctions, common to all Men, but va- 
ried by their Education and Habits — Emotion of Love, 
Hatred, Sympathy, Pride, Humility — Distinction of Moral 
Good and Evil in each, - 323 



Vlll - CONTENTS. 

LESSON XVII. 

Emotions arising from the past — From the Conduct of others : 
Anger or Gratitude — From Natural events : Simple Re- 
gret, or Simple Gladness — From the Review of our own 
Conduct : Moral Regret, or Gladness, - . . . 335 

LESSON XVIIL 

Emotions arising from the Contemplation of the Future — All 
our Desires and Fears generally — Some particular ones, 343 

RETROSPECTIVE GLANCE 353 



INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. 



LESSON I. 



Nature, Importance and Extent of Intellectual Philosophy — !\Iind 
alone can possess or extend knowledge, and therefore the study of 
it mu^t improve all the sciences — Necessary for religious belief — 
Can be studied by ail persons, under every variety of circumstances. 

Edicard. MY dear father, some time ago you promised 
to let us know something about the nature of the mind ; 
and you told us that the science which treated of that, was 
more wonderful, more interesting, and more extensive than 
any, or than all of those upon which we have conversed al- 
ready. Now, I have been thinking on the subject, and as 
the mind is nothing that can be seen, and a man, taking 
him altogether, is thought tall if he be six feet high, I can- 
not see how there should be here any thing more wonder- 
ful than the making of a solid substance, by the mixture of 
tuo portions of invisible air, which we were shown in chem- 
istry — more interesting than the separating of the light of 
the sun into those beautiful colours which I can obtain any 
sunny day, by holding the prism to the opening of the 
shutters — or more extensive than astronomy, which reaches 
not only to the distance of the sun, but to the Georgian 
planet, when at the greatest distance on the opposite side 
of that luminary. 

Dr. Herbert. I am much gratified to find that you 
think so highly of your chemistry, your optics, and your 
astronomy, and 1 hope your respect for them will increase ; 
but though you have a higii respect for these, and though 
they may be among the most important matters with which 
you are acquainted, it does not follow that they are the 
most important with which you can be acquainted. You, 

1. Can there be any study more v/onderful than that of Chemistry, 

Optics or Astronomy ? 2. Does it follow as a consequence, that, 

because you are already acquainted with many wonderful things, 
there can be nothing, of which you are ignorant, still more wonder- 
ful? 

2 



JO FIRST LESSONS IN Le SS. 1. 

no doubt, remember, that when we set out for London, 
you said there could not be a larger building than our 
own church ; and yet you saw St. PauFs, and said you 
were as much fatigued in going to the top ot it as if you 
had walked five miles. 

Edward, I know that, father; but you know the 
church was made by men, and I thought men could make 
as large a church here as any where else. The things 
that I have stated are not made by men, and so 1 cannot 
see how men could find out any thing more interesting 
and greater than they are. 

Dr, .Herbert. That is what older folks than you, Ed- 
ward, are apt to think about the last things they have 
learned ; but it is not the better founded on that account. 

Charles, T think Edward is wrong, father, in arguing 
about the possibility of what we are to converse on being 
greater and more sublime ; I would rather hear on what 
account it is so. 

Dr, Herbert. That is told in few words. Let me ask 
you how wonderful the chemistry, how beautiful the op- 
tics, and how sublime the astronomy, are to John the 
coachman ? 

Mary, I do not think, Sir, that they can be any thing 
to him at all, for he knows nothing about tbein. He can 
barely read the address of a letter, and not even that if 
the hand-writing be not very plain. 

Dr. Herbert. Then, my children, do you not perceive 
from this, that, to any human being, the sublimity, the 
beauty, the magnitude, or any one interesting property 
ol any thing, does not depend upon that thing itself, but 
upon the faculty of the mind that perceives it. * John de- 
rives no pleasure from the sciences, and probably very 
little from the bounty of nature that is scattered around 
us, except in so far as it contributes to his own personal 
and bodily comfort. The world is thus limited to him ; 



* It is on this principle that study and investigation are 
so uninteresting to a large part of the community. Their minds 
want the discipline necessary to render intellectual pursuits 
attractive. And hence, from their amusements and pursuits 
the degree of their mental cultivation is readily ascertained. 

3. What do people generally think about the last things they have 
learned ? 4. What is it, which renders any thing sublime, beauti- 
ful, great or interesting to us, if it be not this quality in the object 
itself.'' 5. Give the illustration. 



Less, I. intellectual philosophy. 11 

but it is not for any diminution in itself; neither is it, 
probably, on account of any deficiency of original facul- 
ties in him to discern in it those qualities which are so in- 
teresting to us ; but merely because nobody, when he was 
young, took the trouble of pointing those matters out to 
him, and that, instead of cultivating his mind as we are 
happily enabled to do, he was under the necessity of work- 
ing for his living. You admire, do you not, the rich green 
oi the fields, the clear blue of the sky, the changing col- 
ours of the clouds, the sparkle of the stars, and all those 
brilliant hues which in succession adorn the flower gar- 
den and the green house ? 

Matilda. I am very fond of them, Sir, especially the 
flowers. 

Dr. Herbert. Then if you had had the misfortune 
to be without eyes, where would have been all this pleas- 
ure to you? So also if you had been without ears, you 
would have been shut out from the sound of music, and 
the more important ones of instruction ; and, in that state, 
the world would have been still a greater blank to you 
than it is to John the coachman. 

Edicard. But seeing and hearing, father, are not any 
part of the mind; they are two senses of the body, as 
Mr. Villiams told us the other day; and you remember 
telling us, how like the eye was to a camera obscura, 
when you first showed us the picture of the church in 
that; and how there is some resemblance between the 
form of the ear and the hearing-trumpet, which, you 
know, makes so loud a noise when one only whispers in- 
to it. 

Dr. Herbert. The eye and the ear are certainly or- 
gans by which the mind perceives, just in the same man- 
ner as the hands are organs by which the mind acts, and 
the feet organs by which it walks. The camera obscura, 
which reflected the image of the church upon the glass, 
did not itself see the image; the hearing trumpet that in- 
creased the sound of the whisper, had itself no know- 
ledge of that sound ; and, in like manner, if it were not 
for the will or wish of the mind, the hand and the foot 
would remain at rest ; and as pieces of matter have no 
tendency, but, like other pieces of matter, to sink in a 

6. Why do you admire the grandeur of the heavens, and the 

variety and beauty of natural scenery ? 7. How must the 

senses be considered in regard to the perceptions of the mind? 



12 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 1. 

fluid of less specific gravity than themselves, or swim in 
one w^hich is of greater. Whatever we know of the ap- 
pearance of the external world, or of any part of it, as 
viewed at a particular instant of time, or whatever we 
know of it as changing with the change of years, we 
have, and we can have, only through the medium of the 
mind; and therefore the mind, which is the source and 
measure of all our knowledge, must not only be to us a 
matter greater and more important to be known than any 
one branch or portion of that knowledge, but greater and 
more important than the whole of it taken together. 

You have expressed, and I am sure you have felt, much 
pleasure as we traced the progress of those illustrious men 
who have made us acquainted with the properties of mat- 
ter, from the magnificent system of the sun and planets 
that run their courses through the immensity of space, to 
the small animacul^ revealed by the microscope- — thou- 
sands of which are hardly equal in bulk to a single grain 
of sand, but which, in that extreme of minuteness, are as 
perfect in their parts, and as lively in their motions, as 
any of the animals of larger growth which we can dis- 
cern without the aid of any microscope. I mentioned 
to you that, neither in the way of magnitude nor in that 
of minuteness, can we limit the workmanship of the Cre- 
ator to that which we have discovered ; for the chain of 
material being may extend both ways farther than it has 
yet been examined by the most careful inquirer, aided by 
the most powerful instruments. When we compare the 
astronomy of modern times with that of the wisest of the 
ancients, and also the researches into the minuter portions 
of matter, whether living or dead, with what was the lim- 
it of their knowledge in that way, we see no reason to 
doubt the conjecture of Dr. Herschel, that the sun ot our 
system is but the attendant of some system that is mighti- 
er; or that there might dwell between the particles of 
substances which to us appear simple, solid and compact, 
whole nations of animated beings, to whose perceptions 
the particles of those substances may appear as gigan- 
tic and as remote, as the sun and the planets are to us. 



8. By what means do we obtain all oiir knowledge, and what 

ought therefore to be considered as the source of it? 9. How 

then must this source and receptacle of knowledge compare with 
knowledge itself, as a subject of investigation ? 



Less. I. intellectual philosophy. 13 

Charles. But, father, all the hope of future discovery, 
which is thus held out, must — according to the principle 
which you taught us, that like causes produce like effects 
— be the result of the improvement of instruments, and 
a more careful examination of the wonders of nature, 
and, so has nothing to do with the study of the human 
mind. 

Dr, Herbert. Have patience, Charles. To what but 
the mind itself are all these discoveries owing ? The 
courses of the planets, and the centrifugal and centripe- 
tal forces, by which they are made to revolve in their 
elliptic orbits, were the same in the days of Ptolemy, nay, 
before one astronomical conjecture was made, as they 
were in the times of Kepler and Newton. The moun- 
tains and valleys in the moon, the satellites of Jupiter 
and Saturn, the rings of the latter planet, with the Geor- 
gian, and those lesser bodies of more recent discovery, 
were the same for ages before Galileo, or Herschel, or 
Olbers, directed a telescope to the scrutiny of the hea- 
vens. So, also, there were animalculae in those fluids in 
which they are now found, long before the days of Leuen- 
hoeck or of Baker. Now, tell me, why the men a thou- 
sand or two thousand years ago did not make the same 
discoveries. 

Edward. They had not the telescopes and the mi- 
croscopes; neither were they so well acquainted with 
the properties of matter, or the applications of mathe- 
matics. 

Dr. Herbert. And where did the moderns find these 
things ? Did they gather the instruments from trees, like 
apples, or reap the mathematics in a field like a crop ? No. 
They owed them all to more vigorous and better directed 
exertions of mind ; and you will find wherever one im- 
provement has been made — wherever any thing has been 
added to the volume of human knowledge, or any new ma- 
chine given to the arts, or any new convenience or elegance 
to the accommodations of life — we invariably owe it to 
something superior in the exertion of the mind. This shows 
us, that, of all things or principles with which we are ac- 
quainted, our own minds are the most deserving of our 

10. Why were not the discoveries of modern astronomers and 

naturalists made two thousand years ago? 11. To what do 

the moderns owe all their advantages and improvements ? 

2* 



14 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 1. 

attentive cultivation ; because they repay that cultivation 
best, as well in additional enjoyments to ourselves, as in 
additional benefits to our fellow creatures. When we 
see that, in the course of ages, men have come from con- 
jectures that appear to us exceedingly absurd, to the 
clearest demonstrations on the most sublime subjects ; 
and when those who have done these things have not 
been much more than as one in a million of the whole hu- 
man race, we cannot help feeling that if the minds of the 
million had been as well tutored and exercised as theirs, 
our stock of information, great as it is now, compared 
with that of our distant ancestors, v/ould have been in- 
conceivably greater. 

Alary. But as a large proportion of the people must 
always have been occupied with labour, just as they are 
now, they could not have had time to pay this attention to 
their minds. 

Dr. Herhert. The time required for this purpose is 
much less than many persons suppose. Those who are 
engaged in labour, which is merely mechanical, will not 
work the less, or tlie less agreeably, because they are think- 
ing all the time ; nay, instead of this, there is nothing so 
well calculated to relieve the tediousness ot mere labour, 
or to prevent those who are engaged in it from falling into 
dissipation in their hours of rest, as a habit of thinking ; 
and we might instance the Scottish poet Burns, and a 
number of other persons, who, when following very labo- 
rious occupations, thought as much and as well as the 
professional philosophers, who have nothing but their stu- 
dies to occupy their attention. 

Matilda. But, father, in our geography, our astrono- 
my, our chemistry, and all the other matters we have stu- 
died, we had something to look at, and something to assist 
us — our globes, our maps, our telescopes, and all the rest 
' of the apparatus; and in studying our own minds, which, 
1 suppose, is what you mean by intellectual philosophy, 
we have nothing to look at, and no apparatus to assist 
us. 

12. On what account then is the mind deserving of cultiva- 
tion ? 13. If every individual in society in times past had en- 

joj'^ed the advantages of a good education, what would probably 

have been the result? 14. Can persons who are engaged in 

labour, attend to the cultivation of their minds ? 15. What ob- 
vious advantage may such studies confer on this class of persons f 



Less. I. intellectual philosophy. 15 

Dr. Herbert. You mistake, Matilda, lii studying the 
mind, we liave tlie whole world to look at ; for all that we 
know of that is through those very operations of the mind 
wliich are the subject of intellectual philosophy. More 
than this — in the most important part of the business, our 
book is always open, and our apparatus is ever with us 
and ready. In studying the material world, we must ei- 
ther look at the parts ol it, or read the description of them 
in the writings of others ; and we are constantly interrupt- 
ed by the absence of that which we need. If you would 
study those heavenly bodies that are visible to the naked 
eye, a cloudy night shuts you up in ignorance. If you 
would study the minuter ones, you must wait till you get 
the telescope. If you would study chemistry, you must 
get the apparatus in order ; if botany, you must wait till 
the flowers are in bloom. In short, there is not one por- 
tion of the science of external nature which you can have 
at all times, and under all circumstances, under your 
command. If you are unable to procure the substances 
and the instruments, you must remain altogether in igno- 
rance ; and though you are able to procure them, you 
must suspend your study, except in mere reflection upon 
what you have already learned, whenever you are called 
away from them. But when one's own mind is the sub- 
ject, it is alike open to all ; it costs no book, and no appa- 
ratus : and you never can be absent from it, since you 
of necessity carry it with you wherever you go. In conse- 
quence of this, the mind is the most generally and con- 
stantly accessible of all the branches of human study. At 
the same lime, it is the one in which all mankind have 
the deepest interest. With many of the subjects of the 
others, there are few persons thai have much to do : but 
everybody has a mind of some degree of capacity or other : 
and, therefore, everybody is interested in studying the 
nature of the mind. 

Charles. You have always told us, in every thing that 
we have studied, that mere speculative knowledge is not, 
strictly speaking, knowledge at all ; and that if what we 
study does not tend to make us better men, and fit us for 
a better perfoimance of our duty, the time that we devote 

IG. "What disadvantages must lie, who studies the material 

world, frequently encounter? 17.1s the student of intellectual 

philosophy subject to the same inconveniences ? 16. In wliich, 

natural, or njental philosophy, are all ranks in society most deep- 
ly interested ? and why ? 



16 FinsT LESSONS IN Less. L 

to it is worse than wasted, because we lose the time, and 
also what we might otherwise have learned in the course 
of it. But you have not told us what advantage we are 
to gain from the study of our own minds. All that you 
have said is about the grandeur of that study as a mere 
matter of speculation. 

Dr, Herbert. To do it w^ell, Charles, we must do only 
one thing at a time ; and as I was about to tell you some 
of the uses of this branch of knowledge when you made 
the remark, 1 shall mention a few of the most obvious 
now. 

In the first place, the study of the mind tends very much 
to the improvement of the mind itself ; and makes us bet' 
ter able to apply it to every thing else. The mind is, as 
it were, the instrument with which we find out every thing 
we know. You have read from history, that those who 
have improved it, have been enabled both to know and to 
do many things which they who have not improved it 
could not even attempt ; and unless we understand any 
thing well, we can neither improve it, nor put it to rights 
w^hen it goes wrong. None of us could make that clock 
upon the mantelpiece go a month or a year without being 
wound up ; and even when it gets out of order, we can- 
not set it right, or tell what is the matter with it — we have 
to send it to the clockmaker. Just so, if our minds are 
not strong enough, or in proper discipline for understand- 
ing what we wish to understand, we cannot put them to 
rights without knowing the nature and machinery of them ; 
and as nobody can know any thing about the particular 
state of our minds, further than we are able to tell them, 
we must, in these cases, be clockmaker to ourselves. 

Edward. But, father, if it be necessary that we should 
know all about our own minds before we can be sure that 
we are able to understand other things properly, should 
not that have been the very first thing that we ought to 
have learned? 

Dr, Herbert. Your observation, Edward, is quite a 
natural one ; and there is only one objection to making 
the study of the mind the first part of education ; namely, 
that it is quite impossible. As we shall explain more at 

19. What may be mentioned as the first advantage resulting 

from the study of the mind? 20. By what analogous reason^ 

ingmay this be illustrated ? 21. "What objection may be urged 

against making the study of the mind the first part of education ? 



Less. I. intellf.ctual piulosophy. 17 

length afterwards, we know nothing ahout the mind, hut 
in so far as it is affected hy other things; and, therefore, 
we cannot be taught any thing about it, till we know 
something about a good many of the things by which it is 
affected. I mentioned, that we may consider the mind 
as a sort of tool or instrument with which we work ; and, 
this being the case, we must be trained to the use ofit at 
first, just as we are trained to the use of other tools and 
instruments. The carpenter does not begin the instruc- 
tion of his apprentices by explaining to them the nature 
of saws, planes, and adzes ; neither does the blacksmith 
begin by lecturing about fire and bellows, and hammers 
and anvils. They well know that such lectures would 
never enable the lads to make a peg or a nail ; and there- 
fore, they put the tools into their hands, and make them 
learn the use of them by practice; and there are many 
expert workmen that understand very little about the na- 
ture of the tools with which they work. 

Charles. Then, if they become expert without the 
knowledge, might not that be dispensed with altogether? 

Dr. Herbert. If there were to be an end of all im- 
provement, it might ; but you have been told again and 
again, that England owes the whole of her superiority in 
the useful arts, and much of her high place among the 
nations, to improvements in the tools and engines with 
which her artificers work ; and these improvements could 
not have been made, if those who made them had not 
very carefully studied those formerly in use, and found 
out both their defects and the means by which these might 
be removed. In a similar manner, it has been by a dili- 
gent study of the mind, and a careful finding out oferrors, 
in thinking, believing, and judging, that real knowledge 
has taken place of the subtile and unmeaning theories, 
which, as you were told, used to be maintained by the 
very ablest of mankind, about the appearances and laws 
of the external world, and the yet earlier absurdities which 
were taught and believed respecting the mind. In the 
great history of the world, this has been done by the men 
of one age making improvements upon the men of the 
ages that went before them, (which has been wonderfully 
accelerated since the invention of the art of printing al- 

22. Give the author's illustration. 23. In what manner lias 

real knowledge taken the place of mere theories.' 24. In the 

history of the world; how has this been done .' 



18 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. I. 

lowed nothing to be lost), and in the little history of eve- 
ry individual, it is done by correcting in every successive 
year and day the errors of the former. 

Matilda. Will you mention some of the other advan- 
tages ? 

Dr. Herbert. Many of the others, my children, are 
merely consequences of that : for when we have said that 
any thing that improves our mind makes us better able to 
distinguish between right and wrong, and truth and error, 
we have said the very strongest thing that can be said in 
its favour ; but I shall mention a few others. 

(2.) The philosophy of mind gives a union to all the 
branches of our hnowledge^ because we find a counterpart 
of every thing in our own perceptions of it ; and when, 
along with the mere motion of every object, as a part of the 
external world, we consider how we are affected by it, we 
make it our own : as when we consider the rose that may 
blossom in the garden that we have not seen, it is com- 
paratively indifferent ; but when, along with it, we con- 
sider how its form and its colour are beautiful to our 
sight, and its perfume pleasing to our smell, we make it 
our own — the beauty and the fragrance belong to us, as 
well as to the rose. 

(3.) Unphilosophical opinions about the nature of the 
mind, and the modes of its operation, were the chief causes 
of all these errors which, for so many ages, concealed from 
man the true laws of the material world ; and it is chiefly 
because such men as Bacon dispelled the mist which 
brooded over the philosophy of the mind, that our natural 
philosophy and our chemistry have become so consistent 
in themselves, and have done so much for the arts. 

(4.) InalltJiat relates to the beauty and the power oflan- 
guage^ the knowledge of the mind is most essential ; and 
he who attempts to instruct or to persuade, to arouse or 
to sooth the feelings, or to act upon the minds of other 
people, in any way, either for his own purposes or their 
good, can have but slender hopes of success, uriless he 

24. In the history of the world, how has this been done? 

25. In the history of an individual, how may it be done ? 

26. What is the second advantag;e resulting from the study of the 
mind ? 27. Give the reason for this assertion, and the illustra- 
tion. 28. What is mentioned as the third advantage resulting 

trom the study of the mind .? 29. What is the fourth advan- 
tage .? Give the illustration. 



Less. I. intellectual philosophy. 19 

know the nature of the mind, and the way in which those 
feelings can be touched. The diflerencc between sense 
and nonsense, eloquence and tediousness, or wit and dul- 
ness, consists more in the presence or the absence of 
knowledge of the mind, either on the part of the ad- 
dresser or the addressed, than any thing else. When 
you saw the woodman cleave the huge block of timber 
with the little wedge, would he have effected his purpose 
if he had either attempted to drive the wedge with the 
back foremost, or placed it across the fibres of the wood? 

Edward. 1 beg your pardon, father, but the woodman 
did not know any thing about the theory of the wedge ; 
for I asked him, and he could not even tell the relation 
between the force applied to the back, and the resistance 
on the sides. 

Dr. Herbert. I thank you for that, Edward, as it wilJ 
enable us to get at one object, to which, otherwise, we 
should not have arrived, without some preface. 

Mary. Edward will be our wedge, then. 

Dr. Herbert. Precisely so; and we hope, by repeated 
blows of the malletof thinking, we shall make him cleave 
the block. The woodman did not know the properties of 
the wedge as a mechanical power, but he knew what it 
could do and how to do it ; and this is just the kind of 
knowledge of the mind which intellectual philosophy 
seeks. Besides the properties of the wedge, or of any 
other instrument made of matter, that appear in the using 
of it, we can have other properties, such as its form, or the 
stuff that it is made of, and we may be acquainted with 
these properties, without knowing how to use the instru- 
ment ; but in studying the mind, we have nothing to learn 
but the uses of it ; we know not what it is made of, what it 
is like, or any thing respecting it, as we do about the real 
material beings that are the objexts of the senses, or the 
imaginary ones that we can form to ourselves. All that 
we can know about it is that it is excited, or put into differ- 
ent states, by different external appearances and occur 
rences, as well as by different trains of thought; and, 



30. In what consists the real difference between sense and 

nonsen-^e, eloquence and tediousness, or wit and dulncss ? 31. 

Give the illustration. 2rZ. How much does the woodman know 

about the wedge, with which he cleaves the timber ? 33. In 

studying the mind, what \s there which we cannot know ? • 

34. And what is all, that we can attain in relation to it ? 



20 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. I. 

therefore, all that we mean when we speak about the phi« 
losophy of the mind, (1) is the states in which the mind 
may be, (2) the circumstances that appear to produce 
those states, and (3) the consequences that result from 
them. 

31atilda. Cannot we know what the mind is ? I am 
sure 1 have heard you say that it is spiritual, and that it 
never can die. 

Dr, Herbert. And in so saying, Matilda, 1 spoke in 
perfect accordance with the revelation of holy writ, and 
the principles of that philosophy which we apply to the 
study of matter. When we say that the mind is spiritual, 
we rather say what it is not than what it is ; for we mere- 
ly mean that it is something which cannot be perceived and 
examined in the same way as we perceive and examine 
matter — something which we cannot measure with a line, 
weigh in a balance, melt in a crucible, or decompose in a 
retort — something of which we constantly feel the opera- 
tion, and are therefore compelled to believe the existence, 
but of which, further than the operation, we know, and 
can know, nothing. Yet, from this very impossibility of 
knowing its nature, there arises an argument for the im- 
mortality of its duration — its freedom from dissolution 
and death — which is altogether irresistible. Death and 
dissolution are words of nearly the same import; and both 
of them can apply only to matter — to that which is made 
up of parts, and of parts that can be separated. The sep- 
aration of those parts is, in many instances, the destruc- 
tion of the individual substance, as a peculiar existence, 
or piece of matter ; and the decomposition of a piece of 
coal, or a billet of timber, by burning it in the fire, is the 
destructton of that just as much as death is the destruction 
of a plant or an animal ; the only difference is, that disso- 
lution destroys one kind of qualities, and death another; 
for both involve the idea of the disuniting of what was 
before united, and involve it very nearly in the same 



35. V7hat three particulars are enumerated as embracing the 
whole subject of philosophical inquiry in relation to the mind? 

■ 36. What is meant, when it is said, that the m^indis spirit- 

^q\ ? 37. What aiises from this impossibility of knowing its 

nature ? Give an outline of the argument in favour of the im- 
mortality of the mind. 



Less. I. intellectual philosophy. 21 

manner; death and dissolution being both alTccted by the 
same means, mechanical or chemical, only varying in the 
mode of their operation, and not always so much in that 
as the varieties of eitlier of them difier from one another, 
— as, the same fire that decomposes the piece of coal, or 
the billet of wood, would occasion death to an animal or 
a plant. We cannot even imagine in the mind any thing 
like composition of parts, whether of integrant parts, or 
parts of the same kind, as the grains of sand in a stone, 
or constituent purts, or parts of different kinds, as the mu- 
riatic acid and soda in common salt; and therefore, it is 
just as impossible for us to imagine its decomposition or 
death. 

Charles. Then are the minds of all the people who 
are collected together in the church-yard, still there; and 
do they, without any of the labour to which we are sub- 
jected, see all that we see, and enjoy all that we enjoy? 
If this be the case, it must be a delightful thing to be 
dead. 

Dr. Herbert. Your question is not unnatural, for it is 
a question about which, in some form or other, a great 
deal of time and ingenuity have been wasted ; but still it 
is a question of ignorance; and one of those that can be 
taken out of the way only by a proper use of intellectual 
philosophy. We know nothing about the mind, except 
in connexion with the body, and our minds know nothing 
about the external world, except in that connexion, and 
by means of the organs of sense ; therefore, it is utterly 
impossible that we can know any thing about the place or 
the feelings of the mind in a separate state ; though as, 
in that state, it must be without those bodily organs by 
means of which we get our external impressions, it must 
either have no impression whatever of things external of 
itself, or be impressed by them in a way which it is im- 
possible for us even to imagine. This may naturally bring 
us to a fifth practical use of the philosophy of mind ; and 
one which is of more importance, than any that we have 
noticed. 

Mary. Have the goodness to tell us that. 



38. Why can we know nothing about the residence, or the 
feelings of the mind^ in a state separate from the body ? 



22 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. L 

Dr, Herhert, (5.) The study of intellectual philosophy 
prevents us from icasting our time and our ingenuity in 
iQxe fancies and speculations, that can lead to no knowledge^ 
and be productive ofjio usefulness ; and it prevents us from 
alarming oiivselves with superstitious fears, of which we 
can know neither the reason nor foundation.* 

Before men began to limit their inquiries and their be- 
lief to their knowledge, so much was spoken and written 
on the first of these subjects, that half the labour of the 
more rational had been expended in clearing it away. 
Before man knew himself as man, or matter as matter^ he 
would need be wise in a world which was to him utterly 
unknown. (1) Whether any piece of matter, as a stone 
or a tree, had an essence separable from its existence, 
and of what qualities this non-existence w^as possessed 1 
, — (2) whether angels could pass from one point of space 
to another, as from the sun to the rnoon, in an instant, 
and without passing through all, or through any of the 
intermediate points? — (3) whether they could see objects, 
and distinguish colours in the dark ?— (4) whether one, 
or an infinite number of them, could, at the same instant, 
occupy the same space — as standing on the point of a 
needle? — {5) whether space would be perfectly empty if 
there were nothing but angels in it? — (6) whether God 
himself could exist in space that v/as merely imaginary, 
in the same manner as in space that was real ? — (7) wheth- 
er he could create form without any substance, as a 
circle without any thing circular ?— (8) and whether he 



* Mr, Locke remarks, ''Five or six friends, meeting at 
my chamber and discoursing on a subject, found themselves 
at a standby the difficultiesjthat arose on every side. After 
we had awhile puzzled ourselves without coming any 
nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it 
came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course, and 
that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of this nature, 
it was necessary to examine ourov/n abilities, and see what 
objects our understandings were, or were not fitted to deal 
with." 



39. What is the fifth advantage resulting from the study of the 

mind ? What remark is made by Mr. Locke ? 40. What 

were some of the questions, which engrossed the attention of men 
in former times ? 



Less. I. intellectual philosophy. 23 

loved a non-existing great being, the existence of wliich was 
merely possible, better than an insignificant being, of which 
the existence was real ? These, with a countless number 
of questions, equally unmeaning and impossible, engrossed 
the attention of mankind for many ages, and gave rise to 
<3isputcs as keen as ever were waged about actual existences 
or real property. 

Edward. What fools they must have been. 

Dr. Herbert, Do not you remember the ghost, which 
only a few years ago frightened all the folks in the village? 
and do you not remember, that you so far believed in it, as 
that you would not go to bed without a light for fear of it, 
till it was found to be only an idle young man, with a white 
sheet about him ? 

Edicard, But I was very young then. 

Dr. Herbert. So you was, and so was the world very 
young in knowledge, when those questions were agitated 
among philosophers ; but old Rachel was not very young, 
when she first propagated the story of the ghost, or when 
she persevered in believing it, after the deception was 
found out. The want of better information, or rather the 
perversion of the powers which they possessed, was the cause 
of both ; and even those who firmly believed in the super- 
stitions, and agitated the foolish questions, were often very 
capable upon other subjects. 

Charles. Garden was a good mathematician ; and yet 
he is said to have starved himself to death, in order to 
prove the truth of astrology. 

Dr. Htrbcrt. So it is said, and by so doing he proved 
its falsehood, as he died of the starvation, and not of the 
prediction. It is not the mere possession of talents, but 
the proper use of them, that keeps people right, at any 
time, or under any circumstances. The vulgar do not 
believe all the superstitious nonsense that they are made 
to believe, ior any want of natural abilities, but merely 
because they have never been taught the difference be- 
tween what human beings can understand, and what they 
cannot, and are thus always confounding the one with the 
other. 

EdiDard. But as ghosts are spirits, as angels are spirits, 
and as God himself is a spirit, will not the denial of the ap- 
pearance of ghosts have a tendency to make people deny 
jhe existence of spirits, and doubt or deny the existence of 
God himself? 



24 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. I. 

Dr, Herbert, And if the faith in the existence of Al- 
mighty God stand on no better a foundation than the error 
and misapplication of the human mind, would it not be 
better to give it up ? or rather would it be an abandonment 
of the belief, in the opinion of more rational and thinking 
persons? If the existence of the Almighty were not found 
in his own works, and in his word, how could we receive 
it from the erroneous fancies and the idle fears of the most 
ignorant part of the human race ? If wisdom failed in find- 
ing him out, how could we hope that folly would succeed 
in the grand inquiry? The God of nature and of revela- 
tion is the true God, known only in so far as it has been 
his pleasure to reveal himself in these ; and that which is 
formed or fashioned by any other means, is a mere idol, 
a creation of the believer in it, and of less value than the 
most insignificant thing which it has pleased the Almighty 
to create. I have told you already — and the more that 
you think upon it, the more you will be convinced of its 
truth — that when we call any being a spirit, in the sense 
in which the term is applied to the human mind, or to 
the Creator, and Governor of the Universe, the name is 
not an iiidex to qualities such as those of a piece of mat- 
ter — it merely means something of which we, from what 
it has done, or is doing, cannot deny the existence, but of 
which the nature is altogether beyond the grasp of our pow- 
ers, and quite unlike any thing that we can examine by the 
senses. 

Mary. Then while the study of intellectual philosophy 
compels us to believe in the existence of a God, will it not 
also increase our Icnoivledge of that great Being 1 

Dr. Herbert. (6.) Directly, and of itself, it will not ; 
but by destroying the errors of our belief, it will send us to 
the only sources lohere the true knowledge is to be found 
-■ — the works of nature and the volume of inspiration ; and 
sending us there, it will be our tutor in our inquiry ; and, 
if we profit rightly by it, it will not fail in directing us to 
the truth. 

Edward. You have said that the human mind is called 
a spirit, because it is something that we cannot know and 
understand in the same way as we understand matter, and 

41. How far can the existence and the nature of the true God be 

known ? 42. What is meant by the terra spirit, when applied to 

the human mind, or to the Creator ? 43. In what way can the 

Study Qf intellectual philosophy increase Qur J;uQ\\iedge of God I 



Less. 1. intellectual fhilosophy. 25 

that God is called a spirit for the same reason. Now is not 
that saying that there is a great resemblance between the 
human mind and God? or that they are nearly, if not al- 
togetiier, the same ? 

Dr, Herbert. Do you know what sort of people are in 
the moon ? or of what materials houses arc constructed in 
Jupiter ? 

Edward. No, indeed, I cannot know. 

Dr. Herbert. And would you, on that account, conclude 
that the people in the moon are nearly, if not altogether, the 
same with the houses in Jupiter? 

Edieard-, Oh no, father ! certainly not — whatever they 
may be like, they cannot be the same. 

Dr. Herbert, In one respect, they are the same though. 
You are totally ignorant, not only of the nature, but of the 
existence of both, and you might call each of them by the 
name '' unknown,'' might you not ? 

Charles. Yes, father — but we cannot call God, or the hu- 
man mind, by the name ^' unknown ;" else why should you 
direct us to adore the one and study the other ? You never 
bade us reverence the inhabitants of the moon, or study the 
houses in Jupiter. 

Dr. Herbert, That brings us both to the resemblance 
and the difference. In their essence — that is, in their own 
nature, and without reference to the manifestations of 
them that we may have in what they have done, or are doing 
— the Creator and the mind of man are as unknown, and, 
to our present perceptions, as unknowable, as the inhabit- 
ants of the moon, or the houses in Jupiter. Thus far we 
apply the term '^unknown" to them with perfect propriety; 
and thus f\ii it would be needless to bid you adore tlie one, 
or study the other ,* but here the parallel and the equality 
stop. 

Mary. I think, Sir, I can understand it : God, as seen 
in creation, and revealed in the bible, can be known and 
adored. 

44. Since God is a spirit, and the human mind a spirit, must we 
conclude that there is a strong resemblance between the Supreme 
Being and ihe mind of man, or that they are nearly, if not altogether 

the same ? 45. In what respect may the inhabitants of the moon 

and the houses in Jupiter be considered the same t 46. In what 

respect can we apply the term '• unknown" to the Creator and to 

the mind of man? 47. But there is a sense in which God can be 

known and adored — what is it ^ 

3* 



26 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. I. 

Dr, Herbert. You are right, Mary ; and just in the same 
manner may we know the mind, by attending to our own 
feelings and thoughts, and marking the impressions that are 
made upon ourselves or others by the changing circum- 
stances in which we are placed. 

From this study, if we pursue it in the right manner, 
and to the proper extent, we can hardly fail to derive more 
exalted notions of the Creator, and more humble and cor- 
rect ones of ourselves, than we could do by any other 
means. The Almighty created all things ; and by the laws 
that he has implanted in his creatures, he can act through 
all the universe at every moment of time ; while we can 
create nothing, no not so much as a grain of sand ; neither 
can we alter, in the smallest tittle, any one of those laws 
by which the world is governed, and all the successions of 
its beauty and its grandeur kept up. Nay, even in the ex- 
tent of our exertions, and what we consider the very depths 
of our wisdom, we find that the arm of the Everlasting is 
our strength ; and were it not for some provision that he 
has made to sustain us, we could not preserve our lives for 
a single moment. 

3latilda. Then the philosophy of the mind is very much 
the same with religion. 

Dr. Herbert. One part of it is called by the name of 
natural theology, or natural religion. It is certainly the 
most sublime, and, I think, the most beautiful and useful 
of the whole. The greater the height to which we rise, 
the better do we discern the positions of things around 
us ; and when we survey our duties as rational beings, 
from that universe which connects us with our God as 
moral and responsible, we can hardly fail in profiting by 
the association. 

1 will not, however, weary you with many more of the 
uses of the subject upon which we are soon to enter ; but 
still there are a few that 1 can hardly pass over without some 
notice, however slight. 

(7.) A knowledge of the human mind^ of the various feel- 
ingSy and of the jneans by ichich pleasant ones may be 
excited, and painful ones avoided, cannot fail in sicecten- 

48. And by what means can we know the mind ? 49. What 

notions of the Creator and of ourselves shall we derive from the study 

of the mind : 50. Can the philosophy of the mind, and religion 

in any sense, be considered the same ? 51. In the seventh place, 

what advantages may we mention as resulting from the knowledge 
of the human mind ? 



I 



Less. I. intellectual philosophy. 27 

ing the intercourse of persons of the same class ; by ena- 
hling us to avoid all means of giving pain and offence, as 
well as preventing us from taking offence where none is 
intended. Aniong those who are by their circumstances 
exempted from the wants that distress the poor, a very 
large portion of the uneasiness that is felt arises from 
misunderstandings, which could not so much as exist if 
the parties had that knowledge of the feelings of the hu- 
man mind, and that discipline in the management of them, 
which it is one of the objects of intellectual philosophy to 
teach. 

(8.) l^he same knoioledge ivoidd teach us to conduct 
ourselves toith more tenderness and humility — that is, with 
more true dignity — to those ivhom the accidents of life have 
placed in conditions inferior to our oivn. The consideration 
that all men, from the prince to the peasant, have precisely 
the same feelings, and stand in precisely the same relation 
to the Creator of the world, coupled with the knowledge 
that the grand differences of men are mental, and that every 
one individual, if circumstances had drawn him out, would 
have shown as much as any other, can hardly fail to elevate 
as well as to equalize our affections for the whole rational 
family of our common Father. 

(^9.) Another thing. In whatever situation of life ice 
may he called upon to perform our parts in society, and 
discharge those duties which every member of a community 
awes to the other members, we shall fad that a knowledge of 
the human mind icill invariably enable us to perform our 
duty in a mcmner more satisfactory to ourselves, and more 
agreeable to others. Every part of society is full of idols, 
to which the ignorant pay their blind devotion ; and 
wherever such are to be met with, the natural tendency 
of intellectual philosophy is to expose and explode them. 
But no where are those idols more abundant than in poli- 
tics, where the springs of action are in the hands of a 
few, and the great body of the pe(»ple are called upon to 
obey, and to act, without any reascjn being assigned in 
the official mandate, which is enforced by power, and 
not by persuasion. This mode of enforcement is una- 
voidable, as there could not be the means of reading eve- 
ry individual, in an empire containing many millions, a 

52. In t!ie eighth place, what would this knowledge tea'^ h ns ? 

53. What is the ninth advantage mcnliuned? 54. Give a 

summary view of the author's illustration. 



28 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. L 

lecture upon the propriety of every command. But though 
this be unavoidable, it is attended with some evils. The 
majority of the people yield an idolatrous and not a rational 
obedience ; they respect the institution, whatever may hap- 
pen to be the nature of it, for its mere existence, and not 
for any good that their understandings teach them to find 
in it. In consequence^ they do not exercise that watchful- 
ness at all times, and give that warning and advice which 
are essential to the best interests both of the rulers and 
the ruled ; and as their allegiance, while they pay it, is a 
matter of blind idolatry, and not of reason, they are at the 
mercy of every demagogue that may happen to proclaim 
an opposite line of conduct with sufficient boldness and 
noise. A more general diffusion of the knowledge of 
the human mind would remove these evils ; and while it 
would abridge the labour of legislators and governors, 
and render what remained more valuable, it would, at the 
same time, prevent the people from allowing their rights to 
be abridged in times of anarchy, and their minds from be- 
ing influenced and carried away by demagogues in times 
of trouble. 

(10.) The last circumstance that I shall mention to you, 
recommendatory oj the study of this philosophy, is the se- 
curity which the student has over it as a mental inheritance, 
ichich enjoyment cannot squander, and which others cannot 
deprive him of. Of all merely temporal possessions and 
enjoyments, it is the nature that they shall perish vviih the 
using; and in proportion to the abundance of the use, 
the stock wears away : but it is the characteristic of this 
study to increase with the exercise ; and the more that you 
taste of the pleasure of self-knowledge, the more will re- 
main for you still to taste, and the keener will be your ap- 
petite. All mere worldly distinctions are at the mercy of 
many contingencies ; and he who in these matters takes 
what he considers as the most secure path, knows not of the 
pitfalls and hazards with which it may be beset. The 
smothered whisper of the menial of a man high in station, 
may occasion the instant disgrace of the most confidential 
and deserving in his service; and the breaking of one rie^gi- 
ment has sent to death, or exile, or both, the man who, if that 



55. What is the last circumstance mpniioned recommending the 

study of meiitul philosophy ? 5G. Give an outline ol the author's 

illustrations ? 



Less. 2. intellectual philosophy. 29 

regiment had stood firm^ would have been at the very sum- 
mit of empire. Even the study of the material world is 
continnrcnt ; the ort^ans of the senses may fail one by one, 
the sources of knowledge may be all shut up, and the ^lory 
of the heavens, and the beauty of the earth, may be to the 
sad remnant of humanity, as if they were not; but though 
every sense were extinguished, though the book of nature 
were closed, for ever closed, the mind could pursue its 
trains of inward reflection, and amid the desolation rise to 
higher views, as we find that contemplation can be better 
carried on in solitude than in a crowd, in the silence of 
the night than during the bustle and the activity of the 
day. 

In the meantime, my children, farewell. Think of 
what we have been saying ; for remember, that what you 
may be told by me, or by any body else, verbally or from 
a book, is not knowledge till you have made it your own, 
and by arranging it in your mind, understood the whole, 
not only as to what it may contain in itself, but as to the 
future knowledge to which it may lead. We shall soon 
meet again, and be assured that this subject will need all 
our attention. 



LESSON IL 

Divisions of the Subject — Man considered as an individual — as social 
— as moral — and accountable — The mind must be studied in its 
own phenomena, which are all that we know, or can know, re- 
specting it. 

Dr, Herbert. Well, 1 have no doubt that, since we 
had our last conversation, you have been thinking about this 
philosophy or knowledge of the mind — have any of you 
found out how we shall set about it ? 

Recapitulate the advantages resulting ficn the study of intellectual 
philosophy 

57. What is the first advantage ? 58. What is the second ad- 
vantage ? 59. What is the third advantage ? GO. What is 

the fourth advantas^e ? 61. What is the fifth advantag^e ? G2. 

\Vhat is the sixth advantage ? Q'^, What is the seventh advan- 
tage ?— — 64. What is the eighth advantage ? 65. What is the 

ninth advantage .? 66. What is the tenth advantage 1 



30 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 2. 

Mary. Perhaps you will have the kindness to tell us, 
and I am sure we will listen to you. 

Dr. Herbert, I have doubts if that would be the best 
way : In all cases of that kind, there is danger of our learn- 
ing the words and not the meaning. Has any other of you 
any thing to propose ? 

Charles. We may get a book, and read it carefully ; and 
when we meet with any thing that we do not understand, we 
will come to you for an explanation. 

Dr, Herbert. That would not altogether do either, 
Charles : many people are, no doubt, obliged to instruct 
themselves by reading ; but if that about which you wanted 
to be informed were a material thing, say an elephant for 
instance, whether would you prefer, seeing it, or reading a 
description of it ? 

Edward. Of course we would prefer seeing the elephant ; 
at least, I am sure I would. 

Dr. Herbert. Then each of us has got a mind, and we 
have only to study that. 

3Iatilda. But we cannot see it : you told us that we 
could not know any thing about the nature of it, further 
than how it acts. 

Dr. Herbert. And how much more than that could you 
know about the elephant.^ 

Edward. A great deal, surely. An elephant has got a 
great body, thick clumsy legs, long hanging ears, small ugly 
eyes — 

Mary. No, pretty eyes, Edward ; eyes that would make 
a person believe the beast were thinking. 

Edward. *^ Pretty, thinking eyes," then, large tusks, not 
a very pretty mouth, and a trunk with which it could pick 
up a pin or fell an ox ;. then it has got skin, and flesh, and 
blood, and brains, and a stomach. 

Dr. Herbert. IN o doubt it has got all these; and yet 
when you have mentioned them all, you have not told us 
what an elephant is; you have only mentioned the names 
of some of the parts of its body ; and if we said that the 
mind is that which perceives, and remembers, and com- 
pares, and judges, and combines, and associates, and has 
feelings and emotions, such as courage, and pity, and joy, 
and anger, we should give just the same account of It as 
you have given of the elephant ; and yet we have no more 

1. What definition may be given of the mind ? 



Less. 2. intellecj ual phtlosopiiv. 31 

knoulednre of it than wc liad before, thongli we have the 
names which the people who use our hm^^uage liave agreed 
to give to some of its phenomena or appearance?^. 

C/icfrlcs. But we can see and feel all the parts of the el- 
ephant, or we can examine and analyze them as substan- 
ces, and we can make a picture of the animal itself. 

Dr, Herbert. That is all very true, Charles ; but, after 
all, it amounts to nothing more than saying that the ele- 
phant is a physical being, the whole of which, as well as the 
parts of which it is made up, is cognizable by the senses; 
and that the mind is a being vvjiich is not physical, and 
of which, or its parts, the senses can take no cognizance. 

Mar}/. We can say something more about the ele- 
phant; it is the most sagacious, and, when properly trained 
and treated, the most tractable of animals. 

Dr. Herbert. That is coming a little nearer to the right 
view of the matter, iMary ; the mind is still more sagacious 
and more tractable than the elephant. But how do you 
find out the ingenuity and tractability of "the elephant ? Is it 
from his size, his power, or any of those parts of him that 
have been named ? 

Eelward. No ; for when I first saw the picture, with 
the clumsy body, the legs like the stumps of trees, the little 
eyes, and the nose like a great thick rope's end, more like 
a tail than a nose, I thought so great and shapeless a thing 
could hardly have walked, instead of doing all that I have 
since been told and have read about him, and even what T 
saw myself of the one at the menagerie. The trunk an- 
swered all the purposes of a hand, or even of two hands — for 
I have seen him hold a large thing in the coil of it, and take 
up a little one with the thumb and finger at the end ; and 
I shall never forget how he served a countryman who played 
him a trick. It was revenge, no doubt ; but the man had 
no right to teaze a beast that was shut up in a cage and 
made a show of The folks were giving the elephant ap- 
ples and bits of gingerbread, which he took with his trunk, 
and some gave him halfpence, with which he bought cakes 
from a basket-woman. There was one man that held out a 
piece of gingerbread to the elephant, and just as he was to lay 
hold of it, the man hit the trunk a blow, and went to another 

2. But will such a definition give us an adequate knowledge of 
what the mind is ? 3. To what may this definition be equiva- 
lent ? 



32 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 2. 

part of the booth. The elephant looked after him, but con- 
tinued to be as civil to the rest of the people as ever. But 
when, a good while after, the man who had hit him came 
within his reach, he gave him a blow with the trunk, which 
knocked him to the ground, before any one knew what the 
elephant was going to do. Nobody could have found out 
that he would have done that, if they had not seen him 
do it. 

Dr. Herbert, Well, this case of the elephant may teach 
us several things. In the first place, it may teach you, Ed- 
ward, never to offer any insult or wrong, and never to make 
an exhibition of yourself to a stranger of whom you know 
nothing ; and, in the second place, it points out where we 
must seek for knowledge of the mind. The form and ap- 
pearance of the elephant gave you no idea whatever of his 
sagacity ; and thus you see that sagacity or understanding, 
even in an animal, is not to be discovered by any investi- 
gation of its form, its size, or its composition as a material 
substance ; but the human mind is far more sagacious than 
any elephant, and therefore, we should not have been any 
better prepared for the knowledge of it, though we had 
known every thing about it as a material substance, than we 
are now, when we know, and can know, nothing whatever 
about it. We must arrive at the knowledge of that, just as 
we arrive at that of the sagacity of the elephant, or that of 
the disposition of any other animal, by observing it our- 
selves, or by reading or hearing whatever others have ob- 
served of it. 

Charles. Then we may study intellectual philosophy 
from all the history and all the biography that is written ? 

Dr. Herbert. Certainly we may ; and not only from 
these, but from every invention and discovery, whether voice, 
or action, or performance, that have been achieved or per- 
formed by man. They are all the results or effects of the 
states of the mind. So that you see we have more abun- 
dant materials here, than in any other science ; and we have 
our own minds in ^ddition — the study of which is more im- 
portant than all the rest. 

4. If we could know every thing about the mind as a material 
substance, would our knowledge of intellectual philosophy be great- 
er than it now is ? 5. How can we attain any true knowledge of 

the mind ? 6. What are some of the materials to which the stu- 
dent of mental philosophy can have access ? 



Less. 2. intellectual philosophy. 33 

Mary, But arc we not in danger of getting confused in 
the very multitude of our means of information ? If I am 
told the same story by two or three persons, I never under- 
stand it so clearly as when I am told it by one. 

Dr. Herbert. That is not the fault of the story, but of 
the narrators, each of whom takes a different view of it; 
and if you were to read all the accounts ol the human mind 
that have been written by the authors that have treated of 
it, you would probably understand less of it than you do 
now that you have not read a word on the subject. In no 
one branch of study may it more truly be said, that they 
have ** darkened coun-el by words without knowl- 
edge." 

Charles. But if so many men, and they, as you have 
said, men of ability, have gone wrong, how can we hope co 
be right, unless we first know all the blunders that 
they have made, and so be prepared not to fall into any of 
them? 

Dr. Herbert. We do not try to teach men to be good, 
by repeating to them the accounts of all the crimes that oth- 
er men have committed, for we have experience that the 
knowledge of such matters tends more to tempt than to 
teach those who have weak minds ; we rather endeavour to 
impress upon them that it is their interest to be good, and 
to keep them as much in ignorance of vice as possible. Just 
so, in the philosophy of mind, it would not be the very wisest 
or safest course to begin an enumeration of all the errors and 
mistakes, in the multiplicity of which the greater part of a 
lifetime would be wasted, and in the mazes of some of 
which we would be at least in great danger of being lost, if 
we did not take truth with us as our guide. 

Edward. But if, as men, those men have been in error, 
how can we hope to be right t 

Dr. Herbert. By a very easy means — by avoiding what 
has tended more than any thing to set the clever men of 
whom we are speaking WTong. Truth was too simple, too 



7. Is extensive reading on this subject useful in the highest de- 
gree ? 8. But will not the knowledge of the errors of others ena- 
ble us to avoid them ourselves ? 9. What course does experience 

direct us to pursue in teaching men to be good ? 10. And in 

the philosophy of the mind, what would be the consequence, if we 
were not to pursue the same course ? 

4 



34 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS, 2. 

much within the power of the vulgar, to be worthy the con- 
sideration of philosophers. In all that portion of nature, 
whether physical, as relating to the external world, or intel- 
lectual as relating to the mind, there is no mystery, and very 
few things about which the opinion or belief of one man can 
be different from that of another, unless in matters of mere 
feeling and taste ; and thus it should seem, that the philos- 
ophers, in order to have something peculiarly their own, set 
about the making of mysteries. 

Charles. Respecting what, then, are we to inquire so as 
to be certain or as nearly certain as possible, that we are 
in the way of the truth? 

Dr. Herbert, That will depend partly on the subjects 
of our inquiries, and partly on the mode in which those in- 
quiries are carried on. The subject of our inquiry is the 
intellectual part of man, in its states or affections, as they 
are felt by himself or perceived by others, without any ref- 
erence whatever to the abstract nature of that which is af- 
fected — that is, to it as a substance, or as being different from 
the affections themselves. We shall simplify the matter, 
however, if we divide it into parts, corresponding to the dif- 
ferent states or relations in which man as a being may be con- 
sidered to be found. Now, can any of you tell me the sim- 
plest state in which man can be placed ? 

Mary. When he has nobody to please or offend, or 
think of, but only himself — Robinson Crusoe on the 
island. 

Dr. Herbert. Well, Robinson Crusoe on the island, 
and ere yet he had found his man Friday, or even the sava- 
ges, had the same mind as if he had been placed in the 
most active situation in the most bustling city. He had 
not the opportunity of exercising his affections and feel- 
ings ; but you have no doubt that he had the capacity of 
exercising them, and only wanted the proper objects in or- 
der to call them forth. 

Mary. No question that he had. 



11. Is there cause for great difference of opinion in relation to 

physical and intellectual phenomena ? 12. Why then did the 

philosophers of other times affect so much mystery in presenting 

their views to the world ? 13. What should be the subject of our 

inquiry in the study of intellectual philosophy? 14. What is the 

plest state in which man can be placed ^ 



Less. 2. intellectual piiilosophy. 35 

Dr. Herbert, Then the first branch of the philosophy 
of man will be to consider him as an individual, merely as 
he is endowed with certain faculties, and capable of exer- 
cising them. This branch of the subject we may call the 
physiology of the mind, which simply means that it is the 
description or naming of the nature, that is, of the opera- 
tions or phenomena, of the mind, as they are excited by 
external objects, or by the internal operations of the mind 
itself To this branch of the subject it will be necessary to 
attend first, as a right understanding of it is the founda- 
tion of all the others, 

Edward But will not that be very difficult? I can 
understand how we are able to think about that which we 
have handled, or seen, or heard ; but how can we think 
about that of which we have handled, or seen, or heard 
nothing ? 

Dr. Herbert, In the meantime we shall content our- 
selves with believing that we do it; and even you must 
admit the fact, not only when you are awake, but when 
you are asleep. Do you not remember the dream that 
you had about the monster ? Did you handle or see that, 
or did any body tell you of it ? 

Edward. No, but I thought I saw it ; and if I had not 
awakened in the attempt to run from it, I am sure I should 
have thought that I felt it too. 

Dr. Herbert, Well, since you could not only think, 
and be terrified at the operation of your own mind, in a 
dream, but remember that dream after you are awakened, 
will you not admit that other people may think, when they 
are awake, about that of which they have had no informa- 
tion, by touching, seeing, or hearing? 

Edward. But I thought and believed that I actually saw 
the monster. 

Dr. Herbert, So you told us ; and also that it came 
out of a thicket, with bldck leaves, and thorns half a foot 
long, in the midst of a country where you could see nothing 
else but sand ; and that the sun was shining very hot. Now 
all this, you know, could not be in any other way than in 

15. Whatia the first branch of this philosophy? 16. By what 

name may it be called ? 17. What is meant by this term ? 

18. Why is it necessary to direct our attention to this branch of the 

subject at first ? 19. Is it possible to think about that, which we 

have not handled, nor seen, nor heard .'* 20. What fact proves 

that the mind may be occupied on other subjects than those which 
are furnished by the senses ? 



36 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 2. 

your mind ; for it was quite dark, and you were in bed, with 
neither black leaf, thorn, nor monster, to annoy you ; so 
that you yourself have experienced enough to show you, 
that there are thoughts which the mind can entertain, and 
appearances that it believes at the time, and can remember 
and describe afterwards, of which it can have had no cor- 
rect information from without. But w'e shall have occa- 
sion to refer to that afterwards, so let us at present enumer- 
ate the other parts of our subject. Is it necessary to study 
man in any other relation than as a single and solitary in- 
dividual — as Crusoe on the island ? 

3Iatilda. Certainly, for men live in society ; and I dare 
say even Crusoe would not have been alone if he could 
have prevented it. 

JJr. Herbert, Most likely not, and as we wish to live 
in society, and the other members of that society have the 
very same nature as we have, we must ensure their good 
offices by giving them ours : we must respect their feel- 
ings and their property, in order that they may respect 
ours, and in that we must, even though there were no 
such thing as kindness or the desire of doing good in our 
nature, do them all manner of kind offices, upon the 
merely selfish principle of getting them to do us kind offices 
in return. This produces a new set of affections, or states 
of the mind, which could have no existence if man were 
merely an individual. The study of them forms a second 
branch of intellectual philosophy, to which the name of 
ethics, or the philosophy of morals, has been given. The 
word morals means merely our manners, or our conduct, as 
it appears to others; but as others may be either pleased 
or displeased with that conduct, and as, living in society, 
it is our interest that they should be pleased with it, we, 
in common language, often use the word morals, as descrip- 
tive only of that conduct which is agreeable to others. Do 
we staiid in any other relations than these ? 

21. What inference may be justly drawn from the incidents of 
the dream, to which the author refers ? 22. In what other re- 
lation than as a single and solitary individual can we study man ? 

— 23. How can we obtain the good offices, the protection, and 

respect of others ^ 24. If we were destitute of kindness, on 

what principle should we be obliged to do £ood to others .' 

25. Could the affection, resulting from this relation, exist in man, 

if he were merely an individual } 26. What name is applied to 

this second branch of intellectual philosophy ? 27. What does the 

word *' morals " mean .? 28. How do we in common language 

often use this term ^ 



Less. 2. intellectual philosophy. 37 

Charles. Yes, we owe duties to the country of which 
we are inhabitants, and the public have a claim on us to 
assist in maintaining those laws and regulations by which 
our persons and our property are protected. 

Dr. Herbert, And we owe many other duties to our 
country than these. It is our duty to promote, as far as 
we can, every thing that can increase the happiness and 
enjoyment of the people among whom we live ; and to 
lessen, as far as may be in our power, the errors, whether 
they arise from ignorance, injudicious laws and restric- 
tions, or the tyranny of individuals, or any thing else that 
retards their improvement. While we are doing these 
things, we are at the same time forwarding the cause of 
morality ; because there is nothing which tends so much to 
rouse and keep alive the anger, the revenge, and the other 
bad passions of men, as subjecting them to hardships and 
privations of which they cannot see the reason or admit 
the justice. This branch of the subject is usually called 
politics^ or the philosophy of the many, or of the nation; 
and though some are of opinion that it is chiefly valuable 
to statesmen who make laws, and rulers who put them in 
execution, yet that man must be very insignificant indeed 
who can perform his part in society without some knowledge 
of it. 

Matilda. You mentioned before, that religion formed 
one of the branches of intellectual philosophy. 

Dr. Herbert. So it does, Matilda, and not of intel- 
lectual [)hilosophy only, but of the whole philosophy of 
nature. There is not a star in the sky, a leaf in the grove, 
or an insect in the sunbeam, that does not, when contem- 
plated in the spirit of true philosophy, reveal the existence, 
and proclaim the wisdom and the power of its Maker. 
And, of coarse, as the human mind is the highest subject 
— the subject most nearly approaching to God-head, though 
the difference be to us immeasurable in kind — which we 
meet with in the study of creation ; the existence of a 

29. What other duties do we owe our country beside that of main- 
taining its laws ? 30. While we are discharging these duties, in 

what sense are we advancing the cause of morality ? 31. What 

is this branch of intellectual philosophy called .'' 32. Should this 

study be confined to any particular class in society .'' 33. What 

does the natural world, when contemplated in the spirit of true phi- 
losophy, reveal to us ? 34. What effect will the study of the 

human mind have on this evidence f 

4* 



38 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 2. 

Creator is more evidently perceived, and his attributes 
more clearly made out, when we are studying the human 
mind, than when we are studying any thing else. The 
religion which forms part of intellectual philosophy, or 
rather which arises from the contemplation of that science, 
at every step we take in it, is not our holy religion — the 
system of Christianity, as predicted in the scriptures of the 
Old Testament, and fulfilled in those of the New. It is 
not the religion of man as a sinner, standing in need of sal- 
vation through our blessed Lord ; neither is it exactly the 
religion of man as a moral creature, accouriiable in a future 
^tate for his conduct in this ; for of the mysteries of the 
Christian faith, or of the nature of a future state, either of 
reward or of punishment, we can know nothing by the light 
of the clearest philosophy, and we must, therefore, have 
remained for ever ignorant of them, if it had not pleased 
God to reveal them directly in his word. The religion 
which arises in the progress of the philosophy of mind is 
the religion of adoration, — of a creature who, while he is 
finding indubitable proof of his own mental immortality, 
cannot withhold ins admiration and his love from that 
Almighty Being, felt, yet uncomprehended, who reared the 
mighty fabric of the universe, and endowed man with pow- 
ers capable of the contemplation of it. This is natural re- 
ligion, or natural tlicGlogy ; the belief of which to a well- 
informed and properly constituted mind, is as irresistible, 
and depends ps little upon opinion or reasoning, as the be- 
lief of man in his own existence, or in that of the material 
world around him. To a certain extent, this religion ac- 
companies the study of the whole of nature; and though 
there have been some svho have professed to doubt or even 
to deny it, it seems doubtful if ever tljere was a man, not 
laborino' under some mental delusion (tor the delusions of 
mistaken philosophy are as wild and unaccountable as those 
of the maniac on his bed of straw;) who seriously doubted 
that along with the creation there must he a Creator. 

35. Is the religion, which arises fi-om the contemplation of the 
natural world, or the study of the mind, the relij^^ion of the Bible .? 
— -36. Since philosophy cannot teach us the mysteries of the chris- 
tian laith or the nature of a future state, on what must we wholly 

depend for instruction ? 37. What is the religion which arises 

in the progress of mental philosophy ? 38. By what term is it 

distinguished ? 39. Is the belief of it dependent on opinion or 

reasoning.^ 40. Can a well educated person of a sound mind 

doubt the existence of a Creator ? 



Less. 2. intellectual piiilosopiiy. 39 

Charles, A subject so extensive, and at tlie same time 
so difficult, must occupy us a great while. 

Dr. Jhrbtri. Not so long as you imagine ; for if we 
can uiiderstand the great outline, our minds will have de- 
rived so much strength and dexterity from that, that we 
shall be able to prosecute the details by ourselves ; and 
ethics, politics, and natural religion, aic little else than ap- 
plications of the physiology of the mind. 

Edward. I cannot see how we are to begin. When I 
am thinking myself, I have not one self to think, and 
another to observe how I think ; anci as for other people, 
I cannot tell what they think, or even that they think at all, 
if they do not tell me, and then I cannot be sure that they 
lell me the truth. 

Dr. Herbert. We must begin, in the same way that 
we begin the study of any thing or object in nature, by ex- 
amining its ap}>earances^ and classing those that have 
points of resemblance, so as to lessen as much as possible 
the number of words with which we have to burden our 
memory; then as to the supposed difficulty of our not hav- 
ing one self (or mind) to think, and another to observe 
iiow we think, we are just in the same condition with re^^ 
gard to the mind itself, as we are with regard to other 
tilings. When we see a rainbow^, we have not one percep- 
tion by which we discern it, and another by which we de- 
cide whether it is a rainbow or not; when we hear the 
sound of any particular instrument, as of an organ, we have 
not one perception by which we hear the sound, and 
another by which we decide that it is the sound of an or- 
gan ; wlien we touch a smooth surface, we have not one 
perce{)tion by wliich we know that we are touching a sur- 
fico, and another by which \re determine that that surface 
is smooth : when we smell any perfume, as that of a rose, 
we l)ave not one perception to tell us that we are smelling 
a perfun^e, and another to decide that it is the peifume of 
a rose; and wiien we taste fruit, as a j)lum or a peach, we 
have not one perception by wiiich we know that we are 

4]. Wliat does t!ic aatlior consider htlle else ttian applications of 

the physiology of the mind? 42. How iimst we begin the study 

of the human mind r 43. Is the difficulty, that we have not one 

facuhy for thinking-, and another for observing or recordiny- our 

thougtits, any greater in mental philosophy than in natural ? AA. 

With what particular instances has the author illustrated his posi- 
tion ? 



40 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 2. 

lasting, and another by which we find out that the sub- 
stance tasted is a particular kind of fruit. In all these 
cases, and in every case, in which we can have a 
knowledge of any one quality of a material substance, as 
discoverable by the senses, there is but one perception, 
that of the quality, and it is instantaneous and indivisi- 
ble. 

Edioard. But I may perceive the taste, or any other 
qaality, whatever it may be, and yet be ignorant of the 
thing of which it is a quality. The first time that I tasted 
a pine-apple, I knew that it was a nice taste ; but I did 
not know what taste it was, as I then knew nothing about 
a pine-app!e. 

Dr, Herbert, But you found out afterwards that it was 
a pine-apple that you had tasted. 

Edward, Yes, after I was told, saw it growing, and 
heard all about it. 

Dr, Herbert, And if they had told you the fruit was 
a mango, or a guava, or anything that you had not before 
seen and tasted, would you have been satii^fied with that, or 
would you have still waited, ignorant of what it was, till 
some one told you it was a pine-apple ? 

Edward, As I would have had no right to believe that 
they w ere imposing upon me, I should have taken whatever 
name they gave it. 

Charlies. Then, as far as the taste was concerned, Ed- 
ward did not get any information ; he only got a name for 
that which he knew before. 

Dr, Herbert, Yes ; and without showing you or telling 
you some other property of the fruit, which shall occasion 
a new sensation or impression, different from that of taste, 
a name is all that anybody could give you. One of the 
greatest dangers that people run, in their attempts to acquire 
information, especially on subjects that are difficult, is im- 
agining that they have gained knowledge when they have 
only got names. You remember the history in the begin- 
ning of the book of Genesis. What were the creatures sent 
to Adam for ? 

45. When we have a knowledge of any quality, what remark is 

made in regaid to the perception of it? 46. As far as taste is 

concerned, was there any real information communicated to the per- 
son, when he was told that it was a pine-apple of which he had tast- 
ed ? 47. What is one of the greatest dangers, to which we are 

exposed in acquiring information ? 



Less. 2. intellectual piiisosophy. 41 

Mary. That he might give each of them a name ; and 
whatever he called each of them, was its name. 

Dr, Herbert. And I suppose Adam would pay particu- 
lar attention to what they were like, before he named them, 
in order that he might know them by their names when 
he met them again. 

31atilda. If he had not done that, the names would have 
been of no use. 

Edward. But the names would have been of no use to 
Adam if he had remained alone, as he was at the time when 
tlie names were given, because he must have known a lion 
from a bear, just as well before he gave them their names 
as after ; and it would have made no difference though he 
had at first called the lion a bear, and the bear a lion ; 
tJiough after there were more people, the names would en- 
able them to communicate to each other anything more that 
they might have found out about the animals ; and after the 
names had been first applied, it would have been improper 
to change them, because it would have given everybody the 
trouble of learning them a second time. 

Dr. Herbert. Then do you not perceive that names (or, 
which is the same thing, language) are of no use in procur- 
ing original information about anything that exists, though 
they enable one person to communicate what he knows to 
others ? Before we can add any fact to the stock of infor- 
mation, we must observe some new quality or appearance. 

Edward. When I say that '* book" is a ** noun," do I 
not give some kind of explanation of it? 

Dr. Hei'bert. You give it the name that grammarians 
give it in their arranging of words into classes : and, in the 
same manner, if you were to call your pine-apple a brome' 
lia^ you would give it the name which botanists use in 
their classification ; but, instead of communicating any in- 
formation, you would make the matter more dark and 
vague, by the use of a name of a much more extensive sig- 

48. Under what circumstance^ would it have been useless for 
Adam to have given names to the creatures, which were presented 

to liim for this purpose ? 49. At the first najning of the animals, 

might not any other name have answered the same purpose as the 

one actually given ? 50. Why then would it have been improper 

for him to change the names afterwards? 51. ]f language is of 

no use in procuring original information, of what use is it ? 

52. What must we observe, before we can add ?\ny fact to our stock 

of information ? 53. Do general names usually communicate 

definite ideas .'' 



42 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 2, 

'nification, which would be applicable to many substances, 
some of them very unlike that which you meant. You 
know the meaning of the word '* phenomenon," do you not ? 

Charles, Yes ; it is the general name for an appearance 
— any new subject, or any new aspect of a subject, that is 
apparent to the sight. 

Dr, Herbert, You know what an eclipse of the sun is ? 

Edward, It is the obscuration of the whole or a part of 
the disc or face of the sun, occasioned by the moon com- 
ing between the sun and the inhabitants of the place where 
the eclipse is visible. 

Dr. Herbert, And would you think that you had suffi- 
ciently explained to an ignorant person what an eclipse of 
the sun was, if you told him it was a phenomenon ? 

Edward. Certainly not. 

Dr. Herbert. There have been those, however, who 
have been satisfied to give and also to receive such an ex- 
planation, without any blame on the part of the latter, as 
the ignorant are to be pitied and not blamed for any impos- 
ture that is imposed upon them. I shall mention a case 
to you, on the truth of which you can depend ; and I men- 
tion it to you, not so much for the sake of telling you a 
Btory (though, as I shall have to make better use of you by 
and by, you must grant that, by way of relaxation,) as of 
fixing in your minds the necessity of not being imposed 
upon by a mere name when you are in search of infor- 
mation. 

In a country town, (I think it was in Scotland, between 
the estuaries of the Forth and Tay,) where the people did 
not use to be very remarkable for their wisdom, there was 
a teacher of Latin, who was a man of some note in his 
way ; but as his profession was words, and as he devoted 
himself closely to it, he had a name more at hand than 
an explanation. Owing to cloudy weather, or some other 
cause, there had not been an eclipse of the sun visible for 
some time, and the people had either never had any knowl- 
edge of one, or they had forgotten it all. One fine sum- 
mer morning, when the people were crowded in the mar- 
ket-place, some one looked up at the sun, and observed a 

54. What is the meaning of the word phenomenon ? 55. But 

would this word sufficiently explain the nature of an eclipse, or any 

other occurrence in the natural world ? 56. For what purpose 

does the author relate the story of the Latin schoolmaster ?^^57, Give 
aa outline of the story, 



Less. 2. intellectual philosophy. 43 

notch in its eastern limb, as if a piece had been broken 
out. One pointed it out to another, till in brief space, 
the marketing was at a stand, and all the folk were gaz- 
ing at the sun. The notch increased, till the dark portion 
approached the centre of the disc, and the light became 
fainter, and was tinged with red. They were alarmed ; 
some spoke of one dreadful catastrophe, and some of 
another ; but the general belief was, that the end of the 
world was come. They began to run about in the greatest 
consternation, as none could inform the rest what was the 
matter. At last the schoolmaster came from his class- 
room, moving with great solemnity, and proceeded through 
the crowd. He found them all in consternation and up- 
roar. ** What is the matter," said he, ** are the people mad?*' 
One seized him by the arm, and pointed to the sun, 
** Nonsense," said the schoolmaster, '* it is a phenomenon ; 
you need not be in the least alarmed, for you may rely 
upon my word that it is nothing but a phenomenon." 
With that, the expounder of nature went his way ; and 
the folk renewed their avocations, consoling one another, 
and quite satisfied that it was — nothing hut a 'phenomenon, 
Edward. What a set of stupids they must have been. 
Dr, Herbert. There was no fault in them, Edward. 
You would have acted in the same way yourself, if any per- 
son, for whose opinion you had respect, had given you a 
word of which you did not know the meaning, as the name 
of an appearance which you did not understand. 

Matilda. But, father, we could not do without words ; 
there are so many things which it is desirable to know, 
that we could not have any knowledge of the hundreth part 
of them, if they were not described to us in words. 

Dr. Herbert. So far from wishing to undervalue lan- 
guage in your estimation, I am anxious only to impress you 
with a proper sense of its value. If it were not for lan- 
guage, our information would be limited indeed. Beyond 
the limits of our personal experience, we should know 
nothing of the present, which is the theatre of our acting 
and enjoying ; we should know very little of the past, 
which is the school of our instruction ; and the little that 
we should know of the latter, would be vague and uncer- 
tain, as we could obtain it only by older persons pointing 

58. What would be the state of our information were it not for 
I language ? 



44 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 2. 

to things present by signs. Nay, even without written 
language our information would be very vague, because 
facts could be handed down only by tradition ; and as it 
is exceedingly difficult for two persons, even though they 
have both been witnesses of it, to give the same account 
of the same occurrence, you can easily perceive that 
it must be next to impossible for a tradition to come 
down through a succession of ages, without having a great 
deal of fancy and falsehood mixed with it, even although 
there were on the part of the narrators not the least de- 
sire to alter that which had been communicated to them. 
But while we thus set upon language its proper value 
(and, next to thought itself, without which there could 
be no language, it is the best gift of our bountiful Creator,) 
we must be careful not to use it in the place of that, 
the place of which it cannot supply. '* Words,'' says a 
very acute philosopher, *^ are the counters of wise men, 
but they are the money of fools." Now, when we wish to 
have the coin of information, we must be very careful that 
we neither ourselves pay, nor suffer ourselves to be paid, 
in counters. 

Edward. Cannot we get the explanations of words in the 
dictionary ? 

Dr. Herbert. Not with the precision, or to the extent, 
necessary for the purposes of science, especially of such 
a science as that of the human mind. What the diction- 
ary gives us, is but very little different from that which I 
am cautioning you against.* Instead of an explanation — 
an enumeration of the qualities of the object of which 
the word is the general name — it gives us generally what 
is called a synonyme, or word having the same meaning ; 
but as there could not be two words of exactly the same 
meaning, without one of them being useless, the diction- 
ary puts us wrong, in as far as the explaining word dif- 
fers from the word which it purports to explain ; and in 



^Webster's quarto Dictionary may be considered an excep- 
tion to this general assertion. 

59. Is it usual for two persons to give precisely the same account 

of an occurrence, which they have both witnessed ? 60. For 

what are we in danger of using words as a substitute ? 61. What 

is the philosopher's remark ? 62. Are the explanations of a dic- 
tionary always satisfactory, and sufficiently definite ? 63. What 

ought it to give us ? But what does it generally give us ? • 

64. Are there many words of precisely the same meaning ? 



Less. 2. intellectual philosophy. 45 

as far as they agree, we get no additional information, un- 
less the thing used in explanation be better known to us in 
its nature and appearances than the thing that it is meant to 
explain. 

C/iarlcs, Then how can we get any information at all ? 

Dr. Herbert. There is nothing more easy, or more 
pleasant, if we would go the right way about it. We 
have powers of observation and reflection, and the world 
is around us as a subject upon which to exercise them — 
a subject which the longest and most studious life cannot 
exhaust. Indeed we are in danger of despising the knowl- 
edge of things, which is the only true knowledge, just 
because it is simple and open to every body; and we 
follow the false knowledge of words, because there is a 
depth and mystery about it, that we are unable to fathom 
and understand. 

Mary, I suppose Pope alludes to that when he says — 

^* True no-meaning puzzles more than wit." 

Dr. Herbert, Precisely so. Where there is nothing 
to be found, we may search long enough before we find 
anything ; and this is the cause of all the errors and dis- 
putes about which men have spoken and written so much, 
upon all subjects, and upon none more than that of the mind. 
On every point there is but one truth ; but there is all the 
world beside in which to plant falsehood : and of everything 
there is but one knowledge, though there be many ways of 
being ignorant ot it. 

Edicard. But the difficulty is, to find the one among the 
many. 

Dr. Herbert. There is no difficulty in the matter. The 
right is always much more easily found than the wrong, and 
the road to it is always the shortest. 

Edward. Then a right line is the shortest distance be- 
tween two points in philosophy, as well as in geometry. 

65. When may a synonyme give additional information ? - 

QQ. If the study of words be in a great measure useless, how shall 

we employ our powers ? 67. Why are we in danger of despising 

true knowledge? 68. And why are we captivated with false 

knowledge ? 69. What is the great source of all the errors and 

disputes of learned men ? 70. Why is there so much more false- 
hood and ignorance on subjects, than truth and knowledge ? 

71. Is the inquiry after truth or right attended with difficulty ^ 

5 



46 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 3. 

Dr. Herbert. You are correct ; and that is the very 
property of that which they stand for, which makes us ap- 
ply inglit and wrong in the sense we do. Right is straight 
— the shortest distance to whatever we niay be in pursuit 
of; and wrongs wrenched or twisted, is any longer way to 
it, and always the longer the more that it is wrong. You 
can now tell me, I dare say, how we are to obtain a knowl- 
edge of anything ? 

Mary. We must go straight to that thing itself. 

Dr. Herbert. That is exactly the way, and it is the 
only way — simple enough, we think, after we have found 
it ; and yet it is not more than two hundred years since 
philosophers would take it, on any subject; nor nearly so 
much since they would take it in the philosophy of the mind ; 
though those upon whom they bestowed the names of the 
illiterate, the ignorant, and the vulgar, had taken it from 
the beginning, in the common business of life ; and they 
had the example of the beasts to teach them. 

Edward. It may then be said, that while they who 
thought themselves wise were playing with counters, those 
whom they called fools were circulating the coin. 

Dr. Herbert. Well, let us take any substance — we need 
not name it, as any one will do — and consider what we can 
know about it. 

Charles. We can know what it is, and what is the use 
of it. That is all that I can find out. 

Edicard. We can know where it came from. 

Dr. Herbert. That is no part of the knowledge of the 
thing itself; are you different when you come out of bed, 
and out of the garden ? 

Edward. I feel differently. 

Dr. Herbert. That is another matter, and belongs not 
to the general knowledge of you, as Edward Herbert, which 
would still be a matter that could be inquired into, though 
you had never been in a bed or a garden. 

Matilda. But we could know its history. 

Dr. Herbert. That is only an enumeration of its 
uses ; and your brother's statement, though not given in 
the usual language of philosophers, is yet all that sound 

72. What explanation does the author give of the words ^' right" 
and ^' wrong" ?- 73. How long is it since philosophers have pur- 
sued knowledge in a rational manner? 74. What is all, that we 

can know about any substance ? 



Less, 2. intellectual piiiLosoniY. 47 

philosophy requires. If we knew what every thin^r was, 
and what were the uses of it, we shouhl have all the in- 
formation, not only that we could desire, but that we 
could possibly obtain; and, therefore, all our inquiries, 
whether relative to external nature or to the mind, must 
be confined to th<3 two branches, the proper conducting 
of which will, therefore, comprise the whole of our phi- 
losophy. 

Edward. But will that apply to events that happen as 
well as to things that are — to the felling of a tree, or to its 
being broken by the wind (as the great mulberry-tree was,) 
as well as to the tree itself? 

Dr. Herbert. Yes, with this difference only, that events 
which happen — can only be observed and known — from 
the things by and to which they happen; while things that 
exist could be known in their existence and their uses, 
though nothing but themselves existed. There is one 
other short question, to which 1 should like to obtain an 
answer, before I proceed to explain to you the language 
into which philosophers put the inquiry about which w^e 
have been speaking, and the manner of conducting that 
inquiry. The question which 1 wish you to answer, and 
to which I beg you will pay particular attention, is this : 
can there be any new use of anything without some change 
in the thing itself, in its ov*'ner or possessor, or in its place 
among other things ? 

Matilda. That is a very simple question, father ; the 
cook cannot use a saucepan, or the gardener a spade, with- 
out moving it from one place to another ; and I cannot 
use so much as a needle or a pin, without taking it out of 
the cushion with my fingers, and putting it in something 
else. 

Edward. And many things are changed altogether when 
they are used ; as coals, when used for the fire, and food 
when we eat it. 

Charles. Yes ; and things which are not immediately 
changed or dissolved are always worn by use, as clothes, 
pens, books, and every thing that can be used. 

75. What may be said, to comprise all the philosophy of external 

nature and of the mind? 76. How may events which happen, 

and also things which exist, be known ? 77. Can there be any 

new use of any thin^ without some change in the thing itself, in its 

owner, or in its place amonj; other things t 78. Give an instance 

in illustration of this answer. 



48 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 2. 

Dr, Herbert. I agree with you that the question is a 
very simple one — so simple that we seldom think of putting 
it, and never need to dictate an answer, even to the most 
ignorant person to whom it can be put ; and yet want of 
attention to this simple question has been the cause of a 
great deal of error. 

The uses of things are the changes of things — though we, 
in our ordinary language, apply the word *' use" to such 
changes or applications of things as are gratifying to our 
perceptions or feelings; and thus it will be more general, 
and, therefore, more philosophical, to say that the whole of 
our inquiries after knowledge must be directed, either to 
things, or to the changes of things. 

Edward. But are not these, in many cases, the same ? 
We may know the use, or change, from the thing itself If 
I see a sharp knife, I do not need any body to tell me that 
I can cut a stick with it. 

Dr. Herbert. If I were to place before you two objects, 
neither of which you had either seen or heard of, could you 
tell me that the one could, or could not cut the other ? and 
if they did, which one would be cut, and which one would 
be the cutter ? 

Edward. Yes, if-— 

Dr. Herbert. We must have no '*if,'' Edward; the 
whole knowledge of the cutting is confined to a single point; 
and thus, if we were to grant you any thing, we should 
grant you all. But let us put the question in a more general 
form ; could you know that of which you were at the same 
time altogether ignorant? 

Edward. 1 do not think you can wish me to answer 
that — 1 could not possibly know, and not know, the very 
same thing at the same time. 

Dr. Herbert. I did not wish you to answer me ; I only 
wished to put the matter in so clear a light that you could 
have no doubt of its truth, and to impress upon you the 
great importance of thinking rightly, and making a right 
use of language, in all philosophical inquiries, and more 
especially in those parts of them that appear so simple, that 

79. How does the author define the word "• use ?" 80. How 

do we apply the word in common language? 81. What is the 

most philosophical expression in relation to our inquiries after 

knowledge ? 82. For what purpose was the question proposed, 

" whether a person can know that, of which he is ignorant V 



Less. ^. intellectual philosophy. 4^ 

we are not generally in the habit of thinking about them 
at all. 

Charles. But we have not yet made any progress in 
the study of intellectual philosophy. In the other sciences, 
we came to definitions, and axioms, and propositions, al- 
most the first evening; and here, nearly a second one is 
gone. 

Dr. Herbert, We shall not do our work the worse, or be 
the longer in doing it, for knowing what it is before we 
begin. We have found out where we must seek, and what 
we must seek, and we are in progress with how we are to 
seek it ; and I do not think we should have saved any time 
by the omission of any of these. 

Mary. Yes, we are to seek the appearances of things in 
the things themselves. 

Dr. Herbert, That is it precisely. The phenomena, or 
appearances, of things, are all that we can know. 

Charles, In hooks, as well as in conversation, I have often 
read or heard of the idea of a thing, and F never could ex- 
actly know what that is. 

Dr. Herbert, That is a word which has produced 
many errors, and given rise to many disputes. The old 
opinion^ when philosophers would take the crooked road 
instead of the straight one, icas^ that besides the mind, 
which perceived or thought, and the thing or event which 
it perceived or thought about, there was in every case a 
7nysterious image or impression^ like the figure that a seal 
makes upon the wax, which is neither the wax nor the 
seal. 

3[anj. But the impression is only the stale of the wax, 
after the seal has been impressed on it, the wax being at 
the time in a fit state for receiving the impression. 

Dr, Herbert, Just so is an idea the state of the mind, 
produced by any seal of knowledge that may be impressed 
upon it, the mind being then in a fit state for receiving 
the impression. An idea is neither more nor less than 
the knowledge that we hive of any thing. A correct idea 
means correct knowledge ; an imperfect idea, knowledge 
only to a certain extent ; and a vague idea, knowledge, 

83. In mental philosophy, where must be the field of our research ? 

84. Wliat must we seek for ? 85. What was the old opinion 

respecting the word ''idea?" 86. But what does this word 

mean ? 87. What is meant by the expressions '' correct idea," 

*• imperfect idea," and " vajrrue idea " ? 

5* 



50 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 2. 

of the accuracy of which we are not ahogether convinced. 
This is rather an interpolation ; but it will do good rather 
than harm. Idea is a short word ; it is in general use; 
and if we always bear in mind that it merely means knowl- 
edge, we can use it without impropriety. Where were 
we when the idea came to visit us ] I hope it will be no 
stranger. 

Mary. *' The phenomena, or appearances, of things, are 
all that we can know.^' 

Dr. Herbert. Yes. But these phenomena give rise to 
two modes of inquiry, which are different in the case of 
the material universe, and more so in that of the mind, — 
or, rather, as applied to that, the one of them is wanting, 
or is at least only an inference from the other. We can 
know the material universe, or any part of it, in these two 
ways — 

1. As it exists in space only. 

2. As it exists in space, and during some portion or suc- 
cession of time. 

In each of these respects, the knowledge that we obtain 
may be different. As it exists in space, we may speak of a 
body, as a whole ; mention it as one substance ; and then, 
its form, its colour, its weight, its consie^tency, and those 
other properties of it which we are accustomed to call me- 
chanical, and which are immediately perceptible by the 
senses^ without any refeience to decomposition, will be 
the greater part of the knowledge that we can acquire. 
This is the common notion that mankind have of material 
substances, as distinguished from each other. Thus, a 
countryman distinguishes a f^int from other stones, by its 
colour, its consistency, and the peculiar form of the fracture 
when broken. 

But we may also regard the individual substance, not as 
one uniform mass^ but as a compound made up of certain 
parts differing in their natures from each other, and yet ex- 

88. To what two modes of inquiry do the appearances of things 

give rise ? 89. What may be said of the knowledge, which we 

obtain in each of these modes of inquiry? 90. How may we 

speak of a body, as it exists in space ? 91. What are the proper- 
ties of a body, which are immediately perceptible to the senses, and 

which constitute a greater part of our knowledge of it ? 92. What 

is the common notion, which mankindhave, of material substances } 

93. Give the example. 94. But in what other manner may 

we regard an individual substance } 



Less. 2. intellectual philosophy. 61 

isting in tlie smallest portion of the substance that we can 
recognize by the senses. Thus a piece of coloured glass, 
which to the senses appears not only of uniform consistency, 
but one substance, or is, as we say, homogeneous, is really 
made up ot these substances, blended together, viz. — 
silicious earth, or Hint, an alkali, and a metalic oxide — the 
two former composing the body or substance of the glass, 
and the last one giving it the colour. 

Cfiarks. Before the process of chemical analysis was 
brought to perfection, many substances were considered as 
simple, which ha\e been found to be compounded of parts. 
The ancients had no idea that air and water were com- 
pounds ; and they would have been astonished if they had 
been told that the light of the sun contained, besides its 
heating and chemical parts, and separable from them, all 
tlie colours that can be imagined to exist^ and that it is the 
pencil with which all nature is painted. 

Dr. Herbert. Those discoveries are so many further 
proofs of the advantages of examining things themselves, 
and not amusing ourselves with verbal speculations about 
them. While the ancients were ignorant of the composition 
of water and atmospheric air, they were engaged in specu- 
lating, how all the different substances were made up of the 
four elements. 

Edward. It is singular that they did not find out the 
colours in light, there were rainbows then as well as now, 
and as they had glass and crystal, the angular pieces of 
these must have reflected different colours when they were 
differently exposed to the light. 

Dr. Herbert. And though apples must have fallen to 
the ground in the days of Ptolemy as well as in those of 
Newton, tliat fact did not lead to the discovery of the law 
of gravitation till tlie lime of the latter. The truth is, that 
there is no property of matter or of mind, and no law of the 
material universe, or of thought, that was not in itself as 
open to the knowledge of man in the early ages of the world 
as it is now. The most profound inquirer that ever lived, 
never invented one quality of matter, or one law of the suc- 
cession of phenomena. 

95. Illustrate this by the example of the piece of coloured glass. 

90. Of what do the discoveries, resulting from the process of 

chemical analysis, furnish f)roofs ? 97. Were the laws of the 

material universe and of thought in themselves, as open to the 
knowledge of man, in the early ages, as they now are .^ 



52 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 2. 

Charles, Why is it, then, that the moderns have made 
so many, and such rapid advances, in the knovi'ledge of 
matter '! 

Dr, Herbert. By limitijig invention and discovery to 
then proper objects ; inventing apparatus and methods of 
making discoveries; and observing the succession of events 
in nature, and the results of experiments ; — in consenting 
to be students before they become teachers. 

Edward. Then the knowledge that we can acquire of 
substances, as they exist in space, is made up of what we 
were on a former occasion taught to call their mechanical 
and their chemical properties? 

Charles. And the mechanical properties are those which 
belong to the substance in itself as a whole, and as not al- 
tered or decomposed by-other sustances, nor as altering or 
decomposing them ? 

Dr. Hcrhert. The line of distinction cannot be drawn 
with precision ; but in the average of cas^s, you are right. 
As in glass, the smoothness, the brittleness, the transparen- 
cy, the hardness, the power of reflecting light, and every 
thing else that we can find out about it, without in any way 
altering its appearance and nature, are mechanical proper- 
ties ; and its being composed of certain ingredients, these 
being separated by the action of fluoric acid ; and its melt- 
ing at a certain degree of heat, and crystallizing internally 
so as to be very brittle when rapidly cooled, are chemical 
properties. 

Matilda. The mechanical properties of an oak enable 
us to make a house of it; and the chemical properties ena- 
ble us to make a bonfire ; but the oak must grow before 
we can do either. We must make an oak of an acorn ; — 
whether is that mechanical or chemical ? 

Dr. Herbert. In tiie sense in wliich we commonly use 
the words, it is neitiier ; but as it consists of a change in 
the substances which the oak selects as food, from their 
own nature to the nature of oak, it is more allied to 
chemistry. 

98. Why then have such rapid advances been made in modem 

times ? 99. What are the mechanical properties of a bodj ? 

100. Where may the line of distinction, between mechanical and 
chemical properties, be drawn in the example given for illustra- 
tion ? 101. Is the p^rowing of an oak from the acorn, either a 

mechanical, or chemical process .'' 



Less. 2. intellectual piiiLosoriiv. 53 

Edward. But 1 can easily find out, that a beam of oak 
can support a weight, or a billet of oak burn in a fire ; but 
I should never be able to discover that an acorn — a little 
thing in a shell — could become like the great tree on the 
lawn. 

Dr. Herbert. And yet it has been discovered, Edward ; 
and the discovery was, no doubt, made before the first pro- 
fessional philosopher was born. But how could you find out 
that a beam of oak would support a weight, or a billet of 
oak burn in the fire ? 

Edward. Other woods bear weight, and can be burned. 

Dr. Herbert. And do not other seeds and nuts besides 
acorns grow up into trees ? 

Mary. I think if we had not seen it, or been told of it 
by somebody, we could not have known more of the one than 
of the other. 

Dr. Herbert, You are right, Mary, and the party who 
told us must either have observed the fact, or been told of 
it ; so that, let the information be hacknied through as many 
persons as we choose, we must come to the observer at 
last ; and, therefore, the shortest way is to go to him at 
once. 

Charles. The beam supporting the weight, the fire burn- 
ing the billet, and the acorn producing the oak, are not 
the substances, as existing in space merely, but as existing 
in time. 

Dr. Herbert. Certainly. These and all such cases are 
the second branch of our knowledge ; and when we have 
exhausted both, we can know no more. The nature and 
composition of all the substances that exist at any one in- 
stant of time, considering each in itself, and without refer- 
ence to any of the others; and the knowledge of all the 
changes in which they or any part of them have been en- 
gaged ; form all that we can know. Thus, when we have 
examined all the mechanical, and chemical, and vegetative 
properties of the acorn; and when we have traced all the 
matter of which it is made up through all the changes and 

102. How can we ascertain, that a beam of wood will bear a 
weight; that a billet of wood will burn; or that an acorn will be- 
come an oak ? 103. But does the observation of these properties 

belong to the first or the second mode of inquiry ? 104. What is 

the second mode of inquiry ? 105- Can any thing more be known 

about a substance, than what is comprehended in the two njodes of 
inquiry already mentioned ? 



54 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 2. 

combinations into which it has entered (and you have seen 
that we have no means of getting at any, even the simplest, 
of them, but by observing it), there is nothing further that 
we can find out respecting it. 

Edward. Cannot we find out the cause why the acorn 
grows, why the beam is strong, or the billet inflammable? 

Dr, Herbert. That is what mankind lost so much time 
in seeking, and whai they always failed in finding. They 
failed, simply because there was nothing to find. As far 
as we can observe the qualities of substances, as they exist 
in themselves, or the changes that they undergo, when 
we change their situations, or the circumstances in which 
they are placed, we are in the path of knowledge ; but 
the moment that we attempt any thing beyond that, we 
seek we know not what, and of course we cannot know 
either where or how to seek it. If I were to order any of 
you to go in search of the thing which none of us knew, 
or knew it were in existence, where would you go to look 
for it ? 

Charles. None of us could tell. 

Dr. Hcrhert. All that we can observe in the universe, 
are, substances by their properties, and phenomena from 
the substances among which /Ae?/ appear ; and, therefore, 
every inquiry that we attempted to make beyond that, 
would be an inquiry without knowing what we were in- 
quiring about. We know the external world, because 
we have observed it, and just as far as we have observed 
it; we know our own nunds, just because w^e think and 
remember, and just as far as we think and remenvber; 
and we know, in a natural and philosophical point of view, 
the Great Creator of the universe, just as we feel traces of 
him in our own minds, or discover them in the other 
works of creation, and our natural knowledge of him ex- 
tends no further than our observation. This (and I wish 
you to reflect upon it, and convince yourselves of the truth 



106. But cannot we find out the cause, why the acorn grows, 

why the beam is strong, or the billet inflammable ? 107. When 

may it be said, that we are in the path of knowledge ? 108. 

What are all the things, which are subject to our observation in the 

universe ? 109. What must every inquiry be, which is attempted 

beyond this.? — — 110. How do we know the external world, and 

how far do we know it ? 111. How, and how far do we know our 

own minds ?< 112. How, in a natural and philosophical point of 

view, do we know the Creator of the Universe ? 



Less. 2. intellectual philosophy. 55 

of it) is all that we can know. But we have no reason 
to lament that it is too limited ; for though the world be 
nearly six thousand years old, and though there were al- 
ways some means, however limited and imperfect, by 
which the people of every age could avail themselves of 
some of the knowledge of the ages before them, yet this 
knowledge is, to the great majority, still exceedingly limited, 
while the progress of the best informed is not much to 
boast of. 

Charles. But we have often been told that the knowl- 
edge of one thing leads to that of another, as the discovery 
of the mercury standing only to a certain height in the 
glass tube, which was made by Toricelli, led Pascal to 
discover the weight of the atmosphere, and the use of 
the barometer in pointing out alterations of that, either 
as occasioned by changes in its own composition, or dif- 
ferences of altitude above the level of the earth. Now 
if the causes had not been known, how could that have 
been ? 

Dr. Herbert. Stretch out that part of your arm which 
is without the sleeve of your coat, and which is divided 
into five portions at the extremity, and tell me what you 
call it ? 

Charles. A hand. 

Edicard. And mine is a hand too. 

Mary. And mine, and yours, and every body's. 

Dr. Herbert. And why do we call them all hands ? Is 
it from any cause different from our knowledge of the hands 
themselves ? 

Edward. We call them hands because they are like 
each other, only some larger and some smaller; and because 
they can all do the same things. 

Dr. Herbert. And is this all the cause? 

Charles. Yes : and there is no use for any more, we 
know them well enough from that. 

Dr. Herbert. And how do you know them ? 

Mary. We know that they have the shape and the 
colour of hands, by looking at them. 



113. If this be all that we can know, have we reason to lament 
that our sphere of knowledge is too limited ? And why ? 

114. Can the knowledge of one thing lead to that of another? 

115. What instance is mentioned ? 



66 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 2. 

Matilda. And that they are living hands, by the fin- 
gers stretching and bending, without being stretched or 
bent. 

Edivard. And that they are strong hands, if we see 
them lifting a great stick, or striking a smart blow. 

Dr. Herbert. Now let me ask you, if in any of these, or 
in any thing else that you ever saw done by a hand, there 
was any thing farther to be known than the hand, and 
what the hand did ? 

Matilda. When I write, there is the pen, the ink, and 
the paper. 

Mary. But if there were not the hand, or something that 
could supply the place of the hand (as we saw in the writing 
automaton), there would be no writing, which is the event 
to which you allude. 

Dr. Herbert, And you never mistake any of these hands 
for a foot. 

Edward. No ; they are not like each other, and they do 
not the same things. 

Dr. Herbert. If you found a foot exactly like a hand, 
and doing exactly the same things as a hand, what would 
you think ? 

31atilda. That it were a hand, of course, and not a foot 
at all. 

Dr. Herbert. Then, in this very simple and familiar 
matter, we have a complete explanation of the way in 
which the knowledge of individual things, and individual 
occurrences, enables us to know other things and other 
occurrences. When things are like in all that we know 
about them, we infer, and cannot help inferring, that they 
are like, on the whole, as things; and we do it for the 
most simple and obvious reason. We know all about 
them, and we know no difference. In like manner, we 
consider two events as being, in whole, like or the same, 
when we know all the circumstances that accompany or 
are connected with them., and when these circumstances, 
singly, and in their order, are precisely the same. Like- 
ness, or the absence of likeness, is all that we can know, 
independently of the information that we get by observing. 

116. What must we infer, when things are like in all that we 
know about them ? 117. What reason can be given for this in- 
ference ? 118. When do we consider two events as being like 

or the same ? 119. What is the author's remark respecting like- 
ness or the absence of likeness ^ 



Less. 2. intellectual philosophy. 57 

It is very little, no doubt ; but it is sufficient for the pur- 
pose : and when we attempt to gain more, we uniformly 
fail. 

If you met with a flower which had all the properties by 
which you distinguish a rose from other flowers, what would 
you call it ? 

Mary. Whatever I might call it, it would certainly be a 
rose. 

Dr. Herbert. And if you were told that all the qualities 
by which you distinguish the rose, were existing at any one 
place, without any other quality along with them, — if you 
were told this by an authority that had never deceived you, 
what would you believe to be there, or expect to find there, 
if you v/ent to examine it? 

Matilda. A rose, of course, and nothing but a rose. 

Dr. Herbert. In like manner, if you knew all the cir- 
cumstances under which an event had happened, and if 
those circumstances happened again in the very same order, 
what would be the consequence? 

Edward. The very same event would happen again. 

Dr. Herbert. And if the circumstances vTere not the 
same ? 

Charles. The event would be different. 

Dr. Herbert. What would be the cause of the differ- 
ence ? 

Charles. The difference of the circumstances. 1 know 
of nothing else. 

Dr. Herbert. Neither do I, Charles ; nor does any body 
know of any other cause ; and that is the reason why it is 
idle to seek for any other. But if all the circumstances 
which you had formerly observed in an event should happen 
again, and yet the event itself not take place, what w^ould 
you infer ? 

Charles. That in the former case there had been some 
circumstances which had escaped my observation, and 

120. If you met with a flower, or were told of one, which had all 
the properties by which you distinguish a rose from other flowers, 

what would you call it ? 121. If you knew all the circumstances 

of an event, and these circumstances should occur again in the same 
order, what would be your conclusion ? 1*22. And if the circum- 
stances were not the same, what would the event be ? and what 

would be the cause ? 123. If all the circumstances of an event 

should again occur, and the event itself not take place, what must 
be the inference ? 

6 



58 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 3. 

which had been omitted in the latter case ; or that in 
the latter case some new circumstance had been intro- 
duced, which had in like manner escaped my observation. 

Dr. Herbert. And how would you go about to supply 
your want of information ? 

Charles. By observing the circumstances more careful- 
ly, when the event occurred again, if it were an occurrence 
in nature ; or repeating the experiment with more care^ 
and varying the circumstances, if it were any thing that f 
could perform. 

Dr. Herhert. And what would you have to guide you 
in the varying of the circumstances ? 

Charles. I would select those that I thought the most 
likely to succeed, and I would take those which I had ob- 
served to be connected with events as like the event in view 
as possible. 

Dr. Herbert. Then you perceive that all that we can 
know about the material universe, must be the result of ob- 
servation ; and that by mere thinking we cannot know, 
though we may find out how to use that which we do know, 
or how to observe what happens, or anticipate events by 
experiment, in such a manner as to enable us to get more 
knowledge by future observation. This constitutes the 
whole philosophy of nature ; and all that is beyond or dif- 
ferent from this, other than direct revelation by our Creator, 
established upon evidence which we cannot controvert, is 
idleness and error. But as the objects of the material world 
have no reference to our future state as moral and account- 
able beings, no revelation of the Almighty was necessary 
respecting them, except that which they themselves proclaim 
in their nature and changes. 

But the philosophy of our own minds — the study and 
knowledge of the thinking principle within us — while it 
differs less in its nature from the philosophy of the external 
world than some have endeavoured to persuade us, is per- 
fectly analagous to that philosophy, in the mode by which 
we must study it. In both cases, we must observe the phe- 

124. If your observation of the circumstances had been partial, 
how would you correct it? 125. What must guide you in vary- 
ing the circumstances? 126. Since all our knowledge of the 

material world is the result of ob>ervation, in what respects may 
mere thinking be useful ? 127. Why was no revelation necessa- 
ry respecting the objects of (he material world ? 128. In what 

respect is the philosophy of the mind, and that of the external world, 
perfectly analogous ? 129. What must we do, in both cases ? 



Less. 2. intellectual niiLosoriiY. 59 

nomena in themselves, as existiijir momentarily, or as they 
occur in trains of buccession ; and the inferences that we 
draw from reflecting on them follow the same law. If the 
mind be similarly affected at two diilerent times, we call 
the state of it — the perception, the recollection, the reflec- 
tion, the feeling, the emotion, the passion, or whatever 
name we give it — the same; and where one state of mind, 
in all the cases in which we have had any perception of it, 
has been constantly followed by another state, we cannot 
help inferring that, upon other and future occasions, the 
former of those states will be followed by the latter. When 
in either case the perfect sameness of the circumstances is 
established, the sameness of the result is a matter which 
we cannot deny or doubt, without doing the same violence 
to the very constitution of our minds, as if we doubted 
that two and two, which made four upon all known occa- 
sions of adding them, would make the same upon every 
other like occasion. 

Edward. But two and two added together, do not make 
four upon every occasion. In Algebra -{- 2 and — 2 added 
together, make not 4 but 0. 

Dr. Herbert, The circumstances are not the same, 
Edward, and the seeming discrepancy here is merely a 
fault in the language — one of those faults of which there 
have been more in treating of the mind, than in any other 
branch of knowledge. The — 2 is not two at all ; it is 
an abridged expression for the operation of taking two 
away. 

Charles. In studying the external world, we have the 
objects themselves, and our own thoughts about them ; 
whereas, in our own minds, we have only the thoughts. 

Dr. Herbert. The cases are still very similar ; for fur- 
ther than we can observe their phenomena, we can know 
nothing of either. One set of philosophers denied their 
own existence, because they had no knowledge of it, be- 
yond their own perception of it as existence : and another 

130. What remark is made, respectino; the inferences? 131. 

If the mind be similarly affected at two diflerent times, what shall 
we call the state of it P 132. When one state of mind is con- 
stantly followed by another, what must we infer ? 133. When 

the perfect sameness of circumstances is established, why cannot 

we deny or doubt the sameness of result r 134. Why did one 

set of philosophers deny their own existence .'' 135. And for tlie 

fame reason, what did another set deny ? 



60 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 2. 

denied the existence of the external world, for the very 
same reason. Both proved the existence of that which 
they denied by the very fact of denying it ; and both erred 
in seeking for that knowledge of which they were already 
in possession — in a quarter where there was only one truth 
to be discovered. 

Edward, What was that 7 

Dr. Htrhert. The knowledge that they were doing that 
which all of us are but too apt to do — neglecting that which 
is real and useful, for the sake of that which is not imagin- 
ary merely, but impossible. 

Charles, Just as some mechanics, instead of applying 
their ingenuity to the improvement or the invention of use- 
ful machines, have wasted it upon perpetual motions — things 
in their very nature impossible, and known to be so to the 
merest novice in the science of mechanics. 

Dr. Herbert, Precisely so, Charles. The nature of the 
mind, as exhibited or discoverable in any thing but the dif- 
ferent states of the mind — the only thing that we can know 
about it — is the perpetual motion of the mind ; and may be 
discovered when they have found out one in mechanics, 
but certainly not till then. 

Edward. Then the fools and the philosophers have some- 
times resembled each other, a good deal more than the 
latter would be willing to allow ? 

Mary. What makes you think so, Edward ? 

Edward, The fools have peopled the external world 
with goblins, and spectres, and other objects of horror ; 
and the philosophers appear to have peopled the world 
of philosophy with difficulties that had just as little real ex- 
istence. 

Dr, Herbert, Your observation is not altogether with- 
out foundation ; but our business must be to take warning 
rather than to censure : we are never in greater danger 
of erring ourselves, than when we exult over the errors of 
others. 

Our next Conversation will be on the succession of phe- 
nomena, or events, in which we shall hav^e to consider what 
people mean when they make use of the word ''power," 



136. How did both prove the existence of what they denied? 

137. In what did both err ? 138. In what respects may 

it be said, that fools and philosophers have resembled each other? 
139, When are we in the greatest de^nger of committing errors? 



Less. 3. intellectual philosophy. 61 

— a word in very frequent use, and therefore it may be as 
well that you think of the meaning of that word before 
we meet. 



LESSON IlL 

Power — Force — The succession of events in the relation of cause 
and effect — Similarity of the mode of procedure in philosophy of 
matter and the philosophy of mind. 

Dr, Herbert, Have you been thinking on the meaning 
of the word ** power," as I requested you ^ and if so, have 
you been able to find out any thing to which it is applied 



as a name 



? 



Edward. Yes. A great number of things : the mechan- 
ical powers — the level, the wheel and axle, the pulley, the 
wedge, the inclined plane, and the screw — the power of the 
wind, and of water, as in driving mills — the power of horses 
in drawing carriages — the power of men, in doing work, 
or undertaking any subject — the power of steam, — the 
powers of Europe — almost every thing, of any use, that we 
can think of 

Dr, Herbert, The more ample you make your enumer- 
ation the better ; for the error in language (and it is one 
which may lead to many errors in thought) is common to 
them all ; but let us take one of them ; the power of a horse, 
for instance — what do you mean by that? 

Charles. The ability that he has to draw any thing 
along, as a cart, a plough, a roller, or a carriage. 

Dr, Herbert, Well, now, suppose yourselves perfectly 
ignorant of the motion of any of these implements, or the 
power, as you call it, of animals to draw them, or suppose 
yourselves ignorant of the motions of animals and carriages 
altogether, what would have led you to know or conclude 
that the horse would draw the cart, and not the cart, the 
horse ? 

Mary, If we had been so ignorant, I do not think we could 
even have guessed at it. 

1. What is commonly understood by the expression, power of a 
horse .' 

6* 



62 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 3. 

Dr, Herbert, And we are not *' so ignorant," just be- 
cause we have observed for ourselves, or because somebody 
else has observed for us, and communicated their infor- 
mation to us. The power of the horse is a simple and every 
day matter, and something similar to those powers which 
we ourselves begin to display long before we are able to 
think about the nature of them ; but another of your pow- 
ers, the power of steam, now does the work of a million of 
horses ; and yet it has not been known to be a power for 
much more than a century. In no one instance can you 
find that the power which you ascribe to the horse or the 
steam, or whatever else it may be, is any thing apart from 
the horse, the steam, or the other thing which we say exerts 
the power. 

Charles. The power of a horse to draw a carriage can- 
not be the same as the horse ; for when in the field, the 
horse has quite a different power, the power of galloping 
about to any part of it that he chooses. 

Dr. Herbert. Still that which we call power is only the 
thing which we say exerts the power, placed under certain 
circumstances. When we are ignorant of the thing and 
the circumstances, we can know nothing about the pow- 
er; and the information that we get about it comes from 
the observation of the appearances, and from nothing else. 
The word ** power" is precisely of the same kind — a 
short name for a succession of appearances ; and it means 
nothing more than the appearances themselves, or rather 
our perception of them, as taking place in succession, 
which is all that we know, and all that vve can know, about 
them. 

Mary. If we do not know the powders of things, and 
especially if they have, as you say, no pow ers to be discover- 
ed, then how are we lo know^ the use of any thing ? Why 
should I sit down to the harp or the piano-forte, if I did not 
know that the instrument had the power of producing mu- 
sical sounds ? 

2. Suppose a person wholly ignorant v>f the motions of animals 
and of carriages, could he at once conclude that the horse would 

draw the cart, and not the cart the horse ? 3. Why are not 

men thus ignorant ? 4. Is it certain that the power ascribed to 

the horse, or the steam, is any thing separate or apart from the horse 

or steam, w^hich we say exerts the power ? 5. What is that 

which we call power ? 6. When can we know nothing about 

power? 7. Whence comes the information that w^e get about 

it ?— — 8. What does the word power mean .? 



1 



Less. 3. intellectual piiiLosoniY. 63 

Di\ Herbert, By experience — by hearing others play, 
and attempting it yourself, just as you do now. The in- 
formation is wholly in the appearances, and our hope of in- 
formation about the power, apart from these, is like that 
of the countryman at the fair. He was attracted by a sign- 
board on a booth, painted with these words, ** The sa- 
gacious elephant, the wonder of nature.'' He paid his 
pence, and entered, in hope of a double gratification to his 
sight. The elephant was shown off, and tlie close of the 
exhibition announced. The countryman was sadly disap- 
pointed, and complained to the exhibitor for imposing upon 
him. *^ I did not care much for the elephant," said he, 
** for I have seen an elephant before, a bigger one than 
yours ; but you have cheated me out of the * wonder of 
nature,' which I came on purpose to see." ** You fool," 
said the man, '* you might easily have known that the 
* elephant' and * the wonder of nature' are the same thing, 
and if you do not know it, you are a * wonder of nature' 
yourself." In like manner, the word poicer individually 
applied, is the name of a certain state of that to which we 
ascribe power ; and the same word is used generally for 
all states of all beings or substances, in which they appear 
to our senses to he "producing changes, either in them- 
selves or in any thing else. This word is used, in the 
same way as we use all general names, to put us in mind 
of things that have a resemblance in some respects, with 
considerable room for difference in others — as flower for 
all sorts of blossom — quadruped for all animals having four 
feet. 

Mary. Then it is the same as you told us formerly ; 
as there is not form apart from substance in a thing that 
exists, or substance apart from the qualities that we per- 
ceive in that substance ; so there is not power apart from 
that to which we ascribe the possession and exercise of the 
power. 

9. How can we know the use of a thing, if we cannot know the 

power of it, or if it has no power ?■ 10. For what purpose is the 

story of the countryman related ? 11. When the word power 

is individually applied, what is it the name of? 12. For what 

is this same word used, when applied generally ? 13. It is as- 
serted that this word, power, is used as all general names are — for 

what purpose are general names used ? 14. How can the meani- 

ing of the word power be Represented as analogous to form or sub- 
stance, in natural philosophy ? 



64 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 3. 

Edward, Do not I know that I have the power of speak- 
ing, or of moving my arm, or of running, whether I be 
doing any of these things at the time or not ? 

Dr, Herbert, 1 should think not. You may remem- 
ber that you spoke, or moved your arm, or ran, at a for- 
mer time, or at many former times ; and if you remember 
the state of all your feelings then, and feel the same now, 
you may, from the similarity of all the circumstances, in 
as far as you know of them, conclude that you can do the 
same thing now ; but that does not establish a certain and 
separate power of doing them, or even an absolute possi- 
bility that you can. People have thought, as you now 
think, that they could do those things, and for the very 
same reason — the remembrance of having done them be- 
fore ; and yet, from the occurrence of some additional 
circumstance v*^hich has taken place without their knowl- 
edge, they have found themselves unable when they made 
the attempt. 

Charles. 1 remember an instance. When Samson 
was shaved in his sleep, by the Philistines in Gaza, he 
thought upon awaking, that he could perform the same 
feats of strength as ever ; but when he tried, he found h§ 
could not. 

Dr, Herbert. As age stiffens our joints, and blunts our 
organs of perception, we are all *' shorn Samsons,^' in one 
way or another. There was a time when I could run as 
fast as any of you, and read the smallest print without spec- 
tacles; and if 1 were to remember only that time, and for- 
get the states that have led to the change, my belief would 
be that I could do those things still. 

Matilda. And is all that we call power, of which we 
speak so much, and to which we attach so much importance, 
nothing but the appearance which things present to us when 
thei/ are placed in certain circumstances ? 

Dr, Herbert. That is the simple and safe view of the 
matter — the only one that can be taken without the danger, 
I had almost said the certainty, of falling into error. 

Charles. But if there be no such thing as power, why 
should there be, in all languages, a word which means 

15. Is the remembrance of what you have done, any certain 

evidence, that you are now able to perform the same thing ? 

16. What are instances in confirmation of this ? 17. What is 

the simplest and safest view of that which we call power ? 



Less. 3. intellectual piiiLosornY. 65 

power; why should every body use that word; and why, 
when we see any change taking place, or observe that any 
change has taken place, should we always refer the change 
to some active being or thing wliich we can call an agent, 
and say that it accomplished the action of which we see 
the effects, in consequence of some active power that it has 
exerted ? 

Edward, If to-morrow I should find a tree, which stood 
ntire when I saw it to-day, with its trunk divided, its top 
'nd branches laid on the ground, and its leaves all wither- 
ing, 1 could not help thinking and being sure that some agent 
had been at work there, which had power to break down 
the tree ; and 1 could tell from the appearance of the divid- 
ed part, whether the tree had been broken by the wind, 
cut by a saw% or felled with a hatchet. 1 can tell, not only 
the cause of what has been done to the tree, but the causes 
of that again — as that the atmosphere had been put into 
that state of rapid motion which we call a gale of wind — 
by a great expansion of the air at some place — by the ap- 
plication of heat, or the condensation of it at another place, 
hy the application of cold ; and 1 might be able to tell the 
•se of this heating and cooling, as in the heating of the 
surface of the earth by the action of the sun during the day, 
and the cooling of that surface during the night in the ab- 
sence of the sun. 

Dr, Herbert. No doubt you might ; and you might 
trace the chain of observation a great deal fuither than 
this, till you had exhausted all the information which 
physical geography affords on the one hand, and till you 
had followed the tree to its formation into some domestic 
implement, or to its being converted into smoke and ash- 
es by the process of combustion ; but in all this you 
would not have found any thing that you could properly 
call a cause, as a thing to which you could, from the ex- 
amination of itself, and itself only, ascribe any quality 
that you could call power. At every step that you went 
backwards in the chain, your cause w-ould become an ef- 
fect — as the wind, though the cause of the breaking of 
the tree, is, by your own account, the effect of the heat- 

18. In observing a tree that has been felled, the probable cause 
)f its falling, its formation into domestic utensils, or its conversion 
nto smoke and ashes by combustion — in all this would there be any 
hing that, strictly speaking, might be called a cause, or any quality, 
hat might be denominated power? 



66 FIRST LESSONS IN I.ESS. 3. 

ing or cooling to which you allude. There is no power 
in the air itself, unless the heat or the cold put it in mo- 
tion. As little is there any power of heat in the surface 
of which you make mention ; for that again depends on 
the presence or the absence of the sun. So that, you 
see, if you are to have a cause and an effect, in the com- 
mon meaning of the words, you must confine yourself to 
one event, or, rather, to the two events that are immedi- 
ately nearest to each other in any succession. You re- 
member coming in wet, the other morning; what was the 
cause of that ? 

Edward. 1 lost my balance in the tree, and tum.bled 
into the pond. 

Dr. Herbert. And should you have lost your balance if 
you had not got into the tree ? 
Edward. Of course not. 

Dr. Herbert. Should you have got into the tree, if you 
had not first got into the field where it grew ? 
Edward. Certainly not. 

Dr. Herbert. Or into the field, if you had remained in 
the house ? 

Edward. No. 

Dr. Herbert. Or out of the house, if you had been un- 
able to leave your bed ? 
Edward. No. 

Dr. Herbert. Then which of all these was the real cause 
of the ducking ? 

I}Iary. I think they were all causes in their turn ; and 
that which was the cause of the last event, was merely the 
effect of the event before it. 

Dr. Herbert. That was precisely the case. There 
was nothing but a succession of events or changes ; and 
after stating what was observed to happen, we should not 
make the matter a bit plainer, though we gave a power to 
each of the events in the succession, when we called it a 
cause, and took that power from it when it became an effect. 
The mere facts of Charles' being fond of climbing trees, 
and there being a pond under the willow, would not have 
ducked him in the pond if he had not gone there ; and, in 
like manner, though you refer to the beings or things that 
have been engaged in any event before, you cannot con- 
clude that they will be engaged in a like event again, un- 
less you be sure, from careful observation, that they are in 



Less. '3. intellectual piiisosophy. 07 

tlie veiy same circumstances. Tlie only meaning <l.n. 
can attach to the word cause, therefor" is that f. T 

first of two events, which happened",' h^o,r of i^ 
or succession ; and the only mpani.„r ti if Z u 

to the word rffect is, that h .s'the ^^ZlJ^i^i;^^^ 
he cause without any oihcr perccp(i6/e event hiirvcS 
between the.n. If we be fam.liar iith the two em.ts 2 
have never observed the former without the laLr f 1 
;t .mmediatcly, then it is impossible for so "S^^^^^^^ 

as;xr«-rci=;:a-^^^^^ 

at on'"L :;rt['rt':" ^°"" ''' "°''''"^" '° ^^e mere ob" : 
*anuij lor ajj tiiat we ino?n nr r-nn t^^^^ l i 

»h.ch „ ,he «„,e„ede„, ; and ihou.h „„ k"',v S r '? 



Pcnjne, 
e worrl cause ? 



—•^0 ^\^vLat Imh:"'^' ■"'•'"'"; ?'^ ''^^ ="'"<='' '« "- ^ 



68 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 3, 

Dr, Herbert, Instead of preventing our knowledge, 
Charles, this is the only way in which we can inform our- 
selves rightly. The cause of any event we cannot explain ; 
we can only name it as the event immediately preceding : 
for if we make oiie other inquiry respecting it, it ceases to 
be a cause, and becomes an effect. 

Matilda. Then, if all that we can know be only the events 
that immediately follow each other, the whole of our knowl- 
edge is very simple, and may be easily acquired. 

Dr, Herbert. Certainly ; and it is probable that this 
very simplicity is the reason why men are so apt to neglect 
that knowledge which can be found, and which their pow- 
ers of observation and perception are so well calculated for 
finding, and follow after that which they always miss, be- 
cause it does not exist to their perceptive powers, and there- 
fore cannot be found. If we knew all the antecedent and 
also all the consequent events in nature, as invariably fol- 
lowing each other, we should be in possession of all the 
knowledge of nature ; and, from any passing event, we 
could retrace backward, or reason forward, to any extent 
that we pleased. We only know what we do actually know, 
and can set no limit to those successions of occurrences 
of which we are ignorant ; neither can we be sure that 
we are in possession of all the qualities of a substance, 
or all the circumstances of an event, because we are not 
able to examine the one, or observe the other, in all ways 
that may be possible. But that which is inaccessible to 
our observation and experience, we hold to be absolutely 
invariable, until some fresh discovery — the result of some 
new combination, brought about without our contrivance, 
or by chance, as we call it — or of some experiment which 
we make intentionally, forces us to alter our opinion, by 
putting us in possession of knowledge that we had not be- 
fore. In this way, every accession is so much more 
knowledge, as we have a fact of which we were not pos- 

26. Since we cannot explain the cause of an event, what can we 

do? 27. And why can we proceed no farther? 28- What 

reason can be given why men neglect that knowledge which lies 
within their reach, and pursue that which they never can attain ? 

29. How far would our knowledge extend, if we knew all the 

antecedent and consequent events in nature ? 30. Why are we 

not sure that we know all the qualities of a substance, or circum- 
stances of an event ? 3L How do we consider that, which is 

beyond our observation or experience ? 32. And how long do 

we thus consider it ? What is every such accession ? 



Less. 3. intellectual philosophy. 69 

sessed before. But when we speak o^ power ^ or causey in 
any other sense than as tlie antecedent of two events, we 
add nothing to our real and useful knowledge, though we 
get a duplicate of language, the one part being either 
precisely tiie same meaning as the other, or no meaning 
at all. 

Edward. But have I noi power to move my arm ? I 
can do it whenever I icilly if there be nothing the matter 
with it. 

Dr, Herbert. Your saying that you have power does not 
give you any information beyond what you would have 
if you simply said that, when you were in certain circum- 
stances, tiiose of health and freedom from restraint (which 
you must have known before, or else you would not be 
able to tell whether they could enable you or not,) the will 
to move your arm is instantly followed by the motion of the 
arm. 

Charles. Then, if there be no powers or causes, why 
should we pay any attention to them ? 

Dr. Herbert. If the effects follow them, Charles, we 
need not trouble ourselves about powers, of which we are 
never able to get any knowledge. If the act which you 
WMsh to perform follov/ your will or mine, in the very man- 
ner, and to the very extent that we wish, are we any thing 
the worse that we have not a something else, beside our- 
selves, called our power, to do it for us? And if we aie 
unable to accomplish what we w^ish, are we any better for 
being told, that not we, but our defective power, is the 
cause of the failure .^ 

Mary. I should think that the supposition that we had 
a power, independent of ourselves, upon which our suc- 
cess, or our failure, depended, would make us indifferent, 
by making the praise or the blame not, strictly speaking, 
ours. 

Dr, Herbert. And, in the same manner, if we attribute 
to the productions of nature certain occult and invisible 
powers, separate from those properties which we observe in 

33. Instead of snying " you have power to move your arm \vhen- 
ever you will, if nothing prevents," how can you express the same 

idea without using the -word power ? 34. What will be the result, 

if we attribute to the productions of nature certain invisible powers, 
separate from their obvious properties ^ 

7 



70 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 3. 

them, it cannot fail in making us in so far indifferent to the 
qualities, and send us to dispuse about imaginary power, 
instead of observing real qualities. This is the source ot 
all the false philosophy that has been produced, both with 
regard to physical subjects, and the study of the mind ; 
and men have failed in obtaining information just because 
they have wearied themselves in seeking for it where it was 
not to be found. 

Charles, But if knowledge be thus simple, how does it 
happen that mankind have always been occupied in search- 
ing for causes, and talking about powers ? If the road of 
nature and truth be so simple and so obvious, why should 
they constantly leave it for the longer and more laborious 
paths of error ? 

Dr. Herbert. The cause of error itself is just as much 
a matter of mystery as any of those causes in search of 
which we err. It is probable, however, that the whole arises 
from the perversion of that principle of our nature, without 
w^hich we should be unable to exist — the desire of knowl- 
edge — the wish, when w^e know any event, to find out 
other iinks in the chain, so that if a similar event should 
again occur, we may be able not only to know what has 
gone before, but what is to follow after. The same desire 
leads us to examine the continuity, — to search, between 
the two events that first present themselves to us, in the 
succession of cause and effect, for other events that may 
stand in the same relation to one another and to these. 
Thus we get our notions of remote and immediate causes 
— as in the case of Edward getting the ducking, his not 
being at home at his studies was a remote cause, and his 
falling into the pond the immediate one ; and as, the more 
that we examine any case, the more of these intermediate 
events we find, lengthening out the chain of causes and 
effects, we very naturally come to the conclusion that, 
in every case, there is still an intermediate sometJihig that 
could be found, till by following the reflection upon this train, 
after the observation of it can be carried on no longer, 

35. Why have men failed in obtaining correct information both 

in natural and mental philosophy ? 36. Is it obvious why men 

so frequently fall into error r 37. What does it probably arise 

from ? 38. What does this desire lead us to do ? 39. Illus- 
trate the distinction between remote and immediate causes. 

40. In examining any case minutely, to what conclusion do we very 
naturally come ? 



Less. 3. intellectual pniLosoniv. 71 

we come to the notion — or rather the dream (for that 
which has no real foundation is nothinf^ but a dream) — 
of power and necessary connexion. The deception is 
rendered more imposing by the fact, that those inter- 
mediate appearances whicli we are accustomed to call 
explanations, or explanatory circumstances, are all in them- 
selves just as difficult as that which we wish to explain by 
means of them. 

Take a common case, — the musical sounds that are pro- 
duced when the fingers are applied in a proper manner 
to the keys of a piano-forte. One who never had pre- 
viously seen the instrument, and whose whole knowledge of 
it was in consequence confined to the mere fact of sound be- 
ing emitted when the keys were touched, and none when they 
were not, would, as a matter of course, consider the touch- 
ing of the keys as the cause of the pleasurable sensation 
arising in the mind. 

Matilda. We know, however, that they would be 
wrong, and would conclude thus only because they were 
ignorant of the nature of the instrument. The keys would 
not produce music at all, unless they were made to touch 
the wires. 

Mary. And though they did, the sounds would not be 
music, unless the wires were in tune, and the proper ones 
struck in succession, and allowed to vibrate for the proper 
time. 

Charles. Nor would even that be enough ; the vibra- 
tions of the wires would produce very feeble sounds, if it 
were not for the vibrations of the instrument itself; and 
the vibrations of the instrument would produce no sound 
if it were not for the elasticity of the air. When we had 
the little bell in the exhausted receiver of the air-pump, it 
did not ring, however hard we struck it, but it did the 
moment the air was admitted. 

Edward, And though the air did vibrate, we could not 
hear the sound, if the vibrations did not reach our ears ; 
and even then, they might be so diseased that we could not 
be capable of hearing. 

41. How is this deception rendered more imposing ? 42. What 

example has the author given to illustrate this subject ? 43. What 

are some of the most prominent particulars mentioned in tlie illustra- 
tion, of which a superficial observer, or one, who for the first time 
had heard a piano, might be ignorant ^ 



^2 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 3. 

Dr. Herbert. Nor would the difficulty stop there ; for 
though the ear appeared to be perfect in its form and struc- 
ture, yet if we were to divide the auditory nerve, which we 
suppose transmits the influence produced upon the ear to 
the brain, and occasions there that change, or state which 
we call hearings the sound would be as unknown to us as 
if the whole of the previous chain of causes and effects had 
never taken place. 

Charles: But this is the explanation that we formerly 
got of the hearing of the sound of a musical instrument, or 
of the succession of changes that take place in the instant 
— so brief that we are hardly conscious of it — which inter- 
venes between the touching of the instrument by the play- 
er, and the impression of the music upon the perception of 
the listener. 

Dr. Herbert. So it is ; and every step of it is not only 
knowledge, but valuable and essential knowledge ; for if, 
at any one step of the process, the circumstances were 
changed, a change would be produced in the ultimate ef- 
fect. As a series of observed facts, which have invariably 
followed in the same order, every time that we have had 
occasion to notice their recurrence, it is strictly a part of 
philosophical information ; but though the points of the 
succession have to our belief come nearly to each other^ 
the blanks between them are in reality just as wide as ev- 
er ; and each of the individual sequences into which we 
have thus been enabled to break the original one, is just 
as difficult as that was before we thought of making the 
slightest interpolation. 

Charles. Then if the whole of our knowledge be con- 
fined to the mere observed appearances, and if there be no 
such thing as power or cause that we can find out, I do 
not see why we should reason at all ; we ought rather to 
content ourselves with the mere appearances. 

Dr, Herbert. That is an opinion which is very apt to 
intrude, when we part with the unknown ground upon 
which we had been vainly attempting to make discoveries, 
and come to that on which all is plain and palpable. I 

44. Is the knowledge of the successive steps of this illustration 
valuable ? 45. If the circumstances at any one step of the pro- 
cess vi^ere changed, what would be the consequence ? 46. How 

may the steps of this illustration be considered as strictly a part of 

philosophical knowledge ? 47. Though the points of successiQa 

seem to come nearer to each other, what is the f^ct ? 



k 



Less. 3. intellectual piiilosophv. 73 

have endeavoured to impress upon you already, that we can 
have no knowledge of things as existing in space, beyond 
what we actually observe of them. We have found that it 
is the same in the succession of events in time. The most 
acute and elaborate reasoning cannot discover a new qual- 
ity^ or put us in possession of a nac fact. But it does not 
follow from this that reason is useless ; for similarity of se- 
quence* among events, is found in the same manner, and 
by very nearly the same process, as similarity of qualities ; 
and from our knowledge of the phenomena of the past, we 
are not only able to perceive of what former causes present 
causes are the effects, but of what future effects present 
effects will be the causes. In as far as our observation has 
been accurate, and the result uniform, we can concentrate 
the whole known history of the world into a single instant, 
and avail ourselves as completely of the experience of those 
who have lived thousands of years ago, as we can of that 
which we ourselves have felt in the moment immediately 
preceding. Nor is this all; for we can try as many exper- 
iments — that is, make as many new combinations — as we 
please ; and by attending carefully to the circumstances, 
and theresultsof those, through a sufficient number of trials, 
we may increase our knowledge almost without limit, by 
the introduction of new trains of succession, which migh 
never have come within our notice in the natural course 
of events. The discoveries of those properties of matter — 
properties which were not so much as imagined to exist — 
which have so amply repaid the labours of the modern 
chemists, and which have gone far in changing the whole 
conduct of the arts, and the whole economy of society, are 
proofs of this, as important as they are numerous and varied ; 
and they clearly show that the labour of thought can be 



* Webster defines this word, a following or that ivhich follows, 
a consequence. 

48. Can reasoning discover for us any new quality, or make us 
acquainted with any new fact? 49. How is similarity of se- 
quence among events found ? 50. What are we able to perceive, 

from our knowledge of the phenomena of the past? 51. If our 

observation has been accurate and the result uniform, what use can 

we make of the history of the world ? 52. What can we do 

further ? 53. How may we increase our knowledge to an extent 

almost unlimited ? 54. What do the discoveries of the chemist 

clearly show .' 

7* 



74 FIRST LESSONS IN Less. 3. 

usefully expended, only when it is occupied about that 
which can be observed. 

Charles. That, however, is the philosophy of matter, and 
not of mind. 

Dr. Herbert. The perceptions that we have of mind 
and matter are the same ; for though the intelligence may 
be brought by a different organ — as the colour of a tulip 
may come to us in the beams of light that are reflected 
from that tulip ; the perfume of a rose may come in the 
odoriferous particles, enjoyable only by the organs of smell, 
that float on the air to some distance around it ; or the 
song of the bird, which comes to us in little pulses or nerves 
that act upon the organs of hearing — yet we are just a& 
ignorant of the process by which those organs convey 
the perception to the mind, as we are of the impressions 
which the states of the mind give and have of their own 
existence. 

Edward. But these are all produced by something 
external — something that exists independently of us, and 
therefore they must be different from that which is a mere 
thought. 

Dr. Herbert, The colour, the odour, or the sound, what- 
ever is the object of any of our senses, is known to the mind 
only as an imrpression of the mind, that is, a state of the mind 
itself ; and as, when one of the senses has been wanting 
from the beginning of life, there is nothing in the other 
senses by which the impression made by the objects of the 
deficient one can be communicated to the mind ; so, of im- 
pressions that arise in the mind itself, without any neces- 
sary presence of external objects, or any impression what- 
ever upon the external organs of sense, the mind has in it- 
self just as much knowledge, and knowledge precisely of 
the same kind, as it has of those matters that are the objects 
of the senses. 

55. What is asserted respecting the perceptions of mind and 

of matter? 56. Have we more knowledge of the process by 

which the organs of sense convey the perception to the mind, than 
of the impressions which the states of the mind give and have of 

their own existence ? 57. How is colour, odour, or sound, 

known to the mind ? 58. When one of the senses has been 

wanting from the beginning of life, can the other senses communi- 
cate to the mind the knowledge to be derived from the deficient 

sense ? 59. How much knowledge, and what kind of knowledge 

has the mind of the impressions that arise within itself.? 



Less. 3. intellectual philosophy. 75 

Charles, Is it possible that the knowledge that we have 
of external nature, which is constantly undergoing changes 
and decompositions — of our minds, which must, as you 
have told us, and as I myself feel, be quite incapable of de- 
composition — and of the Supreme Being, from whom the 
external world and our minds had their beginning — can be 
the same ! 

Dr. Herbert, The knowledge that we have of different 
subjects, as it refers to those subjects, must differ with their 
differences, otherwise it would not be knowledge at all ; 
but in as far as it relates to the mind, it is in its nature the 
same ; and the states of mind, produced by the impressions 
received from the external world, do not differ more from 
one another, than some of them that arise from our internal 
reflections, without any necessary reference to the external 
world, at least to those parts of it that are before us at the 
time ; and indeed the ejfect of those trains of internal 
thought is always the greater, the more that we are indif- 
ferent to the objects of sense. 

Charles. I have often felt that. I have found that when 
I am alone in a room, or in a solitary walk, I can think 
myself into joy, or grief, or anger, or any other state that I 
please, without being able to find out how I do it; and 1 
find, also, that when my attention is called back to the re- 
alities about me, the train of thought is at an end. 

Dr. Herbert. But I dare say you have found, that the 
state of feeling to which the train of thought led, did not 
vanish immediately with that train ; but remained, and 
qualified or disqualified you for that which you were toper- 
form, according as it was of an arousing or of a depressing 
character. This tendency of the mind has many practical 
advantages ; and, when under proper discipline, it bears 
us up against the ills of life, and excites us to a more effec- 
tive performance of our duties. 

Matilda. But we may be very strongly affected by a 
dream, which has no reality, but which we remember with 

GO. Ought one to infer from this, that all knowledge is the same ? 
61. How do the states of niindj produced by external objects, and 
those, which arise from internal reflection, compare in respect to 
uniformity; and what is remarked in regard to the effect of the 

latter ? G2. What may be remarked in regard to the duration 

and the effect of the state of feeling, excited by any train of thought.' 

G3. Can a knowledge of this tendency of the mind be of any 

use to us .'' 



76 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 3. 

all the accuracy of a scene or an occurrence which is real ; 
and yet the knowledge of the mere dream cannot be in any 
way similar to that of the reality. 

2>r. Herbert. In as far as they are states of the mind, 
they are, in their general nature, the same : and if the 
dream were wholly mental, and had no reference to those 
qualities of external things, which are perceived through 
the medium of the senses, — if the dream were a mere effort 
of the mind with reference to itself, as in the considera- 
tion of its own existence, or its own identity, or if it were 
concerning an angel, any thing respecting the Deity, fur- 
ther than what is demonstrated in his works, and declared 
in his word, it would not differ in any way from the same 
impression occurring without the presence of sleep. The 
field or the fortune that we body forth to our imagination, 
in a waking reverie, is just as much a dream as the invol- 
untary one that the same imagination creates when we are 
asleep. 

Mary, 1 have found, that when I have pursued one of 
these reveries, I have completely forgotten where I was 
and what I was about. 

Dr, Herbert. That has been the case with more pro- 
found thinkers than any of us, Mary. I knew a learned 
professor in one of the Northern Universities, who was so 
completely absorbed with his own trains of thought, that he 
used to take off his hat to cows, and apologize to posts 
when he hit his shins upon them in the streets. 

Edward. He must have been a very great fool surely. 

Dr. Herbert. So much the reverse, that he was not 
only one of the most profound thinkers of the age, but one 
who, in his \vritings, expressed himself with the greatest 
perspicuity ; and he was the first man that made the peo- 
ple of his country understand a truth, which, now that 
it is known, we think so plain that we never dispute 
about it. 

Charles. What was it, Sir 1 

Dr. Herbert. A very simple one, Charles, but very use- 
ful to young men : that a man who is in debt never can get 
out of it by borrowing money. 

64. Under what circumstances, are a dream and impressions oc- 
curring without sleep, entirely the same ? 65. Is it possible that 

the train of a person's reflections can be so strong, as to render him 
insensible to the objects around him ? 



Less. 3. intkllf.ctual riiiLosornv. 77 

Edward, Then is inattention to the matters about one 
a si^xn of thinkinij ? 

Dr. Jfcrbert. Certainly not. It is merely a want of 
observation ; and we must have evidence whether it be 
the inattention of the idle, or the abstraction of the 
thougLtful ; the first of which is a cessation of all mental 
activity whatever, and the second so complete an occupa- 
tion of the mind with its own thoughts, that the organs of 
sense cease to give imi)ressions of the objects that are be- 
fore them. 

Charles. But if the absence and the access of thought 
be so very like each other, that we can distinguish them 
only by their effects, how can we know any thiog at all 
about thinking ? 

Dr. Herbert. When we ourselves think, it is not possi- 
ble that we can have any doubt about the matter, any more 
than we can have of the motion of our hands which we 
see, or the sound of our voices which we hear ; but none 
of us could find out that another is thinking, unless the 
thought were followed by some event or change that could 
be perceived by the senses. 

Matilda. But we say, that a person is thoughtful or not 
thoughtful ; and when we make use of such expressions, 
we do not allude to any action done by the party. 

Dr. Herbert, Then what do we mean ? 

Matilda. We mean, that there is something in the look, 
the attitude, and features of the one party, that is a sign 
of thinking ; and that there is no such sign in the other 
party. 

Mary. I should think the look and the attitude, which 
denote thought, inasmuch as they are different from those 
that denote the absence of it, are effects of the thought 
itself 

Dr. Herbert. Unquestionably they are, Mary. We con- 
sider them as signs of thought, because we have found them 
in the same succession of events, of which thinking formed 
a part. Those who have attended carefully to the appear- 
ances, in the general attitude of the body, the position 

QQ. But is inattention to matters about one a sign of thinkino^? 

67. What is the difference between the inattention of the idle, 

and the abstraction of the thoughtful? (}>S. Is it possible for us 

to doubt whether we ourselves are thinking or not ? 69. But 

how can we know that another person is thinking ? 70. What 

fire those able to do, who attend carefully^ to appearances .^ 



78 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 3. 

and action of the limbs, and the expression of the coun- 
tenance, are able to make very close guesses, not only at 
thinking, but at the species of thought. This is especially 
the case with all matters of thought in which we take a 
great personal interest, or which, in the language of com- 
mon life, excite our feelings or passions. It is this appli- 
cation of intellectual philosophy which renders a person a 
good orator, a good actor, a good painter, or statuary, or 
writer, upon any subject that is intended to bring human 
nature forcibly to the observation of a spectator, or to the 
understanding of a reader. 

Mary, But the greatest men, in these respects, that we 
have any account of, have been self-taught; and from what 
you have stated, it would appear that instruction in the 
philosophy of the mind is necessary. 

Dr. Herbert. Everybody that is taught at all, Mary, 
must be self-taught : and the grand difference between 
those great men to whom you allude, and the men whom 
we have been in the habit of calling learned, is, that the 
former have studied man himself, as he exists in nature ; 
and the latter, that false representation of him which is 
written in books. The one class have been successful, 
because they have contented themselves with seeking 
what could be found ; the other have failed, because they 
have endeavoured to find that which could not. The one 
have been experimentalists, and contented themselves 
with observing facts or phenomena, and remembering the 
order in which these have followed each other ; the others 
have been theorists, forming their system while they were 
ignorant of the facts, and then endeavouring to make ihe 
facts correspond with the theory or the hypothesis. 

Edicard. I do not very weli understand what is meant 
by a theory, or a hypothesis. 

Dr. Herbert. Then we cannot have a better subject 
for our next conversation ; and if we shall be able to under- 
stand that, we shall have mastered one important portion 
of our inquiry — by knowing how we are to proceed with it: 
the first part of all inquiries, though by some very unac- 
countably made the last. 

71. What may this application of intellectual philosophy render 

a person ? 72. What is the difference between those, who are 

self-taughtj and those that are styled learned ? 73. Why have 

the first class been successful, and the second class unsuccessful .'' 
74. What epithets may be apphed to each of these classes .' 



Less. 4. intellectual niiLOsopiiY. 79 



LESSON IV. 

Hypothesis and theory — Use and abuse of them — Mental analysis 
only virtual, not real, like that of matter. 

Di\ Herbert. Can any of you tell me the meaning of 
the word theory ? 

Charles. 1 think it means all that we know about any 
subject. 

Edward. I do not think that, Charles; for, you know, 
we have theories of the motions of the planets, by Plato, 
and Ptolemy, and Tycho Brahe, and Des Cartes, and Co- 
pernicus, all contradictory of one another. They cannot 
be all true ; and the ones that are false are not knowledge 
— they are merely opinions, and opinions that are wrong. 

31ary. I rather think a theory of anything means all 
that we believe about it, and may be either true or false, 
according as it does or does not agree with the facts. 

Dr. Herbert. That comes nearer the truth, Mary. 
And can you tell me how far such a theory can be useful ? 

Mary. Only so far as it is true ; the part of it which is 
false must be more than useless, for it leads us wrong. 

Dr. Herbert. And, so far as it is true, what do you 
suppose to be the use of the theory? 

Edioard. To enable us to explain any thing : as we 
explain how a stone falls to the' ground, or how a smooth 
ball will not remain at rest, on an inclined plane by the 
theory of gravitation. 

Dr. Herbert. And how do you explain those matters ? 

Echoard. I say, that the stone falls because the air 
through which it falls has less specific gravity than the 
stone ; and that the ball will not rest on the inclined plane, 
because the line of direction, or perpendicular to the earth's 
centre, through the centre of gravity of the ball, falls be- 
low that point of the ball which is in contact with the in- 
clined plane. 

Dr. Herbert. This certainly sounds better than the 
vulgar saying, that *'the stone falls," or *' the ball rolls;" 
but, in point of information, there is not much difference; 
for the *' why it falls," and the '* why it rolls," are left as 
much mysteries as ever. Is the theory any thing apart 
from the facts — is the theory of a stone falling any thing 
but the fall of the stone as seen at the time, or recollected 



80 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 4. 

by the memory, or repeated on an authority that we have no 
reason to doubt ? 

Charles, From the fall of one stone, under any circum- 
stances, I can reason that any other stone will fall, if placed 
in the same. 

Dr. Herbert. And how do you come to that conclusion ? 
Would your belief have been the same, think you, if you 
had never seen but one stone, and that one had been flying 
upward without your seeing the hand or the engine from 
which it had been projected ? 

Edward. I should have been apt to think that the next 
stone I met with could fly. 

Dr. Herbert. Then the theory of any matter is nothing 
but the successive phenomena of that matter, arranged in 
the order in which they have been observed to happen. 
If the order have never been found to vary, the theory is 
called true, and the truth is confirmed by the number of 
repetitions. If the repetitions have been few, the probabili- 
ty is weaked ; if there have been instances in wiiich the 
events have been different, it is rendered doubtful; and 
if we take into the connexion a single event that v.e never 
knew to happen in it, our theory ceases to be knowledge, 
and becomes an imposition. 

Charles. Is not this gratuitous part of the theory — this 
reasoninoj over and above the knowledcre or the facts^ — 
what is properly termed a hypothesis ? 

Dr. Ilerhert. That is pretty nearly the meaning of the 
term. A theory is, or ought to be^ a succession of events 
which we have observed to happen in a certain invariable 
order ; and a hypothesis, a succession, which we name or 
suppose without having observed them. 

Edward. Then it follows, that a theory must be true, 
and a hypothesis false. 

Dr. Herbert. Not always. New knowledge may over- 
turn a theory which was formerly true ; and new knowl- 
edge may confirm that which was only a hypothesis. Be- 
fore it was known that nitric acid could not dissolve gold, 

1. What is the meaning of the word theory? 2. When is a 

theory said to be true, and how is its truth confirmed ? 3. Un- 
der what circumstances is its probability weakened ? 4. How 

is it rendered doubtful ? and when does it become an imposition ? 

5. What is a hypothesis? Must every tlieory be true, and 

every hypothesis be false ? 6. What two examples illustrate the 

position, that new knowledge may overturn a theory which was 
formerly true, and confirm that which was only a hypothesis? 



Less. 4. intellectual philosophy. 81 

the true theory of that acid was, that it dissolved all the 
metals ; and the surmise of Neivton, that water and 
the diamond, from their refractive powers, contained com- 
bustible ingredients, which remained a hypothesis, and a 
neglected hypothesis, till long after the death of that illus- 
trious philosopher, has been fully confirmed by the discov- 
eries of chemistry — water being composed of hydrogen, the 
most inflammable, and oxygen, the most inflammatory sub- 
stance uitli which we are acquainted, and the diamond be- 
ing found lo be pure carbon, altogether soluble by combus- 
tion. 

J/(7/'^. Then both theories and hypotheses have their 
uses ? 

Dr. Herbert, Certainly. If the theory be extended no 
further than we know, it is the same thing with our knowl- 
ediJe : and it has the advantage of being that knowledge 
systematically arranged ; by which means we can not only 
call it more readily to mind, but make it useful in the ac- 
qui.-^ition of more knowledge. To use a homely compari- 
son, our tiieories are the threads upon which we string the 
beads of fact that we obtain by observation ; and when so 
strung, we do not lose them, or confound the sorts. The 
theory of gravitation is the arrangement of the facts of grav- 
itation ; a theory of the weather would be an arrangement 
of the facts of the weather ; and on all subjects to which 
we can turn our attention, the theory is nothing more than 
the arrangement of the phenomena in the order in which 
they take place. 

Matilda. Then, can a theory ever be useless ? 

Dr. Herbert. Not exactly useless, Matilda ; but theo- 
ries have often been very mischievous. Our desire of in- 
formation is much stronger than our desire of submitting 
to the labour and waiting the time requisite for our being 
informed ; or, which is the same thing, it is easier to wish 
than to work ; and, therefore, as the wish must always 
come first, we are apt to stop at that, and build our castles 
in our own imaginations, as it is done at once, and we have 
not to carry the bricks and mortar. The errors of theory, 

7. What is the use or advantage of theory ? 8. By what 

comparison does the author illustrate its use ? 9. If theories 

have never been useless, what has often been their effect ? 10. 

How does our desire of information compare with the willingness to 
labour for it, and what consequence follows ? 
8 



83 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 4, 

like all the other errors of our thinking and acting, arises 
from our believing in something that we cannot know ; 
and flattering ourselves, that events, of which we have no 
knowledge, will happen in the way in which we wish them 
to happen. The disposition to form imaginary theories, or 
extend real ones beyond tha facts, is much the same with 
that which leads folks to speculate in lotteries, — they think 
better of themselves than of others. I knew a young math- 
ematician, who having, in one of his exercises, proved the 
small chance of gaining any thing in the state lottery, laid 
out all his pocket money in the purchase of shares. While 
we ought to be carefully on our guard against theorizing, 
w^e should be charitable to those who do — as there perhaps 
never was a human being that thought, who had not a false, 
or at least hypothetical theory on some subject. Newton 
theorized about an ethereal fluid, though he could not as- 
scribe a single phenomenon in nature to any of its quali- 
ties. 

Edward, But, surely, hypotheses, which as you have 
explained them, are not knowledge, but ignorance, might 
well be spared as useless. 

Dr. Herbert. Bj no means, Edward. Hypotheses are 
the keys WMth which we open the store-houses of knowl- 
edge, and, when properly used, they never fail in guiding 
us to what we seek, or ta the alternative, (which also is 
knowledge,) that what we seek is not to be found. With- 
out hypotheses we should be deprived of the whole of that 
portion of our knowledge which we obtain by experiment — 
the source of all our inventions in the arts, and our discov- 
eries in the sciences. The hypothesis upon which we pro- 
ceed may be false, — the object which we have in view 
may be unattainable ; but still, if we are induced to experi- 
ment and to observe, we must discover something. So 
long as we keep hypothesis in its proper place, and use it as 
a means of acquiring information, it is valuable ; and it be- 
comes an evil only, when we try to pass it off for what it 
is not — calling it knowledge itself, and not the mere road 
to it. 

11. From what arises the errors of theory ?- 12 With what 

is the disposition for forming imaginary theories compared ? 

13. What remark is made respecting the propensity of mankind to 

indulge in theories ? 14. Of what use are hypotheses.'' 15. Of 

what kind of knowledge should we be deprived, if we could not 

avail ourselves of hypotheses ^ 16. When is hypothesis valuable, 

and when does it become an evil ^ 



Less. 4. intellectual philosophy. 83 

Charles. Then, theory is the arrangement of the infor- 
mation that we already possess, and hypothesis the arrange- 
ment of that, of which we are in quest. 

Dr. Herbert. Partially so, but not altogether ; for in 
our inquiries we may proceed either by theory or hypothe- 
sis. Where the quality or event of which we are in quest 
is altogether new, we have nothing but iiypotiiesis to guide 
us; but when the quality is similar to a known quality, or 
the event a repetition of a known event, we proceed upon 
theory, or, as we call it, upon a fixed principle. Thus, if 
tlie inquiry were, whether a certain piece of matter, the 
specific gravity of which were unknown, would or would 
not sink in water, that inquiry would be pure hypothesis 
up to the moment of making the experiment ; but if it 
were whether a piece of matter of a given specific gravity, 
would or would not sink in water, we would proceed upon 
theory, and would conclude that our observation had not 
gone to the whole case, if we found the experiment to vary 
from the theory. 

3Iari/. When astronomers calculate the places of the 
celestial bodies, and the times of eclipses, and other phe- 
nomena of the heavens, they proceed upon theory ; but 
when the astrologers attempted to connect those events 
with the events of society, they proceeded upon hypothesis. 

Dr. Herbert. Yes; with this explanation, that, in the 
case of the astronomers, the sequence of antecedent and 
consequent, or of cause and effect, as we call it, had been 
observed to be uniforni and invariable in all instances ; 
while, in the case of the astrologers, the sequence had not 
been observed in any one instance. 

Edward. What, then, should have led the astrologers 
to make the assertions, or anybody to believe them? 

Dr. Herbert. A wish to profit by the delusions of others, 
on the part of many of the astrologers, and those who em- 
ployed them, no doubt ; and the general error of the igno- 
rant, that of receiving the conclusion without attending to 
the fact, on the part of their dupes. 

Matilda. After they had got a number of alleged coin- 
cidences between the prediction and the result, I can im- 
agine that they might succeed ; but I cannot think how 
they would do it at the first. 

17. When may we proceed by theory, and when by hypothesis 

in our inquiries after knowledge? 18. Give the illustration of 

the two modes of procedure. 



84 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 4. 

Dr, Htrhert, That calls to my recollection one source 
of error in the consideration of cause and effect, to which I 
omitted to direct your attention, while we were conversing 
on that subject. The events that are happening at any 
one time are innumerable ; and though each of these be 
the effect of the immediately preceding event, and the cause 
of the one immediately following, yet their coincidence 
in point of time must, in all cases where we are ignorant 
(and, even to the wisest of us, there are many), leave us 
exposed to the danger of confounding one train with another. 
Thus, an eclipse of the sun may be immediately followed 
by the death of a monarch, the loss of a battle, or the con- 
flagration of a city ; they may have perfect continuity in 
time, and they may also have proximity in place, which 
are, after all that we can observe, in the sequence of the 
&ame train of events. (1.) They are in their own nature 
striking ; and, therefore, to those who are not aware of 
the intervention of the moon as the cause of the eclipse, 
which is not a necessary discovery by the sight, the moon 
not being visible w^hen in the close vicinity of the sun, 
the eclipse^ which is an effect and the cause only of the 
partial obscuration of the sun, may be considered as the 
cause of the disaster. (2.) Other circumstances are likely 
to contribute to the delusion : the great body of those 
who hear of the fact, may be ignorant of the decease of 
the monarch, the inferior strength or skill of the vanquished 
army, or the casting of the brand that set fire to the city. 
They have thus both a cause and an effect to dispose of, 
in sequence, as far as their information goes ; and, there- 
fore, that they should join these together, is by no means 
unnatural. 

Charles, But in these cases, the causes which are thus 
misplaced, are all of a very mysterious nature. 

Dr, Herbert. That, of course, is the very reason why 
they are misapplied. Even the most ignorant do not attri- 
bute every-day occurrences — such as their own health, the 
progress of vegetation, the flowing of the river, or the ap- 
parent motion of the sun — to any thing supernatural. The 
witches did not keep people in health, or ripen the corn, 

19. What source of error does the author refer to, which he 
omitted to mention when on the subject of cause and effect ?-- — 
20. What two considerations account for the frequency of delusion 
from this source among the lower classes in society ? 



Less. 4. intellectual philosophy. 85 

though they were supposed to produce sickness, and blast 
ithe crop ; and they were not supposed to do even these 
things by their ordinary powers, in the same way as people 
do their common business : they did it all by means of 
some power delegated to them by a being having superior 
abilities to theirs. The whole of the events to which super- 
stition applied, were those which had a powerful influence 
upon the feelings of the parties, and of the real causes or 
antecedents of which they were ignorant. Thus you see 
that we must not only be on our guard against using hy- 
pothesis in the place of observation, but we must be equally 
careful not to confound the sequences in matters that we 
do observe. 

Mary. But how are we to apply these cautions to the 
study of the mind, in which there is nothing to be observed 
at all ? 

Dr. Herbert. We must proceed just as in any other 
case ; we must notice the states of it, as they are excited by 
the perceptions of things external, and the trains of thought 
that follow in succession when we reflect. 

Matilda. But thinking is so very unlike what we think 
about, that 1 cannot see how the study of the one can lead 
us to any knowledge of the other ? 

Dr. Herbert. We do not know any thing about the 
mind, farther than that it thinks^ and is one and indivisible, 
and therefore indestructible; and, consequently, we are 
unable even to guess what it is like or not like. But there 
are cases in other parts of our inquiry, where we have phe- 
nomena that lead us to conclude that there is a substance, 
although, to our organs of sense, and the apparatus of our 
research, that substance has not yet been made palpable in 
a separate state. 

Charles. Electricity is one of those cases. 

Mary. Galvanism is another. 

Edward. And magnetism is a third. 



21. In consequence of the errors arising from this source, what 
does the author infer, that we should guard against, and avoid con- 
founding ? 22. But how can we apply these cautions to the 

study of the mind ? 23. How much do we know about ihe mind ? 

24. What cases may be mentioned in natural philosophy, where 

we have phenomena, that lead us to conclude that there is a sub- 
stance, although it has not yet been made palpable to our senses, in 
a separate state ^ 

8* 



86 PIRST LESSONS IN Less. 4. 

Dr, Herbert, And caloric. We know nothing about 
that, as separate from all other substances, as existing in 
space, though its phenomena, as existing in time, be among 
the most familiar as well as the most important with which 
we are acquainted. We cannot ascribe to it any of the 
qualities by which we distinguish one piece of matter from 
another, such as weight, or hardness, or colour ; and yet 
we know as much about it as enables us to make it the 
most manageable^ at the same time that it is the most 
powerful servant that we possess. Now, if there be a 
something, which performs compositions and decomposi- 
tions, among physical substances that are almost endless; 
and if we understand the sequences of the phenomena of 
it, just as well as we do those of substances that are palpa- 
ble to the senses, apart from the rest of the material crea- 
tion, there can be no bar in the way of our knowing the 
phenomena of that which thinks, if we confine ourselves 
to the phenomena, and do not attempt to be wise beyond 
human possibility about the ''abstract essence," words to 
which nobody could possibly attach any meaning what- 
ever. The very same method which we resort to in the 
study of matter, will conduct us rightly in the study of 
mind. 

Charles. But if the study of mind and matter be conduct- 
ed in the same manner, would not that lead us to conclude 
that matter and mind are the same, or that the mind is a 
material substance ? 

Dr. Herbert. The similarity of the modes of study 
arises from the sameness of the mind that studies them, 
rather than from any thing analogous, far less identical, 
in the subjects themselves. The carpenter uses the saw 
in the same manner, whether that which he cuts be deal 
or oak. 

Charles, But f have read about some who have contend- 
ed that the mind is material ; and will not the similarity in 

25. What do we know, and what do we not know about caloric? 

26. Since we cannot ascribe to it weight, or hardness, oi- colour, 

of what advantage is the knowledge which we possess of it ? 

27. Since the knowledge of caloric, which can be known only by 
its effects, is as well understood and as useful to us, as the knowl- 
edge of those substances which have weight, or hardness^ or colour ; 
can there be any thing to prevent us from knowing the plienomena 
of the mind, if we confine our attention to the proper sphere of in- 
quiry ? 28. Why is the study of mind and of matter to be con- 
ducted in the same manner? 



Less. 4. intellectual philosophy. 87 

the mode of studying it and matter, lead to such a result 
as this? 

Dr. Herbert, If we were to consider the mind as dis- 
cernible apart from its perceptions and trains of thought, 
which we could not do without considering it as a separate 
substance, existing in and occupying some portion of space, 
then we could not well avoid considering it as material, 
because material substances are the only ones that we can 
know in this way. But if we attempt to describe the 
mind in this way, it will be the mere creature of our imag- 
ination. When we say a material substance, we always 
mean a substance composed of materials — a substance 
which admits of mechanical division, or chemical solution, 
or one which can enter into mixture or combination, so 
that its former appearances may, to a greater or a less 
extent, be altered. Now, we cannot even think of the 
mind as being thus decomposable, or thus entering into 
combination. 

Charles. When the mind is affected by the impressions 
of external objects on the senses, and when all the motions 
and actions of the body follow the wishes of the mind, may 
we not thence conclude that the mind is in a state of com- 
bination with the body. 

Dr. Herbert. Juxta-position, Charles, is not combina- 
tion ; neither is connexion combination, in the chemical 
or even the mechanical sense of the term, any more than 
immediate succession in time is the observed sequence to 
which we crive the name of cause and effect. Those 
senses by which we perceive the external world are not in 
combination with the mind that thinks, for we have expe- 
rience of thinking without their operation, and even with- 
out the existence of some of them. When we separate 
the parts of a chemical compound, as when we decompose 
water by the oxidation of a metal, there is not a trace in 
the separated hydrogen by which we could find out that it 

29. In what light must we consider the mind, necessarily to in- 
volve the conclusion, that it is a mateiial substance ? 30. What 

is understood by a material substance ? 31. Can any of these 

things in any manner be applicable to the mind ? 32. Since the 

connexion between the mind and the body is so intimate, ought we 

not to conclude they are in a state of combination ? 33. What 

occasion have we to conclude that the senses are not combined with 

the mind ? 34. What instances are mentioned for the purpose of 

illustration ^ 



88 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 4. 

ever was in combination with the oxygen. But the memory 
of sounds remains after the ear is deaf; and, as was inter- 
estingly shown in the case of Milton, the mind can paint 
new scenes of the most exquisite beauty and the most stu- 
pendous grandeur, after the sight of the eye has been 
quenched for ever. 

Mary. But the feelings that we have in joy and grief, in 
hope and fear, in success and disappointment, or in the re- 
membrance that we have done well, or that we have done 
ill, are as different as those objects of the senses that are 
external ; and ought we not to consider them as arising 
from different qualities of the mind? 

Dr. Herbert. They have been considered as such by 
those who would have been very much mortified if they 
had been told that their doctrine of a cojiipound mind^ 
made up of many conflicting powers and passions, ever 
and anon in rebellion against reason, their governor, ne- 
cessarily involved the notion that the mind is a material 
substance, that is, a compound of many parts or elements ; 
and when that is once admitted, there is no avoiding the 
conclusion that the parts of the compound may again be 
separated, and the mind cease to exist. Thus the notion 
of anything like composition in the mind, puts an end to 
the philosophy of mind altogether (and, in part, to the 
mind itself) ; and our disquisitions about the intellectual 
and active powers, the passions, the emotions, and all the 
other parts, into which the mind, as momentarily exist- 
ent, is separated, are really disquisitions about something 
which is material, and, in the consideration of our own 
minds, different from those minds themselves ; for by this 
the mind becomes like the ether, or the fifth element of 
the ancients, a material substance, of which we know noth- 
ing, and which is, therefore, a mere creation of the im- 
agination. 

Edward. Then these opinions of the mind are not theo- 
ries ; they are hypotheses. 

Dr. Herbert. They are purely hypotheses ; and as 
they tend in no way to regulate our inquiries, and cannot 

35. To what conclusion must we necessarily come, if we adopt 
the notion, that the sensations of joy and grief, hope and fear, arise 

from different qualities of the mind ? 36. What must be the 

result, if we admit that the mind is a compound ? 37. And what 

would our disquisitions about the powers of the mind become ?— 
38. Are such hypotheses of any use ? 



Less. 4. intellectual philosopiiv. 69 

be verified by experiment, they are useless hypotheses — 
idols whicli, like all idols, waste our time and our activity 
in the worshipping, but do nothing for us in return. In 
this, as in every other part of a subject so very nice and 
difficult, the means of error lie thick around us; and the 
truth is but in one direction — in the phenomena, that is, in 
the successive sfc/fes of the simple, undecomposable and in- 
destructible mind. 

Charles. If we cannot analyse the mi[id, 1 am at a loss 
to see how the study of it, however long, or however assid- 
uously we attend to it, can give us any more knowledge 
than that which can be possessed by any one. 

Dr. Herbert. The search after knowledge which may 
not be possessed by any one, is the search of we know not 
what. To go in quest of that is folly, and not wisdom. 
What our object should be is, to seek after that which any 
body may know, but which few in fact do know, because 
they have not sought after it, the vulgar from ignorance 
and indifference, and the learned, from the vain desire of 
having knowledge above others ; not in degree only, which 
they might obtain, but in kind, which, as their minds, or 
means of perception are the same, is utterly impossible. 
We know more about some of the events and the substan- 
ces in nature, than those who have not examined the 
qualities of the latter, and observed the successions of the 
former. 

Charles. Yes, we know the causes and effects in the 
successions, and can analyse the compounds into the parts 
of which they are compounded. 

Dr. Herbert. Well, the phenomena of the mind hap- 
pen in succession ; and we find that, in each succession, 
a certain definite perception or emotion follows a certain 
other, in the same manner, and with the same uniformity, 
that the perception of the persons and furniture in a room 
follows the introduction of lighted candles ; and we also 
know that many of our perceptions and feelings are com- 
pounded of simpler ones, into which they may be sepa- 
rated. 

39. Amidst so much error where must we look for the truth ? 
40. Why have neither the vulgar nor learned attained abetter 



knowledge of intellectual philosophy? 41. How do the plie 

nomena of the miud happen r 42. What do we find in each 

succession ? 43, What do we know respecting our perceptions 

and feelings.' 



90 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 4. 

3Iatilda. Almost every perception that we have is com- 
pounded. Even that of so common a thing as a lighted 
candle, which we can separate into the candle itself, its be- 
ing made of matter that will burn and give light, the appli- 
cation of the match to it, the degree of light, and so many 
other circumstances, that I cannot name them. 

Mary. In like manner, when I am pleased or offended, 
there is the thing or thought that pleases or offends me, the 
reason why it does so, the propriety that it should do so, and 
a variety of other considerations, any of which might have 
existed separately without the others ; but the pleasure, or 
the offence, could not have existed in the manner that it 
did without them ail. 

Di\ Herbert, Thus you see that the states of the mind 
are as capable of analysis as the substances in nature ; 
and as every compound state is, as it were, the common 
consequent to the whole of those other states, simple or 
compound, by which we have uniformly found it to be pre- 
ceded, and which are therefore its causes, the analysis 
opens to us a train of discovery, by which we may not 
only know, scientifically ^ the successive phenomena of the 
mind, just as we do those of the external world, but also 
found an intellectual art upon our intellectual science, and 
regulate those states of the mind that are productive of our 
conduct as individuals, and as members of society in the 
same way that we found an external art upon our scientific 
knowledge of the mechanical and chemical phenomena 
of matter. As there is not a single event in the external 
world which is not consequent to some other event as 
an effect, and antecedent to a third as a cause; so there 
is not one state of our mind which is not consequent to 
a former state, and antecedent to a state that follows ; 
and unless we have studied the successions with the same 
care, we must fall into the same errors in our thinking 
and acting, as we do in judging of the events of the external 
world. 

44. How may the feeling of pleasure, or offence, be analysed ? 

45. How may every compound state be considered? 

46. What does the analysis open to us, and what may we know 

by it ? 47. To what further use may we extend the knowledge 

which we thus gain ? 48. In the external world, is every event 

the efFect of some preceding eveiyi, also the antecedent of some one, 

which follows after ? 49. D^es this hold true in regard to the 

phenomena of the mind ? 50. Into what errors must we fall, 

unless we carefully observe the successions ? 



Less. 4. intellectual philosophy. 91 

Charles. I can perceive that we may fall into similar 
errors, as they who, by misplacing the cause and the effect, 
do, when tliey attribute the happening of a public calamity 
to the occurrence of an ecli[)se, or the appearance of a 
comet. 

Edward. Yes, and the effect will be much more se- 
rious to us ; as it will effect our own happiness, in which 
we shall not have the opinions of others with us, as is the 
case with those who attribute external events to the wrong 
causes. 

Dr. Herbert. There is no question of it. If we could 
have the trains of our thoughts and feelings completely 
analysed, we should be on our guard against many of our 
errors, and spare ourselves much both of our mental re- 
gret and our external misfortune. Thus the philosophy 
of the mind, when diligently^ studied and properly applied, 
tends not only to make us wiser, but to make us better and 
happier ; and while it does this, it is not like most other 
branches of our knowledge, contingent upon external cir- 
cumstances, and liable to the external decays of our na- 
ture. It extends, as we proceed ; and when the scene 
closes upon the external world, it gives us confidence in 
that future hope, w^hich, even in this world, is our best en- 
joyment in prosperity, and our only sure consolation in ad- 
versity — a consolation which, while we hold, (and once 
obtained, we cannot quit it if we would), — enables us to 
ride buoyant over the most troubled waves that can agitate 
the ocean of time. 

From what we have already said, 1 trust you see how we 
are to proceed in our inquiry ; and, therefore, when we re- 
vert to the subject, we may be able to begin the inquiry 
itself There are two subjects to which you may turn your 
thoughts in the interim ; — (1. ) That we know ourselves and 
the other subjects of our knowledge, and (2.) that we know 
that we are the same beings to-day as yesterday, and shall 
still be the same to-morrow. 

Edward. These are such very simple matters, that I do 
not think any body can have a doubt about them. 

51. What would be the consequence, if we could completely 

analyse our thoughts and feelings ? 52. In what two respects 

is the philosophy of the mind to be preferred to other branches of 

knowledge ? 53. How far does its influence extend, and in what 

does it give us confidence ? 54. What two subjects are men- 
tioned as deservincp attention ? 



92 FIRST LESSONS IxV LeSS. 5. 

Di\ Herbert, That they are simple, and never doubted, 
or made the subject of questions, by ordinary persons, is 
true ; but, as has been the case with many other matters, 
that are so simple that they cannot be made plainer by any 
speaking or writing than they are in the mere perception, 
they have been made the foundations of innumerable dis- 
putes, and in order that a man should be able to prove 
that lie exists, and is himself, they have found it necessary 
to make a double man of him, and set the one part to 
work to know and prove the existence and identity of the 
other. 

Charles, In this double existence, they mast have found 
difficulty ; because they themselves must sometimes have 
mistaken the imaginary for the true, and whenever they did 
this, they must have been unable to prove any thing. 

Dr. Herbert. They were worse than that, Charles. 
Arguments, like inquiries, are no stronger than their weak- 
est parts. Iftherebebut one false position in an argu- 
ment, or one mistake in the nature of a substance, that 
erior, or that mistake, spoils the whole. Parts may be true, 
and other parts false ; but one falsehood destroys the truth 
of the whole. 



LESSON V. 

Consciousness and conscience only states of the mind — Memory — 
Sameness — Mental identity must not be confounded with personal 
identity — Existence and mental identity, truths which cannot be 
denied — Intuitive belief. 

Dr, Herbert. You have no doubt been thinking upon 
the subjects to which I requested your attention at the 
close of our last conversation. You will recollect that we 
had come to the conclusion, (1,) that the mind is one think- 
ing, indivisible, and indestructible existence; (2,) that we 
can know nothing about its nature apart from the states in 
which it necessarily exists, or, as we may term them, the 
phenomena of it; (3,) that we may observe the order in 

55. Have these obvious truths ever been doubted? 
1. What six particulars have already been considered, and estab- 
lished in the preceding conversations ? 



Less, 5. intellectual philosophy. 93 

which these phenomena follow each other, as antecedents 
and consequents, or causes and effects ; (4,) that each state 
of the mind, in a continued train of perceptions or thoughts, 
is an effect, considered in reference to that which immedi- 
ately preceded it, and a cause, in respect of that which im- 
mediately followed ; (5,) that if we do not observe careful- 
ly we shall be in danger of falling into the same errors, by 
connecting causes with wrong effects, and effects with 
wrong causes, as we are in the study (or rather the neglect 
of the study) of external nature; (0,) and, that many of the 
states of the mind are compound, and that these we may 
analyse or separate into the simpler states of which they 
are composed, just as we may analyse compound sub- 
stances into the simpler elements of which they have been 
made up. 

Edicarch We can understand all these except the last 
one, and that we can also partially understand ; we can 
understand that some of the states are compound; but still, 
as this individual state is only one state of the mind which 
cannot be divided, we cannot see how the simpler parts of 
which the compound state is made up, can be separated by 
analysis, as we can separate the constituent parts of a ma- 
terial substance, — as the acid and the alkali in a salt. 

Dr. Herbert. The analyses are certainly different ; be- 
cause we require a material apparatus to act upon the ma- 
terial substances, and the other analysis is wholly an ope- 
ration of the mind; but still in the substantive part of the 
process there is very little difference between them. When 
we analyse the salt, and get at the acid and the alkali, we 
merely retrace one step in the succession of external phe- 
nomena backwards, get from the salt as an effect to the 
presence of an acid and an alkali, in such proportions and 
under such circumstances as have been observed to be 
followed by their uniting in a salt. In like manner, when 
we would analyse any compound state of the mind — as the 
joy that we feel when we get possession of any thing 
which is gratifying in itself, and which we did not expect 
— when we trace this joy one step backward, and resolve 

2. Is the analysis of a material sub-tance and that of the states 

of the nnind in any respects alike? 3. In analysing a salt what is 

the process ? 4. In analysing the sensation which arises from 

getting possession of a thing gratifying in itself, and which we did 
cot expect to obtain, what is the process ? 
9 



94 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 5. 

it into the gratification arising from our regard for th« 
thing itself, and our gratification arising from the novelty 
of its coming to us without our having expected it — these 
two parts are just as distinct from each other as the acid 
and the alkali ; and any one of them may exist as a sepa- 
rate state without the other. Each singly would have been 
a different feeling at the time from the compound ofthi 
two ; and each would have remained as a different por- 
tion of the memory from that, which results from the two 
together. 

Mary. T can see that there may be many simple ele- 
ments in the feeling or state of mind that one may have or 
a very simple occurrence ; and yet that those elements may 
all be so far of the same kind as that they may tend to give 
strength to the compound feeling. 

Dr. Herbert. 1 dare say you can mention an instance. 

Mary. If I merely receive a letter, there is pleasure in 
that; if it be one that I was anxious to have, the removal 
of my anxiety is a pleasure ; if it came from a friend, that 
gives me pleasure; if it be well written, there is a pleasure 
in that ; there is a pleasure if it contain agreeable informa- 
tion, and there is also a pleasure if this agreeable informa- 
tion be about myself, or any one else in whom I feel an 
interest. It is a pleasure on the whole — pleasure in all 
the parts of which it is made up; and the pleasure would 
be changed by the absence or the alteration of any of those 
parts. 

Charles. It is very difficult for one to imagine any feel- 
ing that could not be thus analysed. 

Dr. Herbert. And it is almost as difficult to imagine 
any thought, how^ever simple and however transient, that 
stands alone without connecting itself with the past, or in- 
fluencing the future; and thus the most trifling state of 
the mind becomes a matter of the greatest consequence, if 
we are to make the proper use of our power of thinking, by 
turning it to the acquisition of knowledge and happiness. 

5. What is remarked of the two parts of which the sensation is 

composed ? 6. And what is further remarked of each part 

singly ? 7. What instance illustrates the position that many 

simple elementary sensations may be so combined as to give strength 

to the compound feeling ? H. Does a thought ever stand wholly 

alone, without being connected with the past or future? 9. How 

^ may the most trifling state of mind become a matter of the ^?eatest 
consequence ? 



Less. 5. intellectual philosopht. 95 

The late Dr. Thomas Brown, of Edinburgh, one of the 
most profound and accurate, as well as one of the most ele- 
gant thinkers tliat ever made the human mind his study, 
gives a description of it at once so touching and so true, that 
I cannot refrain from reading it to you. 

*' Mind is capable of existing in various states, an enu- 
meration of which is all that constitutes our knowledge of 
it. It is that, which perceives, remembers, compares, 
grieves, rejoices, loves, hates; and though the terms, what- 
ever they may be, that are used by us in such enumera- 
tions, may be few, we must not forget that the terms are 
mere inventions of our own, for the purpose of classifica- 
tion, and that each of them comprehends a variety of feel- 
ings that are as truly different from each other as the 
classes themselves are different. Perception is but a single 
word: yet when we consider the number of objects that 
act upon our organs of sense, and the number of ways in 
which their action may be combined, so as to produce one 
compound effect, different from that which the same objects 
would produce separately, or in other forms of combina- 
tion, how many are the feelings which this single word de- 
notes ! — so many, ifideed, that no arithmetical computation 
is sufficient to measure iheir infinity. 

■^^ Amid all this variety of feelings, with whatever rapidi- 
ty the changes may succeed each other, and however op- 
posite they may seem, we have still the most undoubting be- 
iief, that it is the same individual mind which is thus affect- 
ed in various ways. The pleasure which is felt at one mo- 
ment, has indeed little apparent relation to the pain that 
was felt perhaps a few moments before; and the knowledge of 
a subject which we possess, after having reflected on it fully, 
has equally little resemblance to our state of doubt when 
we began to inquire, or the total ignorance and indifference 
which preceded the first doubt that we felt. It is the sante 
individual mind, however, which, in all those instances, is 
pleased and pained, is ignorant, doubts, reflects, knows. 
There is something * changed in all and yet in all the same,' 
which at once constitutes the thoughts and emotions of the 

10. Wh>it ar ' the terms, in which Dr. Brown enumerates the 

different states of the mind ? 11. What does eachof these terms 

comprehend ? 12. What is remarked of ihe single term percep- 
tion ? 13. Of what can we have the most undoubting belief 

amidst all the variety of feeling ? What are some of the remarkl 

with which Dr, Brown illustrates the subject? 



96 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 5. 

hour, and outlives them,— something which, from the tem- 
porary agitations of passion, rises, unaltered and everlast- 
ing, like the pyramid that still lifts the same point to Heav- 
en, amid the winds and whirlwinds of the desert.'' 

Edward, I feel it. I remember the time when I cared 
only for hoops and hobby-horses, and now I have learned 
a great many things ; but I was Edward then, I am Ed- 
ward now, and I shall be Edward while I live, though I 
should become a king, or a philosopher, or even a fool. 

Dr. Herbert. Let us take what may be apparently the 
simplest of the three states, the fact of your being Edward 
at the present moment : how do you prove that, or how 
could you convince any body of it? 

Edward. 1 know not how I might convince any other 
person of it; but I feel that I cannot have any doubt of it 
myself 

Dr. Herbert. And yet there have been philosophers 
that have not only doubted, but denied it. 

Charles. Denied their own existence ! why, surely that 
is impossible; for the existence itself is necessarily involv- 
ed in being able to deny it. If they denied the existence, 
they must have denied the denial of it, and been, after all, 
just in the same state as other people. 

Mary. They might, with just as much propriety, have 
denied the existence of the earth, or the sun, or any, or all 
of the material universe. 

Dr. Herbert. So they might, and indeed with a good 
deal more propriety ; for as the existence of no one indi- 
vidual part of the external world is absolutely necessary 
to thinking, the knowledge which a mind has of its own 
existence, that is, of its thought, is more intricate than that 
of any thing external. May not our senses deceive us? 

Charles. In the qualities and uses of things, which are 
discovered only by experiment and experience, they may ; 
and there may be things that are too small or too re- 
mote for being perceived by our senses ; but if the organs 
of sense themselves be not deceived, we can have no 
doubt about the actual existence of any thing that we 
perceive. 

14. Can a person doubt his own existence ? 15. What raust 

the denial of one's own existence necessaiily involve ? 16. Why 

might a person more reasonably deny the existence of the material 
universe, than his own existence ?--. — 17. Can our senses ever 
deceive us ? 



Less. 5. intellectual philosophy. 97 

Matilda. But many people have believed in apparitions, 
which of course had no existence : and I myself after look- 
ing stedfa^tly for some time at the setting sun in the west, 
saw the aj)pearance of suns, of a greenish colour, upon 
turning to the east. 

Dr. Herbert. The apparitions are mere creatures of 
the mind itself, formed much in the same way as the new 
scenes and worlds that we see in dreams, and of which we 
have ofien a more lively remembrance than we have of 
some scenes that actually exist. The mind is so impressed 
with, or rather so identified with its own thoughts, (from 
the very uiiqiiestionableness of its own existence,) that, in- 
stead of fluting a belief in the reality of what has been per- 
ceived through the tnedium of the senses, it often co'nes, 
by their recurrence in trains of thought, to believe in the 
reality of that which was at the first only imagination. It is 
thus that the power of receiving truth, when not properly 
exercised, is in danger of picking up error, and mistaking 
that for truth. 

Matilda. But the green suns ! — I saw them. 

Dr. Herbert. 1 question not that you did, or that any 
body else would have seen them under the same circum- 
stances ; but there was a cause ; you had been looking 
stedfiistly at the sun. 

Matilda. Ye.^, and for some time, till my eyes began to 
ache. 

Dr. Herbert. That was the cause. When we look in- 
tensely for some time upon any very brilliant colour, we lose 
the perception of that, and become remarkably sensitive to 
another colour, which is called the complement or accidental 
colour of the first, being that which, added to or mixed with 
the first, would make white light ; and if the lookincr be 
continued till the eyes are pained, the accidental colour is 
seen whether it be present or not. Ail these are, however, 
no argument aijainst the truth of our sensible perceptions, 

18. What are apparitions, and how formed ? 19. How does 

the remembrance of such things often compare with those that 

really exist ? 20. JCy what means is the mind often induced 

t^ believe in the reality of that, which at the first was only imagina- 
tion ? 21. What reason can be given, why the person, °who 

has been steadily gazing at the sun, should see immediately after- 
wards, in another part of the heavens, suns of a greenish colour.' 
22. Is this an argument against the truth of our sensible per- 
ceptions .' 

9* 



93 ' FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 5. 

when the organs of sense are properly formed, and in their 
ordinary state of health. 1 once knew a family that had 
none of ihem the power of distinguishing colours ; and yet 
they were in every other respect very capable. But their 
defect in this matter did not destroy the truth of the per- 
ception which other people have of colours, any more than 
the ignorance of the uneducated, as to the mechanical and 
chemical properties of matter, tends to destroy the truths 
and the applications of those sciences, to persons that are 
conversant with them. 

Charles. Where should the disposition in those philoso- 
phers, to whom you have alluded, to deny their own exist- 
ence, and that of the external world, arise ? They could 
not have seriously wished that either themselves, or the 
world, had been out of existence. 

Dr. Herbert. I dare say they were just as fond of life, 
and of all the enjoyments of life, as other people. But the 
grand source of error, in this, as in all other parts of the 
philosophy, both of the mind and of matter, appears to 
have been the desire of some supplemental knowledge for 
philosophers, even on the most common and obvious mat- 
ters, in which those who were not philosophers should not 
be able to participate. 

Edward. As in the matter of a man's existence, they 
might want to give him two selves, that the one might prove 
the existence of the other. 

Dr. Herbert. That comes pretty near to it. in all 
matters of internal or intuitive belief, matters, the truth of 
which we find it the most difficult to doubt, they allowed 
what they called consciousness to be the evidence ; but 
they came to the external world for their analogy, and 
maintained that the consciousness of the thought, or state 
of the mind, was something separate from the thought or 
state itself, just in the same manner that the evidence of 
an external event is something different from the event 
itself. 

Mary. Even I wonder at that. We can have no evi- 
dence of any event which we have not ourselves witnessed, 

23. Wliat could induce philosophers to deny their own existence, 

and that of the external world ? 24. "What did they allow to be 

evidence in all matters of internal or intuitive belief? 25. What 

did they maintain, when they came to the external world for their 

analogy ? 26. What is the only evidence we can have of aa 

event, which we do not ourselves witness, either in the happening 
or in the consequences ? 



Less. 5. intellectual philosophy. 90 

either in the happening or in the consequences, other than 
the evidence of those who tell us; and we can have no 
evidence of what we perceive hy the senses, but tlie im- 
pression on the senses themselves : so if the matier to be 
believed be a mere state of the mind, which no witness can 
see, and which none of the organs of sense can feel, what 
evidence can we get more than the mere feeling of the state, 
that is, the mere stale itself? 

Dr. Herbert, And yet, they not only erected conscious* 
ness into a separate power of the mind, quite distinct 
from the thought, the sensation, the feeling, or the state of 
mind, whatever it happened to be, simple or compound, but 
they divided this ideal consciousness into two separate pow- 
ers: the one they cdA\ed conseiousness^ ov the intellectual 
sense, the office of which was to make us know what we 
thought and felt ; and the other they called conscience^ or 
the moral sense, the office of which was to tell us whether 
what we thought, and felt, and resolved to do, was right 
or wrong. 

Charles, When we merely think, T do not see that there 
can be any thing but the thought; but in our sensations, 
such as m seeing, is there not the evidence of the eye, be- 
sides the know ledge of the mind; or, when we hear, there 
is one knowledge of the sound, and another of that from 
which the sound proceeds ; as I may hear the sound of 
music, and not know whether it be the sound of a piano- 
forte or a harp, till I have either seen the instrument, or 
listened to it for some time. 

Dr. Herbert. Still in this case there is not, first, the 
perception of sound, together with the consciousness of that 
perception ; neither is there, afterwards, the perce[)lion of 
the sound of a harp, and the consciousness that it is the 
sound of that instrument: there are two perceptions, each 
standing in no need of any separate consciousness, to make 



27. What must be our only evidence of what we perceive by 
the senses '^ 28. If the state ot the mind be the object of our in- 
quiry, what must be the evidence r 29. Into what did these 

philosophnrs erect consciousness? 30. Into what two powers did 

they divide this ideal consciousness ? 31. And what was the 

office of each ? 32. In listening to the music of a harp, is there 

first the perception of the sound, v ith the consciousness ot it ; and 
afterwards the perception of the sound of a harp, and the con- 
sciousness that it is the sound of that instrument .' 33. IIow 

many perceptions are there in this instance i' 34. Do they re- 
quire a separate consciousness ^ 



100 FIRST LESSONS IN LE^&i 5. 

you know it ; and there is a comparison of the sound pro- 
duced, or the instrument producing it, with a former sound 
or a former instrument, the perception of which was in 
the memory ; and the sequence of the sound and the instru- 
ment, which you have learned by former experience, leads 
you to place them again in the same order of cause and 
effect. 

Mary, Then in every case where we perceive, there 
is not the thing perceived, the perception, and conscious- 
ness — there is only the perception and the thing per- 
ceived. 

Dr, Herbert, Precisely so ; and when the perception 
is merely a thought, without any external object acting 
upon the organs of sense, the perception and the thing 
perceived are the same — that is, there is nothing but the 
perception. 

Edward. And when we remember, is there not memory 
and the thing remembered, besides the mere remembering 
of it? I remember the horse that was solil last year, and 
the thunder-storm that happened on Wednesday. Is that 
a proof that 1 have no memory, or that there was no horse 
and no thunder-storm ? 

Dr, Herbert. Do you see the horse, or the lightning, 
or hear the roll of the thunder now ? 

Edward. Certainly not. 

Dr. Herbert, Then if your power of remembering thera 
were to be destroyed, and they had been the only horse 
and the only thunder-storm of which you ever had any 
knowledge, to what would your knowledge of them amount? 
Would you know a horse if you were to see one, or a thun- 
der-storm if it were to take place ? 

Edward. Of course I would not. 

Dr. Herbert. Then after you lost recollection of them, 
in what would your memory consist ? 

Edward. In other things which I might remember. 

Charles. Then, Edward,! think it is very evident, that 
the memory is nothing else than the state of the mind in 
remembering. 

35. What comparison is there in this instance ? 36. What 

leads you again to place them in the same order of cause and effect? 
37. When we perceive, is diere the thing perceived, the per- 
ception, and the consciousness? 38. When the perception is 

merely a thought, what may be asserted respecting it ? 39. When 

we remember, is there memory and the thing remembered, besides 
the mere remembering it .'' 40. What then is the memory ^ 



Less. 5. intellectual philosophy. 101 

Mary, And the remembrance of any thing has no ex- 
istence, except when it forms the present thought — that is, 
when it is the existing state of the mind. 

Matilda. But still it is curious how it comes, not only 
when we do not wish for it, but when we are trying to keep 
it back. I sometimes find that I cannot remember j but 
always when I try, I find that I cannot forget. 

Dr. Herbert. Then that is another proof that we have 
not recollection, as a separate power, to bring past feel- 
ings and perceptions to mind when we wish ihem, any 
more than we have consciousness as a power to put us in 
mind that we are perceiving and remembering, or con- 
science, as a separate power, to warn us of the wrong 
that we are meditating to do, or coming to reprove us for 
what we have done. We have siniply a mind, to question 
the existence of which would be an absurdity ; because 
the very act of questioning would be assuming the exist- 
ence of what we questioned. This mind is not made up 
of any distinct pincers or principles, for then it would be 
no mind at all, but a material substance; but is known to 
us only by its successive states. Those states follow each 
other in the order of time, as antecedents and conse^ 
quents, or causes and effects, just as the events of the ex- 
ternal world. By experience, we find out the chains of 
those sequences; and we have the power of comparing 
them together, so as to conclude that the consequent will 
follow the antecedent ; and thus, by alteiing, compound- 
ing, or remodelling the antecedents, we are enabled to 
conclude that we shall produce corresponding alterations 
upon the consequents. By those means, our experience 
becomes to us a rule and guide in our future conduct, just 
in the same manner as our experience in the events of 
the external world is a rule and guide to us in respect to 
them. 

Edicard, But would it not have been better for us if 
we had known the nature of our own minds, in the same 
way as we know the mechanical and chemical properties of 
matter ? 

41. Are recollection, consciousness, and conscience separate 
powers of the mind ? 42. Why would it be an absurdity to ques- 
tion the existence of the mind ? 43. Jf the mind were made up 

of distinct powers, what would it be ? 44. But how is the mind 

known to us .^ 45. How do those states follow each other.' 

46. By what means does our experience become a guide to us in 
our future conduct .? 



102 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 5. 

Dr. Herbert, That is impossible, from the very nature 
of the case, unless we adopt the experiment of the two 
minds, the one to think, and the other to watch it while 
thinking. 

Charles. But we can judge of the minds of others. 

Dr. Herbert. We can observe what others do, and 
we can examine what train of thought and impression 
^ould have led us to do the same ; and from that we 
may imagine what had been their trains of thoughts and 
impressions antecedent to the observed action. If the 
experience, and habits, and circumstances of all men were 
the same, both as regarded their minds and the perfection 
and exercise of their bodi'y organs, we would have a prob- 
ability of not being very far wrontJ ; but as the differences 
of mankind, in habit and experience, and, for aught that we 
know, in the original construction of the organs of sense, 
and, probably, of the faculty of the mind itself as a think- 
ing existence, are in the observed instances exceedingly 
various, and may be more so in those that we have not the 
means of observing, our comparisons in this way can never 
have the same certainty, as those which we derive from the 
study of our own trains of thought. 

Mary. It vve did not admit that conscience is a power 
of the mind, would not that tend to make us relaxed in our 
moral duties? 

Dr. Herbert, Our errors will not be prevented by the 
use of a name, Mary, if tiiere be not some reality to which 
that name is attached. If we know that certain painful 
feelings have always followed immediately or remotely from 
the performance of certain actions, or the formation of cer- 
tain wishes, what want we more, or rather what more can 
we receive? If we are informed of the punishment — if we 
see it, what more would we have, what more can we have, 
to restrain us from the antecedent of which it is the invari- 
able consequence ? 

47. Bow far can we judge of the minds of others? 48. How 

might we have a strong probability of the correctness of our 

opinion in re2;ard to the minds of others? 49. What prevents 

us from attaining the same degree of certainty in relation to the 

minds of others, which we may derive from the study of our own ? 

50. If conscience is not a separate power of the mind, what is 

there, which has the same effect in deterring us from doing wrong, 

which has usually been attributed to this imaginary power ? 

51. Does this restraint from doing evil, which a knowledge of the 
consequences of evil imposes on us, embrace all that is valuable in 
what is commonly termed conscience 7 



Less. 5. intellectual philosophy. 103 

Charles. That is surely all that is valuable in conscience, 
only it wants the name. 

I)r, Herbert, And when the name would mislead us, 
Charles, we are always better without it ; therefore the true 
wisdom lies in knowing the thing itself, and then the name 
is a matter of little moment. We umst use the same names 
as those with whom we converse in the same language, 
only we need not, and ought not, to attach their erroneous 
meanings to them. 

Mary, Then consciousness is nothing more than the 
knowledge of our present perceptions, and of our past 
recollections. 

Dr. Herbert. It is not even that, Mary. It is not the 
knowlodgeof the state of mind ; it is those states themselves. 
Their existence is the knowledge of them. They cannot 
exist without being known ; and they cannot be known but 
when they exist, and where they exist. Leaving all the 
evidence that you have of the existence of the Chinese, and 
the non-existence of the Lilliputians, and also of the differ- 
ences that are described in the real account of the one race, 
and the imaginary account of the other, tell me in what 
your perception of the former differs from that of the latter 
as a state of your mind. 

Edward. The accounts are so different. 

Dr. Herbert. We have nothing to do with the accounts ; 
these are the evidence which we weigh in the balance 
of experience. The simple thought, without one other link 
in tlie chain of connexion, how does it differ in the two 
cases? 

Edicard. I can see no difference. 

Dr. Herbert. And the great fire in London, as to wheth- 
er it happened in 1()66 or 1766, or not at all, if you have 
the same story without any reference to the date, or the 
truth, or the falsehood ? 

Matilda. It would be all the same. 

Dr. Herbert. Then do not those instances convince 
you that, in any single state of the mind, taken without 
reference to the chain of successions, to which we have 
found, by experience, that it belongs, and without any 

52. What is consciousness? 53. What is remarked respect- 

incr the existence of the states of the mind ? 54. Aside from the 

evidence of tlie existence of Chinese, and the non-existence of the 
Lilliputians, does the perception of tlie one differ from that of the 
other, as a slate of the mind ? 55. What do the instances men- 
tioned prove ? 



104 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 5. 

comparison with other states, there is merely the existence 
of the state, without any separate consciousness or knowl- 
edge of it, by which we are informed of its existence; but 
that it is identical with our own existence at the time, and 
the belief of it is founded on the same unquestionable basis 
as our own existence, (which is identical with it at the 
time,) — the declaration of it that would be involved in the 
very denial ? 

Charles. But if, in the single and momentary states of 
mind, whether they be produced by present impressions on 
the senses, or arise in the memory, or be formed in new 
combinations, as men must do, when they invent, there be 
no consciousness or knowledge, beyond the mere state 
itself; and if that be identical — which means the same with 
our own existence — then how shall we know that, amid all 
the changes of our feelings, in our lisllessness, and our 
thought, our joy, and our grief, our pleasure, and our pain, 
and all the countless variety of our mental phenomena, we 
are still the same identical beings? 

Dr. Herhert. You have put the objection well, Charles, 
and you have put it eloquently; but still out of the very 
ground of your objection we find the means of its over- 
throw, — a proof of our identity, which nothing can shake ; 
but which rests upon the same foundation, and involves in 
the denial the same proof of its truth, as our existence itself. 
But we must take care not to lose ourselves, as abler reason- 
ers have done, in a wilderness of words. You used the 
word ** same," and the word ** identical ;'' did you mean 
that they were equivalent terms, the one of which might, in 
reference to the continuity of our existence, be used always 
instead of the other ? 

Charles. J think they are equivalent. 

Dr, Herhert. The Thames in the hills of Gloucester- 
shire, where you could jump across it, is not the same as at 
London, where it at once floats thousands of vessels. 

Charles. No, it is not the same, certainly, for it is deep- 
er and broader at the latter place. 

56. But what do they prove, that it is identical with ? 57. 

Is it an objection to our own personal identity, that we have no con- 
sciousness beyond the state of the mind itself ? 58. On what 

does the proof of our identity rest, and what does the denial of it 

involve ? 59. Are the words sam,e and identical, terms of similar 

import in reference to this subject ? 60. Give the author's illus- 
tration of these terms. 



Less. 5. intellectual philosophy. 105 

Di\ Herbert. But from the smallest rill that gets the 
name, to the estuary where it miiifrjes with the ocean, is it 
not the continuous and identical Thames ? 

Charles. It is the identical Thames, certainly, and not 
another river, to which we can give a new name, preserv- 
ing the old one and the river of which it is the name. 

Dr. Herbert. And the water that forms the Thames — 
is that the same for two years in succession ? 

Edward. No, not for two days, or at the same place, for 
two hours. 

Dr. Herbert. Yet it is the identical Thames, 

Mary. It is not another river, certainly. 

Dr. Herbert. When it is foul with mud in a flood, and 
when free of it in dry weather, is it the same ? or would it be 
the same if its course were made as straight as a line, and 
its channel cased with polished marble ? 

Matilda. It would not be the same in any case, but it 
would be the Thames in them both. 

Dr. Herbert. And none of us are the same now as when 
we were little children, and could not speak or go from one 
place to another, without being carried. 

Mary. 1 see it now. There can be an identity of ex- 
istence, with endless varieties in the mode or state of that 
existence. 

Dr. Herbert. That is precisely it, Mary ; and because 
they would not see this very simple matter, they either 
doubted the identity of our existence, or wished to prove 
it by proving the sameness of our state, in which of course 
they failed, as it varies every moment. 

Edward. And how did they fall into that error ? 

Dr. Herbert, That is a matter of much less importance 
than how we shall avoid it ourselves. But they probably 
erred a little in the subject itself, and a good deal more in 
the words they made use of. They confounded our mental 
identity, or our identity as existent, with our identity as 
persons^ endowed with certain powers, and placed in cer- 
tain circumstances ; and as the supposed powers, which 
are merely observed phenomena, vary in themselves, and 
are varied by the circumstances, they could not prove the 

61. What can identity of existence be consistent with ? G2. 

What has been the consequence of not viewing the subject in this 

light ? 63. In what did the error of former philosophers lie ? 

64. With what did they confound our mental identity ^ 
10 



106 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 5. 

identity of the compound being they called person^ and in 
that they lost sight of, or doubted the identity of the simple 
existence called mind. 

Charles. We can never doubt our identity ; we are 
conscious of it. 

Dr. Herbert. That was the rock upon which some of 
the wisest of them split. They took the consciousness of 
the moment, as apart from the stale during the moment, to 
prove the momentary existence ; and they took the con- 
sciousness of the past recollections, as apart from the rec- 
ollections themselves, to prove the identity ; and between 
both, they had almost shuffled man out of his momentary 
existence as a sentient being, his continuity as an ac- 
countable one, and the indivisibility of his mind as an im- 
mortal one. 

Mary. They might as well have denied the identity of 
an instrument, because slow music is played at one time^ 
and quick at another, and because it jars vvhen not in 
tune. 

Dr. Herbert. One of the principal causes of error on 
this subject has unquestionably been the confounding of 
the mind with the body, and endeavouring to consider the 
whole man or person not only as identical in one continu- 
ous mental existence, but as having that identity extended 
to a sameness in his material frame, the particles of which 
are continually changing, in being wasted by use, and re- 
newed with food. Now, even in the case of the body, 
though there be a constant change in the substance, so that 
after a certain period, of which we can of course never 
know the length, there may not be one particle in the 
frame that was in it at the beginning of the period, yet 
there is a continuous identity, which renders it just as im* 
possible for us not to suppose that it is one body, as it is 
impossible for us to doubt the existence of the mind, or 
that in all the variety of its feelings and thoughts, it should 
continue one and indivisible. The constant change of the 

65. Since they could not prove in this manner the identity of the 
compound being they called person, what did they consequently 
doubt? — —QQ. What did Ihey do to prove the momentary exis- 
tence ? 67. And what to prove the identity ? QS. What 

were the consequences of such reasonings ? 69. What is men- 
tioned as one of the principal causes of error on this subject ? — — 
70. What sort of an identity must that be, which is applied to a 

body undergoing a constant change.^ 71. Hag such a body a 

fair claim to be called one body ? 



Less. o. intellectlal piiiLosoniY. 107 

matter, to which the mind is joined in that mysterious 
union winch fornis the life of the body, with a mind, of the 
substance of uhich as made up of parts, (which we have 
said is all that we can know of the nature of any substance 
as existing in space, and withont reference to its successive 
phenomena in time,) they could know notliing, seems so to 
have puzzled them, that, in their attempts to explain, they 
attended first to one part of the compound, and then to the 
other. 

Charles. 1 do not think that the connexion of a simple 
and undecomposable mind, with a body, the substance of 
which is continually changing, is any more mysterious 
than the connexion of such a mind with a body, the par- 
ticles of which would have remained the same during life, 

Edward. Or any more than a little black seed, which 
I put into the ground, should grow up into a large plant, 
and produce flowers and other seeds, 

Manj. Or than that I can lift my arm. 

Dr. Herbert. Of all matters that are unknown to us, 
it is almost useless to say that our knowledge must be the 
same ; for all that w^e can say about them is, that we are, 
and must remain, alike ignorant of them: the nature of 
God, the way in which the stupendous frame of the uni- 
verse arose at his will, the growth of a plant, the life and 
motions of an animal, why any event follows any other in 
the order which we, from experience, call cause and effect, 
are all equally difficult to our comprehension ; for this very 
plain reason, that they are all unknown, and, to our per- 
ceptions, all unknowable. If we will not believe in our own 
existence, or our own identity, unless we know the nature of 
mind, as abstract and apart from the phenomena, we ought 
to abstain from all the processes of the arts, and from tak- 
ing our food ; for the unanswerable loliy comes in the same 
manner, and at the same stage of all inquiries. As far as 
our knowledge extends, it is day, and we can discriminate 
one thing from another, and talk accurately about agree- 
ment and disagreement, sameness and difference, identity 
and non-identity ; but if we attempt to pass beyond the 
boundary of knowledge, all is impenetrable darkness, and 

72. What subjects are enumerated of which we must remain 

alike ignorant? 73. And why must we remain ignorant of 

them? 74. What course of conduct ought the man to pursue, 

who will not beheve in his own existence or identity, because he 
e«.nnct know the nature of the mind apart from its phenomena ? 



108 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 5. 

and to our perception there is nothing, because we do not 
perceive at all. 

Charles. But if we cannot make the very foundation of 
our knowledge plainer by reasoning, what is the use of rea- 
soning at all ? 

Dr. Herbert. You may properly call it the foundation 
of our knowledge, Charles, for it is the line which draws 
the distinction between the fabric that man builds, by his 
experience and reasoning, and that in the construction of 
which man has no concern, and yet without which he could 
not build a single inch. 

Matilda. It is in allusion to this, that we call those 
schemes and fancies that have no foundations, ''castles in 
the air." 

Dr. Herbert. Yes, and every science that has not a 
foundation in this intuitive belief, is nothing but a castle in 
the air. All matters of simple belief, that is, all truths to 
which w^e cannot deny our assent, and yet cannot resolve 
into inferences from a comparison with truths formerly 
known, are considered as intuitive; they are their own 
evidence ; can receive no other, and stand in need of no 
other ; and any attempt to prove them, uniformly fails, be- 
cause it involves that which cannot take place, making two 
or more of that which, in its nature, is only one. Those 
intuitive truths have a very great advantage over those that 
are founded upon reason and experience, because there can 
be no misunderstanding of them, there being no room for 
mistake or error. 

Edward. Then if all our knowledge be founded on these 
intuitive truths, and if there can be no mistake or error in 
them, how can we err at all ? 

Dr. Herbert. For the very same reason, Edward, that 
a house may tumble — because we have not built it skilfully. 

Charles. But the house may be well built, and yet fall, 
in consequence of the badness of the foundation. 

Dr. Herbert. There is never any fault in the founda- 
tion ; but we may lay on it a greater weight than it can 
bear : In other words, we may not choose it properly ; but 
then the fault is in us, and not in the foundation. The very 

75. What truths may be considered as intuitive ? 76. W^hat 

is said of their evidence, and why do attempts to prove them uniform- 
ly fail ? 77. Why do these truths have an advantage over those, 

that are founded upon reason and experience .'* 



Less. 5. intellectual philosophy. 109 

first thing that a skilful architect does, is to ascertain that 
the foundation which he chooses can support the structure 
that he intends to rear, and if he find it not solid enough 
for this at the apparent surface, he must dig down to the 
solid stratum. 

Mary. I can see the application. Whenever we err, 
we build falsely, and make an application of cause and effect, 
which has not been proved by sufficient experience; or we 
build upon an improper foundation, mistaking some result 
of reasoning, in which there is a fault, for the intuitive truth 
or belief, to which we should have dug down. 

Dr. Herbert, Yes ; the mistaking of the truth of evi- 
dence and reasoning, for truths of intuition, has been the 
cause of many errors, and also the cause why some have 
denied the existence of intuitive truths themselves, and by 
that means attempted to destroy the foundation of all reason- 
ing and belief 

Charles. But in these cases, could they not have sepa- 
rated the testimony or the reasoning from the intuitive parts 
of the proposition ? 

Dr. Herbert. Not without that process of reasoning 
which we may properly call a mental analysis. We have 
seen, already, that, however complex they may be in their 
causes, the states of the one indivisible mind are still in 
themselves one. None of you believe that after an eclipse, 
calamities happen to men and nations, which would not 
have happened if there had been no eclipse. 

Edward. Certainly not. 

Dr. Herbert. But you do not deny the happening of the 
eclipse itself? 

Edward. No ; so far from that, I can teli with certain- 
ty when it is to happen, years or centuries before it does 
happen. 

Dr. Herbert. Then, you see, that in this very simple 
belief, the eclipse and its consequent calamities, which to 
the mind of the believer in it is but one simple state of the 

78. What has been the cause of many errors, and also induced 

some to deny the existence of intuitive truths ? 79. What is that 

process of reasoninj; called, by which the truth of testimony or rea- 
soning is separated from that of intuition ? 80. What is stated 

in regard to the states of the mind and their causes? 81. Al- 
though there is but one simple state of the mind in the belief of an 
eclipse, and that calamities attend it, yet what two things are there 
blended in it? 

10* 



110 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 6* 

mind, though the causes of it be compound, there is blend- 
ed with the truth of the eclipse, the falsehood of the im- 
puted consequences, and this destroys the truth of the whole 
state of mind of the believer, upon which the alarm that he 
feels is founded. 

Edward. But :vhy should w^e not trace every thing back 
to the intuitive behef, and then there could be no error 
at all ? 

Dr. Herbert. By the very constitution of our nature, 
that is, by all that we feel in ourselves, or can observe in 
others, we prefer that which is our own to that which is not. 
The reasonings are of our own making, the intuitive belief 
is not; and, therefore, we are in great danger of attending 
only to the reasoning, and neglecting the intuition, just as 
we repair and beautify our houses, without giving ourselves 
any trouble about that solid foundation upon which the 
lowest stone or pile is supported. 

Charles. But how shall we be able to distinguish this 
unerring intuition from our own reasonings, that may be 
false ? 

Dr. Herbert. We can give no general definition, 
Charles; and, indeed, general definitions are only longer 
names, and of no great use, unless we examine the qualities 
and phenomena of the thing defined. But we cannot 
mistake it for reasoning, though we may and do mistake 
reasoning for it. ** It is universal, immediate, and irresis- 
tible ;" it cannot be made plainer by tiie longest descrip- 
tion, or attributed to causes anterior to or simpler than itself; 
but, like the mind that believes it, it is in every instance 
indivisible — traceable in (»ur comprehension to nothing an- 
terior, and referrible, as all incomprehensible matters are, 
to the Creator, or those trains of sequence by w^nch he has 
been pleased to produce the phenomena of matter and of 
mind. 

Mary. Then we believe that we are, and are, through 
life, the identical existences, amid all the changes of the 

82. From this what consequence follows ? 83 Why do we 

not trace every thing back to the intuitive belief, and by that means 
avoid error ? 84. What remark is made about general defini- 
tions ? 85. Which are we the most liable to mistake, intuitive 

truth for reasoning, or reasoning for intuitive truth? 86. But 

what is the general definition of intuitive truth ? (Give it in the au- 
thor's words.) 87. Why do we believe that, amid all the changes 

of the states of our minds and the matter of our bodies, we are, 
through life, the identical existences.? 



Less. 6. intellectual philosophy. Ill 

matter of our bodies, and the states of our minds, just 
because ice cannot help believing it ? 

Dr. Herbert. Certainly ; and the denial of the belief is 
equally a denial of the scepticism that denies it ; as that 
too must either be an air-built castle, a combination of words 
without any meaning, or it must have its foundation on in- 
tuitive belief. This scepticism, as it relates to our contin- 
uous identity, is finely ridiculed in an anecdote in the 
** Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus," at which we have al- 
ready laughed as a pleasant story, and to which you will 
soon be in a condition for returning with a higher pleasure, 
as the most admirable exposure of the folly of false philoso- 
phy that ever was produced by man. Do any of you know 
to what part of the JVIemoirs I allude ? 

Edward. Sir John Cutler's stockings, I suppose. 

Dr, Herbert. Yes. Can you repeat the story ? 

Echcard. *^ Sir John Cutler had a pair of black worsted 
stockings, which his maid darned so oft with silk, that they 
became at last a pair of silk stockings. Now, supposing 
those stockings of Sir John's endued with some degree 
of consciousness at every particular darning, they would 
have been sensible that they were the same individual pair 
of stockings, both before and after the darning ; and this 
sensation would have continued through all the suc- 
cession of darnings : and yet after the last of all, there was 
not perhaps one thread left of the first pair of stockings, but 
they were grown to be silk stockings, as was said before.'' 

Charles. ** The secretary of the freethinkers" was cer- 
tainly in the right. The substance was not the same, but 
there was the continuous identity of the pair of stockings, 
which, from the frequent darning, I should suppose Sir John 
must have had on his legs every day. 

Edward. But the stockings had not the consciousness, 
and therefore could not know that they were the same pair. 

Mary. Nor would they, though they had continued 
black worsted, without any darning at all. 

Dr. Herbert. Then you perceive that there are among 
material things, several kinds of sameness and identity, 

88. What must the denial of the belief of identical existence im- 
ply ? 89. What are the two alternatives, one of which this 

scepticism must be ? 90. As it relates to continuous identity, 

how has it been ridiculed ? 91. Since in material things, there 

are several kinds of sameness and of identity, arising from the way 
in which we consider the things themselves ; what is meant by 
sameness of mass ? sameness in one quality ^ and identity ^ 



11'2 FIRST tfissoNs IN Less. 5. 

arising from the way in which we consider the things 
themselves. There is sameness of mass, with successive 
change of substance, as in the case of the stockings, or 
a cask of ale after it has soured into vinegar ; sameness 
in one quality as in all known qualities; and identity, the 
thing itself, without any change of substance. Sameness 
in qualities can be determined by experiment, though the 
thing has been out of our sight ; but there is no proof of 
identity of mass, other than the continued presence of the 
thing identified. So that you see, even in the external 
world, absolute identity is the immediate result of intuitive 
belief — nothing but the belief of the existence of the thing, 
continued through a certain portion of our time. 

Chaj^Ies. And mental identity is nothing more than the 
successive states of the mind, which are all that the mind 
knows of its own existence. 

Edward. Then if 1 were not to think at any time, would 
not that destroy the continuity of my identity ? 

Dr, Herbert. If it were possible that your thoughts 
could be seen by another person, and if they were the only 
indications that other persons had of the existence of your 
mind, the pauses between thought and thought, if there 
were any, might appear to that person as chasms in the 
continuity of your mind's existence, because he himself 
must have been thinking during those pauses, otherwise he 
would not have perceived them. But our thoughts are not 
known to others ; and we, as we ourselves have seen, have 
no knowledge of them other than the very thoughts. There- 
fore, we can have no knowledge of any want of continuity 
— can take no note of time between thought and thought, 
and are in fact mentally nothing but when we are thinking. 
To us the measure of time or succession is the state of the 
mind only, and to suppose a pause or blank between one 
thought and another, would be but another name for the 
interpolation of a new thought between them. 

92. How is sanieness in qualities determined ? 93. W^hat is 

proof of identity of mass ? 94. W^hat, then , in the external world 

is absolute identity the result of.'' 95. And what is mental identi- 
ty said to be ? 96. Supposing our thoughts were exposed to the 

view of another person, and there should be an interval between 
thought and thought; how would it appear to him, and bj what 

means must he be apprised of it? 97. Can we be conscious, in 

respect to ourselves, of any lapse of time between thought and 
thought ? 



Less. 5. intellectual philosophy. 113 

Charles. But if I forget that I thought of a particular 
subject, does it follow that 1 did not think of it? 

Dr. Herbert. Some very able men, and Locke himself 
among the number, have entangled themselves in that ques- 
tion. The existence of the mind for the moment, is noth- 
ing other than the state of the mind for that moment ; and 
a past state which you cannot recall, is to you, for the 
moment, or even the life-time, just as much a non-exist- 
ence as a future state, in which the mind has not been at 
all. The identity which is sought to be established is the 
identity of that ideal and confessedly variable power which 
we call memory, and not the identity of that mind which 
is always the same as existing, but may be in different 
states of existence, of which that which they call the 
power of memory, is nothing else than the mind in a state 
of remembering ; and while the objection proceeds upon 
the very assumption that the identity which they wish to 
establish is not an identity but a diversity, the proof, if 
they could get it, would be of precisely the same kind as 
that by which Fluellen establishes the identity of Macedon 
and Monmouth — ** There is a river in Macedon ; and 
there is also moreover a river at Monmouth : it is called 
Wye at Monmouth ; but it is out of my prains what is the 
name of the other river ] but 'tis all one : 'tis so like as 
my fingers is to my fingers, and there is salmons in them 
poth." 

Edward, That is not any proof at all. 

Dr. Herbert. The absurdity of it is more striking, be- 
cause the philosophical dramatist intended that it should be 
so ; but the absurdity is not greater than when the gravest 
men, in the most solemn manner, and with the most earn- 
est desire of arriving at the truth, institute comparisons be- 
tween things which are totally different, or of both or one 
of which they know nothing. 

We have now, I trust, seen, in general terms, both what 
we have to study, and how we are to study it. We have 
considered the art of building — the mode in which we are 
to prosecute our inquiry ; we have dug down to the sure 
foundation — intuitive belief — that which we can neither 

98. What becomes of a past state of mind which cannot be re- 
called ? In endeavouring to establish the identity of the mind, 

what has been the principal source of difficulty ? What is the in- 
stances given by the author to illustrate this mode of reasoning ? 
99» What has the author been illustrating and explaining ? 



114 piRsf LESSONS IN Less. 5. 

deny nor render more simple by explanation and analysis ; 
and we have found out what are to be our materials — the 
various states, or phenomena, or affections of the mind ; — 
it, therefore, only remains for us to rear the structure. 

Certain cautions are, however, necessary, to insure our 
doing that with success and stability. We must bear con- 
stantly in view, that our own mind is the source of all our 
materials ; and though we have no reason to doubt that 
the general laws of its phenomena are the same as those 
of the minds of others, we must be careful not to measure 
their extent by the extent of ours. For there may be 
many, we cannot tell how many, of our lellows, who by 
longer and more successful study, may have been able to 
analyse opinions and beliefs which to us appea;: perfectly 
simple and intuitive, and to see diversity where we fancy 
that we have found sameness, or sameness where we have 
imagined that we have found variety. We must admit 
these to be our teachers in every case where we are con- 
vinced of the truth of their doctrines; and we must also 
be prepared to alter our own opinions, when new knowl- 
edge renders that necessary. We must be equally oil 
our guard against being dogmatical in our present opin- 
ions, so that we may not exclude the truth which expe- 
rience would let in upon us, and against that restlessness 
after novelty by which we are in danger of leaving the 
truth which we possess for more showy and dazzling mat- 
ters, of which the very gloss and glitter prevent our see- 
ing the errors which they contain. We must yield to no 
authority, save our own conviction ; and, like dutiful sub- 
jects, we must instantly bow to that, though, likewise sub- 
jects, we must understand the nature and see the value of 
the decree, before we yield obedience to it. Above all, 
we must continue faithful to the free region of thought, 
and not allow ourselves to be overcome by the despotism of 
words. 

Charles. If we were always to make ourselves so much 
masters of every subject that came before us, in the way 

100. Jn the study of intellectual philosophy, what ought we to 

keep constantly in view ? 101. Why ought we not to limit the 

extent of the minds of others by our own ? 102. What two things 

ought we to guard against lest we exclude the truth, which expe- 
rience teaches us, or forsake the truth which we already possess for 

gomething more showy and dazzling ? 103. To what authority 

only should we yield ?— 104. What is the concluding caution ? 



Less. 6. intellectual philosophy. 115 

of thought, as that we could know the whole truth, respect- 
ing it, would not that prevent a great deal of disputing, and 
put an end to difference of opinion altogether? 

Dr. Herbert. That it would lessen the quantity of dis- 
putation is certain ; and, it is equally certain, that it 
would have some tendency to make the opinions of mankind 
more uniform than they are at present. But diversified as 
are the pursuits and experiences of men, there are very 
many subjects upon which it is hardly possible for two in- 
dividuals to have the same opinion ; and, therefore, even 
when we think they are wrong, and try to correct them, 
we should be very tender of the opinions of others. 



LESSON VL 

Arrangement of intellectual phenomena — The external affections. 

Dr. Herbert. You of course know what is meant by a 
scientific arrangement? 

Charles. Forming the objects into particular classes, or 
into such a classification as shall tend to further the pur- 
poses of science.* 

Dr, Herbert. Is it any part of the science of knowledge 
of those objects themselves ? 

Edward. Certainly not, any more than the arranging of 
the letters in the order of a, b, c, is any part of the knowl- 
edge of the letters, or the arranging of the books in the 
library, is the reading of them. 

Mary. It is a little more than the order of a, b, c, Ed- 
ward ; that is not a scientific arrangement, but a confusion ; 
there is no classification at all. Neither the letters that are 
similar in shape, nor those that are chiefly pronounced by 
the same organs of voice, are placed beside each other, so 
that the succession of the letters does not assist in knowing 
either their shapes or their sounds. 

*" Classification has reference only to the mode of consid- 
ering objects." 

1. What is meant by a scientific arrangement? 2. Is this 

arrangement any part of the real know lege of the subject ? 



116 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 6. 

Matilda. But there is more in the arrangement of the 
books, if they be properly arranged — that is, the French 
books all beside each other ; the poetry, the same ; and so of 
the other kinds. 

Dr. Herbert. That is really a scientific arrangement, 
Matilda : first, because it can be formed only by one who 
understands the books ; and, secondly, because it enables 
the reader to find the kind of book, at least, that he wants. 
Would a person who could not read arrange the books in 
this way ? 

Charles. Most likely such a person would place beside 
each other those that were most nearly equal in size, and 
resembled each other the most in the binding. 

Edward. But that would still be a scientific arrangement, 
according to the science of the party, because one who 
could not read would know no likeness or difference in 
books, but their size, shape, and colour. 

Mary. In like manner, the Linnaean classification of 
plants is not made by those parts of them that are the most 
striking at first sight, as their general size and form, the 
size and shape of the leaves, the colour of the flowers, or any 
of their more obvious appearances ; but from ihe pistils and 
stamens, little points and filaments in the centre of the flow- 
er, to which nobody but a botanist ever would pay the 
smallest attention. 

Charles. The same is the case in the zoological system 
of the same naturalist, where the whale is classed with 
quadrupeds, and the bat with man. 

Dr. Herbert. But still, though we are not warranted in 
saying that those are the best classifications that could be 
made, either of plants or of animals, yet they have been 
very generally adopted, and the sciences have made more 
progress since their adoption than they made in any former 
period of the same length. Not all the individuals only 
that make up a class have some differences, but the indi- 
vidual is itself changed by time and circumstances ; so that 
all we can obtain is the mere facility of finding that which 
we seek, and of knowing that it possesses the general qual- 
ity from which the class is named. Classification, there- 
fore, is not in itself science, to any very important extent; 

3. Why may the arrangement of the books of a library according 

to their subjects be considered a scientific arrangement ? 4. What 

has been the progress of botanical and zoological studies since the in- 
troduction of the Linnaean system, compared with former periods ? 
5. Since classification is not in itself science, what is its use ? 



Less. 6. intellectual philosophy. 117 

and yet it is highly conducive to the acquisition of science, 
just as the division of science itself into historical and 
philosophical science, and the subdivision of these, as appli- 
cable to various classes of the objects of our inquiry, are 
conducive to the same purpose. If we had to seek the 
diamond in a mountain of sand, how much greater would 
be our labour than if we had to seek it only in a load ; 
and how much should we simplify that again, if we had to 
seek it only in a handful. It is this love of simplification 
which has led both to the classifications in science, and 
to that classification, by the use of general names, to 
which all mankind must probably have recourse.* So con- 
venient do we find it, and so much does it agree with that 
intuitive tendency of our nature which leads us to seek 
our object, whatever it may be, by the simplest and short- 
est road possible, that we are in danger of carrying it too 
far, and are never more in danger of being obscure or 
wholly unintelligible than when we strain after excessive 
simplicity. 

Charles. But we are not making a system of intellectual 
philosophy ; and so, as the classification does not constitute 
the knowledge that we are in quest of, would it not answer 
our purpose just as well, if we took one of the systems that 
have been already made? When we studied botany, we 
proceeded at once to the Linnaean system. 

Dr, Herbert, In botany, and the other sciences of mat- 
ter, we had two separate subjects — the mind which exam- 
ined, and the class or flower that it did examine. But in 
intellectual philosophy, the examined and the examiner 
are one ; and, therefore, though a proper classification will 
not give us more knowledge than in any of the other 
sciences, an improper one may be more productive of errors. 



^ " The science of Mental Philosophy, as far as it relates to 
the classification of the mental phenomena, is built upon one 
of its own powers — that power by which we discover resem- 
blance or relation in general." Payne, 

6. What illustration is given ? 7. What has led to classi- 
fication in science, and to that, included in general names ? 

8. What danger is apprehended to result from carrying this princi- 
ple too far ? 9. Why may we not, in pursuing the study of intel- 
lectual philosophy, make use of some former system, as in the study 
of botany and zo )logy ? 

11 



118 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 6. 

The qualities of material substances can be examined as 
they exist in space ; the qualities (if we may so use the 
expression) of the phenomena of the mind, can be found 
only in the future results to which they lead, or in the phe- 
nomena by which they were preceded. We can dissect a 
material substance with the knife, melt it in the crucible, 
or distil it in the retort; but there is no knife, no crucible, 
no retort, by which we can separate the parts of a thought : 
— we must go back to the thoughts consequent to which it 
arose, or forward to those to which experience has taught 
us that it is antecedent. 

Edioard. Would not a very good first division be into 
thoughts that give pleasure, and thoughts that give pain ? 

Charles. It would not include the whole, as there are 
many states, in which the mind is indifferent both to pleas- 
ure and pain. 

Mary. Nor between pleasure and pain should we be 
able to find a boundary. For if I hold my hand out of 
the window on a cold day, the cold pains me ; when I 
draw it in, and shut the window, I feel neither pleasure nor 
pain ; when I bring it near the fire, I fee) pleasure ; and 
if 1 bring it too near, or continue it too long, I feel pain 
again. 

Matilda. It is something the same with the light of the 
sun. When we walk out on a fine day, and see the leaves 
and fiowers glowing, and the moth glittering in the sun- 
beams, it is very delightful ; but if we look, even for a short 
time, at the sun, which is the source of all this beauty and 
pleasure, our eyes dazzle, and we feel pain. 

Dr. Herbert. A man, racked by the most excruciating 
pain, may yet feel pleasure at the hearing of good news, 
such as that his malady is not mortal. So that, in the 
science of the mind, as well as in the science of matter, 
you see we must not be led away by that arrangement, 
which is perliaps the first that we make, and have some 
knowledge of, from the very moment of our birth. 

Mary. Sometimes a thought comes into my mind when 
1 am not wishing for it, and sometimes when I do wish. 
Does not that make a difference, which would do for two 
classes ? 



10. What is remarked in regard to the qualities of material sub- 
stances, and also the phenomena of the mind ? 11. What objec- 
tions might be urged against dividing intellectual philosophy into 
thoughts that give pleasure, and thoughts that give plain ? 



Less. G. intellectual riiiLOsopjiY. 119 

Charles. I should think not. When the thought comes 
without a wish before it, there is only one state of the 
mind ; but when there is first a wish and then a thought 
following, there are two states ; besides, the thought may 
be in itself the same, whether you wish for it or not. If 
you think of a green field, or a rose, or in fact any thing, 
the thought you have of it, if it be merely of the thing it- 
self, must be just the same whether you previously wished 
for it or not. If this were not the case — if the wish for a 
thing could alter the knowledge which we have of the 
thing, and which, as we have been told, is, to us, the 
thing itself — then we could be able to alter many things by 
wishing. A wish could shift a mountain as easily as a grain 
of sand. 

Dr. Herbert. A division of this kind has sometimes 
been adopted, by those who would have it that the mind 
is a compound of many principles. They divided what 
they called the powers of understanding and the powers 
of will. 

Eclwcirel. But I may think of that which I do not un- 
derstand, and think of it without any will or wish to do so; 
and that thought could not belong either to the understand- 
ing or the will. 

Mary. In like manner, if I thouglit what I wished, and 
nnderstood what I thought, as I now do, voluntarily, that 
two and one make up three, it would belong both to the 
understanding and the will. 

Matihla. And I sometimes feel happy, and at other times 
unhappy, without understanding why I should feel so ; and 
not merely without any will, but contrary to it : so that 
we could not make the classes of the understanding and the 
will, because connected with the very same thought, we 
should sometimes have the one, sometimes the other, some- 
times both, and sometimes neither. 

Dr. Herbert, You did well in using the word '* con- 
nected," Matilda; for the will or the understanding is 
another state of the mind, immediately preceding or fol- 
lowing the thought, and connected with it in the order of 
succession — the only connexion of thoughts that we can 
know. 

12. What objections may be urged against dividing the subject 

Jnto voluntary thoughts, and involuntary thoughts ? 13. What 

objections may be urged against dividing the subject into the powers 
of the understanding and the powers of the will ? 



120 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 6. 

Edward, We might as well divide the other animals 
into beasts of the lion, and birds of the eagle. 

Mary. But we should want a good many other classes : 
fish of the dolphin, serpents of the viper, insects of the bee, 
and many more. 

Dr. Herbert. The error in this classification lay in 
classing the phenomena of the mind according to two of 
those phenomena themselves. What think you of the di- 
vision into the intellectual powers and the active powers? 

Charles. You have shown us, that the use of power or 
powers of the mind, as signifying anything but the states 
of the mind itself, is improper — a name corresponding to 
that in which there is no reality. 

Dr. Herbert. Leave out the powers, then — what think 
you of the intellectual states and the active states ? 

Mary, They put me very much in mind of what you 
once told us about active and neuter verbs. They are 
both the names of states, only in the active verb two par- 
ties are referred to, and in the neuter but one. The 
names of the intellectual states would be the neuter verbs 
of the mind, and the names of the active states, the active 
verbs. 

Charles. With this difference from the common use of 
verbs, that the verb itself would be its own nominative. 

Dr. Herbert. The difference in that respect is less than 
you suppose, Charles. The woodman is not the nomina- 
tive in the felling of a tree, longer than he is actively em- 
ployed in felling it ; and so the mind is not the nominative 
in any state after it passes into another. 

Edward. I think the mind must be active in any state 
of thought. 

Dr. Herbert. That is exactly my view of the subject; 
and I think it the right one. Indeed any other view of it 
is productive of singular absurdity, and would make the 
mind of the man who acquires no knowledge, more active 
than that of him who careers over the whole field of know- 
ledge, and extends its boundaries on every side. They 
who have adopted this division — and they are among the 
most eminent men of modern times — make desire and aver- 

14. What is the principal error in this classification .'' 15. What 

may be said against dividing^ the subject into intellectual powers and 

active powers f*. 16. What absurdity would this division imply ^ 

17. What do those, who advocate this division, consider active 

powers, and what, intellectual ? 



Less. G. intellectual philosophy. 121 

sion, and hope and fear, active powers ; while reasoning 
and imagination are classed among those that are merely 
intellectual. Hence it would follow, that they who sit with 
their arms folded, and torture themselves with those de- 
sires and passions that never ripen into action, and who 
never advance one step in the acquisition of knowledge, or 
add one iota to the useful arts, are not only more active 
than they who discover the properties of substances, and 
the laws of phenomena, and turn them to the augmentation 
of the beauty of the fine, or the value of the useful arts; 
but that they alone are active, while the men who have 
beautified and benefited the world are merely contempla- 
tive or passive. The truth is, however, that when the mind 
thinks — when we have in its state any evidence of its exis- 
tence — it is always active ; and if it ever cease to do this 
(for of its so ceasing we can have no proof,)it ceases to ex- 
ist. Not only this, but the mind seems to be equally active 
in all its varied states. To it, the greatest and the least 
effort appear to be the same ; the thought of an atom and 
that of a universe, are entertained in the same time, and leave 
the same exhaustion ; and in the operation of the mind, 
there is not a jot more of fatigue in careering round the or- 
bit of Saturn, than there is in measuring the circumference 
of a grain of sand. Be the mental occupation small or great, 
lowly or sublime, it is all the same to the mind. 

Charlies, Why then should we speak of the mind as 
being fatigued or exhausted by long and intense application 
to any particular subject, if all matters be alike easy to it? 

Dr. Herbert, When we speak of the fatigue or exhaus- 
tion of the mind, we speak figuratively, as we do in most 
of our observations respecting it. We reason from the 
analogy of the external world ; and, though we may name 
the mind, we really mean the body. The connexion be- 
tween the organs of sense and that internal being, known 
only in its states and phenomena, to which the senses are, 

18. What inference may be fairly deduced from this ? 19. 

What is the truth in regard to the mind when it thinks ? 20. Is 

the mind more active when extending its research to the utmost 
bounds of the solar system, than when examining a mote or small 

grain of sand? 21. What do we mean when we speak of the 

fatigue or exhaustion of the mind ? 22. Is the connexion be- 
tween the organs of sense and the mind, a subject that can be sat- 
isfactorily investigated ^ Why ? 
11* 



122 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 6. 

as it were, the interpreters of the external world, is one of 
those subjects which must forever lie beyond the power of 
human scrutiny, because we have no means of tracing its 
operation, any more than we have of knowing that mysteri- 
ous sequence, by which one consequent event, rather than 
another, follows an antecedent one ; but this we know, that 
as one of the senses becomes deadened by long and intense 
use of its organ, so thevvhole of the sentient faculties of the 
body become wearied by excessive study. This, however, 
can no more be attributed to the fatigue of the mind, than 
we can attribute the dimness of the eye and the dulnessof 
the ear, which occur in old age, to any mental decay. It is 
impossible for us to understand why the eye sees, any more 
than the hand ; or why the ear hears, any more than the 
feet ; because we cannot discover how matter can convey 
any sort of intelligence to mind. But if we admit, (which 
we must either admit, or deny that of which the very denial 
involves an acknowledgment,) that the mind, in all its 
states, is one indivisible and unalterable existence ; and 
admitting this, it is impossible for us to imagine that it can 
be fatigued or exhausted. Those are casualties that can 
happen only to a compound ; and they can happen only 
in consequence of such an exhaustion of some of its com- 
ponent parts, as may be again replaced by the infusion of 
new matter as the body is refreshed by food. This unity, 
or rather oneness, of the mind, in its nature, and this un- 
changeableness of it through all its changing states, while 
they keep us clear of the errors into which they who regard 
it as a compound are almost sure to fall, very much nar- 
row the division of its phenomena into that variety of arbi- 
trary classes, which has given to the philosophy of mind 
a far more formidable and unintelligible appearance than it 
could by possibility assume, if it were studied as it is in 
reality, and not as it is expressed in words. All thoughts, 
or notions, or ideas, or whatever name we may give to 
those portions of our knowledge that we are unable to re- 

23. Does the dimness of the eye or the diilness of the ear in old 

age, prove that the mind is decaying ? 24. What is the reason, 

that we cannot tell why the eye sees, rather than the hand .? — What 
consequence follows, if we admit that the mind, in all its states, is 

one indivisible and unalterable existence.? 25. Is the study of 

intellectual philosophy rendered more simple or more complex, by 
admitting that the mind in all its states is one indivisible and un- 
alterable existence ^ 



Less. 6. intellectual philosophy. 123 

solve into simpler portions, have this in common, that they 
are states of the mind j and, farther than this, we can, as 
mere states of the mind, tell nothing about them. How, 
then, shall we be able to make any arrangement, even into 
two classes ? 

Mary. It is very easy, I think. Our thoughts or states 
of mind, that are produced by, or follow immediately the 
presence of external objects, must be different from those 
that arise in the mind itself, without any reference to an 
external object, or when the object to which they refer is 
not present. 

Dr, Herbert. That is the substance of the most gener- 
al decision that we can make; and, if we do not carry it 
too far, there can be no great objection to it. That the 
states of mind thus produced may be precisely the same, or 
different, or that the same or different states may be pro- 
duced in each way, we must admit; so that the division is 
not a division of the states of the mind themselves, but a 
division of the modes in which they are produced. 

Echcard. As the state of my mind, with regard to the 
knowledge of a tall man, riding a white horse, is just the 
same when I merely think of it, as when 1 actually see it. 

Dr. Herbert. Yes. As to the mind itself there can be 
no difference, though the presence of the object, and the 
affection of the organ of sense, be present in the one case, 
and wanting in the other. The affection of the mind oc- 
curs as instantly in the one case as in the other ; but though 
the state that follows external sensation, cannot be re- 
solved, in reference to the mind itself into the two sepa- 
rate parts of external sensation and inward consciousness : 
yet as the cause, or antecedent, is different in the two 
cases, that still makes a difference necessary in our mode of 
considering them. Thus we have two divisions of mental 
phenomena : — 

1. The \i\\e\\omex\di o{ external perception. 

2. And the phenomena of internal perception. 

The first of these arises immediately from the presence 
of external objects ; the second arises in a way which we, 

26. What is the most general division of the subject of intel- 
lectual philosophy, and against which the fewest objections can be 

urged ? 27. What must we admit in regard to this division ? 

28, To what does this division more particularly refer? 29. 

What are the terms in which this division is expressed ? 30. 

From what does the first arise ? 



124 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 6. 

perhaps, understand just as well, but about which we are 
unable to say so much, as we have no material organ or 
object — nothing that exists in time, about which to speak, 
and therefore it appears to be much more abstract than the 
other. 

Charles. T think 1 understand the distinction. When 
I observe the mulberry tree upon the lawn — the tree, 
with its brown trunk, its large green leaves, and its dark 
purple berries — or, rather, as we were taught in optics, 
when the light that is reflected from these to my eye, pro- 
duces some eff*ect on that organ, instantaneously with 
which, or so immediately after it that I cannot distinguish 
between them, my mind is in that state which 1 call the 
perception, or the knowledge of a mulberry tree actually 
before me at the time ; and this is a phenomenon, or state 
of the mind, arising from, or consequent to, external per- 
ception. 

Dr, Herbert, That is nearly what is meant in the case 
of a perception by the sense of sight. Theii what would 
you call an internal perception respecting the mulberry 
tree? 

Mary. I may think how long it has taken to grow ; 
what changes have occurred in the parish during the time; 
how different it looks in summer and in winter ; how it 
once was a mulberry pip; when it shall cease to grow; or 
into what the timber of it shall be fashioned after the tree is 
cut down. 

Edward. Or that silk worms are fed upon the leaves of 
mulberry trees, and killed by scalding water, for the sake 
of the silk. 

Matilda. And I may think how like or unlike our mul- 
berry-tree may be to the mulberry-tree of Shakspeare ; and 
then I may think of Shakspeare himself and his plays, and 
Lady Macbeth, and poor Ophelia, and mad Lear. 

Edioard. Or I can imagine a mulberry-tree ten times 
the height of ours. 

Mary. And one can think of our mulberry-tree itself, 
without any alteration, though one were at ever so great a 
distance from it. 

31. Though we may understand the second as well as the first, 
why are we not able to say so much about it? 32. What in- 
stance of external perception^ is given ? 33. What instance of 

internal perception is given, and in what manner is it illustrated ? 



Less. 7. intellectual niiLosoniY. 125 

Dr. Herbert. These, and countless other thoughts, 
which the presence of the mulberry-tree, or the memory of 
that presence, regarded as a state of mind, would produce, 
are all so many instances of the phenomena of internal 
perception ; and the number of them, you can easily see, 
depends on the other knowledge of the mind. One who 
had never been out of this parish, where no silk worms are 
reared, or who had never read or heard of Shakspeare, and 
liis mulberry-tree, would not, and could not, have had any 
perception of the silk, or Lady Macbeth, or Lear, by mere- 
ly looking at a mulberry-tree. Those internal impressions, 
therefore, thougli they may have been first communicated 
by the senses, cannot in any respect be considered as ex- 
istences in space, any more than there is a separate ex- 
istence in space called an impression, or idea, besides 
the external object which acts upon the organ of sensation. 
In our next conversation we shall consider more at large 
the phenomena of external affection. 



LESSON vn. 

External affections — Sensations — General sensation — The corpo- 
real process — the five senses — Examination of those of smell and 
taste. 

Dr. Herbert. Do any of you recollect what we purposed 
to converse about this time ? 

Edward, The external affections of the mind ; which 
are those states of the mind that arise along with, or so im- 
mediately consequent on, the presence of something exter- 
nal of the mind, that we have room for no other thought or 
state of mind between them. 

Dr. Herbert. Do you think that this class of affections 
of the mind ever can arise before the external object be 
present to the organ of sense ? 

Charles. Certainly not ; but immediately after. 

Dr. Herbert. Then is there any harm in calling the 
presence of the external object the cause of the mental af- 
fection — in the sense in which we have defined cause, as 



1. What are the external affections ? 



126 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 7. 

the event by which any other event is immediately and in- 
variably preceded ? 

Mary. I think not. That is just what we mean by 
cause, 

Charles, Then our definitions of the external affections 
of the mind, will be those that have causes external of the 
mind. 

Edward. I think vve should say immediate causes : for 
when I think of any particular object, such as the brown 
pony, my having seen that pony is the cause of my think- 
ing of it, whether the pony be present at the time or not. 

Dr. Herbert. The pony is the pony, whether we see it 
or not ; but the cause of your thinking on it, is the previous 
state of your mind, — whether the sight of the pony, the wish 
to ride, or any thing else. All causes are immediate, the 
nearest event in time to the effect ; so that ^* those which 
have external causes" will do for a short definition of the 
external affections. Now let us see how many ways we 
have of acquiring them ? 

Kdicard. We have five, and no more ; arising from the 
five senses, of smell, taste, hearing, touching, and seeing ; 
and these have all their particular organs. 

Dr, Herbert. Well, we shall allow that four of them 
have, and that without the organs of any one of these four, 
we could have no knowledge of those qualities of objects 
which are its particular province ; but to what organ shall 
we confine the sense of touching ? 

Edward. To the hand : if I can touch any thing, I can 
touch it with my fingers. 

Matilda. And I with my elbow, or my foot. 

Charles, The whole surface of the body is one organ of 
touch. 

Edward, No ; not the nails and the hair ; they can be 
cut without any pain. 

Dr, Herbert, So can the papillae of the palm or the 
fingers, if the instrument be keen enough, and we do not 
cut too deep; and a violent application to the hair, or the 
nails, is as painful as to the most sensitive part of the 
hand. 

2. Is it proper to call the presence of the external object the 

(Siuse of the mental afFeclion ? 3. How many ways have we of 

acquiring the external affections ? 4. From what do these arise ? 

5. Which of the five senses does not appear to be coiifine^ to 

a particular organ ? 



Less. 7. intellectual philosophy. 127 

Charles. Bat the skin feels immediately at the place 
where touched, while the feeling in the case of the hair or 
the nail takes place only at its insertion into the skin. 

Dr. Herbert, We cannot very well localize the feeling 
— that is to say, name the point of space, at which the 
sensation of the body is followed by the affection of the 
mind, because the succession is in time, and not in space, 
as we do not know any thing of the mind in space. But 
is the feeling confined to the surface of the body ? 

Charles. Certainly not ; I can feel the position of my 
arm or leg, without any thing external touching or disturb- 
ing it. 1 can feel the motion of the muscles, when I 
move them, though the limb in which they are insert- 
ed do not move ; and I can feel pain when nothing touches 
me, and when 1 do not move. 

JEdivarcL And I can feel hunger and thirst. 
Dr, Herbert, Thus you see, that though we had enu- 
merated the whole five senses, and attended, as carefully 
as we could attend, to all their operations, we should not 
have exhausted all the sources of our external perception ; 
for though man had been without these senses, and had 
not been susceptible of pain or pleasure from the contact 
of external objects— though he had been thus, as it were, 
without the world, there would still have been left to him 
some of the most agonising pains, and some of the most 
exquisite pleasures, that chequer his sensation ;* and if 
his mind had been constituted in the same manner as at 
present, those pains and pleasures would have arisen from 
the presence of those derangements and restorations of 
the animal functions, which are, in the sense in which 



*For instance, "Our various appetites, such as hun^r, 
thirst, ^'c. Muscular })leasures and pains." 

Paley says, that the young of all species of living beings, 
seem to receive pleasure simply from the exercise of their 
limbs and bodily faculties without reference to any end to be 
attained, or any use to be answered by the exertion. 

6. Why are we not able to name the point of space, at which 
the sensation of the body is followed by the nffcction of the mind? 

7. But is the feehnijj confiapd to the surface of the body ? 

8. Do the five senses embrace all the sources of external percep- 
tions ? 9. What would have been left to man, if he had been 

without these senses, and not susceptible of pain or pleasure from 

the contact of external objects? 10. What would those pains 

and pleasures have arisen from, if the mind had been constituted as 
it is at present ^ 



128 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 7. 

we have explained the word, their causes, and retained in 
trains of reflection, just in the same manner as the odours, 
and the tastes, and the sounds, and the colours, that are 
the objects of those senses that are confined to local or- 
gans. The information would no doubt have been con- 
fined ; compared with what it is at present, this knowl- 
edge would not have been so varied, but it would have 
been knowledge still ; and though man could have had 
no perception of the form even of his own body, he would 
still have had a science, and would have been able to num- 
ber up his feelings, and his comparisons of theni, just as 
we, through the medium of the senses, do those respecting 
the external world. In fact, he would have been in pos- 
session of all that strictly belongs to the philosophy of mind ; 
for the various qualities of external objects, and the me- 
chanical way in which these are supposed to act upon the 
organs of sense, belong not to the philosophy of mind, but 
to that of matter. 

31ary, By what name should we call those affections 
of the mind that are produced without any allusion to the 
organs of sense, and that yet have causes external of the 
mind itself.^ 

Dr. Herbert. To find an appropriate name for them is 
not so easy. If we were to invent one, nobody would 
understand it but ourselves ; and of the names that have 
been used, none are altogether unobjectionable, as they 
have been applied to other affections besides these. 
Charles. Are they not feelings ? 

Dr. Herhert. No doubt they are, but the word has too 
wide a signification for being descriptive of them. Feel- 
ing has nearly the same signification with findings which 
is used in place of it in some parts of the country ; and be- 
sides, in common language, it is used for internal affections 
of the mind, as well as for external ones. What we com- 
monly call our feelings are those states of the mind conse- 
quent to perceptions, either external or internal, which are 
accompanied or instantly followed by pleasure or pain, and 
to which we give the name of emotions, — as when we see 
or think of any thing, and either of these is followed by the 

11. What would have been his information compared with what 

it is at present .-^ 12. Why may not the \y or d feelings properly 

express those affections of the mind, that are produced without any 

allusion to the organs of sense .' 13. What in common language 

is meant by the term feelings ? 



Less. 7. intellectual philosophy. 129 

thought that the possession of it would make us or others 
happy or miserable. 

Edward. We are sensible of them ; could we not, 
therefore, call them sensations ? 

Dr. Herbert. No doubt they are sensations ; but those 
who have written on the philosophy of the mind, have been 
so much in the habit of confining the word sensations to 
those qualities and phenomena of the external world which 
we discover by the organs of sense, that, by the use of the 
word, we should be in danger of confounding the one with 
the other. They are, as it were, the senses for which there 
are no particular organs, and among them may be reckon- 
ed all derangements of the ordinary functions of life, wheth- 
er the result be mere listlessness or ennui, or take the more 
definite form of absolute pain, the seat of which we can 
point out. The listlessness, the ennni, or the pain, we can- 
not attribute to the mind itself; for, independently of that 
being inconsistent with its very nature, we can trace them 
to some cause, that is, to some previous state of the body. 
We shall, however, have occasion to mention them more 
particularly when we come to examine the sense of touch 
— the sense to which they have the greatest resemblance, 
both in their diffusion over the body, and their influence 
upon the mind. 

Mary. You have made use of the word sensation and 
the word perception^ in speaking of the external affections 
of the mind, and I did not properly understand the differ- 
ence between them. When I smell a rose, taste an apple, 
hear a nightingale, see a star, or touch a thorn, which is 
that, a sensation or a perception } 

Dr. Herbert. The affection itself, without any refer- 
ence to the quality from which it proceeds, as if you felt it 
and knew not of the object or the quality itself, is properly 
a sensation ; as it would be if you smelt a scent or heard a 
sound for the first time, you could not refer it to the rose 
or the nightingale ; and it becomes d. perception , when from 
being familiar with it before, you so instantly refer it to the 
object or the quality, that the two states of the mind ap- 
pear to be but one. 

14. To what has the word sensations been confined by philosoph- 
ical writers ? Since neither the term feelings, nor sensations^ 

definitely express these affections of the mind, what are they, and 
to what can they be traced as their cause ? 16. What is the dis- 
tinction between the words sensation and perception ? 

12 



130 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 7. 

Charles. The sensation then is consciousness of a state 
of the mind ; the perception, consciousness of something 
external, which is the cause of that state. 

Dr. Herbert. Not exactly, Charles j the sensation is 
consciousness of the affection of the organ of sense ; the 
perception, consciousness of the external object- The im- 
aginary sound that rings in a disordered ear, or the mist 
that floats before a decayed eye, is just as much a sensation 
as the most perfect hearing, or the clearest vision -, but 
neither the one nor the other is a perception, as there is 
nothing external of the organ. 

Edivcu'cL Then our organs of sense may deceive us ? 
Dr. Herbert. They may be altered as well as destroy- 
ed by disease ; but as that has never been the case with 
the organs of the majority, these keep those of the minori- 
ty right in matters of sensation. To the man with the 
jaundiced eye, all objects are yellow ; but he cannot per- 
suade others of that, any more than the blind man can 
persuade them that there is no colour, the deaf man that 
there is no sound, or the ignorant man that there is no 
knowledge. 

Mary. Then the process of sensation, even when it is 
not accompanied by or changed into perception, is not 
perfectly simple : there is an external object, real or be- 
lieved, a change in the organ, and an affection of the 
mind. 

Charles. And the senses are not all the same in their 
power ; some are sentient only when the organ is touched 
by the object, and some, though the object be at a distance 
greater than we can count. I do not hear the sound even 
of thunder or of a cannon, if it be more than a few miles 
distant : I cannot smell the strongest perfume, if the body 
that sends it be many yards off; and I cannot taste or 
touch, without an actual contact of the object and the or- 
gan ; but I can see a star at the distance of probably more 
millions of miles than all the arithmeticians in Europe 
could reckon in a century. 

Edward. Yes, and I can see the flash of a gun when 
fired at a distance before I hear the report, although the 
report must really be the first that happens; and I can so 
measure the time between them, as to be enabled thence 
to calculate their distance from me with considerable pre- 

17. Illustrate this distinction ? 



Less. 7. intellectual philosophy. 131 

cision. So that it should seem that some of our senses are 
so much more slow in their operation than others, tliat they 
actually change the order of events by making the former 
appear the latter, and the latter the former. 

Dr. Herbert. And this objection involves its own an- 
swer in the very circumstance which enables you to com- 
pute the distance from a knowledge of the elapse of time. 
That has nothing to do with the immediateness of sensa- 
tion in the organ, but all depends upon the different de- 
grees of velocity with which that physical phenomenon 
which causes the change, arrives at the organ. Is your 
hand more sluggish in its sensation of heat when you put 
the end of a dry stick or a glass tube into the fire, than 
when you so place a metallic rod ? 

Charles. Certainly not ; for that would make my sensa- 
tion no state even of my own organs, but merely a conse- 
quence of the nature of external things. 

Dr. Herbert. And so it is certainly with reference to 
the external object as a sensation, but not with regard to 
the organ in its sentient power, that is, in its fitness to re- 
ceive the impression. The glass rod, you know, you could 
hold by the one extremity till the other w^ere melted, and 
the stick till consumed within a shortdistanceof your fingers; 
w^iile the metalic rod would become so hot that you could 
with difficulty hold it, before any remarkable change had 
taken place in the extremity of it which you had inserted 
in the fire. 

Echccird. These differences arise from the different 
facilities of conducting heat that belong to, and form part 
of, the nature of the different substances that you have 
mentioned. 

Dr. Herbert. Just in like manner the different sub- 
stances which are the external causes of sensation by the 
different senses, are transferred, with greater or less velo- 
city, from the object to the organ. Light, being physically 
the rarest of any of those that are sensible at a distance 
from the object that immediately sends them to the organ, 

18 Does it arise from any imperfection of the senses, that some 
are sentient only when the organ is touched by the object, while 
others are immediately affected by objects at immense distances.'' 

19. Why is not the hand equally affected by the heat, -when 

it holds a rod of metal, and when it holds one of dry wood in the 

fire? 20. What is remarked respecting light and its power of 

producing instantaneous sensation } 



132 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 7. 

proceeds at the swiftest rate, and over the greatest distan- 
ces. So swift indeed is its progress, that over any measura- 
ble distance its passage is, to common observation, instan- 
taneous. Sound, which arises from the vibration of parti- 
cles of matter more solid and gross than those of light, pro- 
ceeds slower, on the ordinary principles of physics. Smell 
and taste, which do not appear to be attended with any 
motion at all, except the mere diffusion of the odorous par- 
ticles in the one case, and the separation of the sapid ones 
in the other, demand what we call an immediate contact. 
As the particles by which smell is excited are perfectly 
inscrutable, we cannot form even a reasonable hypothesis 
as to the modes of their action , but the resisting par- 
ticles, in touch, and in all those affections which are 
usually ascribed to it as a single sense, have some re- 
semblance to the resistance of bodies in mechanical pres- 
sure or collision ; and the action of those particles which 
affect the organs of taste, seems to be accompanied with 
more or less of a chemical decomposition in the body 
tasted. 

Charles. In the whole of these sensations, varied in the 
different organs, and again, in the different ways by which 
those organs are affected by different substances, the brain 
is considered as the ultimate organ of sensation, to which 
the sensations are conveyed along the nerves, from those 
ramifications of the latter that are thickly spread over the 
immediate organ of the sense. 

Dr. Herbert. Such is the common theory ; but it is a 
theory that can never be verified by facts, as we lose sensa- 
tion even before we begin to dissect for it. 

Charles. But I have read that if the nerve, connecting 
any organ or member of the body with the brain, be divid- 
ed, or violently compressed, or in a state of disease, that 
organ loses it sensation, and that limb its sensibility. 

Dr. Herbert. That is true ; and so delicate is the me- 
chanism of the sentient structure, as contributing to sensa- 

21. What is remarked respecting sound ? 22. What is re- 
marked respecting smell and taste ? 23. Are the particles by 

which smell is excited of such a nature as to be satisfactorily exam- 
ined .? What is remarked respecting the resisting particles in 

touch } 24. What is remarked respecting the particles which 

affect the organs of taste ? 25. Can it be satisfactorily proved, 

that the brain is the ultimate organ of sensation? 26. What 

instances are mentioned, which render the common theory, at 
least, doubtful ? 



Less. 7. intellectual philosophy. 133 

tion, that all sense of touch and all power of motion may be 
destroyed in a palsied limb; while, upon dissection, no vis- 
ible change of the nervous arrangement can be at all detect- 
ed. In those that have not the power of smell, no differ- 
ence has been found in the olfactory nerves : and in cases 
of gutta Serena^ where sight is completely destroyed, not 
by any visible injury to the external mechanism of the eye, 
but by a destruction of the optic nerve, the substance of 
that nerve does not appear to be altered. Thus, from all 
that we can discover, it does not appear whether the ultimate 
seat of sensation be in that central mass of the nervous sys- 
tem which we call the brain, or in the portion that comes 
immediately in contact with the external object, whose 
presence is the cause of sensation. 

Mary, Why, then, should we be in the habit of estimat- 
ing the mental powers by the supposed quantity of this 
central mass ; and imputing different degrees of capacity, 
as well as different habits and propensities, to its having 
one form rather than another ? 

Dr. Herbert. This inquiry, like others, is open to ob- 
servation ; and if we find that a certain form, even in the 
external structure of the head*, is invariably accompanied 
by certain abilities and dispositions, we can no more dis- 
sent from them, as standing in the relation of cause and 
effect, that we can dissent from the same relation in any 
other two phenomena which we find in immediate and in- 
variable sequence. 

Matilda. If, then, the phrenologists could but make 
their experience extensive enough, they would establish 
that science upon as sure a basis as any other of the sci- 
ences. 

Dr. Herbert. No question they would ; but the diffi- 
culty is in making the experiments. These are necessari- 
ly confined to a very limited number of individuals as com- 
pared with the whole ; and they are necessarily vague in 

* " Phrenology is now applied to the science of the mind 
as connected with the supposed organs of thought and pas- 
sion in the brain, broached by Gall." Webster. 

27. What is the result of the discoveries which have been n^ade 

on this subject ? 28. If such be the result of the most extensive 

discoveries, what foundation is there for the science of phrenology ? 
29. What is remarked respecting the experiments of the phren- 
ologists ? 

12* 



134 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 7. 

themselves — there being no more reason to attribute the 
observed faculty or disposition to the protuberance at any 
one place, than to the surrounding depression by which 
that protuberance is rendered perceptible. We have no 
evidence that any one perception of the senses, or any one 
affection of the mind, is connected, either with the whole 
brain, or with any portion of it, as distinguished from the 
rest of the nervous mass, which is diffused through the 
body till it end in filaments too fine for our nicest observa- 
tion. Let us take a very simple case. In closing one's 
hand, where is it that you are able to trace any thing of the 
antecedent thought and the consequent act ? Is it in the 
brain, in the hand, or in the nerves connecting the brain 
with the hand ? 

Edward. It is in the hand only that I can either see 
or feel it. If I had not been told, I should have known 
nothing about the brain, or the nerves either : and even 
now% I know it only as a matter of hearsay ; for I never 
saw or felt them, or was in any w^ay conscious of their ex- 
istence. 

Dr, Herbert. Thus you see that, in any of the sensa- 
tions, to whatever sense they may be referred, our absolute 
knowledge stops at the organ of sense. If that be derang- 
ed, the effect is precisely the same as if no sentient body 
were present ; but farther than this, our inquiries have not 
been able to penetrate ; and, therefore, one hypothesis is 
just as good as another ; for it is a good maxim in philoso- 
phy that where nothing can he affirmedy nothing can he denied. 
There have been those, however, who have made as com- 
plete systems of nervous action, as ever they did of demo- 
nology, or the music of the spheres. Some have attributed 
the whole process to vibrations of the nerves, sent from the 
surface to the central mass ; without ever considering how 
different the nerves are, in their structure, from any other 
substance in which we have perceived such vibrations. 

30. What is remarked respecting the connexion of the perception 
of the senses, or the affections of the mind, with the brain or any 

part of it? 31. What simple case is proposeTi for illustration, 

and what conclusion follows ? 32. In regard to our sensations, 

how far does our absolute knowledge extend ? 33. If the organ 

of sense be deranged, what is the effect? 34. What maxim in 

philosophy is mentioned? 35. To what have some attributed 

the process of sensation .'* 



Less. 7. intellectual piiiLosorHv. 135 

They have forgotten, loo, that if sensations were merely 
mechanical vibrations, propagated in this manner, there 
would be little chance of the same sort of vibration being 
conveyed to the central mass of the brain, which was orig- 
inally given to the slender filaments of the external nerves. 
In a common musical instrument, we do not get the same 
sounds from slender strings as from thick ones; neither 
do we get the same from those that are short as from those 
that are long. Upon this hypothesis, sound and sight should 
have more short and rapid vibrations as compared with 
smell ; and a gout in the toe should be far more grave than 
a pain in the head, because the nerves connecting it with 
the central mass are longer. 

Mary. I do not see that those precautions are absolutely 
necessary, because the belief itself is of such a nature, as 
that one is in little danger of falling into it. 

Dr, Herbert. Whenever we are on the confines of 
matter and mind, we are never altogether free from danger. 
Many of the words which we are compelled to use as ex- 
pressive of the phenomena of the one, being the names 
also of the phenomena of the other, we are in danger not 
only of confounding the individual phenomena, but becom- 
ing materialists with regard to the mind, in the midst of 
our most laboured arguments for its immaterial nature. 
Besides, when we confine our inquiries into any of the 
senses, to the observable phenomena of that, we are on 
safer ground, and we quit that ground whenever we attempt 
to connect the sensation of any of the organs of the senses 
with any thing intermediate between it and the instantly- 
consequent mental affection. If there were a process 
of transmission, it would take some time, however short, 
and we should not have that instantaneous knowledge 
of touch, in any sensitive part of the body, which is mat- 
ter of daily experience. All that we can know about 
the matter is, that there must be some change in the state 
of the sentient organ, immediately consequent upon the 
presence of the object ; but, instead of following it into the 
hidden chambers of life and thought, and knowing how it 

36. What obvious objection might be urged against this view ? 

37. Where must we confine our inquiries, that we may be on 

safe ground ? 38. And when do we quit that ground ? 

39. What would be the consequence, if tliere were a process of 

transmission ? 40. What is the amount of all that we can know 

about this matter ? 



136 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 7. 

is borne onward and how received, we do not know any 
thing about the change, farther than that it is an invariable 
consequent of the healthy state of the organ, and the pres- 
ence of the object. 

Charles. But still it is singular that a distant object, such 
as the sun in the sky, or the bell in the steeple, should pro- 
duce a change of state in our organs of sense. 

Dr. Herbert, It is w^onderful, certainly ; but it is not 
singular, for the whole of nature is made up of such mys- 
teries, and the sequence of one antecedent and consequent 
is just as inscrutable to us as another. That any one sub- 
stance can be the cause of a change in any other, when 
separated to a distance in space, is, however, an assumption 
of the same kind, and leads to the same errors, as the 
supposition that there can be a pause in time, or ol suc- 
cession, between the cause and the effect. When we make 
those pauses between one reality and another, we cannot 
help filling them up with something that is imaginary ; 
and as the imaginary pauses between the antecedent and 
consequent event and sequence, have been filled up by 
imaginary matters, to which the names of power and 
'* necessary connexion" have been given; so the pauses 
and distances which we make between the sentient organ, 
and that which we consider to be its object, have been 
filled up by those imaginary creations of man, images and 
ideas, and other incomprehensible spectra of things, which 
have, when followed out by the sceptics, or even by those 
who wished not to be sceptics, led many otherwise intelli- 
gent men to ascribe the same imaginary nature to that 
which really exists. Let me ask you, if it would alter the 
distinction of the sensation if the communication between 
it and the organ were cut off close by the object, or close 
to the organ itself? 

Mary. It certainly would make no difference : a board 
interposed between my eye and the window, if it covered 
all the window, would be the same, in effect, as to my look- 
ing out, whether it were close to the eye, or immediately in 
contact with the glass. 

41. What would be the consequence were we to assume, that 
cme substance can be the cause of a change in another, when sepa- 
rated from it? 42. If we make pauses between one reality and 

another, with what do we fill them up ? 43. What has been the 

result of using these imaginary creations of man, such as images, 
ideas, and the like ^ 



Less. 7. tntcllectual philosophy. 137 

Edward. And I should think that an exhausted receiver, 
placed over my head, wouhi as ctlcctually prevent me from 
hearing the tinkle of the bell, as when the bell itself is with- 
in the receiver, and I am in the open air. 

Dr. Herbert. There is not the least doubt of it. The 
light which gives us the sensation of vision, the undula- 
tions which give us that of sound, and all the other media 
of the senses (and they are impropeily called media, for 
they, and they alone, are the objects of sense), must make 
a direct impression upon the organ ; and if the impres- 
sion upon the organ be the same in any two instances, it 
matters not what may be the difference of the objects to 
which we can trace the sentient [)articles that act upon 
the organ. The smell of a rose, in rose water, is not, by 
the sense of smelling alone, to be distinguished from that 
in the flower; neither is the sound of a cannon, if it be as 
loud, and as often reverberated, at all distinguishable by 
the ear from the sound of thunder. Therefore, it is appa- 
rent, that the sensation has no necessary connexion with 
the body or substance that we are said to perceive, but is 
a consequence of our former experience of the co-exist- 
ence of such a sensation and such an object. If we w'ere 
to smell at rose-water for ever, we would never be able to 
arrive at a single property of the rose, as seen, or as hand- 
led ; and the sound of thunder certainly never led man- 
kind to the invention of fire-arms. Thus you see that, 
even in those cases where we think the perception of the 
sense does it all, that would be both feeble and useless, 
were it not that we can mingle it with our experimental 
knowledge ; nor is there a single object, or event, in the 
external world, or a single affection of the mind, that we 
can in any way explain but by another, either as similar 
in its momentary properties, or as similarly situated in the 
succession of cause and effect. All, therefore, that Na- 
ture has given us is the faculty of acquiring knowledge, 
and objects of which we may have it; and when we cease 
to experiment, either in outward observation or in inward 

44. What is necessary that we may see an object, or hear a sound ? 
45. What follows if the impression upon the organ be the same 

in any two instances ? 4G. What instvinces are mentioned, as an 

illustration ? 47. What conclusion necessarily follows from such 

facts ? 48. In acquiring information, of what use is experimental 

knowledge ? 49. What has been given us to enable us to ex- 
tend our information ? 



138 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 7. 

comparison, we cease to learn, and are not only idle, but 
in error. 

Mary. Is not the sense of smell the simplest of our 
senses ? 

Edward. That is not easy to say, unless you tell us 
what you mean by simple. 

Mary. I mean the one that gives us the most limited 
and the least complicated information. 

Dr. Herbert. In this view of the matter, certainly it is ; 
for it could convey to us none of those portions of informa- 
tion which make us acquainted with the properties, or even 
with the existence of external bodies. We speak of the 
odours of certain substances : but, as I have already said, we 
cannot certainly infer the presence of the substance from 
the present sensation of the odour, even though we have 
been long accustomed to see or feel the one at the same 
time that we smell the other. You may find the perfumes 
of a thousand flowers, in a thousand bottles, in a perfumer's 
shop ; and yet there may not be a single flower within 
miles of it. The whole matter discoverable by us in the 
exercise of this sense is, that the interior membrane of the 
nostrils, upon which what we call the olfactory or smelling 
nerves are spread out, is affected in a particular manner; 
and we infer that the matter which thus affects them is 
mingled with the air that we breathe, just because the 
strength of the sensation is increased or diminished with 
the increase or the diminution of respiration. 

Matilda. But may not an odour be compound ? If I tie 
together a nosegay of several flowers, as of roses, sweet peas, 
and mignionette, and hold it at some distance from me, the 
smell is not that of any of the three, but a compound of them 
altocrether. 

Dr. Herbert. But it is a compound which we have no 
means of analyzing by the mere sense of sm.ell, unless one 
of the flowers so predominate as to give its scent to the 
whole ; and then we cannot name the accompanying flower, 
unless we have previously smelt the same combination, and 
at the same time ascertained that the presence of that was 
necessary to the present sensation. 

50. Is the information conveyed to us by the sense of smelling 

limited, or extensive ? 51. What is the whole, which we can 

discover in the exercise of this sense ? 52. From this what shall 

we infer ? 



Less. 7. intellectual philosophy. 139 

Charles. In this respect, man is far inferior to many of 
the other animals. The hound courses upon the scent, and 
the blood-hound on the slot, where nothing is perceptible 
to the utmost refinement of human research ; and dogs 
have been known to find their way by the scent, backwards, 
over many miles, even hundreds of miles, where they were 
in close carriages during their former journey, and could 
not, by possibility, have had a single object of sight to 
guide them on their return. 

Dr. Herbert. The senses of the animals, which are 
given to them for their preservation almost immediately at 
their birth, are formed in a state of perfection : while those 
of man, who is to be nursed in his helpless years, and in- 
structed afterwards in his organs of sense, as well as in every 
thing else, has them in the state of extreme feebleness; but 
when they are once educated, they answer his purposes much 
better than the naturally more acute senses of the other 
animals, It is true we cannot track game, or follow a man, 
or find out a place, by the mere sense of smelling, if that 
place be at any distance from us, and there be no current 
of air wafting the odorous particles, by which smelling can 
^uide us; but still, compared with our other senses, or, 
rather, after the experience of their operation, our feeble 
sense of smelling can guide us to information, at which none 
of the other animals could arrive. The scent of a dog ena- 
bles him to find his home, his feeder, or his food — all the 
objects in which he is interested ; but we have no reason 
to conclude that, with all his acuteness, he could make 
any distinction between a rose and a tulip. This shows us, 
that a teachable faculty, however feeble it may be at its 
commencement, is far better than even the most acute facul- 
ty, if it cannot be taught. 

Mary. I think the sense of taste is one from which, 
next to smell, we derive the least information. 

Edward. I differ from you there. We derive a great 
deal of very useful and pleasant information from the sense 
of taste. All the nice fruits and sweatmeats are distinguish- 
ed by the taste , and if there was not something more 
pleasing in the tastes of pine-apples, and grapes, and peach- 
es, than in apples and potatoes, it would be all orchards and 
fields, and no hot-houses. 

^ • - 

53. How do the senses of animals compare with those of 
man? 



140 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 7. 

Dr, Herbert. That the pleasures we derive from taste 
are very numerous, I readily admit. That they are agree- 
able to us all, we cannot deny : and that if they were 
struck out of the catalogue of sensations, there are very 
many whose enjoyments would be sadly abridged, I fear 
I must allow. But those pleasures are treacherous as 
pleasures ; and if we do not mingle the enjoyment of 
them with something more intellectual than anything which 
they themselves could furnish, we would not only have 
small claims to the character of rational and informed be- 
ings, but injure our existence as mere animals. It is per- 
haps here that our cultivated senses have the least advan- 
tage over the instinctive ones of the animals. It is prob- 
able, that the pleasure of taste is the most general of 
their pleasures: and yet we do not find that they become 
the victims of dainties, as is but too often the case with 
man. 

Charles. In the case of tasting, there appears to me to 
be something more than in that of smelling. There is a 
sensation of the presence of the substance tasted. 

Dr, Herbert. That seems doubtful, Charles. When 
we take a substance into the mouth, the chief seat of the 
organ of taste, mere tasting, the mere sapidity, is not the 
only sensation that arises. There is a feeling of the exist- 
ence of the body, by touch, by pressure, more or less, upon 
the tongue and palate, so intimately accompanying the 
mere taste, that we can hardly separate the one from the 
other : but still they are not the same : the one is, as 1 
have said, analogous to a mechanical pressure or resistance, 
and the other to a chemical decomposition ; and it is 
doubtful whether any sensation of taste w^ould arise, unless 
from a decomposition of the sapid substance to a certain 
extent; so that if we had no sense but that of mere taste, 
it is doubtful whether we could have acquired any cer- 
tain knowledge of external existences : and certainly we 
could have known none of their properties, except their 
sapid ones. 

Charles, Then, as the sense of taste conveys so much 
individual pleasure to us, are we to consider that its value 

54. What is remarked of the pleasures of the sense of taste ? 

55. When we taste a substance, what is there besides the sensation 

of tasting ? 56. To what are they analogous .? 57. If we had 

not been endowed with any other sense than that of tasting, what 
would probably have been the consequence ? 



Less. 8. intellectual philosophy. 141 

is confined to that ; and that it has no influence upon man 
in a state of education and society ? 

Dr, Herbert. So far from that being the case, Charles, 
it is this very sense, which, when turned to a proper account, 
tends more to promote kindly feelings, between those 
who are on an equality, and sympathy for those who want, 
than even the most intellectual of our other affections, eX' 
ternal or internal. Its recurrence is at the table, where 
we all meet ; it is a pleasure in which we all partake ; 
and mankind must be depraved, indeed, if a number of 
them can meet together, and all be happy, without some 
wish not for the happiness of those who are assembled 
merely, but for the happiness of all the rest. The social 
meal is the period at which both by nature and by religion, 
we think of the bounty of our Creator ; and, so thinking, 
it is surely the fittest time for remembering the wants of 
our fellow-creatures — for thinking of the case of those who 
toil hard, and yet are hungry, while we follow our pleasures, 
and yet fare abundantly. Nor is there any doubt that the 
remembrance of the blessed Founder of our religion was 
coupled with the particular act of the gratification of this 
sense, in order that, by remembering his unspeakable mercy 
to us, we might learn to be merciful to others. 



LESSON VIIL 

Sense of hearing — Limits of external sensation — Musical sounds — 
Musical ear — Language — Instinct of man compared with that of 
animals — Superiority of reason over instinct, as regards space, as 
regards time. 

Dr. Herbert, The order, in which the senses are class- 
ed, is of little importance, unless we attribute certain per- 
ceptions of external things to the touch or vision, as imme- 
diate sensations, when perhaps they are inferences resulting 
from experience; and thereby produce confusion. 

58. What is the tendency of this sense when turned to a 

proper account ? 59. In what manner does the author illustrate 

this ? 

13 



142 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS, 8. 

Therefore, we shall next consider the sense of hearing. 
Is the information with which it furnishes us, in the first 
instance — that is, in a single and unrepealed sound — of 
more importance, or more fraught with information, than a 
single instance of smell or taste ? 

Matilda, I think it is. There is a charm in a musical 
note which conveys a pleasure different from any that we 
can have from the sweetest scent, or the most delicious 
flavour. 

Edward. I should doubt that ; for I would prefer a 
nice ripe strawberry, fresh from the plant, to any single 
musical note that I ever heard or could hear. 

Charles. And, I am sure, when I walk out in the fresh- 
ness of the spring, I cannot tell whether I derive the most 
pleasure from the fragrance of the blossoms or the songs of 
the birds. 

Dr. Herbert. But do you think that you would be bet- 
ter able to come at a knowledge of the birds from their 
notes, without having seen them, than you would at a knowl- 
edge of the blossoms from their mere fragrance ? 

Mary. They must have been seen first, certainly, and 
heard singing at the same time. Indeed, all the senses, of 
which we have yet spoken, seem to me, if they are not ac- 
companied by the experience of the other senses, to convey 
nothing but the mere sensation of smell, or taste, or 
sound, which may be agreeable or disagreeable to us, and 
is felt to be so, without any other reference to the substance 
from which we suppose that it arises. 

Dr. Herbert. And do you think that the sense of 
sound, which still does not, in itself, convey any informa- 
tion of external existences, is fraught with no other infor- 
mation than that of the mere individual sounds themselves ? 

Mary. When the sounds are skilfully arranged, so as 
to produce a piece of music, that music may pioduce the 
most powerful impression upon the mind, and have an in- 
fluence, not only upon the immediate conduct, but upon 
the general character. We have read of the Swiss being 
won back to their native mountains by the sound of the 
airs to which they were accustomed to listen there ; we 
have read of armies having been rallied by the sound of 

1. Can the sense of sound convey any other information than 

the mere existence of the sound itself? 2. What impression 

may sounds, skilfully arranged, produce ? Give the illustration. 



Less. 8. intellectual niiLosopiiY. 143 

their favourite music, when the command of tlieir general 
had lost its power ; we have read of the sailor overcoming 
the perils of the deep, cheered even by his own song dur- 
ing a storm ; and we have all felt that, not in the sounds of 
music or in the songs of the human voice only, but in the 
rustling of the leaves, the rushing of the waters, the moan- 
ing of the winds, the roaring of the thunder, and in every 
sound, from whatever it arises, or however it is pitched and 
modulated, there is an effect upon the feelings of which 
w^e have no trace in any perception, either of smell or of 
taste. Smell and taste are, in themselves, mere solitary or 
selfish pleasures ; but in the pleasures of sound, we sym- 
pathise with all nature. 

Charles. One of the most remarkable circumstances 
about sound, or the sense of hearing, is the extremely mi- 
nute variations of it which are clearly and at once discern- 
ible. All roses have pretty nearly the same scent ; and 
from the same tree you cannot, by that sense, distinguish 
one from another, if they be in the same stage of growth. 
All pieces of sugar, if equally free from extraneous matter, 
have the same sweetness, and an ounce, in its continued 
application, would certainly be at the end more sweet than 
a pound. Sounds, on the other hand, admit of endless di- 
versity ; no two notes are the same on one instrument ; no 
single note is the same when the atmosphere is dry as when 
it is damp ; no one note is the same on any two instru- 
ments ; no two human voices are alike ; and no one human 
voice preserves exactly the same sound, when expressing 
even the shortest word or sentence, if the feeling and appli- 
cation of it be not exactly similar. Nay, so very variable 
is that which produces sound, be it voice or instrument, 
and so susceptible is the ear to those variations, that not 
only the people in different countries, but those who are 
differently occupied, or differently exposed to the weather, 
do not pronounce the words of the very same language, as 
mere sounds, (without any reference to their signification,) 
so as to produce the same effect upon the ear. 

Dr. Herbert. As we are apt, from observation, to asso- 
ciate a complication of effect with a complication of cause, 
we should be led from the anatomical structure of the ear, 

3. What is said respecting the variation and variety of sounds? 

4. To what conclusion should we be led from the anatomical 

structure of the ear ?-' How does the ear compare with the other 

organs of sense ? 



144 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 8- 

as compared with that of the organs of smell and taste, to 
infer a much greater variety in the sensations ot which it is 
susceptible. Of all our organs of allocated sense, the ear 
is certainly the most intricate in its structure. Its parts 
are the most numerous, and the least analogous in their of- 
fices, to any thing we meet with in external mechanics. 
The organs of smell and taste are mere surfaces, which have 
another, and, as would appear, a more important use in the 
animal economy. The indispensable office of respiration, 
the less continuous one of receiving food, which is equally 
important, and the powers of voice, which are, in an intel- 
lectual point of view, the most important of any, are in a 
great part allocated to the very same organs as smell and 
taste ; while the ear, with all its singular machinery, an- 
swers no purpose but that of hearing. 

Mary, The eye I should reckon a nicer and more com- 
plicated organ than the ear ; it is more beautiful, and it ex- 
presses the internal feelings of the mind, of which there is 
not a trace to be found in the ear, which, in human beings 
at least, is quite motionless. 

Edward. Nor is the ear absolutely necessary for the 
transmission of sound. 1 have read of those who have re- 
tained their hearing after the loss of the external ear ; and 
I know that if the mouth be kept open, sounds can be 
heard though both ears be shut. 

Charles, And not only that, but, in some cases, a par- 
ticular sound is more loud and sonorous when the ears are 
shut, than when they are open. If I fasten a bit of string 
to the poker, take the end of the string between my teeth, 
and thus suspending the poker, hit the other end of it 
against a hard body, as the fender, 1 can hear the sound a 
great deal better when my ears are closed, than when they 
are open. 

Dr, Herbert, These instances only show that the cause 
of hearing, — that is, the change in the external world, im- 
mediately antecedent to that change in the state of the au- 
ric nerves within the ear, which is instantly followed by the 
mental consciousness of sound, is not only not remote — as 
the bell which is swung in the steeple or the bird which 
sings in the grove, — but is nearer to us — in more absolute 

5. What does the experiment of the string, attached to the poker, 
sLow? 



Less. 8. intellectual philosophy. 145 

contact with those nerves — than the external ear, or than 
a great part of the internal cavity. For, as you have ob- 
served, the vibrations of the poker and the cord, wlien com- 
municated to the teeth, and thence to the air in the mouth, 
produce a louder sound when the auditory passacre is shut 
than when it is open. Now there are communicating ducts 
that lead from the mouth to very near the cavity of the in- 
ternal ear ; and these, in the case alluded to, are no doubt 
the channels of sound. 

Matilda. But why should the sound be louder, in the 
case alluded to, when the ears are shut, than when they 
are open 1 

Dr. Herbert. The ear is adapted to receive sounds from 
all quarters — from every point of surrounding space ; and 
as there is always something in motion, and causing pulsa- 
tions in the air, a number of sounds must be constantly as- 
sailing ui, though from habit we do not heed them, unless 
when one more powerful than the rest forces itself upon 
the organ. Now, in the case alluded to, these sounds are 
partially excluded by the closing of the ears, and the par- 
ticular sound that has, as it were, an unbroken connexion 
with the internal ear, is left to produce its effect undis- 
turbed. 

Charles. That seems at variance with another fact. 
The country people always open their mouths when they 
are listening eagerly to any particular sound ; and I have 
often done the same, and felt considerable advantage from 
it. 

Mary. You forgot, Charles, that it is the ear and not 
the mouth, which collects sounds from all quarters. When 
we listen open-mouthed, we always turn our faces in the 
direction from which the sound comes ; and thus we get 
an increase of that particular sound, without any increase 
of the other disturbing sounds that are around us. 

Matilda. Yes, and that sound must have been loud 
enough to overcome all these, before we began to listen 
to it. 

Edward. If sound be produced only by the pulsation 
or vibration of the air, or other body, that is immediately 
in contact with the internal ear, how comes it that we can 
know the point from which sound proceeds ? If I hear a 

6. How is the sound, in this instance, conaraunicated to the organ 
of hearing, and why should it be louder ? 
13* 



146 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 8. 

lamb bleat in the field, a bird sing in a tree, or a bee hum- 
ming over a flower, I can go to the place where it is, with- 
out any guide but the sound alone. 

Charles. No, you cannot. Do you not remember the echo 
at the great rock ? You stood at the point where the echo 
is loudest. I came up behind the bushes, and called ' Ned,' 
and you went to the rock to seek me. 

Edward. But I did not hear you. I heard the echo, 
and that came from the rock. 

Mary. Not originally, Edward ; the echo never begins 
the conversation : it never speaks till it be spoken to. 

Dr. Herbert. In the mere sound itself there is certain- 
ly nothing to guide us to the knowledge of direction, or 
distance, or of a sounding body. The mere sensation of 
sound is all that the momentary action of the organ gives 
us ; and if we had never been sensible of anything but that, 
instead of having any knowledge of external objects, we 
should not have known that we had bodies at all ; at least 
they would have been the whole universe to us, and we 
would have had no knowledge of them, further than the 
pains or the pleasures that arose from the changes of their 
states at any particular point, and far any particular time 
that they had been in a state of change. Would a pain in 
the limb, or the stomach, or even in the brain itself, or the 
pleasure that is felt when the pain suddenly ceases, and the 
part returns to its wonted state of health, give you a lesson 
in geography or astronomy, or even enable you to find out 
that you had hands or feet? 

Charles. Certainly not ; it would not give one a lesson 
even in the anatomy of the part affected. 

Dr. Herbert. And yet the affections to which I have 
alluded are, in themselves, much more acute, and therefore 
much better calculated for conveying more knowledge from 
the mere facts of their own occurrence, than any ordinary 
sounds which we can hear. 

Edicard. Then, if our senses give us no information, 
what is the use of them ? 

Dr. Her^bert. They give us sensation, Edward, or rath- 
er they are themselves known to us only in sensation ; for 
they do not give us any knowledge even of their own organs. 

7. Can we, from the mere sound itself, ascertain from what direc- 
tion it comes ? 8. If the sense of hearing had been the only sense 

ever given us, what would have been our knowledge ? 9. How 

are the senses known to us ? 



Less. S. intellectual philosophy. 147 

It we had liad no sense but that of sight, for instance, and if 
the impressions or affections of the organ of that sense, pro- 
duced by the various modifications of light, had been as 
transient in the mind as they are in the optic nerves upon 
the retina, or in whatever other place of the sentient mass 
the sensation of sight aiises, we might have enjoyed the very 
same sense of sight that we enjoy now, and have enjoyed it 
for any number of years, without having the slightest knowl- 
edge of body, or extension, or duration. We would have 
been beings of the moment only, and the perceptions of sight 
would have been nothing more than momentary pleasures 
and pains, analogous to those that we feel in the healthy or 
the diseased states of our internal organs, — of those organs 
which, with all our senses, and all our powers of continued 
observation and comparison, we could have had no knowl- 
edge, if the body had never been dissected. 

Charles. Then the sensation is a mere state of the or- 
gans, beyond which, as a pleasure or a pain, we never could 
have had any knowledge, if we had had nothing else than 
the sensation. 

Dr. Herbert. That certainly is all. 

Mary. And yet the senses are the original means by 
which we come at our knowledge of all the properties of 
external objects. 

Dr. Herbert. We have no other means of acquiring 
any knowledge whatever of anything, as existing in space 
— that is, for the moment, and without looking back, or 
making trial forward. 

Edward. Then we know nothing whatever. 

Dr. Herbert. When we come honestly to that point, 
Edward, without deceiving ourselves, we are farther ad- 
vanced in the path of true knowledge than they who have 
filled the shelves of their library with books upon this very 
philosophy of the mind, about which we have been convers- 
ing for some time, and respecting which I was aware that 
we should come to this conclusion sooner or later. It is 

10. Under what circumstances might we have enjoyed the sense 
of sight without having any knowledge of body, or extension, or 
duration ? 11. Under these circumstances, what would our per- 
ceptions of sight have been ? 12. What is meant by the term 

sensation ? 13. What is meant when it is said, that the senses 

are the original means of all our knowledge of the properties of ex- 
ternal objects ? 14. When we acknowledge our ignorance on 

this subject, in what relation to it do we stand, as it respects our 
advaQcement in knowledge .'* 



148 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 8. 

fortunate that we have come to it here. We have said 
enough, I trust, about the simpler senses to understand the 
extent and limits of the information that they give us ; and 
that will enable us to restore to its proper source the other 
and more extended information which has been attributed 
to the remaining senses of touch and vision. 

Charles. But if we deny that the senses give us our in- 
formation relative to the external world, w^ould not that at 
once destroy philosophy and religion, and reduce the world, 
the universe, ourselves, and all, to mere dreams and imag- 
inations ? 

Dr. Herbert. Instead of that, Charles, it establishes 
them all, upon a foundation which is the only sure one, 
and one which cannot be shaken by argument, or under- 
mined by sophistry. But, in order that we may be the bet- 
ter able to see, and to bear in mind, the point at which the 
truth begins, let me call your attention carefully to one 
very short question : — '' If we had had but one sense, as 
that of hearing, and one sensation from it, as one note of a 
bugle, once sounded, but never repeated ; would we have 
been better or worse qualified for acquiring knowledge by 
that sense, than we are with all our senses, all our experi- 
ence, all our reasoning?'^ 

Mary. In that case, the universe, to us, would have 
been but one bugle note. 

Dr. Herbert. Then, if the note had ceased, the sense 
of hearing been extinguished, never to return, and the 
taste of a peach had been as momentarily impressed upon 
our sense of taste, how should have stood our knowledge ? 

Echcard. The world would have been, to us, the mo- 
mentary taste of a peach, and nothing else. 

Dr. Herbert. Again : if that had passed in like man- 
ner, and the sense of smell had been impressed by the mo- 
mentary odour of a violet ? 

BlatUda. The odour of a violet would have been all. 

Dr. Herbert. If that had passed also, and we had got 
one momentary glance of the colour of a rose ? 

15. What will a knowledge of the Hmited extent of the informa- 
tion, which the simpler senses give us, enable us to do ? 16. On 

what foundation does this view of the senses, establish philosophy 

and religion ? 17. In designating the point at which truth 

begins, wha' -^estion does the author propose, and what answer 
should be givtn? 



Less. 8. intellectual riiiLosoriiY. 149 

Charles. The colour of the rose would have been all 
we knew. 

Dr. Herbert. That also having been destroyed, if the 
finger had been pricked by the point of a needle 1 

Mary. The whole would have been a needle's point. 

Dr. Herbert. If there had been no external sensation, 
but only one twinge of inward pain r 

Charles. The whole would, of course, have been one 
momentary feeling of pain. 

Dr. Herbert. Thus we have enumerated all the senses, 
and have found that in one operation of each of them, sing- 
ly, the only knowledge that we could by possibility obtain, 
is the mere sensation itself. 

Edward But if I had felt any of them once, I should 
know it again if it returned, — at least, if I recollected the 
former time. 

Dr. Herbert. Then you observe, that the senses, in 
their individual operations, (and they are nothing but these) 
give us the individual sensation only; and that these are 
not knowledge, unless the mind perceives them in succession, 
decides upon their sameness or diversity, and observes them 
in the order of their occurrence. So that it is not by the 
senses, considered in their organs, that the state ot external 
things which put these organs into particular states, that 
our knowledge of matter is originally received ; for the very 
facts of the existence of the affected organ, the affecting 
cause, and the sequence to which the name of cause and 
effect is given, are deductions of experience, the results of 
internal affections of the mind ; and without these affec- 
tions, though the substances and occurrences in the exter- 
nal world had been just the same as they are now, we should 
have remained in utter ignorance. 

Charles. But is there not sight in the eye, taste in the 
tongue, or sound in the ear, when they are not actually 
seeing, and tasting, and hearing? 

Dr. Herbert. Just as much as there is music in a flute, 
writing in a pen, fire in a billet of wood, a statue in a block 

18. After having enumerated all the senses and attended to the 
operation of each one of them in a single instance, what result fol- 
lows ? 19. Since the senses, in their individual operations, give 

the individual sensation only, what further is requisite, that our sen- 
sations may become knowledge .'' 20. On what ground of rea- 
soning is it asserted, that our knowledge of matter is not originally 
received by the senses considered in their organs.'* 21. With- 
out these affections, what would have been the consequence I 



150 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 8. 

of marble, or a philosopher in a man. If you have observed 
any result with regard to the placing of any thing in any 
circumstances; and if you again meet with the same thing, 
or a thing exactly similar, you cannot help believing, that 
if you place it exactly in the former circumstances, you will 
have the former result ; but the time, at which there is no 
change, is a time of ignorance : and if one who had no for- 
mer knowledge should come then, he would go as wise as 
he came, and no wiser. 

I have felt it necessary to be thus particular upon the 
proper nature and limits of the senses as sources of infor- 
mation, because this is the point at which, not the ignorant 
only, (and they are not to be blamed) but many oiihe most 
philosophic upon other points, jumble the nature of the 
senses and the mind. By investing the mutable and perisha- 
ble organ ^'ith those perceptions, with that knowledge, and 
that reflection and comparison, which belong only to the im- 
mutable and indestructible mind, they fail in their attempt, 
and bring down the mind to the mutable and mortal organ ; 
as if a man, by binding the mill-stone and the lead to the 
eagle, and attempting to make them all fly, should confine 
the eagle to the earth, and make the whole of the unnatu- 
ral compound, mill-stone and lead, all over. 

Mary, Then are our senses, which are to us the sources 
of so many pleasures, so very insignificant? 

Dr. Herbert. Nothing in creation is insignificant : the 
dullest organ of sense, the most insignificant object of growth, 
the simplest property of the simplest substance, has an in- 
genuity of structure, and an adaptation of purpose about it, 
which rise incomprehensibly, not in degree, but abso- 
lutely in kind above the finest eflforts of man's most cul- 
tivated art : and there is, perhaps, none in w-hich this is 
more wonderfully displayed, than in that organ of the 
sense of hearing, from tlie consideration of which we have 
made rather a long, though, I trust, not an unprofitable 
digression. 

22. If any thing be placed in certain circumstances, and th-e 
result of it he observed, what would be expected if the same thing, 

or one like it, should be found in similar circumstances ? 23. 

Why has the author been thus particular, on the proper nature and 
limits of the senses ? 24. What have those philosophers in reali- 
ty done, who have invested the oigan of sense with the perceptions, 
knowledge, reflection and comparison, which belong only to the 
mind? 25. What illustration is given? 26. What is re- 
marked respecting the ingenuity of structure in the organ of hearing ? 



Less. 8. intellectual philosophy. 15 1 

Edward. Those pulsations or waves in the air, to 
which you have attributed the change of state in the in- 
ternal ear thai produces hearing, are not mere motions of 
the air ; for though I drive the air ever so forcibly back- 
wards or forwards at my ear, with my hand, I do not hear 
any noise ; I only feel a sensation of cold, the same as if 
the part against whicli the air is driven were exposed to 
the wind, and I feel that nearly as much in my hand as in 
my ear. 

Charles. And if I strike a glass against my ear, the sen- 
sation is pain, and not sound ; while if I strike the edge 
of it with the nail of my finger, as it stands on the table, 
there is a loud and continued sound, without any sensation 
of pain 

Dr. Herbert. The particular change of the air in the 
internal ear, which is the immediate antecedent of sound in 
general, or of any particular sound, is sensible only to that 
organ, and sensible only to it in the simple sensation of 
sound, which the ear, of course, has not the faculty of analys- 
insr and of which the mind has no further information than 
that which the ear gives ; and the same may bo said of 
the immediate antecedents in all cases of sensation, what- 
ever may be the organ ; but we may be assured, that the 
changes that produce sound are exceedingly delicate, in 
consequence of the minute variations, of which we can take 
notice. 

Matilda. That is peculiarly striking in the case of 
music. If a string be ever so little out of tune, or a note 
played ever so little out of tune, the ear detects it in a 
moment. 

Mary. It is singular, too, why the voice, in singing, 
should obey the ear, since the one is the action of the throat 
and mouth, over which we cannot easily conceive that the 
ear can have any control. 

Dr. Herbert. It is the mind that controls them both; 
though, as the formation of the organ must have a consid- 
erable effect upon the sensation, or the motion, we need 
as little wonder at the accordance that sometimes exists 
between the organ of hearing and the organ of voice, as at 

27. To what is the particular change of air, whicli is the imme- 
diate antecedent of sound, sensible r 28. Can the ear analyze 

this sensation ^ 29. What does the mind know about it ? 

30. W^hat may be said respecting antecedents in all cases of sen- 
sation .' 



152 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 8. 

the existence of a musical ear, which we often meet with, 
not only without accordant vocal powers, but without even 
that musical dexterity, that flexibility and rapidity in the 
motion of the fingers, which is essential to fine execution 
in the performance of music. In what these original dif- 
ferences consist, we cannot of course tell ; because they, 
as particular modifications of hearing, are, like ihat, known 
onlj in their own existence, and in nothing else. That 
they have no connexion with the general activity of the 
mind, we must admit ; for it is proverbial, that the most 
skilful musicians have never been the most acute and in- 
telligent of men. Neither are they indicative of a greater 
general perception in the ear ; for many of those that have 
had exquisite musical ears, have not only not been more 
sensitive to other sounds than those who have had no such 
musical sensitiveness, but they have remained listless under 
appeals of oratory at which the unmusical have been affect- 
ed even to tears. 

diaries. May not a good deal of what is termed a mu- 
sical ear, depend upon cultivation and practice ? 

Dr. Herbert. Of that there can be little question ; and 
were we all to devote as much and as undivided attention to 
this single subject as the musicians do, there is no doubt that 
we should acquire some degree of perfection in it, just as 
we acquire in any other matter to which we direct our ob- 
servation long and attentively. 

Edward. The power of music over the mind must have 
been much greater in ancient times than it is now ; for 
though there be a piano forte in almost every farmhouse, 
we do not find the beasts dancing to that, as they are re- 
ported to have done to the lyre of Orpheus. 

Mary. The beasts, I suppose, have become accustomed 
to it. You remember the shepherd's dog, that got into the 
church, and began to howl in accompaniment to the organ. 
Now, he could not know so much about music as our 
Ranger, who hears it every day, and never seems to be 
aflfec^ed by it in the least. 

Dr. Herbert, And mankind were much less familiar 
with it, too; and from want of general information, which 

31. Is it a fact, that there are persons who have a good mu- 
sical ear, but are destitute of vocal powers and musical dexterity ? 

82. What is mentioned as proverbial, in regard to musicians' 

33. Do such persons have a better general perception of sound, 
than others ? What is the reason that music has less effect on man- 
kind now than it is said to have had in former times .? 



Less. 8. intellectual rEiiLosopiiY. 153 

has since been so widely diffused by the art of printing they 
were credulous upon matters which are now generally un- 
derstood, and, therefore, are not wonders at all, 

diaries. I have been reading the " Memoirs of Martinus 
Scriblerus," since you last alluded to them ; there is a very 
amusing story there about the power of the ancient music, 
and the failure of a modern trial. 

Dr, Herbert, Suppose you should read it to us, Charles ; 
we shall not be the worse for a pause, or even a smile, if 
the story can produce one. 

Charles. ** The bare mention of music, threw Corne- 
lius into a passion. * How can jou,' quoth he, * dignify 
this modern fiddling with the name of music? Will any 
of your best hautboys encounter a wolf, novv-a-days, with 
no other arms but their instruments, as did that ancient 
piper, Pythocaris ? Have ever wild boars, elephants, deer, 
dolphins, whales, or turbots, showed the least motion at the 
most elaborate strains of your modern scrapers, all which 
have been, as it were, tamed and humanized by ancient 
lnu^icians ? Whence proceeds the degeneracy of our 
morals ? Is it not from the loss of ancient music ? by which, 
(says Aristotle) they taught all the virtues ? Else might 
we turn Newgate into a college of Dorian musicians, who 
should teach moral virtues to the people. Whence comes 
it that our present diseases are so stubborn ? Whence 
is it that I daily deplore my sciatical pains ? Alas I be- 
cause we have lost their true cure by the melody of the pipe. 
All this was well known to the ancients, as Theophras- 
tus assures us, (whence Coelius calls it loca dolentia de- 
cantare^) only indeed some small remains of this skill 
are preserved in the cure of the tarantula. Did not 
Pythagoras stop a company of drunken bullies from storm- 
ing a civil house, by changing the strain of the pipe to 
the sober spondseus ? and yet your modern musicians want 
art to defend their windows from common nackers. It 
was well known, that when the Lacedaemonian mob were 
op, they commonly sent for a Lesbian musician to ap- 
pease them ; and they immediately grew calm, as they 
heard Terpander sing. Yet I don't believe that the Pope's 
whole band of m.usic, though the best of this age, could 
keep his Holiness' image from being burnt on the fifth of 
November,' 

14 



154 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 8. 

* Nor would Terpander, himself/ replied Albertus, * at 
Billingsgate, or Timotheus at Hockley, in the Hole, have 
any manner of effect^ nor both of them together, bring 
Horneck to common civility.' 

'That's a gross mistake,' said Cornelius, very warmly; 
' and to prove it so, I have a small lyra of my own, framed, 
strung, and tuned after the ancient manner. 1 can play 
some fragments of Lesbian airs, and I wish I were to try 
them upon the most passionate creatures alive.' 

* You never had a better opportunity,' says Albertus ; 
* for yonder are two apple-women, scolding, and ready to 
uncoif one another.' 

With this, Cornelius, undressed as he was, jumps out 
into ihe balcony, his lyra in hand, in his slippers, with a 
stocking upon his head, and a waistcoat of murry-colured 
satin upon his body ; he touched his lyra, with a very unu- 
sual sort of harpegiatura, nor were his hopes frustrated. 
The odd equipage, the uncouth instrument, the strangeness 
of the man and the music, drew the ears and eyes of the 
whole mob that were collected about the two female cham- 
pions, and at last, of the combatants themselves. They all 
approached the balcony, in as close attention as Orpheus' 
first audience of cattle, or that at an Italian opera, when 
some favorite air is just awakened. This sudden effect of 
his music encouraged him mightily ; and, as it was observ- 
ed, he never touched his lyra in such a truly chromatic and 
enharmonic manner as upon that occasion. The mob 
laughed, sung, jumped, danced, and used many odd ges- 
tures, all of which he judged to be caused by the various 
strains and modulations. 'Mark!' quoth he, ' in this, the 
powder of the Ionian ; in that you see the effect of the ^o- 
lian.' But in a little time they grew riotous, and threw 
stones. Cornelius then whhdrew. 

* Brother !' said he, * do you observe that I have mixed, 
unawares, too much of the Phrygian? I might change it 
to the Lydian, and soften their riotous tempers. But it is 
enough : learn from this example to speak with venera- 
tion of the ancient music. If this lyra, in my unskilful 
hands, can perform such wonders, what must it have 
done in those of a Timotheus, or a Terpander V Having 
said this, he retired, with the utmost exultation in himself, 
and contempt of his brother; and, it is said, behaved that 
night with such unusual haughtiness to his family, that 



Less. S. intellectual philosophy. 155 

ihey had all reason for some ancient Tiliocen to calm his 
temper." 

Edward. How very absurd it was to suppose that music 
could possibly have such effects. 

Dr, Herbert. We are all a good deal readier to notice 
and ridicule the credulities of others than to take care of 
our own ; and it is by no means impossible, that the writer 
who, in the extract that has just been read by your brother, 
has so admirably ridiculed the effects ascribed to the an- 
cient music and musicians, had not made up his mind 
whether he should or should not believe in the conscious- 
ness of knowledge, in addition to knowledge itself We 
are never so apt to fall into credulity ourselves, as when we 
are laughing at the credulity of others. 

Matilda. Even now there is great pleasure in listening 
to music. 

Dr. Herbert. No doubt of it; and when we cultivate 
an ear for music, we are cultivating the means of a very 
refined and very harmless pleasure ; only we must be care- 
ful to keep it within due bounds ; unless we have to de- 
pend upon it for our living. The excessive or exclusive 
cultivation of" such a feeling as this, is unfavorable to feel- 
ings and pursuits that are, in themselves, more valuable. 
If the husbandman were to spend all his time in gazing 
upon the beauty of the landscape, or the gardener in smell- 
ing the odor of the flowers, the fields would soon cease to 
be beautiful, and the flowers would very soon wither, or be- 
come choked with weeds. 

Matilda. But we may reckon the pleasure of music 
the chief pleasure that we derive from the sense of hearing, 
just as the pleasure of perfume is the chief one that we 
derive from the sense of smell ? 

Dr, Herbert. If there were nothing but the individual, 
— if we had no knowledge of the external world, — if we 
were not linked to the society of our race, and had no la^ 
boisand duties to perform, it might be that the sounds of 
music, if they could in such circumstances be heard, would 
be among the most delightful and valuable of our pleasures : 
but still, in themselves, and without the association of 

34. What is remarked on cultivating an ear for music? 

35. To what is the exclusive cultivation of a musical taste unfa- 
vorable r 3G. Under what circumstances might we reckon a 

taste for music the most delightful and valuable of our pleasures ? 

37. Would these pleasures without association communicate 

to us any knowledge .' 



156 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. S. 

Other trains of thought^ we should derive no knowledge 
from them, but the succession of pains or pleasures that 
arose from the succession of sounds. What we call the 
pleasure of music, is not a simple pleasure, arising from the 
sound alone. The feelings of our fellow-men mingle with 
the strain — the affection of the lover and the friend, the 
innocence of pastoral life, the boldness of the mariner, the 
devotedness of the patriot, the joy of the happy, or the 
misery of the unfortunate, with all the other varieties and 
charms of life, blend with the music ; and that which, in 
itself,, is nothing more than a succession of simple sounds, 
to each of which, singly, no meaning is attached, becomes 
by the suggestions of memory, and the coloring of fancy, a 
delineation of nature, or a drama of human life, in the con- 
templation of which information from all the other sources 
of mental affection, external and internal, comes in aid of 
the mere sensation of the ear ; and nature, in all her forms, 
and man,, in all his moods, blend with and give interest to 
the lay. 

Charles. When I heard Eraham sing ^ The Storm,' the 
sky, with its reeling clouds and its rolling thunder, the sea, 
with its billows of foam and its dells of darkness, the strug- 
gling of the ship, the shouting of the pilot, the activity of 
the sailors, the creaking of the partial wreck, the momen- 
tary despair at each fresh disaster, the start anew for life, 
the deliverance in the hour of peril, the glee, the bustle,, 
and the thankfulness of heart, all came before me with so 
much freshness and force, that I lost sight of the singer 
and the stage, and fancied myself on board the vessel, and 
an active partaker in all the vicissitudes. 

Edward. And who could hear * Scots wha hae,' sung, or 
even hear the air played, without seeing the gallant little 
army kneeling down in their devotions, which were to hal- 
low to their deliverance or death, or the Bruce himself dash- 
ing forward to assail the defier, and be the foremost to win 
victory in the memorable field ? 

Dr. Herbert. It is even thus, from the associations 
with which they are linked, that the old national songs 
take so powerful a hold upon the feelings and memories 

38. If the pleasure of music be not simple , arising from sound 
alone, what mingles with the strain, in order to produce the effect? 

39. Why are the old national songs remembered with pleasure,. 

while the more scientific music of the theatres and opera-houses is 
forgotten ? 



Less. 8. intellectual ruiLosOpiiY. 157 

of the people, and retain their interest and their popular- 
ity, while the airs that are warbled in succession at the 
theatres and opera houses, how scientifically soever they 
may be set, and how sweetly soever they may be sung, 
perish after a season, and are forgotten. If we are to 
have this pleasure of the ear a permanent pleasure, we 
must make it something more than mere melody — we 
must weave it into the tissue of time, and find in other 
trains of thought some antecedent that shall call it up as 
a consequent, besides the mere succession of the musical 
notes. 

Mary. Then it is not so much the mere music, as what 
we may call the interpretation of the music, that affords us 
pleasure ? 

Edward, But the interpretation must be in that of which 
the music puts us in mind ; for when unaccompanied by 
a song, there is no meaning in the notes of music, as there 
is in the worc's of language. 

Charles. 1 think that, considering them as mere 
sounds, there is just as much meaning in the one as in the 
other. If the case were different, we should be able to 
understand any foreign language, such as French, with- 
out the labor of learning it, just as we do our native 
tongue. 

Dr. Herbert. Our native tongue costs us more labor 
in the learning, than any, or than all other languages put 
together ; only it is begun so early, and the labor is so 
gradual, so uninterrupted, and so eclipsed by the more 
interesting knowledge of things tliat we acquire along 
with it, that we do not heed the steps of the acquirement* 
The pleasure that we permanently derive from music, we 
derive from it as a language; and the chief difference is 
that the interpretation of the music lies in a few scenes 
and feelings, while that of words is as long as the his- 
tory of man, and as extended as the boundaries of his 
knowledge. 

Charles. Language is the only means ofcommunication 
between one human being and another; and if men could 
not have communicated their plans to each other, they 

40. What must we do, if we wish to have this pleasure of the ear 

a permanent pleasure? 41. How does the interpretation of 

music differ from tliat of language ? 

14* 



158 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 8. 

would have been more helpless than the other animals, 
which, if they had the same means of acting in concert that 
we have, would never have allowed us to sway the sceptre 
over them as we do. 

Mary, You forget, Charles, that there is a language of 
gesture and expression, as well as a language of words. It 
is possible to agree, or refuse, or applaud, or reprove, by a 
look ; and our eyes tell whether a person is in good humor 
or in bad, from the gestures of the body, or even the gait 
in walking, though the person so observed never utters a 
syllable. 

Edward, The birds and beasts too have a language of 
this kind. Dogs and horses know their old acquaintance, 
and even the humor that each other are in. 

Dr, Herbert. As these are their only means of commu- 
nication, perhaps they may have them in greater perfection 
than we have, just as their senses and organs of motion 
and self-preservation are much more perfect at their birth, 
and do not stand in need of that cultivation, without which 
ours would be so feeble. Between them and man there 
is however this difference, that their language, whatever 
may be its value and import to the individual, is not hand- 
ed down from generation to generation, and accumulated 
in the course of time. The dogs of the present day do 
not profit by the experience of those that lived an age ago ; 
while man, by the aid of language, profits by the expe- 
rience of ages that have long gone by, even though not a 
trace of those ages should remain but the simple benefit 
that has been conferred. Man enjoys the benefit long after 
the benefactor is forgotten ; and of the implements and 
operations that are in most common and of most important 
use there is hardly one of which we with certainty know 
the original inventor. Who made the first plough, or the 
first knife ? who first wrote with a quill, or even who con- 
trived the first alphabet, are questions which admit of no 
satisfactory answer. 

Charles, One cannot help noticing the extreme delicacy 
of the senses in animals. A dog will read the expression of 
our countenance with far more apparent acuteness than a 
peasant ; and not only so, but he understands language, as 

42. What difference between the animal creation and man is men- 
tioned, in regard to the communication of knowledge from one gen- 
eration to another ? 



Less. 8. intellectual philosophy. 159 

he returns a kind word by caressing, and an angry one by 
crouching, if you be his master, or running off, if you be 
not. These indicate in them something more than mere 
external sense. 

Dr. Herbert, Their approximations to reason are cer- 
tainly very astonishing, — so much so, that if we found them 
guilty of the same blunders of which we are guilty, we 
should be apt to conclude that they proceeded by opinion 
and argument in the same way that vve do ; but we observe, 
from the unerring nature of their conduct, even in circum- 
stances in which the individual could never have been 
placed before, and in which, therefore, he could not be 
guided by any thing like comparison and experience, that 
their rules of conduct are of that class, which, in our own 
case, we can neither deny nor resolve into any former ex- 
perience ; and, therefore, we call them intuitive perceptions 
or instincts. 

Mary, But still they are capable of being taught by ex- 
perience. If they have been deceived with any thing, they 
will avoid things that are similar for the future ; and we 
may make them docile or amusing, if we take pains with 
their education. 

Edward. Even in a wild state, they have the means of 
acting in concert. 1 have read that the sheep in moun- 
tain pastures form themselves in battle array to protect 
the helpless of the flock from the foe; that the beavers act 
in bands, in the conducting of their curious architecture; 
and even the wild geese upon their aerial march, are 
formed in order, and have a scout in front, and a guard in 
the rear. 

Charles. If any one disturbs a bee-hive, the bees flock 
out in numbers, and sting, which they never attempt, if you 
do not interfere with them, or their operations; and if you 
merely look at an ant-hill, the little creatures carry on their 
labors without appearing to take any notice of you; they 
carry their grains of corn, and flies, and beetles, singly or 
in concert, according to the weight; but the moment that 
you attack the hill, they appear upon the breach, and give 
you battle, if you do not retreat. 

43. Under what circumstances might we attribute reason to 

certain animals ? 44. What reasons are given for considering 

the senses of animals, intuitive perceptions or instincts ? 45. 

What instances of sagacity in the bee and ant are mentioDed .'* 



160 fiRST LESSONS IN LeSS. S. 

Matilda. Even in the spiders in the garden, there are 
singular instances of skill. I do not so much mean the con- 
struction of their webs, as the means they take for their 
own safety. They appear to be all cannibals ; and the larg- 
est one, the one that seems capable of spinning the great- 
est quantity of thread, in which they enmesh each other, 
appears always to be the victor. This they appear to know 
by the weight, and have many means of guarding against. 
When one approaches the web of another, he feels at one 
of the threads, and if he be smaller than the owner of the 
web, he retreats; if not, he advances, and the other retires 
along one of the main threads, and if he be pursued, he 
either lets himself down by a thread, by which he can 
again ascend, or he cuts the main thread, and lets the as- 
sailant drop, web and all. 

Dr. Herbert. One of the most singular approximations 
to reason that I ever heard of in the animal world, happen* 
ed in the case of a Newfoundland dog, that belonged to a 
gentleman whom 1 once knew. The dog was large and 
docile, and, generally speakings good natured. About noon 
every day, he was sent to the village, about a mile distant, 
for bread, which was tied in a towel, and the dog, carrying 
the parcel by the knot, always delivered it very carefully, 
and had his dinner when his task was completed. One 
day he returned dirty, with his ears scratched and bleed-* 
ing, and was sulky ; but he delivered his charge with the 
same safety as ever. When the servants went to give him 
his dinner, they found that he had left the house, and was 
making across the fields for a farm that was on the brow 
of a hill about a mile distant. There was a mastiff at the 
farm, with which he had had disputes before, and they con- 
cluded that he had gone there with a hostile intention.. 
When he came to the farm, the mastifF and he conversed 
as dogs do for sonte few minutes,^and then they set out for 
a mill, about a mile distant, in another direction; at which 
there was a large bull-dog,, not,, generally speaking, a friend 
to either. They conversed in the same manner with the 
bull-dog, after which^ the three set off in company, and 
avoiding the house of the first one's master^ which they 
would have had to pass had they taken the nearest road, 
they arrived at the village. The village curs began to 

^Q. What is related of the spider I 47. Relate the anecdote 

&i the dog. 



Less. 8. intellectual niiLosoriiY. IGl 

yelp and snarl, at which the three powerful confederates 
were roused, and proceeded to kill every cur as they went 
along, their manner being so ferocious that none of the 
villagers would approach them. When they had complet- 
ed the massacre, they went and washed themselves in 
a ditch ; after which, they went straight to their homes, 
and quarrelled as before, the very next time that two of 
them met. 

Edward. That is very singular. 

Dr. Herbert. It is not more singular than true. The 
combination of those who were, in general, not friends for 
one common purpose, in which only one had been engaged 
at the first, might seem a little puzzling, if we did not take 
it into the account, that dogs are in their wild state grega- 
rious, and hunt their prey in packs, and that, therefore, an 
instinct of combination or association is as much a part of 
their nature, as the hunting of those animals that are their 
prey. 

Edward. But what should have taken them to the vil- 
lage ? or made them attack the dogs there ? 

Dr, Herbert. The curs had set upon the Newfoundland 
dog, when he was in charge of the parcel, and his instinct 
of fidelity overcame for the time his instinct of revenge, 
though the latter was left to act as soon as the former was 
at an end. 

Edicard. The expedition appears to have been planned 
with more skill, and executed with more decision, than 
many human expeditions. 

Dr. Herbert. No question of it ; and that is the very 
reason why I told you the anecdote. That which w^e 
consider as the perfection of human reason, is really 
not human reason at all. Our intuitive belief, the in- 
stincts of animals, the growth of plants, the properties 
and phenomena of matter, are the facts themselves, while 
our reasonings are only the comparisons of one fact with 
another ; and as we can never be certain that we are in 
possession of all the circumstances that must meet togeth- 
er, before that fact can follow them, as a consequent or ef- 
fect, we can never arrive at that unerring certainty which 

48. How can the combination of the dogs be accounted for, with- 
out referring it to reason ? 49. What are the facts on which 

our reasoning is employed ? 50. Why can we never arrive at 

unerriDg certainty .? 



162 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 8. 

takes place in nature. The one is that which we seek to 
know ; the other is our knowledge of it. Our knowledge 
may be imperfect or faulty, but the fact or phenomenon 
can be nothing but itself The oyster, in the construc- 
tion of his shell ; the tree, in the expansion of its blossom, 
and the ripening of its fruit ; the stone that falls to the 
earth, or the lead that sinks in water, are all far more 
certain and unerring, than the judgment of man, even 
when he flatters himself that his philosophy is the most 
perfect. 

Charles. And are our faculties of reason really of less 
value than the instincts and qualities of the other parts of 
creation ? 

Dr. Herbert. By no means ; they are of a higher order. 
The instinct perishes with the animal, and the quality of 
the substance is at an end when the substance is decom- 
posed and the parts of it enter into new compounds ; but 
the mind of man lives at all times, and in all space ; and it 
does so through that very sense of hearing which has led 
us into these digressions. The instincts of the animals 
may produce a {q\v results, that to us appear, in their cer- 
tainty, superior to human reason: just as we feel that we 
have not the eye of the eagle, the scent of the dog, the 
fleetness of the deer, or the strength of the elephant ; but 
all these arise merely out of the present wants of the indi- 
vidual : .when those wants are satisfied, he lays him down 
to sleep; and when his body is exhausted, he lays him 
down to die, and there is an end. But by the faculty of 
thought, and i\\e sense of hearing, with those inventions 
which have enabled us to hear with the eyes, and collect 
upon the shelves of our libraries the vivid memory of all 
the wise things that ever have been said, and all the bril- 
liant things that ever have been done, a man can sit here 
in England, and contemplate the universe, in all its known 
parts and forms, and at every step of its eventful history. 
What is the most acute sense of any single object, com^ 
pared with that power, before which space and time are as 
nothing, but which can concentrate into the wonderful 

51. What is remarked respecting knowledge, and respecting/aci ? 

52. Why ought we to consider instinct inferior to the faculty 

of reason? 53. What are we able to do in consequence of pos- 
sessing the facultyof thought, the sense of hearing, and other means 

of obtaining information ? 54. Can the most perfect sense of any 

single object bear a comparison with the intellectual powers of mgm ? 



Less. 8. intellectual philosophy. 1G3 

here, and the yet more wonderful now, all of present or of 
former nature that is known ? As our knowledge is noth- 
ing but the states in whicii the mind exists ; so tiie mind, 
existing in a state, is to us that state itself. We can not 
only follow the track of every traveller upon the land, and 
every mariner upon the deep, — we can not only be this mo- 
ment amid the snows ^f Spitzbergen, and the next on the 
burning sands of Lybia, — we can not only now riot in the 
spicy groves of the Ea<t, and taste the delicious fruits of 
the Oriental Archipelago, and be the next moment among 
tlie blazings of volcanoes, the rockings of earthquakes, and 
the ruins of mountains on the table land of the Andes, — we 
can, as mental beings, not only bound away from the earth 
itself, stand where we will in imaginable space, see it turn- 
ing round, and exposing its successive longitudes to the 
alternation of day and night, and its hemispheres by turns 
to the succession of the seasons ; but we can contemplate 
all sides and points of it at once, and condense the year, 
with all its changes, into a single moment. Would we listen 
to Demosthenes, or to Cicero, — would we struggle- for free- 
dom at Plataena, or at Marathon, — would we reason with 
Plato, or doubt with Pyrrho, — would we be throned in the 
capitol with Augustus, or sit with Marius upon the ruins 
of Carthage, — it is accomplished by a single volition, and 
the mind is at the most distant point of space, or the re- 
motest of time, before the finger can be moved, the breast 
give one pulsation, the ear catch a sound, or the eye vary a 
glance. 

It is this which gives to man his superiority, that stamps 
upon him a character, and imposes upon him a responsibil- 
ity that do not belong to any other part of that creation 
which comes within his view. From the first man that ever 
reflected to the last that shall be left upon the earth, there 
flows one vast and unbroken current of knowledge. In this 
current, every individual may mingle, grasp all its more re- 
markable attributes, and add to it the new combinations 
that have arisen from his own experience and invention ; 
and whatever of great or of good he himself shall connect 
to this immortal stream, cannot be lost, but will float down 

55. Enumerate some of the particulars, which may be said to be 

present to the mind of a man at his volition. 56. What does 

this power give to man ? 57. From whom and to whom flows 

the current of knowledge ? 



164 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 8. 

for the information of other minds, when he and all the 
things which contributed to his mortal existence shall be 
quite forgotten. 

Therefore, the true glory of man consists not in that 
which he accumulates or builds,in that over whicii he bears 
the sword of conquest, or sways the sceptre of power. In 
that strife, one nation succeeds another; one conqueror 
lays the palaces and strong holds of a former level with the 
dust. We inquire for Nineveh — it is an empty name; for 
Babylon — and which is the heap ? for Tad mar — it is a few 
blocks of mouldering stone in the wilderness. The glories 
of Greece are no more ; the Acropolis is spoiled of its tem- 
ples; the Areopagus is empty of its judges: there is no 
orator in the rostrum, and no sage at the porch. Every 
vestige of the *^ house of clay" is gone, save that which is 
even more mournful than if it were not ; but the spirit is as 
green, as fresh, as living, and as life-giving as ever. The 
words of wisdom, the wonders of eloquence, and the witch- 
ery of song, have not perished — and they will not perish, 
but remain to awaken new admirers and call other minds 
into emulation, until the general current of thought shall 
stand still, or be turned into a channel of which we have 
at present no knowledge. 

Charles, And all this depends upon the sense of hear- 
ing ? 

Dr. Herbert, It may be, in some respects, said to de- 
pend upon that sense, inasmuch as without the means of 
communication from individual to individual, and of trans- 
mission from age to age, it could not have existed ; and 
without hearing and voice, which, as is evident, must exist 
before written language, the knowledge of man would have 
been limited to the results of his own individual experience ; 
and when we consider how little most individuals contribute 
to the stock notwithstanding the advantages that they de- 
rive from that stock, and their possession of the sense of 
hearing, and the faculty of communication, we cannot sup- 
pose that without these their advances could have been 
very great. 

58. Iq what may it be said, that the true glory of man does not 

consist ? 59. But does the intellectual labor of man, like the 

work of his hands, sink into oblivion ? 60. In what respects 

may it be said, that all our knowledge and intellectual pleasure 

depend on hearing .? 61. To what would the knowledge of 

man have been limited, if hearing and voice had never been given 

him ? 62 Under circumstances of this nature, is it probable that 

knowledge would have made such progress .'' 



Less. 8. intellectual philosophy. 165 

Edward, And yet from the mere sense of hearing we 
could not have derived even the slightest idea of the exist- 
ence of an external world, or the exisjtence of our hodies; 
and nothing, in fact, but the mere sounds, as producing 
pleasure or pain. 

D)\ Herbert. Not even *' as producing" pleasure or 
pain ; but as being in themselves the pleasure or the pain, 
that we feel, and nothing else; and the pleasure or the 
pain bein^i the feeling of the sound, and nothing but that 
feeling, not originally referrible to the ear, or the auric 
nerve as an organ of hearing, any more than to the exter- 
nal body, to which, from the evidence of experience, we 
learn subsequently to attribute the sound. We speak of 
sound, as being something external of the body, and of the 
organ of hearing as being something external of the mind 
— not because we could come to such a conclusion from 
the sensation of sound once felt; but merely from experi- 
ence in the presence of the body, which, from that experi- 
ence, we learn to call sonorous ; from observing it struck 
or otherwise acted upon, so as to produce the state that we 
call sounding, and from observing that the sound varies as 
the ear is open or shut, or healthy or diseased. If we could 
hear the sound, which we now call the sound of a violin, 
without the presence of the violin, or with its presence, and 
nobody playing on it, would we continue to call it the sound 
of a violin 2 

Mary, Certainly we could not : but it might be like 
the sound of a violin ; and if we had been accustomed to 
hear that instrument, we could not hear a sound like that 
which it produced, without thinking on the violin and the 
playing. 

Dr. Herbert, That is exactly the conclusion at which 
we wished to arrive. The ear informs us of nothing but 
the sound ; we do not hear the shape of the instrument, or 
the act of playing, w^hich is necessary in order to enable 
us to refer the sound to a particular instrument, and to a 
particular act; and, therefore, if our means of information 

63. How do we speak of sound, and of the organ of hearing ? 

64. Why do we speak thus? 65. If we could hear the 

sound, which we call the sound of a violin, without the presence of 
that instrument, might we continue to call it the sound of a violin ? 

66. What does the ear inform usj and what does it not inform 

us? 

15 



166 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 8. 

had been limited to the single sense of hearing, our knowl- 
edge would have been confined to the mere sensation of 
sound ; and though a skilful succession of musical notes 
might have given us the very same mental pleasure that 
they give us now, we could have known nothing of voices 
or of instruments. 

Charles. And w^e could not have derived those pleas- 
ures from music, to which we have already referred, as re- 
sulting from those scenes in nature, and those actions of 
human life, which we are now^ enabled to associate with 
the airs, and which certainly produce stronger emotions in 
the mind than could be produced by any mere succession 
of sounds, however perfect in harmony, or however sweet in 
melody. 

Matilda. And if we had no other sense than that of 
hearing — at least, no other means of knowledge than that 
conveyed by the ear — we would have had no meaning 
in language, but must have regarded it just as we do 
the notes of an air that belongs to another country, and 
to other associations than those with which we are ac- 
quainted. 

D)\ Herbert. No question of it. 

Charles. In like manner, if our single sense had been 
that of taste, or of smell, vve should have had no knowledge, 
but the pleasure or the pain which resulted from those feel- 
ings : and could not have known that there was a rose to 
be smelt, or a peach to be tasted. 

Edivard. Nay, we should not have known that there was 
a nose with which to smell, or a tongue and palate with 
which to taste. 

Dr. Herhert. Just so. In each of the three senses 
whose phenomena we have considered, there is nothing com- 
municated but the sensation itself. Nor could it be other- 
wise. The action upon the organ of sense, whether that 
be produced by odoriferous particles, as in the sense of 
smelling ; by sapid particles, as in the sense of tasting ; or 

67. What would have been the consequence, had our means of 
information been limited to the single sense of hearing ? 68. Un- 
der such a limitation, would not music have lost its power, and 
language its meaning t 69. What would have been the conse- 
quence had our information been limited to the single sense of taste 

or smell ? 70. Since nothing is communicated, in the three senses 

referred to, but the sensation itself, what is the action in reality 
upon the organ of sense .'* 



Less. 8. intellectual philosophy. 167 

by waves or successive pulsations of the air, as in hearing, 
is still, after all the experience we have of it, nothing more 
than the contact of one piece or description of matter with 
another piece. Not only this; for it is a contact so very 
gentle in its operation, so momentary in its influence, so 
perfectly obliterated when the contact ceases, that there is 
not a physical trace of its effects even for a single instant. 
The odoriferous particles which affect the olfactory nerves 
in the cavity of the nose, are so perfectly minute, that we 
cannot trace them by the finest instruments that art has 
invented ; and from the immense distance to which a very 
small portion of odorifertms substances, such as a grain of 
musk, or assafoetida, diffuse their odours, and the length of 
time tliat they continue to do this without any apparent 
waste of their substances as matter, we are led to ascribe to 
the particles by which those nerves are excited, a minute- 
ness of which we have hardly any conception, and which 
we can never hope to trace by any other sense than that to 
which they address themselves spontaneously, and without 
assistance from our art. So, also, in the case of tasting, 
though there be a certain analogy to chemical operations, 
we cannot easily discover — indeed we cannot at all discov- 
er — the specific change which makes one taste differ from 
another — which causes honey to produce one taste, and 
wormwood, a taste which we call the very opposite. In the 
sense of hearing, too, not only the particles of the atmos- 
pheric fluid, but the motion upon which hearing depends, 
are not matters of direct observation ; the sound which 
comes to the ear in the voice of thunder, or the bursting 
of a volcano, is so very gentle, that it would not bend a 
rush, or break a cobweb, at any considerable distance from 
where the antecedent explosion takes place ; and a sound 
may be loud in the ear, while it is utterly impossible to 
discover the slightest change in that atmosphere which is 
the immediate cause of the sensation of hearing. 

Mary. And scents, and tastes, and sounds, may all be 
so strong, that the sensation of them may be exceedingly 
painful. 

71. Why does not this contact leave any physical traces of its 
effects ? 72. What particulars are mentioned respecting the par- 
ticles which affect the olfactory nerves ? 73. What is remarked 

respecting the sense of tasting? 74. And what respecting the 

sense of hearing ? 



168 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 8, 

Dr, Herbert, No doubt they may ; but the pains which 
they produce have very little resemblance to that to which 
we are accustonved to give the name of bodvly paia, as aris* 
ing from an external injury^ such as a wound,, or a bruise^ 
or an internal derangement, as in a head-ache. When 
the organ of sense in the senses^ to which we have al- 
ready alluded^ is pained by the strength of the sensation, 
there is not only no permanent arrangement of its parts, 
but there is no actual pain, in the common acceptatk)n of 
the term. 

Charles. I have read of soldiers and sailors becoming 
quite deaf amid the continued roar of their cannon; and I 
have also heard that some persons have entirely lost their 
hearing from exposure to loud and sudden sounds. 

D7\ Herbert. The first of these cases occurs very fre- 
quently ; indeed, invariably, unless the parties stuff their 
ears with wool or cotton, or otherwise prevent the violent 
concussion of the air from being propelled into the inter- 
nal cavity of the ear; but the effect thus produced is not 
produced upon the ear, necessarily, as an organ of hear- 
ing ; it is a mechanical effect, the same as would result 
from a blow or a thrust, which made no sound at all ; and 
the only difference consists in its being a mechanical injur- 
ry, done by a rare substance in extremely rapid motion, 
rather than by a dense one, of which the motion is slow. 
In like manner, though the case be not quite so explica- 
ble, it may be concluded that the dazzling of the eye^ 
w^hich arises from gazing intensely upon a brilliant object, 
as upon the sun, or that extinction of sight which is some- 
times produced by sudden or violent inflammation, is 
brought about by mechanical means, analogous rather to 
those that would bruise or lacerate any other part of the 
body, than by a mere affection of the eye as the organ of 
sight. 

It was necessary that we should consider the operations 
of those simpler senses at some length, before we proceed 
to those of which the operation is more complex, in order 
that we might avoid the error into which so many have fall- 
en, of attributing to sensation and the organs of sense, facul- 

75. What sort of an effect must that be which makes a person 

deaf, who is exposed to the continued roar of cannon ? 76. How 

is it conjectured^ that blindness is usually effected ? 77. Why has 

it been necessary to consider the operations of these simpler senses 
so minutely ? 



Less. 9. intkllectual philosophy. 169 

ties which we cannot imagine to belong to them as matter ; 
and which, by being imputed to them, lead us to confound 
our external body, which is mutable and mortal, with our 
internal mind, of which we cannot imagine the essence, 
whatever it may be, to be in any way changed, and of which, 
if we were in any way to predicate mortality, which is 
nothing but dissolution, we should concede at once the 
spiritual existence, nay, the existence altogether, and end 
in the most singular paradox into wiiich it is possible to be 
driven, — that man, while he is nothing but a combination 
of material organs, neither of which can, either singly 
or in combination, by possibility know any thing, is yet 
able not only to extend his knowledge instantly over all 
time and over all space, but to rise from the contemplation 
of that which he must perceive to have been fashioned to 
some knowledge of the Almighty Architect, from whom 
man himself, and all the wonders with which he is surround- 
ed, have emanated. 



LESSON IX. 

Senses of touch and vision — Particular phenomena of touch — Tactual 
qualities discovered by resistance or interruption of motion — 
Touch or any of the senses alone could not give us any knowl- 
edge of external things — Origin of external knowledge — Knowl- 
edge of space and time — Phenomena of vision — Sensation may be 
heightened by desire — Desire with confident beUef is will. 

Dr, Herbert. In our former conversations we have 
considered the grand distinction between matter and mind, 
and between the modes in which the two can be philo- 
sophically studied. (L) We have seen that matter may be 
studied as it exists in space, and as it exists in time ; but 
that of mind, we can know nothing but its existence in 

78. What must be the consequence of attributing to sensation 
and the organs of sense, faculties, which do not belong to them ? 
79. What is that paradox into which such an error must neces- 
sarily drive us .'* 

1. How may matter be studied.^ 2. What do we know of 

the mind .'' 

15* 



170 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

time, or the successive states in which it is, inasmuch as 
our very notion of the existence of the mind precludes any 
division into parts, real or supposed, which is all that we 
mean when we speak of the knowledge of matter as exist- 
ing in space. Hence we have come to the conclusion, that 
the only way in which mind can be studied, is, by the study 
of its phenomena ; by observing the succession of its states 
so as to remember which is the antecedent, and which the 
consequent ; and that the succession of these is instant 
and invariable. (2.) We have seen that this succession 
is all that can be meant by the relation of cause and effect ; 
and that, in a continued succession, when we look back- 
ward, the cause becomes an effect, and when we look for- 
ward, the effect becomes a cause. Thus we were led to 
conclude, that that which we call power, in physical con- 
sideration, is nothing more than the invariable following 
of one event by another; or, if we seek, and even find, 
an event intermediate between them, that event stands 
no nearer to either of them, than they formerly did to each 
other, and is the effect of the first, and the cause of the 
last, leaving us two successions of cause and effect, each 
of which, beyond the mere fact of the succession, is just as 
inexplicable to us as the one with which we originally 
started ; and that thus, instead of solving the difficulty, we 
double it. (3.) In like manner, we have seen that, in 
the phenomena of mind, we have nothing but this succes- 
sion to guide us ; and that, if we attempt to establish any 
other means of knowledge, they invariably lead us into error 
and absurdity. Hence we have seen that what are called 
the powers of the mind, are nothing but the mind itself; 
that the consciousness of any state, is nothing but the state ; 
and that, in our internal deliberations, we are not weighing 
one portion of the mind against another; but that the mind, 
as one indivisible thinking principle, is in one state, indi- 
visible in itself — though haply the consequent of several 
anterior states — to which state we give the nameof deliber- 

3. To what conclusion does this naturally lead us ? 4. What 

is meant by the relation of cause and effect? 5. To what con- 
clusion must this lead, in legard to that which we call power ? 

6. What have we to guide us in studying the phenomena of the 

mind ? 7. What is meant by powers of the mind ? 8. By 

consciousness of any state ? 9. To what conclusion must we 

come, in regard to our internal deliberations ? 



Less. 9. intellectual philosophy. 171 

ation. (4.) We have seen, farther, that in those states, or 
affections of the mind, some have reference to external 
sensation, either as general, or as allocated to particular 
organs of sense; and that others are internal, and arise in 
the mind itself, without any present reference to sensation, 
or those properties and phenomena of external things, which 
we consider as the objects of the senses. (5.) We have 
seen, also, that though tiiere be certain truths, which we 
cannot deny, without assuming the belief of them in the 
very denial, such as the facts of our mental existence, and 
our mental identity; yet that our knowledge of every thing 
exterior of the mind, is acquired by experience ; that this 
experience is not in the organs of sense, or in the sensa- 
tions which they give us : but that it is deduced by the 
mind from the very same principle which renders it, in 
the succession of its own states, or thoughts, incapable of 
doubting for a moment its own existence or identity. 
We have exemplified these in the three senses of smell- 
inor, tasting and hearing , and we have seen that, thou(rh 
the materials furnished by sensation be slender indeed, be 
mere feelings, not probably distinguishable from those of 
internal pleasure and pain, of which we do not know the 
locality, or the existence, of which they are affections, yet, 
that out of these materials the mind can erect for itself a 
fabric of knowledge, uncircumscribed by extension, and 
unbounded by time. From this we are to proceed to ex- 
amine the more complicated senses, and thence conclude 
our physiology of the mind, by an examination of its inter- 
nal affections. Of course you remember the usual names 
which are given to those two senses, which we have not 
yet subjected to analysis. 

Charles. They are the sense of touch or feeling, which 
is diffused all over the surface of the body ; and the sense 
of sight, or vision, which is confined to the eyes. 

Dr. Herbert. Is there any thing remarkable about the 
circumstances under which these two senses act, as we say ; 

10. To what have the states or affections of the mind reference? 

11. What must we assume, in denying our mental existence 

and mental identity ? ] 2. How is our knowledg;e of every thing 

exterior cf the mind acquired ? What is experience? 13. What 

can the mind accomplish, by means of the slender materials furnish- 
ed by sensation ' 14. What two senses still remain to be examin- 
ed ? 15. What is the most remarkable circumstance in rela- 
tion to these senses ? 



172 FIRST LESSORS IN LesS. 9. 

that is, when they become sentient, or impress the mind 
A'ith a new feeling or state ? 

Mary, The most remarkable one is this: the sense of 
feeling can be excited at all times, in the dark as well as 
in the light ; the sense of sight can be affected in the light 
only. 

Edward, I am not sure that the latter part of this de- 
finition is exactly true. When in bed, in a dark night, 
and when the shutters and curtains exclude even the light 
of the stars ; nay, when I cover my face with the bed- 
clothes, and shut my eye-lids as closely as ever I can, if I 
press the ball of my eye obliquely with my finger, I can see 
a luminous appearance in the direction toward which it is 
pressed. 

Matilda, And I remember, when my eyes were in- 
flamed, that shut them how much soever I would, little 
threads of light used to play across them continually, 
when they ^^^x^ shut, which I did not perceive when they 
were open. 

Dr, Herbert. There is no doubt, that the threads of 
light, which you perceived during the inflammation, arose 
from the increased action of the little blood vessels, by the 
turgid ity of which, arising from a partial stoppage of the 
circulation, the inflammation was produced ; and there is 
just as little doubt, that the luminous appearance conse- 
quent upon pressing the eye-bail obliquely in the dark, 
arises from a momentary turgidity of the same nature, the 
pressure stopping, while it lasts, the return of the blood 
by some vein : and the apparent perception of these, as ap- 
pearances distinct from the eye, is a very strong argument 
against the knowledge of any thing external of the mind, 
as arising from the eye as an organ, and independently 
of reasoning from former experience. That, however, 
we shall be better able to understand, after we have exam- 
ined those affections which are usually attributed to 
touch, as a separate and distinct sense, of which the or- 
gan is the whole external surface of the body, and the in- 
ner surface of the palms and fingers in a superlative de- 
gree. As this is a matter of more difficulty than any of 

16. When the eye is close and the eye-ball obliquely pressed, 

or when the eye is inflamed, why are threads of light seen ? 

17. Against what are these apparent perceptions, a stiong argu- 
ment ^ 



Less. 0. intellectual philosophy. 173 

those to which we have already attended, it may not be 
amiss to ascertain, previously to any inquiry after new 
knowledge on it, the nature and extent of the knowledge 
that we already possess. What, then, are those sub- 
jects of which you get information through the medium of 
touch ? 

Edward, One of them is the feeling of pain, if I be cut, 
or wounded, or bruised. 

Mary. Another is the feeling of heat and cold, in all 
their varieties, from the cold that pinches me with pain, to 
the heat that scorches me in the same manner ; and so ex- 
actly similar are these in their extremes, that when I inad- 
vertently touched the frozen mercury, both the feeling I 
had, and the effect that it produced on my fingers, were the 
same as if I had touched a hot iron. 

Charles. A third class is the size and shape of bodies, as 
if I feel a stick, I can tell whether it be long or short; if I 
feel a surface, I can tell whether it be large or small ; and 
if I feel the boundaries of any surface, I can tell whether it 
be of one shape or another, as that a shilling is round, and 
that a card is rectangular. 

3Jatilda. And 1 can feel whether a surface be smooth, 
as in polished marble, or a looking-glass ; or rough, as in 
the bark of a tree ; whether it be downy, as in fur, or rough, 
as in wool, or the bristles of a pig. 

Edward. And I can also feel whether a substance be 
hard, like iron ; soft, like melted wax ; brittle, like glass; 
tough, like India rubber ; and, indeed, except its colour, I 
can feel almost every thing about it as well in the dark as if 
I saw it. 

Dr. Herbert. And I suppose you can also feel whether 
it be light or heavy ; and have the same feeling of that, 
whether it is placed on your hand, or suspended by a string, 
of which you shall take hold ? 

Charles, Yes ; and I can feel whether I am, or am not, 
able to bend a tree, or lift a weight. 

Dr. Herbert. And let me ask you, in what place of 
your body you believe you feel the latter circumstance, 
whether in your hands, that are in immediate contact with 
the tree, or the weight, or in any other place ? 

18. What are the subjects, of which we are generally said to 
acquire information, through the medium of the touch? 



174 FIRST lESSONS IN Less. 9. 

Charles, If 1 strive hard, I feel it in my back; indeed, 
I feel it all over, and it brings a perspiration even over my 
forehead. 

Dr. Herbert, Now let me ask you, whether you attribute 
this feeling all over you to the mere touch of the tree, or 
the stone ? 

Charles, Certainly not. I must attribute it to the action 
of every muscle ; for if 1 continue it for a sufficient length 
of time, all these muscles feel pained by the exertion ; and 
not only this, but I breathe with difficulty, and my pulse is 
increased, so that I am not fit for a new exertion until I 
have rested for some time. 

Dr. Herbert. Then in the case of this feeling, you ob- 
serve, that it is not like the sensation arising from smell, 
or taste, or hearing, referred to a particular organ, by 
which organ alone the sentient state can be produced ; but 
that it extends to every portion of your body, external or 
internal, which is brought into action ; and, that a feeling 
of this kind would be as improperly described as a sensa- 
tion of mere touch, as though you were to call it a taste, 
or a smell. By the mere touch of the finger, in one place, 
could you tell if you did not see it, or had not some pre- 
vious knowledge of it, that the body you touched was heavy 
or light? 

Mary, I could tell that only according to the resistance 
that the body made before it moved with the touch of my 
finger. 

Dr, Hei^btrt, And would you know, from the mere 
touch of your finger, that it did move ? 

31atilda. I could know that only by knowing that it 
either moved away from my finger, so as not to be touched, 
or that my finger moved after it, touching it still. 

Dr. Herbert. And in the first of these cases how 
would you know that the body moved away from your 
finger, and not your finger from the body : or, in the sec- 
ond, how would you know that the body did not follow 

19. In endeavouring to raise a heavy weight is only some partic- 
ular part of the body affected by the effort ? 20. Can the sense 

of feeUng, like the sensation of smell, or taste, or hearing, be con- 
fined to a single organ ? 21. To what does it extend ? 22. 

Could a person without sight or any previous knowledge tell by 
the touch of the finger, in one place, that the body touched was 
heavy or light ? 



Less. 9. intellectual philosophy. 175 

your finger, in contact with it, as you were drawing it 
back ? 

Charles. From the mere point of the finger, in con- 
tact or not in contact with the body, I should, of course, not 
know cither ; but 1 should feel in my arm, or in the finger 
itself, according as the one or the other were extended 
or contracted, whether the point of the finger, and conse- 
quently the body, were brought nearer to me, or pushed 
farther off. 

Dr. Herbert. Then here, again, you see, that the knowl- 
edge is not in the mere touch, but in the muscular action, 
accompanying, preceding, or following that touch ; and, let 
me ask you, what extent of information you could obtain 
from the motion of a muscle, if your knowledge were limit- 
ed to that ? 

Charles. The sensation that a muscle moved — certainly 
nothing more. 

Dr. Herbert. And would that give you any information 
about the body that you touched, or even about the muscle 
itself in which the sensation was felt? 

Edward. I do not see how it could : if the exertion of 
the muscle were the same, the feeling produced by it would 
be the same, whether a body were touched or not ; and the 
feeling would be the same whether the muscle were in the 
arm or in the leg. 

Dr, Herbert. In one case, therefore, you see that the 
knowledge is not obtained from the mere touch ; and that 
from the simple feeling there arises no knowledge but that 
feeling itself; and it is gone as soon as the muscle assumes 
a new state or position. 

Edward. But if I were to touch a body with my finger, 
1 could tell whether it were hot or cold. 

Charles. You could not always depend upon it. You 
remember the experiment of the three basons of water ; 
one with very cold water, another with very warm water, 
and the third with water about the usual temperature of 

23. Could a pprson tell, whether his finger moved the body, or 

the body moved from his finejer? 24. If the knowledge be 

not in the mere touch, in what is it? 25. What extent of infor- 
mation can be obtained from the muscle ? 26. Would the sen- 
sation, that a muscle moved, give any information about the body 

touched ? 27. Does the mere touch communicate knowledge .' 

2S. What knowledge arises from the simple feeling? 

29. How long does this feeling continue ^ 



176 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

the hand. When we put our hands for some time, one 
into the cold water, and one into the hot, and then 
phinge them at once into the temperate, that from the 
warm water felt chilled with cold, while that from the cold 
water felt agreeably heated; or, the same portion of water, 
at the same temperature, felt both cold and hot at the same 
instant. 

Dr, Herbert. Hence you perceive, that the feeling of 
cold and heat is not only not a certain means of obtain- 
ing knowledge of the qualities, or even the existence of 
any thing external ; but a mere feeling, and dependent 
more upon the temperature of the body itself than upon 
that of things without. This is farther proved in many 
cases of disease, — as in agues, in w'hich shivering cold and 
burning heat are felt in succession, and with great inten- 
sity, though the body be all the while well clothed, and 
exposed to an atmosphere of precisely the same tempera- 
ture. The same occurs in many other diseases: and in 
every case of inflammation, which we always refer to the 
interruption of some of the natural and healthy circulation 
of the fluids, we feel a burning pain not merely in the 
region that is affected, but in any healthy part of the body 
that is applied to it. Hence, we may conclude, that our 
sensations of heat or cold have really nothing to do with 
.the qualities of external bodies, but arise solely from the 
changes of our own organs; and that whether the pain 
arise from diseased inflammation, or from the proximity 
of a body in a state of combustion, the immediate cause, 
and, therefore, the cause of that sensation, to which we 
give the name of painful heat, is a state of the vessel, 
which retards the usual circulation — a resistance of some 
of those internal motions, of the existence of which, in 
their healthy states, we have no sensation or knowledge 
whatever. 

Edward. But I am sure that by touching any substance 
I could know whether it were hard or soft. If hard, it 
would not yield to my finger, and if soft it would. 



30. What knowledge can the feeling of cold or heat give ? 

31. On what is this feeling dependent ? 32. In what cases is 

this evident? 33. What may we conclude in regard to our sen- 
sations of heat or cold .? 34. What is, in fact, the cause of the 

sensation of painful heat, whether it arise trorn inflammatioQ, or 
from a body in a state of combustion ? 



Less. 9. intellectual philosophy. 177 

Dr, Herbert, That we can distinguish between hard- 
ness and softness, 1 do not mean to deny ; but we do not 
know it from mere touch ; for, to touch alone, atmos- 
pheric air is just as hard as steel or diamond. How do 
you know when a body gives way to the touch of your 
finger ? 

Charles, By pressing on it, and feeling that it gives 
way to the pressure. 

Mary, That is, that it admits of a certain motion in your 
finger which the hard body resists ; and this, I apprehend, 
is discoverable in the action of the muscles, just as we said 
was the case in the light body and the heavy. 

Dr. Herbert. That is precisely the case, Mary ; and I 
suspect that, after we have examined all the sensations usual- 
ly ascribed to touch, w^e shall come to the same conclusion 
wilh regard to the whole of them. 

Edward. I can understand how T shall find out that a 
surface is straight, by the motion of my finger along it being 
all in the same direction, and not requiring me to move 
my finger upward or downward ; but in examining the 
length, for instance, of a smooth or level surface, I think I 
should be able to tell whether that surface were long or 
short, by the touch of my finger alone. I should know by 
applying my finger to it, whether it were longer than my 
finger ; by pressing the whole surface against the palm of 
my hand, I should know whether it were larger or smaller 
than the palm ; and I should know whether the boundary 
of it were circular or angular, because the angular points 
would press more strongly than the continuous parts of the 
circular figure. 

Dr. Herbert. That you do know these things, though 
some of them very vaguely, if it were possible for you to 
make the experiment for the first time, unaided by the 
sense ot sight, I shall admit ; but the question to which 
we are seeking an answer, is anterior to this, and far more 
simple. How come you to know the length of your finger, 

35. If the sense of touch does not inform ns, whether a substance 
be hard or soft, from what source do we obtain this information? 
36. To what conclusion will the examination of all the sen- 
sations ascribed to touch bring us ? 37. Is it an easy matter 

to tell how we know, by the sense of toucli only, that a surface is 

straight, or long, or short ? 38. Is it obvious how we know the 

length of the finger or the breadth of the palm ? 

16 



178 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

or the breadth of your palm, or in fact that you have a fin- 
ger or a palm at all ? For if we assume the existence and 
measurement of the finger and the palm, without any in- 
quiry as to how we came by the knowledge of them, we 
may assume all the rest; for the finger and the palm are 
just as much external of the mind, wliich is sentient, as the 
book which we measure with the finger, or the orbit of the 
earth, of which we determine the magnitude by calcu- 
lation. 

Edward. It is impossible for me to tell how 1 came to 
know the existence of my palm or my finger, or the size 
of the one or the other, because I have been acquainted 
with them from the very earliest time I can remember; 
and though I can recollect when they were both smaller 
than they are now, I cannot, even in imagination, go back 
to a time when I was ignorant of their existence, or even 
of their dimensions, though I might remember a time at 
which I was ignorant of inches, and could not tell how 
many inches or parts of an inch my finger was in length, 
or the palm of my hand in breadth. 

Dr. Hcrhtrt. Though we cannot in our own memory 
go back to the times at which we were ignorant of these 
matters, yet w^e are certain that there must have been such 
times ; and we see in those children that come under our 
notice, and I saw it in each of you, a period, when though 
you possessed the same identity of mental existence, and 
no doubt the same susceptibilities of mind as you possess 
now, or shall possess at any future period, however assidu- 
ous and successful you may be in your intellectual culture, 
at which it would have been impossible to assume that you 
had any knowledge, not only of the external world, but of 
the existence of your own bodies — a period, at which the 
only indications of sensation that you exhibited were com- 
plaint when not at ease, and quiet when you were ; and 
when, therefore, we m,ay conclude that all the states 
of your minds were perfectly analogous to those which 
we feel from hunger and satisfaction, or from internal 
pain and its absence ; all of which convey no knowl- 

39. If we may assame the existence and measurement of the 
fing:er and palm, without inquiry, why may we not assume the ex- 
istence and measurement of other things ? 40. "What are the on- 
ly indications of sensation that infants exhibit? 41. What may 

we conclude respecting the states of their minds? 42. Of what 

do these states of the mind convey no knowledge? 



Less. 9. intellectual philosophy. 179 

edge whatever, even of that part of the body, the derange- 
ment of which precedes the unpleasant sensation, and the 
restoration to its healthy state, tlie pleasurable or the tran- 
quil one. 

Mary. I myself remember that when 1 used to see the 
little baby at the gardener's, it cried when it was hungry or 
in pain, and was silent when fed, or laid in an easy posi- 
tion ; it shuts its little eyes against a glaring light, and open- 
ed thetn when the light was soft and mild ; and it kept its 
little hands and feet, and fingers and toes, in constant mo- 
tion ; but in all this tliere did not seem to be the least ref- 
erence to any thing without, or even to the eyes, that were 
opened and simt, or the limbs that were moved, farther 
than as they might have been pleasant or painful to itself. 
It did not look at me : neither did it notice the brightest 
object that I could present to it. It did not attempt to 
seize any thing with its hand, nor point its feet to the 
ground as if attempting to walk; and though it started at a 
loud noise, and seemed hushed by a soft one, it did not by 
any motion of the eyes nor the fingers, give the least indica- 
tion of the direction of that from which the sound proceeded. 

Dr. Htrhert. This, Mary, is exactly the state at which 
the philosophy of the mind, in as far as it concerns the 
origni of knowledge and sensation, should be begun. In- 
deed, we would require to begin it earlier. The moment 
of our birth — and even before we are born — the first 
change of temperature, or of position, which produces a 
feeling painful, or the reverse, is the starting point for the 
intellectual philosopher. It is a point, however, which he 
can never reach, either in his own case, or by experiment 
on the cases of others; and, therefore, all the knowledge 
that we can obtain of it must be hypothetical. Our memo- 
ry does not carry us back farther than a time at which our 
experimental knowledge is considerable, and at which our 
infant minds have already begun to reason — differently, no 
doubt, but as accurately — on the successions of cause and 
effect, as we do in the utmost vigour of our information in 
after life. Still, unless we can frame such an hypothesis 
as shall go back to this very time, it is utterly impossible 

43. Where is the starling point for (he intellectual philosopher? 
44. But since he can never reach this, what must his knowl- 
edge be ? 4.5. Why is it impossible for us to reason about the 

origin of our knowledge, unless we can frame such a hypothesis as 
shall go back to our earliest infancy ^ 



180 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

for us to reason about the origin of our knowledge ; because 
if we refer merely to the extensions we get after the pro- 
cess has been once begun, we necessarily take for granted 
the very object of which we are in quest, and make knowl- 
edge not the result of individual sensation, as has been so 
frequently contended, but a mere deduction from other 
knowledge, of which we were formerly in possession. 

Charles. But, if our sensations of touch, as in change 
of temperature or of pressure, give us nothing but feelings 
that are pleasurable or painful, how can we thence arrive 
at all those properties of matter of which the touch after- 
wards gives us such accurate information, that blind men 
have not only been expert mechanics, but some of them 
could distinguish the colours in cloth by merely passing 
their fingers over its surface? 

Dr, Herbert, The precise process by which this is 
done in the earliest and simplest instances, we cannot ex- 
actly know ; but we may judge of it from the way in which 
we subsequently extend our information. The very suc- 
cession of sensation to sensation, as continued in time, or 
continued in space, give us our knowledge of extension in 
both ways ; and though two kinds of continuities are dif- 
ferent from one another, in the things to which we apply 
them, our modes of estimating them are pretty nearly the 
same. Nations, which are unacquainted with geometry 
and mensuration, estimate distances from place to place by 
the number of days or hours which a man of ordinary ce- 
lerity would take in passing from the one to the other ; and 
we have no knowledge internally of the length of time, but 
by the succession of our thoughts, and no means of meas- 
uring it externally but by a series of motions which we 
find to return under similar circumstances, and therefore 
believe to be all of the same length — as the apparent mo- 
tion of the sun — the motion of the hand or index upon the 
dial of the clock or watch, regulated by the same pendu- 
lum or the same balance, and therefore presumed by us to 
be uniform. 



46. How shall we judge of the process by which we acquire 

knowledge in the earliest instances? 47. What gives us our 

knowledge of extension in time or in space ? 48. How do the 

nations, which are unacquainted with geometry, measure the dis- 
tance from one place to another ?- 49. How do we internally know 

the length of time, and by what means do we measure it ? 



Less. 9. intellectual philosophy. 181 

Edward. We have an instance of this similarity in the 
consideration of motion and time, in the use of the word 
''tide,'' which we apply to the flux and reflux of the water 
of the sea, and also to times of the day, as *' morning-/tc/e," 
*' uoon'tide,'' '' even-tide.'' 

Cliarlcs, And we apply the same word to the course or 
succession of events generally; as when we say, ^'the tide 
of time," or, '* there is a tide in the aff'airs of man." 

Dr. Herbert. The only simple notion that we can form 
of extension, whether in space or in duration, is that of a 
succession of parts, or of something that could be divided, 
and might be shorter or longer ; and that is the reason why 
we cannot define or explain what we mean by a mathe- 
matical point, in any other way than by referring to the 
termination of aline, or a meeting of two lines. 

Mary. Then the little baby, that could not notice or 
take hold, or make the least motion toward any object, 
was really at school, and reasoning like a philosopher? 

Dr. Herbert. No question of it. Its thoughts and rea- 
sonings were, no doubt, different from those that it may 
have in future life; and as they are not then to be useful 
to it, they do not remain on the memory ; but they are the 
states of the same mind, and follow each other by the very 
same law that regulates the most profound inquiries of the 
sage. Of the impulse that first sets the muscles in motion, 
we can know nothing with certainty, though we may sup- 
pose that it arises from some pain that is felt by the contin- 
uance in the same position, because we feel, in after life, 
that the most easy position into which we can throw the 
body is ease only for a time ; and that perfect quiescence, 
if continued for a sufficient length of time, becomes so 
painful that we are forced to prefer motion. 

Matilda. The very yawning and stretching of the indo» 
lent are proofs of that. 

Charles. But though this painful feeling might produce 
motion, I do not see how the child could thence obtain any 
knowledge even of its own hands and fingers. 

Dr. Herbert. If the child move its little hand over any 
space, there will be a succession of muscular feelings, the 

50. What is the only simple notion, which we can form of ex- 
tension? 51. What probably first sets the muscles in motion ? 

-52. What is the process, which is supposed to take place in the 

earliest attempts of a child to gain information by the sense of touch } 

16* 



182 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

conamencement of which^ on a second effort, will lead to 
the expectation of a recurrence of the same series, upon 
that intuitive principle which is the very foundation of rea- 
soning; and if this series be interrupted by the hand com- 
ing in contact with any other substance, a new feeling will 
be produced, till, by a number of these little experiences, 
the child will become acquainted with the surface of its 
own body, and with the other substances that interrupt its 
trains of muscular feeling. The eye too, after a little time, 
becomes in the same manner sensible to the changes of 
light. At first, we have every reason to conclude that the 
experience of the hand, or rather of the muscular feeling, 
and that of the eye, are quite distinct ; for we find that 
after the child has begun to notice and to grasp, the eye 
and the hand do not immediately obey each other, but the 
child will attempt to grasp at that which is not within its 
reach, and miss that which is. Nay, in what we may re- 
gard as the very simplest case — an attempt to grasp the 
one hand with the other, when they are both in sight, the 
child will err till after many trials. Indeed, it cannot be 
otherwise ; for there is a very nice point in reasoning to be 
settled, before an accurate knowledge be obtained of the 
most simple and familiar extension. The succession of 
feelings have to be adjusted to the time in which they take 
place ; and this, even in after life, is by no means an 
easy or a certain matter. If we travel a distance on foot, 
weary and fatigued, it seems much longer than if we rolled 
swiftly over it in a carriage ; or even than if we had 
had an agreeable companion to beguile the tediousness of 
the way. 

Mary. And a day too feels much longer when one is 
idle and listless, than when one is active and bustling. 

Charles. And I invariably find, that the day which ap- 
pears the longest in passing, is the shortest in memory. 

Dr. Herhei^t, Then if we, after all the information that 
we have obtained, are unable to know the length either of ex- 
tension or of time, without a process of reasoning, how can 
we suppose that that knowledge could be obtained by mere 
sensation, which can convey to us nothing but a pleasure 



53. Why is it thought, that the experience of the hand and the 

eye are distinct ? 54. What reason can be given why the child, 

in attempting to grasp one hand with the other, will often fail in its 
earliest trials ? 



Less. 9. intellectual niiLosoPHY. 183 

or a pain, without informing us of the existence of any thing 
but the mind ? 

Charles. 1 think I can so far understand the matter 
now. The means by wliich we acquire knowledge in 
those early stages of our lives which we do not afterwards 
remember, are precisely the same as those by which we 
extend that knowledge after we grow up; and that we 
could no more by mere touch alone, tell the form or the 
size of a circular disc of any substance, than we could by 
mere touch calculate its area in terms of the diameter, or 
find out whether it could or could not be dissolved in a cer- 
tain acid. 

Dr. Herbert. The mere sensation — whether tactual, by 
the mere application of the body to the skin, without pres- 
sure : or muscular, in the compression of our body, or the 
interruption of a motion — could give us no information 
that there were a body touchirjg the skin, or impeding the 
motion, if we had not from previous experience an expect- 
ation of a certain train of feelings which we felt to be in- 
terrupted, and a new feeling or train introduced by the 
touch or the resistance of the object. 

Edward. But I can, instantly, and without any reason- 
ing, tell when any thing is applied to my hand, whether it 
be large or small, rough or smooth, solid or liquid, cold or 
warm. 

Dr. Herbert. So can you instantly tell, upon hearing 
a note of music, if you happen to have studied that art, 
whether the note proceeds from a flute or a harp; or 
when a flower is brought sufficiently near for your smell- 
ing it, whether that flower be a rose or a tulip ; and yet 
you could never come at any knowledge of the instru- 
ment from the mere sound, or of the flower from the scent. 

Mary. If one sense cannot inform us of the existence 
of any thing external of the mind, I do not see how anoth- 
er can. The external process is the same in them all. 
A certain extension of the ear comes in contact with the 
vibrating air in hearing ; a certain portion of .the eye 
comes in contact with the light in seeing ; a certain por- 
tion of the organ of smell or of taste, comes in contact with 
the external cause of these sensations. Now, as the por- 
tion of the organ that is afl*ected in any one of these, must 

55. What besides mere sensation is necessary to give us informa- 
tion that a body is touching the skin or impeding the motion ^ 



184 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 9. 

have some shape, as well as that portion of the skin which 
comes in contact with a body in touching ; the sensations 
of these should have figure, and we should be able to hear 
or smell a circle or a triangle, as easily as discover one by 
mere touch. 

Dr. Herbert. In one instance of touch without experi- 
ence and reasoning, we are precisely in the same condition 
as in the case of the other senses. The circle and the tri- 
angle are compounds, the results of certain successions of 
perception, and stand in nearly the same relation to our 
senses of touch and vision, as a tune or piece of music, 
stands to that of hearing. 

The mind, which alone is sentient, has no quality similar 
to those of matter. It is not sonorous when we hear music ; 
three-cornered when we see, or feeh or think of a triangle ; 
neither can we ascribe to it length, or hardness, or softness, 
or any one of those qualities which are the objects of its 
compound perceptions ; but the connexion in which we 
have invariably found those qualities, which experience has 
taught us to ascribe to matter in any of its known modifi- 
cations, leads us from any one of them to the rest, and gives 
us our notion of matter. 

Charles. If touch gave us any knowledge of form oth- 
er than as a certain series of feelings, and were not, in its 
individual operations, the mere sensation of certain resis- 
tances that vary only in degree, as sounds vary in degree, 
— if, for instance, the mere touch of a three 'Cornered sur- 
face gave us at once, and without any process of reasoning, 
our notion of a triangle, — then we should all, whether 
we had studied geometry or not, have precisely the same 
notion of it — should know, for instance, that the sum 
of the three angles must in all cases be equal to two right 
angles. 

Dr. Herbert. Why should you think so, Charles ? 

Charles. It is the conclusion to which I am necessari- 
ly led, by the consideration of our other senses. In taste, 

57. When is the sense of touch in the same condition with the 

other senses ? 58* In what relation to the senses of touch and 

vision, do the circle and triangle stand ? 59. And why is the 

relation the same ? 60. Can we ascribe to the mind any of those 

qualities, which are the objects of its compound perceptions ? 

61. What then leads us from any one of the rest, and thus gives 

us our notion of matter? 62. If touch give us the knowledge 

of form without any process of reasoning, what consequence would 
follow .'* 



Less. 9. intellf.ctual philosophy. 185 

for example, sweet is equally sweet, salt equally salt, 
and bitter equally bitter, to the ignorant and the learned. 
We cannol, hy any study or analysis, make that which 
is the immediate cause of sensation there any plainer 
than it is to the sense of those that never once thought 
about the matter, and as the contact with the hand in 
touching is not a hit more intimate than that with the 
tongue in tasting, (indeed it is not so intimate, for there 
is no necessary change of the touclied body in touching, 
while there is always a certain degree of solution in 
tasting) we can see no reason why a cause which is of a 
similar kind, and not greater, should be followed, by not 
only a greater effect, but by an effect of a kind altogether 
different. 

Edward. If we ascribe the knowledge of external bodies 
to the mere sense of touch, or of vision, without any opera- 
tion of the mmd, we of necessity consider them as the mind 
— and thus have a feeling mind in our fingers, and a see- 
ing one in our eyes. 

Dr. Herbert. That is what they who hold the doctrine 
(and when you come to read the books that have been 
written on the subject, you will find, that they are the ma- 
jority) have invariably, though unintentionally done; — 
they have mentalized the organs of the senses, in order to 
prove immediately by them the existence of the external 
world ; and having done this, there was hardly any alter- 
native but that they should materialize the mind. 

Matilda. But still the senses are necessary, and with- 
out them we could not have been in possession of the in- 
formation. 

Dr. Herbert. Nor if we had had only the organs of the 
senses without the mind, could we have had the slightest 
knowledge of" the external world, of the organs of sense, or 
of our own existence. The light falls equally upon the other 
parts of the face or body as upon the eye ; and the vibra- 

63. If we ascribe ihe knowledge of external bodies to the mere 
sense of touch or of vision, without the operation of the mind, wliat 

do we necessarily consider those senses? G4. Whnt have they 

done to the mind, who have mentalized the organs of the senses in 

order to prove the existence of the external world? G5. Since 

light falls equally upon other parts of the f^ice as upon the eye, 
and the vibrations of the air produced by a sounding body, fall equal- 
ly upon other surfaces as upon that of the internal ear, what is 
necessary in order to produce any sensation, or any consequent per- 
ception ? 



186^ FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

tions of the air, produced by ii sounding body, fall equally 
upon other surfaces as upon that of the internal ear ; but 
it is only where the communication with the mind is es- 
tablished, and while it exists, that any sensation, or any 
consequent perception, is produced. The flash of the gun 
falls in vain upon the eye-ball of the blind, and the deaf 
hear not the roar of artillery. 

Marij, Then we may consider the mind as the work- 
man — the carpenter, for instance, — and the organs of 
sensation and motion in the body as the tools, without 
which he could not work, and varying which, he might 
work better or worse, according as they were improved or 
injured ; but the finest tool would be of no use without the 
carpenter. 

Edward. And the carpenter must also learn his trade ; 
no man is born with a knowledge of the use of saws or axes, 
or even that there are such tools in existence. 

Dr, Herbert. The analogy is not a bad one ; and though 
analogies are not proofs, they are illustrations. We must 
educate the intellectual carpenter — or rather he educates 
himself before he learns our language, and we can com- 
municate with him — in the knowledge of his tools, and in 
the use of them, before he can fashion for himself the fabric 
of knowledge. 

Mary, In considering how we acquire knowledge by 
the eye, which is the sense which gives us the most im- 
mediate perception of external things, we must consider 
that organ as educated, before we can communicate our 
thoughts. 

Dr. Herhert. No question of it ; the mere presence of 
light in contact with the retina, or expanded portion of 
the optic nerve, which is all the physical act of vision, 
could not in itself produce so strong a feeling as the 
laceration or burning of the finger. The light that thus 
falls upon the retina, must be very small in q :antity, and 
yet in all the variety of its colors, and the modification of 
their parts and tones, that give us the perceptions of color, 
and form, and dis^tance, and stillness, and motion, the sen- 
sation is so immediate, that we feel no pause between the 

66. What analog:y is introduced to illustrate the subject? 

67. In the acquisition of knowledge by the eye, how must we con- 
sider that organ ? 68. What is remarked of the feeling produced 

by the physical act of vision ? 69. What particulars are men- 
tioned in the phenomena of vision ? 



Less. 9. intellectual philosophv. 187 

forTiw "" '^''' ""'' "" P'''<=«P<i"" of whatever is be- 
tr.bute,„,„d, see external objects in the same manner i 
H.,^''.' f^^fr'- "^^'^ .'''"^ '^^ "^''^'^ o'-j'^c's, we cannot 

te no T\'rrrT r '°^""^ ^"^-^'^ <■•"'" ours. 

We do not hnd that the dog, for all his acuteness of scent 
pays he least attention to perfumes ; for if he be hun'^y 
he will eave the choicest parterre, in quest of carrion 
ne.t er do ue find that any l^f the a'nimal are affecteib; 
gh unless that sight be connected in some vvaywith 
ihe.r own existence, or that of their prey, or their kind or 

exSrrrnThrart oT'",V"^'^ ^^' •^'^'^"' <^ 'n,akeMhem "m'o 
expei tin the art of self-preservation, we cannot doubt but it 
never becomes even of the kind to which we .ive "he name 
of science or knowledge. The wisest animafthat ever ex 
.sted, never gave the least indication that he knew the dTf 

JlriXle'^'Th ""'r' r'^^' °'- ''^'--" - --le an'd 
a triangle. 1 hej evidently feel pain and pleasure in the 
same way that we have those feeling in ou^- bodies ai5 
even :n those artificial trainings to which the S been 
subjected, a very little analysis enables us to trace them to 

Te : ::;;:n"^ "tLt 't^t''^^^ -« essentia foTt'L: 

preservation. They perform the tricks that they have been 

augh only because the performance has becoie as oc at" 

or blows ' "■ *^"'"'"°' '"' ''' °---«"' -th hunger 

Edward. And it is only as associatin<r with man thit 

to dJn'cJT '''" '"""• . ^'""'^ ^'''''^' "-' Matilda tauih 

:n^^s tX ro?i:etfThefdot ''-' - ^ --- 

ed but to w.n favor w.th man. The little dog that has 
and^tncks, which soL of the':„ r/lau.ht'fo pe^^l^L^^t'd 



188 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

been taught to dance for his bread and butter in the house, 
forgets his dancing, and attempts to catch birds, the mo- 
ments he gets into the shrubbery ; and we have no more 
reason to conclude that the dog, which we train, has 
science in that which he does, than that the hop, or the 
convolvulus, which we train to a pole, has science, be- 
cause it mounts up in a spiral, and twines its successive 
folds all in the same direction. That instinct which makes 
the trees put on their leaves in spring, and shake them off 
before the frost of winter, is every way as wonderful, and 
not more different from the operation of intellect than the 
sagacity of the dog or of the elephant ; and the growth 
and renovation of our bodies are every way as wonderful, 
as that certain portions of the surface of them should be 
differently affected by external causes that do not affect 
other parts. But though the growth of the body and the 
instinct of animals be incomprehensible, as well as the 
nature of the mind, we must not thence confound them 
with each other. Our utter ignorance of any number of 
subjects, does not establish any similarity among them ; 
for utter ignorance furnishes us with nothing that we can 
either affirm or deny. We feel the mind in that innate 
and instinctive feeling of our existence which is tacitly 
taken for granted in our very attempts to deny it ; we see 
it in the instruction which one man gives to another, 
either by signs or by language ; and we read it in those 
accumulated volumes of thoughts, which, as we formerly 
had occasion to mention, makes us, at any moment we 
please, tenants of all space, and contemporaries with every 
age. When we find one dog enkindling the valor of 
another, by recounting to him the deeds of his ancestors, 
or schooling him in any of the sciences, then, but not till 
then, we may institute a comparison between the knowl- 
edge of man, which is, in every instance, the result of 
experience, and that of the other animals, which is a mere 
instinct, and not more dependent upon reasoning than the 
vegetation of a seed in water, and its ceasing to grow when 

75. What in the vegetable world, is as wonderful, and approach- 
es as near to the operation of intellect, as the sagacity of the dog or 

the elephant? 76. Ought we to conclude, because the growth 

of the body and the instincts of animals are as incomprehensible, as 

the nature of the mind, that matter and mind are similar ? 77. In 

what do we feel the mind ? 78. In what do we see it ? 79. 

Where do we read it ? 



Less. 9. intellectual philosopiiy. 189 

plunged into nnercury, or when the water and it have been 
boiled. 

Charles, Then the possession of senses by the other 
animals, and senses which require less cultivation and prac- 
tice than ours, till they become perfect, is no argument for 
the existence of an immaterial and immortal spirit in them : 
neither is it any argument for the necessary existence of 
such a spirit in man, in addition to the senses of the body 
— generally diffused as in touch or feeling, or confined to 
local organs as in the other senses. 

Dr. Herbert, Certainly not ; and it has been with a 
view to prevent your confounding the corporeal process in 
sensation, with the perceplion of the sentient mind^ which 
turns each of those perceptions to an element of future 
knowledge, that I have detained you so long on this part 
of the subject; and I have done so, chiefly, because this 
is the source of the greater part of that scepticism, both in 
philosophy and in religion, which is much too prevalent 
among those who have learned to speak without learning 
to reason. 

Matilda. It is singular that any body should doubt the 
existence of that which they can see with their eyes, or 
touch with their fingers. 

Dr. Herbert. It was just by assuming, for there was 
not even a shadow of proof of the assumption, that the 
perception of the mind was analogous to the sight of the 
eye — that is, the varied light falling upon the retina in 
vision, — or the touch of the finger — the application of a 
rough or a smooth, a circular or an angular surface to it, 
— that they were led into the error. Leaving out the con- 
sideration that the eye does not convey the knowledge of 
anything external to the mind, until there has been a cer- 
tain process of reasoning and experience, by which the re- 
turn of the same sensation in the organ is accompanied 
with the suggestion of the presence of the object whicli ex- 
perience has associated with it, they were reduced to two 

80. Can the possession of acute and perfect senses in any case, 
be an argument for the existence of an immaterial and immortal 

spirit? 81. What two things is there danger of confounding 

together ? 82. What is the consequence of indistinct and indeti- 

nite notions on this subject? 83. By what process were any 

persons ever led to doubt the existence of the objects that surround 

thera ? 84. What important consideration did they leave out 

in their philosophizing? 85. To what alternatives did this re- 
duce them ? 

17 



190 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

alternatives, — either at once to materialize the mind, and 
make it nothing but the senses of the body ; or divide the 
single mental state into two acts of the mind, sensation 
and perception. 

Charles. As I am sensible of an odor, and 1 perceive that 
it is the odor of a rose ; or I am sensible of a figure, and I 
perceive that it is a board in the shape of a triangle or a 
circle ; is not this the very same error, as when we say we 
have thought^ and the consciousness of thought ? 

Dr, Herbert, Not very different from it, although not 
precisely the same ; for the consciousness is with the 
thought, or rather the very thought itself, whether that 
thought be an external or an internal affection of the mind ; 
while that to which they gave the name of perception^ as 
an immediate consequence of sensation, — is a result of ex- 
perience; and the same state of the organ, and consequent- 
ly the very same state of mind, as an individual instance, 
might have taken place — nay, might, in the first use of the 
organ, have taken place — without the association or sugges- 
tion of an external object, to which the name of perception 
is given. 

Edivard. But since, in this way, we should have two 
ways of getting a knowledge of a figure, one by seeing it, 
and another by feeling it, would we not be puzzled which 
of the senses to believe? If I hold my finger up near my 
eye, it seems taller than the tree or the steeple ; and yet if 
I were to apply it to either of them, it would cover but a 
very small portion. 

Dr. Herbert. ^ No doubt of it. This division of percep- 
tion into visual and tactual, led to a division of the object 
into visible figure, and tangible figure, and thus made every 
one object that we could both see and handle, two. Besides 
the tangible tree or steeple, which we could touch, or 
climb, or measure with a line, and to which they gave a 
permanence, both of figure and magnitude, unless when 
a physical change had taken place in it, there was a co- 
existent visible fgure, always small enough for getting in 
at the pupil of the eye and impinging upon the retina, and 

86. What did they mean by consciousness ? 87. To what did 

they give the name of perception ? 88. Under what circum- 

s ance, might the same state of the organ and the same state of the 
mind have taken place ? 89. To what did the division of percep- 
tion, into visual and tactual, lead.'' Explain this theory of the 

visible figure and tangible figure. 



Less. 9. intellectual philosophy. 191 

which was not only thus smnllj but admitted of endless 
varieties of magnitude, according to the distance from the 
eye. The imagination of this small and intactible figure, 
distinct both from matter and mind, impinging on the retina 
of every eye that was turned to the object, and remaining 
in every mind that had once perceived and remembered 
tne perception of it, has been the subject of more keen 
disputations, and has led to the formation and the over- 
throw of more theories, — has occasioned more waste of 
time, and led to more mistakes and errors, — than the study 
of all tiie real objects that are within the scope of human 
knowledge. Those imaginary existences, in addition to 
every thing that really exists, have, under the successive 
names o^ phantasms, images^ films, and ideas, at times at- 
tempted to conquer the real world, and people the void 
with their own nonentity. These errors are fortunately, 
however, peculiar to the learned, and by them introduced 
only into their speculations. If a plain man gets the tangi- 
ble loaf of bread, which experience has instructed him will 
appease his hunger, he never troubles himself about the 
visible form ; for he, unfortunately, has found out by the 
same experience, that if it be light, and the visible form 
do not meet his eyes, the tangible form will not satisfy his 
huno;er. 

Mary, If we had the knowledge of external things 
from the mere effect on the eye, without any process of 
reasoning, would not one eye be enough ; or rather, would 
not two eyes give us double vision ? 

Dr. Herbert. That has been supposed ; and if the eye 
alone were concerned in the knowledge that we derive by 
the suggestions that accompany vision, there is no doubt 
that it would. 

Edicard. I can see double whenever 1 please, for I 
have only to press one of my eve-balls a little aside. 

Dr. Herbert. That only proves that you can see with 
both eyes, and that by the pressure you put them in a po- 

90. To what did this imaginary figure, which they fancied to 
impinge on the retina of the eye, and at the same time to be distinct 

from matter and mind, lead? 91. By what names, have those 

imaginary existences been desio;nated ? 92. To what class of 

people have these errors been confined ? 93. What phenomena 

in regard to the sense of sight are proofs, that figure and position 
are not the results of immediate and instinctive perception by the 
ej^e, as a sentient organ ^ 



192 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

sition with regard to each other, with which you are not 
familiar. If your eyes are parallel, you by the pressure 
make ihem squint, and the light from the object falls upon 
a different part of the one than it has been accustomed to 
fall, while it falls on the same part of the other. If, how- 
ever, you had been a constant squinter, an attempt to alter 
the eyes so as to make them parallel, would have produced 
the very same effect. 

Charles, I can understand it ; we perceive motion, by 
the motion of the light on the retina; and, unless by expe- 
rience, we could not tell whether that were the motion of 
the object or the eye ; and even with our experience, if I 
look hastily to one side, in running or in riding, the ob- 
jects that I know to be fixed on the ground seem running 
in the opposite direction. Now, by pressing upon the one 
eye, so as to produce motion in it, while the other remains 
fixed upon any steady object, that object as seen by the eye 
that is moved, will appear as in motion ; and if I keep the 
eye in any position but that to which it would assume, the 
object will to that eye appear in a different position from 
that in wiiich it appears to the other. 

Dr, Herbert. AH these are but so many more proofs 
that figure and position are not the results of immediate 
and instinctive perception by the eye, as a sentient organ; 
but that they are the results of former experience. 

Edwar^d. And yet there is an image or picture, formed 
upon the retina, of all that is before the eye in seeing. 

Dr. Herbert. That image, Edward, as has been the case 
with all images, however made or for what reality soever 
they tvere substituted, has lead the believer in it away from 
the true faith. We have seen in our optical studies, that 
images may be formed with equal perfection in any instru- 
ment, in which the light is let into a dark place, through a 
lens of a construction similar to the natural lens in the eye; 
we have seen similar images formed in the light upon white 
paper, by bending the light to a right angle, in the prism 
of a camera lusida; and there is hardly a being that lives, 
and has not seen similar images, reflected from smooth 
surfaces, such as that of a mirror, or the surface of still 
water. 



94. What facts are mentioned respecting the formatiou of an icft* 
age, similar to that on the retina of the eye ? 



Less. 9. intkllectual philosophy. 193 

Edward. But we have been (old that the coat of the eye 
continues to produce this image after the eye is dead, re- 
moved from its place, and all the covering behind the reti- 
na dissected away. 

Mary. This is a proof, Edward, that seeing is some- 
thing different from the image. The eye in the state you 
mention, does not see, neitlier does the camera obscura, or 
the mirror, or the lake. 

Dr. Herbert. That the external process in the sensation 
of vision depends in some way or other on the eye, we must 
admit, because the destruction of the eye destroys it ; but 
that the sensation, even as excited in the nervous extension, 
far less as referrible to the mind is, in any way that we can 
explain, connected with the image, we have no evidence 
that would warrant us to conclude, and no analogy that 
would lead us to conjecture. 

Thus in all the external affections , from what sense soever 
they may arise, there is nothing originally apart from the 
mere sensation ; and loithout the exercise of the mind we 
should retnain forever ignorant not only of the existence 
of the external world, but of our own bodies, which, con- 
sidered with reference to the mind, are just as much exter- 
nal as the (lowers in the field or the stars in the sky. Our 
knowledge of any one of them is just as experimental as of 
any other . and the only difference is, that we become first 
and most intimately acquainted with those that come first 
and most frequently under our notice. Thus, while its 
successive states are all that we know of the mind — that is, 
all that the mind knows of itself, to the mind, that is, to us 
there is no knowledge but the states of the mind itself Of 
tliese there is probably not one, even the most simple and 
familiar, but is complex in itself, and, if it amount to any 

95. What do these facts prove? 96. Why must we admit, 

that the external process, in the sensation of vision, is dependent on 

the eye ? 97. Have we any evidence or analogy, that would 

lead us to conclude, that the sensation is connected with the image ? 

98. Since there is nothing apart from the mere sensation, in 

all the external affections, of what should we have been forever ig- 
norant, without the exercise of the mind ? 99. And since our 

knowledge of any one thing is just as experimental as of any other, 

what follows as a consequence ? 100. In what does all our 

knowledge consist.^ 101. Are these states of the mind simple, 

or complex.^ 

17* 



194 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 9* 

thing to which we can give the name of knowledge, is a link 
in many trains of successive thought, a consequent of many 
antecedents, the recurrence of any one of which may make 
it again recur, with the same invariable and unbroken cer- 
tainty, that day and night return, and the seasons revolve. 

Charles. But still the senses are to us the sources of 
many and exquisite pleasures. If all had been scentless, 
and tasteless, and without soundyor resistance, or light, we 
might as well not have b^en ; the oyster in his shell would 
have been an epicure compared with us. 

Dr. Herbert. I readily concede the happiness^ Charles, 
As connected with every thing that is essential to us as an- 
imated beings, or delightful to us in the associations, and 
connexions, and occupations of life, we live only in sensa- 
tion : for sensation is only another name for life, and the 
final cessation of sensation is all that we can mean by 
death, the dissolution of the mind being a contradiction in 
language. Then, the desires and emotions that spring up 
and blend with our sensations, keeping the mind ever ac- 
tive, the wish of the future ever alive, and hope ever on 
the wing, produce a variety so charming, that, while the 
mind retains its power of thought, and its connexion w^ith, 
and control over, the actions of the body, the severest 
reverse is never ruin, nor the very extreme of pain un- 
mingled with pleasure. The captive chief, whose army has 
been utterly discomfited, or who has been deserted by it 
in the moment of extremity, may, as he lies in fetters with- 
in the cold dark dungeon, with his death-wound rankling, 
or the certainty that the dawn of the morning is to bring 
him to an ignominious death, — even he, in this extremity, 
may revert to the fields of his former victories, and riot in 
all the bustle of the strife, and all the pride of conquest; 
and he may take strong liold on hope, forget the fetters, 
the dungeon, the wound, and the approaching fate, and 
spring forward to new conquests over those whose captive 
he is, and feel that he is mightier and more invincible 
in chains or at tlie scaffold than they are in the posses- 



102. What is remarked of their recurrence ?- 103. In what 

connexion may it be said, that we live only in sensation ? 

104. Since sensation is only another name for life, what must its 
cessation be ? 105. What are the effects ot the desires and emo- 
tions, that blend with our sensations and keep the mind active ? 

106. Give an outline of the illustration. 



Less. 9. intellectual philosophy. 195 

sion of victory and the plenitude of power. Who can 
deny that those mental aroiisings from the depth of exter- 
nal bereavement — those triumphs over the world and over 
fate — are gleams of an immortality which shall survive the 
vicissitudes of time — demonstrations of spirit in man, over 
which not the extreme of misfortune and suffering, or death 
itself can have any power 1 Nor are they the portion only 
of the accomplished and the wise ; for they are common 
to human nature in it rudest as well as its most highly cul- 
tivated states ; and the American Indian, while lie raises 
his death-song, and recounts the valorous deeds of himself 
and his tribe, meets death with the same resolution as if he 
were a Socrates or a Seneca. 

Chariot, Then, the way in which some of our feelings 
are modified by other feelings, becomes one of the most im- 
poitant branches of the philosophy of the mind. 

Dr. Herbert. Further than the inquiry whether the 
mind be or be not the body, or subject to the same changes 
as matter, which is the chief part of the inquiry to which 
we have yet alluded, the whole physiology of the mind, 
and all its applications to the conduct of man as a ration- 
al and accountable being, is little else than an inquiry into 
the manner in which the feelings modify each other; and 
though those modifying feelings be all, strictly speaking, 
internal affections, yet as they modify the external affec- 
tions to which we have been directing our attention, the 
more remarkable of these require to be noticed before 
we proceed to the internal analysis. The causes of 
those sensations which we have hitherto considered, pro- 
duce their effects without any immediately preceding feel- 
ing, on our part, in which we can trace them as having 
mingled. 

Mary. But they may also be accompanied with, or pre- 
ceded or followed by, other feelings : — as I may see a rose 
when I am or have been desiring to see it: or having seen 
it, I may wish to pull it, or that a flower so beautiful were 
exempted from decay. I may have the wish, the desire, to 
pull the rose without the will ; or I might have both : or I 
may simply attend to the rose, without any wish about the 
matter. 



107. What do these mental exertions and triumphs, amidst 

extreme external sufferings, demonstrate ? lOS. What inquiry 

constitutes nearly the whole physiology of the raind ? 



196 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

Dr, Herbert. There is no doubt that the perceptions 
which are given us through the medium of the organs of 
sensation, may, with reference to the very same external 
cause, be far more strong under certain circumstances than 
others ; and that those circumstances which strengthen or 
weaken the perception of external objects, may arise either 
from the state that we are in, as regards ourselves, or 
from the state of other causes of excitement around us. 
Pain or pleasure, or occupation of any kind, or even the 
exhaustion of fatigue, may make that produce little impres- 
sion, which, in another state, would have affected us more 
strongly , and, in like manner, an external object may pass 
almost unheeded in a crowd of objects that are more at- 
tractive, which, alone, would have produced a far more vivid 
perception.* 

Charles. Any thing, whether it tend to make that which 
is before us the most striking and conspicuous object, or 
make it the object which we desire the most, will in 
that w^ay render the affection produced by the object more 
vivid. 

Dr, Herbert. The feeling, whether you call it a wish 
or a will, or simple attention, is still of a similar kind ; a 
new state of mind to which we may give the general name 
of desire — the most varied, the most important, and the 
most frequent of our intellectual states — the state which is 
always intermediate between a pleasure or a pain that is 
felt, and the other stale to which we look forward, as in- 
volving a contrast or an antidote. There is no such thing 
as the will, as a power of the mind, or as any thing differ- 
ent from the mind itself, in that state to which we give 
the name of willing. *' I have the will to lift my arm," 
means nothing more than that *' I am willing to lift my 
arm ;" that is, that my mind is in a state of which I know 
and believe the immediate consequence will be the lifting 
of my arm. 

"^Two Y)ersons of different occupations, having passed 
through the same street at the same time, will give a very 
different account of the objects which attracted their attention 
on their way. 

109. May our perceptions, with reference to the very same ex- 
ternal cause, vary? llO. From what may the circumstances, 

which strengthen or weaken the perception, arise ? 111. How 

may the affection produced by an object be rendered more vivid ? 

112. What is the meaning, which can be properly attached to the 
term will 7 



Less. 9. intellectual riiiLosoniY. 197 

Matilda. Then, if we have no will, why should we talk 
so confidently about it — as having a will to do one thing, 
and no will do to another ? 

Dr. Herbert. Just for the same reason that we talk 
about consciousness, and memory, and understanding, and 
judgment, as different from the mind itself, in those states 
to which we give the names of knowing, and remember- 
ing, and understanding, and judging, — an unobserved ten- 
dency to regard the mind as being similar to matter, and 
to find a distinct quality in it as the explanation of every 
state, just as we speak of sharpness in that which cuts, or 
heat in that which warms. When we make a classification 
of the states or phenomena of the mind, we cannot ac- 
company that with an actual analysis and separation of 
parts; and, therefore, though we may speak of sensations, 
or internal intellectual states, as having relation only to 
knowledge, and none to those emotions which are pleasur- 
able or painful, we are never able to make the correspond- 
ing separation in the process of thought itself. It will 
mingle even with our external affections; and though we 
are sometimes able to trace the chain of connexion by 
which it comes, even that is not always in our power; 
and thus, though it would be an absurdity to say that 
we do not will, when we are willing, we do not will 
the state that is the immediate antecedent — the cause 
why will may be with the perception or the internal sug- 
gestion. 

Mary. Desire and will must be different ; for I can 
desire any thing, however impossible, such as to fly, or 
to be in two or three places at the same time; but I 
cannot be said to will that of which 1 do not see the pos- 
sibility. 

Dr. Herbert. That is pretty nearly the distinction, Mary. 
Will is desire, with the confident anticipation that the de- 
sired result is to follow. 

113. From what tendency does it arise, that we talk about will, 

consciousness and memory, as different from the mind itself? 

114. When we make a classification of (he states of the mind, can we 
accompany the classification with an actual analysis and separation 
of parts? 115. Although we may speak of the internal intellec- 
tual states, as having relation only to knowledoje and not to emotions 
of pleasure or pain, can we make the corresponding separation in 

the process of thought? 116. What is the distinction between 

will and desire ? 



198 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 9. 

Charles. And the only ground that there can be for that 
anticipation is the former experience ; and that would, 
of course, remain, if some unknown occurrence had cut 
off the result ; as a man might have the will to lift a 
bag containing a hundred weight of feathers, which he 
had formerly lifted, even though the contents were chang- 
ed to a ton of lead, if he himself were uninformed of the 
change. 

Dr. Herbert. Precisely so; and if he knew of the 
change, and had formerly found that he was unable to lift 
the ton of lead, the desire to do so would cease to be a will, 
and be a wish, — that is, a desire without any knowledge of 
the certainty of its accomplishment. 

Edivard. Then we cannot, as is often said, have the 
will to do, and not the power ? 

Dr. Herbert. We never have the power till that which 
we wish actually takes place, for that is the power ; but we 
have the will when we do not doubt that we shall have the 
power, — that is, that what vve wisli for will take place. 

Charles. Then a wish is a desire that some event should 
take place, without any belief in the certainty ; and a will 
is a similar desire, strengthened by a belief, founded upon 
past experience. 

Blary. But it is singular that, from a state of mind 
that may be considered to arise from many sensations 
that occur together, as when I hear a number of instru- 
ments playing in concert, or examine a nosegay, com- 
posed of many flowers, my thoughts should he turned 
chiefly to one, as to the bassoon in the band, or the rose 
in the nosegay ; and that my thoughts should thereby be 
carried away altogether from the band to a solo on the 
bassoon — the song of which that solo was the air — the 
poet by whom the song was composed, or, perhaps, poetry 
in general, or from the nosegay to the rose — thence to a 
particular rose-tree in our own garden — from that to the 
garden itself — thence to the house, and the pleasure of 
home. 

Dr. Herbert. When we go earnestly, and without pre- 
judice, in quest of truth, we often find it where we would 
little expect. In this very susceptibility of the mind to 

117. Can a person will to do a thing, and not have the power to 
do it .^ 



Less. 9. intellectual philosophy. 199 

attend to one portion of the complex sensation rather 
than equally to the whole, we have an additional proof of 
that indivisibility of the mind, which is at once the philo- 
sophical proof of its existence, as different from matter, 
and the foundation of our dearest and most permanent 
hopes. Any sensation is always the most .vivid when it 
comes alone : we hear better in the stillness of the night 
than in the hum and bustle of the day ; we catch the per- 
fume of any one flower better, when there is no breeze, 
than when the storm is roaring though every tree and 
bending every twig ; and we see any one object more dis- 
tinctly when we confine our vision to that, by a tube, a 
piece of paper rolled up, or even by looking through our 
hand Now, in any complex state of the mind, whether 
of external or internal affections, as our perception of the 
whole compound is less vivid than if we perceived only 
one part of it, so some parts of it must be more familiar to 
our former experience and trains of thought, than others; 
and the remembrances of those former experiences will arise, 
and, from the more vivid impression that they impart, 
clothe that part with desire or will — and by the suggestions 
of association, lead one person to one train, and another 
to another, from that complex state, which, without regard- 
ing former habits and associations, is the same in them all. 
It is thus, that those states of mind, to which the names 
of attention, and will, and the desires, have been given, 
and which have been very unphilosophically and im- 
properly called separate powers, or faculties, form, as 
it were, the connecting links that blend our sensations, 
our internal affections, and our actions, into continuous suc- 
cessions. 

Charles. But surely we can pay attention, can be willing 
or not willing, and can desire or not desire? 

Dr, Herbert, That we can do all these I do not mean 

118. What is mentioned as an additional proof of the indivisibility 

of the mind ? 119. When is a sensation the most vivid ? 120. 

What instances confirm this? 121, What is remarked respect- 
ing our perceptions in any complex state of the mind? 122. 

What consequences will result from the parts of this compound, 

which are more familiar to our experience ? 123. How do the 

more familiar parts of the complex state of the mind, by the sug- 
gestions of association, lead different persons ? 124. What form 

the connecting links, that blend our sensations, our internal affec- 
tions, and our actions into continuous succession ? 125. Can we 

desire or not desire, at our pleasure ? 



200 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10. 

to deny. We can be in those states ; and when the ante- 
cedent to which any of them is the invariable consequent 
comes, either in an external or an internal affection, we 
cannot help the allusion, or the will, or the desire. But 
we must not, on that account, consider them as separable 
powers of the mind. They are merely states, and when 
the mind is in any of them, that state is, for the time, all 
that w^e know, or can know, of the mind, just as much as 
any other state in which the mind can be. As regards the 
mind itself, they are simple states, because the mind itself 
is simple ; though as regard those antecedent states, which 
we consider as their causes, they may be compound. 
They are, in fact, all desires; differently modified, I ad- 
rait ; but still nothing but desires ; and when we attend to 
and analyze that, by which any of them is produced, we in- 
variably find in it something which accounts for the exist- 
ence of the desire. Attention is generally the desire of 
knowledge of some kind or other ; and will is desire ac- 
companied by the belief of the thing desired. We must 
not undervalue the states to which we give those names, 
any more than any other of our mental states ; but we 
must not take them out of that class to which they belong, 
and as belonging to which, only, we can understand or ex- 
plain them — the successive phenomena of the mind. 



LESSON X. 

Internal affections are either mental states, or emotions — Mental 
states are the return of former knowledge simply, the comparison 
of one state with another — Succession of suggestion the same as 
that of cause and effect — We cannot will or control it. 

Dr. Herbert. You remember what w^e were to consider 
as an internal affection of the mind, as distinguished from 
an affection that is external ? 

126. But under what circumstances can we not avoid the allusion, 

the will, or desire ? 127. In what respect may these states be 

called simple, and in what, compound ? 128. What is attention 

said to be ? 129. And what is the will 7 130. Since attention, 

willing, and desire, are merely successive phenomena of the mind, 
how ought we to regard them ^ 



Less. 10. intellectual philosophy. 201 

Charles. So far as I recollect and understand the sub- 
ect, we were to consider as external, those affections of 
the mind which arc connected with or arise immediately 
upon sensation, that is the immediate presence of an exter- 
nal cause, acting upon some part of the body that is senti- 
ent, — as upon the optic nerve in vision, upon our muscular 
powers in resistance, or upon the substance of the body 
generally in the case of pain, whether preceded by an ex- 
ternal hurt or an internal derangement. 

Edward. And though we are to consider the sentient 
state of mind consequent to the operation of any of these 
causes, as being really an affection of the mind, and not of 
the external organ ; yet we are to understand that the 
knowledge of the external cause is not an immediate result 
of the single sensation, but a recollection that the same 
sensation has, when formerly felt, been invariably preceded 
by, or accompanied with, the same external cause. 

Or, Herbert. You remember rightly ; and if we suc- 
ceed as well in the more difficult portion of our inquiry, 
which is yet before us, we shall have made at least some 
progress in the study of mental physiology ; and in so far, 
by a knowledge of the phenomena of our minds, and the 
observed laws of their succession, prepared ourselves for 
a more valuable use of that most essential part of our na- 
ture. How shall we make even an imaginary division of 
our internal states of mind ? 

Mary. I can feel some sort of division, though I know 
not well how to give a name to it. When I merely think, 
without reference to any external thing actually present, I 
sometimes think, and do no more; and at other times I 
both think and feel. In the one case I do nothing but re- 
member or know, and in the other I may be so much af- 
fected by that which I know or remember, that I may be 
joyful or sorrowful, may laugh or cry, or be affected with 
the mere thought, just as much as I would be affected by a 
real occurrence. 

Dr. Herbert. That is something near the proper divi- 
sion, Mary. It is a division that has been remarked from 
the earliest period at which we have any account of the 

1. What is an external affection of the mind ? 2. What 

besides a single sensation is requisite to a knowledge of the external 
cause ? 

18 



202 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10. 

physiology of the mind as a branch of study ; but it is a di- 
vision more easily felt in the mind itself than conveyed or 
even named to others ; and therefore the very words that 
have been made use of, as distinguishing the one class 
from the other, have generally been the sources of much 
confusion and many errors. Some have called the phe- 
nomena that fall under the class which you have described 
as thinking without feeling, the powers of the understand- 
ing ; and the other class, those in which feeling mingle 
with and modifies the thought, the powers of the will. Oth- 
ers, with a difference in words, but the same obscurity of 
meaning, have called the former class of phenomena (for 
they are all phenomena, and not powers) the intellectual 
powers, and the latter the active powers. But as the mind 
is active in all its states, whether of external or internal af- 
fection ; and as the mind understands all its knowledge, 
whether the presence of that knowledge be accompanied or 
followed by emotion or not; and, farther, as that which 
they considered as the will, had sometimes just as little to 
do with the thought accompanied by emotion, as with that 
with which no such accompaniment is perceptible ; those 
appellations always conveyed either more or less than was 
intended to be expressed ; and, therefore, the use of them 
invariably introduced a confusion, which it were wise as 
well as profitable to avoid. 

Edward. Then, what name shall we get to call them 
by ? for even a bad name would be better than none ; as 
a name is a short memory, and may suggest all the rest, as 
the word *' triangle'' puts me in mind of at least twenty 
propositions in the Elements of Geometry, besides a vast 
number of practical applications. 

Dr, Herbert. We shall make use of some names, Ed- 
ward ^ and that we may not be responsible for their accu- 
racy on our own authority, we shall adopt those that have 
been introduced by the latest, and, in my opinion, the clear- 
est and best authority on the subject — the late Dr. Thomas 
Brown, of Edinburgii, from whose writings I have already 
indulged you with a quotation, and to the perusal of whose 
lectures I shall most earnestly recommend you, as soon as, 

3= What has been meant by the term powers of the understand- 
ing ? 4. What by the powers of the will? 5. What other 

terms have been applied to the same phenomena ? 6. What ob- 
jections may be made to these terms ? 



Less. 10. intellectual philosophy. 203 

in our desultory conversations, we have, as it were, broken 
the ice of the subject. 

Matilda. And what are the names that he gives to those 
divisions which were mentioned by Mary, and which you 
said were nearly accurate ? 

Dr. Herbert. They are exceedingly simple : — the first 
he terms Intellectual States ; and the second, Emotions — 
tliough the intellectual state and the emotion may exist to- 
gether, and thus make a more complex affection of the mind 
Uian that which takes place in mere thought without emo- 
tion. In order that we may simplify the inquiry as much 
as possible, we shall first consider the intellectual states, 
ajid then the emotions. In this limited sense, what are we 
strictly to understand by an intellectual state of the mind, 
considered as internal? 

Charles. Any thought that may arise in my mind^ with- 
out the presence of an external object or event ^ as the subject 
or cause of that thought ; and that thought will be a purely 
intellectual state, as distinguished from an emotion, when 
it is unaccompanied by any of those states which we call 
joy or grief, hope or despair, satisfaction or disappointment, 
or any other that may give me a mental feeling of pleasure 
or pain, which my experience does not justify me in attrib- 
nting to an external cause. 

Dr. Herbert. Which do you think the most worthy of 
otir notice, the internal intellectual states, which are pro- 
duced, as it were, in the mind itself, without any present 
external causes ; or those states, that are the results of sen- 
sation ? 

Mary. I should think the internal states, certainly. 

Dr. Herbert. And why should you think so, Mary ? 

Mary. I am not sure that I can satisfactorily explain it ; 
but I feel that they are far more important than the others, 
because we have no control over our mere sensations. 
(1.) Those actions of external things upon our organs that 
produce them, take place without any concurrence or con- 
trivance, or even desire on our part ; (2.) and if our knowl- 
edge of any sensation lasted no longer than the external 
cause of that sensation were applied to our organ of sense, 

7. What terms more properly designate this division ? 8. 

What is an intellectual state of the mind ' 9. What reasons 

may be piven for considerinc; the intellectual states more worthy of 
aotice than those states, which are the results of sensation ? 



204 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 10. 

we should never be the wiser for any experience — we could 
learn nothing, and would, in fact, know nothing. 

Edward. If I did not remember that a former fire burn- 
ed me, I should be as apt to put my hand into the fire of 
to-day, as into any other place ; and if I did not remember 
that water had formerly slacked my thirst, I should just be 
as apt to apply any thing else for that purpose — as salt, or 
even sulphuric acid ; but by remembering what I have 
formerly found out, or have been told, about those substan- 
ces, I avoid the salt, as knowing that it would increase the 
painful feeling of my thirst, and sulphuric acid, because I 
know^ that it would occasion greater and more dangerous 
pain. 

Matilda. 1 have noticed that the baby, to which Mary 
formerly alluded, when it began to use its hands, and had 
found out the way of bringing them to its mouth, endeav- 
oured to catch at every thing that it saw, and carry it there 
w^ithout any regard to the use or the danger of the thing so 
attempted to be grasped. When I held the candle in one 
hand, and the bit of cake in another, it attempted to catch 
at the flame of the candle in preference to the bit of cake. 

Dr, Herbert. You have been playing the philosopher, 
Matilda, without intending it, more than many w^ho have 
made it their principal study. The child, to appease the 
feeling of hunger, which to it was the most frequent feeling, 
and knowing from experience that its mouth was the aper- 
ture by which that feeling had formerly been appeased, 
grasped not at that which had the nutritious quality — a 
know^ledge which it did not then possess — but at that which 
made the most vivid impression upon the organs of sight. 
We think the knowledge of the infant, in that helpless 
state in which it would put a knife or poison into its mouth, 
in preference to the most wholesome and best adapted food, 
very limited, as compared with the results of our experience ; 
but if we had been in possession of nothing but our senses, 
and wanting, as we do, those instincts which guide the an- 
imals in the choice of their food, and in all the other cir- 
cumstances that contribute to the preservation of their ex- 
istence, we should have been in a much more helpless condi- 
tion than the child, for we should not only have been in total 

10. What would have been our condition, destitute as we are of 
the instincts, which guide animals m the choice of their food and in 
the preservation of their existence, had we been in possession of 
nothing but our senses ? 



Less. 10. intellectual philosophy. 205 

ignorance of what was food and what was not, but we 
should not have known that food would appease hunger, or 
that we had a mouth to be fed, or a hand to feed it. Even 
now, after all that our experience has taught us, we 
are sometimes, not in cases of novelty only, but in those 
which, under circumstances very similar, have happened 
to us before, apt to overlook the lesson, and prefer the daz- 
zling to the useful, the showy to the substantial, with as lit- 
tle reason as the child displayed in preferring the flame to 
the piece of cake. We should bear in mind, at all times, 
that the present emotion, whether pleasurable or the reverse, 
by which any thing is accompanied, is not in itself knowl- 
edge ; and that, in itself, it is no more capable of guiding 
us to a proper election of what we should do, than the vis- 
ion of the child — all without experience as it was — was 
capable of guiding it in the election of the nutritive arti- 
cle, when the dull cake and the dazzling flame were pre- 
sented to it at the same time. We all, more or less, prefer 
the flame to the food, until we have been taught by expe- 
rience. 

Charles, Then a knowledge of the internal affections 
of our minds is of great importance in the regulation of our 
ordinary conduct. 

Dr. Herhert. Certainly it is : and wherever we find 
one person more circumspect in his conduct, and more on 
his guard against what we are accustomed to call the con- 
tingencies of life, than another, we may always be assured 
that that person is a better practical physiologist of the 
mind, whether he happens to have known or studied that 
as a science or not. Beyond our mere instincts, and they 
are few and feeble, and have little influence upon the parts 
that we are called to act in life, we have nothing but our 
minds to guide us in the hioioledge of the world, and the 
influence that its objects and events must have upon our suc- 
cess or failure, our happiness or misery; and therefoie we 
cannot pay too much attention to the nature and succession 
of those intellectual sidXe^ of the mind, which are not the 
sources or the means of our knowledge, but that knowledge 

11. Do we, with all our experience, sometimes prefer the 

dazzling and showy to the useful and substantial ? What should 

we always bear in mind ? 12. By what may we know the per- 
son, who is a good practical physiologist of the mind ? 13. What 

have we to guide us in the knowledge of the world ? 14. If our 

minds aie of such importance, what inference necessarily follows.^ 

18* 



206 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10- 

itself; — not that knowledge merely which arises from the 
simple contemplation of that of which we have formerly been 
sentient ; but of all that original and inventive knowledge 
that enables us to make new discoveries in science, and 
form new combinations in art, till the world be, as it were, 
filled with new truths, and furnished with new enjoyments. 

Charles, But as our sensations are involuntary, and as 
all our knowledge is derived from, or, rather, consists in, 
reflections upon them, it is difficult to imagine how we can 
control that reflection over which we have no control in 
the original sensation or perception. 

Dr. Herbert, If we w^ere to deny or abstain from any 
inquiry, because of its difficulty, Charles, we should stop at 
the very threshold of knowledge. We know that men do 
control their trains of thought, because we find that one 
turns an occurrence to a good purpose, and another turns 
the same occurrence to a bad purpose. The experience 
of one man teaches him wisdom, and that of another leaves 
him as much a fool as ever. There must be, therefore, a 
mental discipline to be acquired ; and the results are so 
very different in their importance, that that alone is a suffi- 
cient inducement for us to make the inquiry. 

We are to bear in mind, that though the single influence 
upon the individual sense be simple and involuntary, there 
is nothing to which we give the name of an object or event 
which is equally simple. The object consists of parts, and 
has qualities : for it is only as consisting of parts and hav- 
ing qualities that we have any knowledge of matter ; and 
the event is the sequence of an antecedent and a consequent 
— each of which may necessarily involve the existence of 
parts and qualities, or of other antecedents and consequents. 
Now, as our knowledge of things as existing, and of events 
as happening, is derived from former experience, all the 
considerations that enter into the complex knowledge of the 
object or the event, cannot stand in the same relation, ei- 
ther to the whole of our experience, or to that which has 

15. What knowledge, besides that of simple contemplation, may 
be included in the intellectual states of the mind, which, from their 

importance, demand our attention ? 16. How do we know that 

men control their trains of thought ? 17. How does the experi- 
ence of individuals vary? 18. Is an object or event equally as 

simple, as the single influence upon the individual sense ? 

19. What is the only way, in which we can have any knowledge 

of matter ? 20. Since all our knowledge is derived from former 

experience, in what relation do the considerations, that enter into 
the complex knowledge of an object or event, stand.? 



Less. 10. iNrELLECxuAL philosophy. 207 

been of most frequent or recent occurrence, and is, on that 
account, the most vivid and fresh in the memory; and the 
very fact tliat experience is knowledge, leads to the conclu- 
sion, that that portion of the complex perception whicli has 
the most immediate reference to the freshness or the fre- 
quency of our experience, will be itself more familiar than 
the rest, and lead the thoughts from the immediate percep- 
tion to some parts of the train, of which, in our former ex- 
perience, that portion formed a part. 

Mary. As the sight of a book might lead one who ad- 
mired a handsome library, but did not read much, to the 
style of the binding ; another to the author, and the other 
works that he had produced ; or a third to the subject of 
the book, and the other books that had been written on the 
same subject. 

Echcard. And from that, one might come to wish that 
one had the same or a liner book ; that one had seen the 
author; or that one could write a book equal to it, or one 
to refute any thing wrong that it might contain. 

Dr. Herbert. The variety of those suggestions might 
be innumerable; but by attending to them we should 
invariably find, that they had always some reference to 
the former experience of the party ; and that the partic- 
ular thought, or train of thought, did not come upon the 
mind, in the same way that an unexpected glare of light 
falls on the eye, or an unexpected missile impinges upon 
the body, but in consequence of some principle of sugges- 
tion — some reference to former thought — though that sug- 
gestion might be so delicate, and that reference so slight 
and momentary, that there might be no suggestion of itself, 
as a separate state of mind, intermediate between the an- 
tecedent thought and the consequently-suggested resem- 
bling one. 

Charles. But is not this the same as that to which we 
give the name of memory ? 

Dr. Herbert. The use of that term is apt to mislead us, 
as, in common language, we are apt to speak of good mem- 
ory and bad — as if the memory and the mind that remem- 
bers were not one and the same. Now, apart from the ab- 

21. To what conclusion, does the fact, that experience is knowl- 
edge, lead ? 22. If we attend to our sug;gestions, what shall we 

invariably find ? 23. How does a particular thought or train of 

thoughts come upon the mind r 24, How is the memory com- 
monly spoken of? 



SS)8 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10. 

surdity of considering memory as apart or property of mind, 
the very definition of which excludes the possibility of parts 
or properties, memory, as it is commonly defined, would 
be a treacherous guide in our intellectual analysis. It will 
not obey us : it will neither quit what we are anxious to 
forget, nor render up to us that which we are anxious to 
recollect. 

Matilda. I have often felt that. When I have done 
something of which 1 did not approve, or which I felt not 
to be right, the very pain of the feeling kept me from for- 
getting the fact ; and again, w^hen 1 have torgotten what I 
intended to say, I have been unable to recollect it, till the 
very anxiety of doing so was at an end ; and then I would 
recollect it at once, without any w^ish of doing so, and 
when it was too late for answering the purpose that I had 
intended. 

Dr, Herbert. We need not fatio^ue ourselves with any 
of the subtilities with which others have perplexed them- 
selves, in accounting for the origin of those intellectual states 
of oar minds, wiiich are of so much importance to us. A 
single theory, or a single name, will not make the matter 
more plain, neither should we understand it any better, 
though we made use of as many separate names, as w^e feel 
different states. The states themselves are all that we know ; 
and by examining them, we shall best find how they are 
connected with each other. Let us consider what those 
states are which arise thus, without being preceded by im- 
mediate sensation. 

Edward, They are just the knowledge of any thing 
that we have formerly known, or read, or been told of, or 
any thing that we can imagine. As I can think of the 
horse, that I have seen ; or I can imagine a horse with 
wings, or a figure of a horse made of gold, though I have 
never seen either of the last two, or believe that they ever 
existed. 

Dr. Herbert. Well, let us take the horse that you have 
seen ; what could you think about him 1 

Charles. I could think of him simply, without any ref- 
erence to any thing else ; and I could think of him as he 

25. Of what use would memory, as it is commonly defined, be 
to us in our intellectual analysis ? 26. Why would it be a treach- 
erous guide ? 27. Would a theory or a name be of any use in 

solving difficulties ? 28, What are the states of the mind, which 

arise without being preceded by immediate sensation .'' 



Less. 10. intellectual iuilosopiiy. 209 

resembled other animals, oilier quadrupeds^ and other 
horses; and also as he ditlered from them. 

Dr. Herbert, If you had never seen or imagined that 
there was any other horse than the individual, would you 
then think of his resemblance to other horses ? 

Mary. Certainly not, as a matter of real comparison ; 
but I could imagine other horses, and resemblances or 
disagreements between that horse and them ; just as I 
might imagine another church or steeple, similar or dif- 
ferent, though I had never seen any but those of our own 
parish. 

Dr. Herbert. Then do you not observe in this, that there 
may be two ways of thinking, even on the least complex 
subject that could be imagined ? 

Echoard. Yes ; thinking simply of it as itself, and think- 
ing of it as compared with something else ; and in the lat- 
ter case, I would necessarily think also of the other thing 
or things referred to in the comparison. 
Dr. Herbert, Any thing more ? 

Charles. I might think of the thing — as the horse, for 
instance — as grazing at one time, galloping at another, and 
lying down at a third. 

Mary. But that would be comparing the horse in one 
state with the horse in another ; and thus, though it would 
not be a comparison of exactly the same kind as the former, 
it would still be a comparison. 

Dr. Herbert. And if the subject of your thought were 
not a thing or substance, but a quality, as the color of a 
rose, or the hardness of steel ? 

Edward. I could think of it simply or in comparison 
with other qualities of the same kind. 

Dr. Herbert. If it were an action or event? 
Charles. I could still think of it in the same manner, 
simply, or by comparison with other events of the same 
kind ; but 1 do not know that I could think further about it, 
without passing to other subjects, or considering how my 
own feelings would be affected by it. 

Dr. Herbert. Those two states of the mind, which are, 
as regards the subjects of its internal affection, different 
from each other, we might term *^ internal perceptions of ex- 

29, What tw^o ways are thereof thinking on a subject? 

30. How might the comparison be extended ? 31. What terms 

may be apphed to these two states of the mind ? 



210 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10. 

istence or occurrence/' and *' internal perceptions of rela- 
tion ;" but as we have no reason to attribute them to any 
different principles or faculties of the mind itself, which 
has in reality no differences but those of its states, we must 
conclude, that they arise in the same manner ; that, in all 
cases, they are nothing but suggestions of former knowledge 
— states of the mind that are the invariable consequents of 
certain antecedent states, as invariable as a sensation of 
pain is the consequent of the application of a live coal to 
the hand, or a weight's falling to the earth is a consequent - 
of the cutting of the string by which that weight had pre- 
viously been suspended. 

Mary. But how can we suppose that states of the mind 
which are all so varied, can be produced by mere suggestion 
alone, and without that memory, and conception, and will, 
and fancy, and imagination, of which we are so much in 
the habit of speaking, and by the very use of which, as 
words, we all but prove the existences which they are the 
names of? 

Dr, Mtrhert. The names, that we may give, do not alter 
the realities to which we apply them. That 

^' The rose 
^Y any other name would smell as sweet," 

is no fable. Whenever we use a name as common to any 
two individuals, between which we can but discern the 
slightest difference, that name ceases to be accurately de- 
scriptive of either of them, and must not be used as ,such ; 
and whenever we find that we are using a name for which 
we can discover no reality, the sooner we discard that name 
the better. If we say, that a certain state of mind is sug- 
gested by conception, or will, or fancy^ or imagination, or 
any other supposed power or faculty that we may name, 
without the means of describing it or being sure of its ex- 
istence, we have not traced the origin of the suggestion, 
but are farther from it than we were before, as we have not 
only interpolated, between the antecedent and the conse- 
quent, another link which stands in as mysterious and in- 

32. Why must we conclude that they arise in the same manner ? 

33. What are they in aU cases r 34. Of what are they the 

invariable consequents .? 35. When ought we to discard any name 

that we are using ? 36. Why are we farther from the origin of a 

suggestion, when we say that a certain state of mind is suggested 
by conceptioa or will, than we were before i' 



Less. 10. intellectual philosophy. 211 

explicable a relation to each of them, as they previously did 
to one another ; but which, by being purely fanciful, while 
it doubles the difficulty, communicates its own imaginary 
nature to the whole. When we say that a state of mind 
is a suggestion of memory, we have not advanced a step 
nearer to the antecedent state which was the cause of the 
suggestion ; we have receded, and cannot regain our for- 
mer position, till we have removed the obstacle of memory 
out of the way. 

Edward. Must we then invent a new language, before 
we can understand the philosophy of the mind ? 

Dr. Herbert. By no means. We must do only that 
which we ought to do in all cases where we make use of 
language — take care that the words v^/hich we employ have 
a meaning, and that we adhere uniformly to that meaning 
in the use of them. 

There is no objection to the use of the word '' memory, '' 
if we do not use it as a suggesting power ; when we use it 
in its proper signification, it means that particular class 
of suggestions which are the original perceptions them- 
selves, produced again without alteration or embellishment. 

Charles. Then memory is to be considered, not as the 
antecedent — the former experience that suggests, or the con- 
sequent which is suggested — but the correspondence of the 
suggested state of the mind\\\\\\ some state that hdid former- 
ly existed. 

Dr. Herbert. That is the proper meaning of the word, 
Charles, and the only real meaning that we can attach to 
it. If the original perception had been that of a horse 
grazing peacefully in a meadow, and the suggestion of the 
same horse were to be, that he were caparisoned, had a 
soldier on his back, and were charging in battle, the mere 
memory of the former peaceful state of the animal never 
could of itself have suggested thf^ combination in which he 
now appears; other suggestions must have arisen — the 
suggestions of armies and battles ; and they too must have 
been modified, if not in any other respect, yet by the intro- 
duction of this horse into the ranks. 



37. What caution is necessary in the use of words in the study of 

the human mind ? 38. What is the proper meaning of the word 

memory ? 39. In the instance of the horse, here mentioned, 

could the memory of the original perception have suggested the 
combination described ? 



212 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10. 

Matilda. These additional circumstances would have 
been the productions of fancy or imagination. 

Dr, Herbert. We can no more have any knowledge of 
fancy or imagination, as a suggestive power, than we 
have of memory. It is a mere modification of the state 
of mind that is suggested ; and though it make the whole 
subject of that state ever so novel, or ever so different, 
from what it would have been unmodified, — as in the cases 
of which we have said the word ** memory" may be said 
to be descriptive, — it is still in itself just as much a result 
of suggestion as if it had been the simple return ot a 
former perception, unchanged in the slightest shade. In- 
deed, all those considerations that have been invested with 
the mysterious properties of powers and had the origin of 
our suggested states of mind attributed to them, are in 
themselves the consequents or effects of that of which 
they are said to be the antecedents or causes ; and in as 
far as they are mere modifications of states of mind, they 
are no more the causes of those states, than being black, 
brown, or chestnut, or having four legs, are the causes of a 
horse. 

Edivarcl. Then why should they have been employed in 
that sense ? 

Dr. Herbert. For the same reason, no doubt, that led to 
those other errors that we have had frequent occasion to 
notice, for the purpose of avoiding them : the disposition that 
mankind, when they persuade themselves that they are phi- 
losophizing, have to turn away from nature, because it is 
simple and accessible to all, and cannot be moulded accord- 
ing to their hypothesis, and to make idols of their own 
which they can fashion as they have a mind, and shut up 
in the cabinets of their own words, inaccessible to the 
knowledge of those whom they call the vulgar. 

Charles. There can, however, I presume, be no objec- 
tion to the use of the word conception, if we confine it 
merely to the state of the mind itself, and do not apply it 
to that which is the antecedent or cause of the state. 

Dr. Herbert. What name we may give to the state of 
mind is of course of no consequence ; for the variations of 

40. Is fancy or imagination a suggestive power ? 41, What 

is it ? 42. What are all those considerations, which have been 

invested with the mysterious properties of powers ? 43. Why 

then should such terms have been employed ? 



Less. 10. i.ntellectual PHiLosopny, 013 

state being innumerable, no word can be descriptive of 
them all, or of any one class of them. There is, hSwever 
he same objection to the word conrrptlon, as to those 
tha have been already mentioned, and to others, such as 
abstract, on, and the association of ideas. It has been 
used ;.sclrscnptn-e of a certain ori/inal power of the mind 
and not as of a snnp/e mollification of the state of the mind • 
Z:^lT"''' *'•'' "'' ^"^ '' "^'S''' ^'"^ "« to «eek the an! 
sequen" su^^'"" '" ""' "'^'^'^ '''^'^"g^d °"'y 'othe con- 

We do not add any farther information, when we say we 
are consoous ot a ihmg, or have an ^V/c« of it, than whin 
we say we/„„,. „ ; and, therefore, the consciousness anS 
esVl'r Tl^'-^u '5' T"^'^' description, and we mi'ht 
Just m the same manner, we do not better explain the 
recurrence of a state of mind when we say that it is a sucr 
gestion of memory, than when we say sUply hat it is^a 
suggestion ; nor half so well as when we say ha a 

ue do not analyze those states of mind by which it i« im. 
mediately preceded. ^ "" 

whtf i"' ''%^'' "°u '° ""'""'y ^^P-"^^^ "'at -='ate of mind 
vh.ch arises from the combination of several former states 
by call.ng .t the result oUhe associcUion of ideaTlslTel 
we call ,t a suggestion of these states ; because even hou'h 
we should avoid the error in the meaning of the w^rd S 
and regard tt merely as the notion, ov knotcledTollhe 
h,ng known we find that the association may on ai n ie- 
.res, and other feel.ngs and emotions, to which lie word 

ete' inT ""^ P'°P"''-^ ^' ^PP"'^''' ^' tbev are not kZ 1- 
edge in the proper meanmg of the word. The immediate 
feelmg that suggests to us an absent friend, may bT. ief 
because he .s gone from us,-or joy, that his' beiJg so gone 

trips can we best PTnro=c, ii,« °''.> > »e Know it. 4C. In what 

17. How can we th/^n , -T ^«'="f^*nce of a slate of mind? 



214 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10. 

is advantageous to himself; and though the suggestion may 
be so powerful as to place him on the chair beside us, and 
make us mentally mourn to him for what we have suffered 
by his absence, or exult and congratulate him on his good 
fortune, it can in no proper sense of the w'ord be called an 
association of ideas. 

So, also, though the suggested state of mind be one in 
which one subject is detached from an usual combination 
of subjects, or one quality from a number of co-existing 
qualities in the same substance, and though that w^iich is 
thus placed more alone and completely before the mind, be 
thus abstracted from other consideration^ with which we 
were in the habit of meeting it combined, — the abstraction 
is the modification^ and not the cause, of the state ; and 
though we were to say that such a state were the sugges- 
tion of abstraction, we should still have the inquiry before 
us, clouded indeed, but not diminished ; for we should still 
feel the want of that portion of our past experience which 
suggested the abstraction itself. 

Mary. Then we are to consider our intellectual states 
as suggestions of states that formerly existed ; and they 
may be simply states of former perception of external 
things, or may have recurred many times as intellectual, 
and have been changed and modified at each recurrence? 

D)\ Herbert. And the anterior states, to which we shall 
be able to trace the returns and the modifications, are all 
that we have to guide us in the analysis of this most impor- 
tant part of our intellectual existence ; unless we conde- 
scend to play the idle game of words, and ^* philosophise 
without philosophy." 

Charles. And as you have mentioned that the only 
general division of those suggested states is into those that 
relate to the subjects simply, and those that relate to them 
as compared with other subjects, we shall have the two di- 
visions of suggestions of subjects and suggestions of rela- 
tions. 

Dr. Herbert. As our object is not the knowledge of 
that which may be suggested, which must vary with all 

50. When the suggested state of mind is one in which one sub- 
ject is detached from its usual combination, is the abstraction, the 

modification, or the cause of the state ? 50. If such a state be 

called the suggestion of abstraction, is it a clear expression ? 

51. What have we to guide us in the analysis of our intellectual 
states ? 



Less. 10. intellectual philosophy. 215 

men, and with every man at different times, but of the phe- 
nomena and laws of the suggestion itself, which are in kind, 
though not in degree or in object, common to all men, we 
shall, as tliey have been made use of before, employ the 
terms simple suggestion, and the suggestion of relations, 
or relative suggestion. 

The analysis of these, if we could make it perfect, would 
put us in possession of the whole knowledge of the mind, 
as intellectual ; we should thence see how the fleeting and 
momentary impulses of the present, connect us with the 
past and the future; and how even those experiences of 
the senses, which are as fleeting as the touches of exter- 
nal things that are their causes, may become lessons and 
warnings, not only through the longest life, but through 
the whole period to which the history of man can extend, 
in those streams of knowledge that individuals pour into the 
general tide. In the full analysis of this, too, we should 
be able to have the causes of all those diversities that are 
found in the human charaoter ; for wisdom and folly, dul- 
ness and wit, genius and stupidity, in all their shades, where 
there is no derangement of the organs of the body, or of its 
mysterious connection with the mind, are all attributable 
to varieties in those trains of experience and thought which 
give rise to our suggestions ; and as our emotions are blend- 
ed with these, much of our happiness and misery arise 
from the same sources. 

Mary. But are there not original differences among 
mankind ? 

Dr. Herbert. That is a question which we can never 
answer, Mary ; and, therefore, it is one upon which we-need 
not enter. We observe differences ; but the safest plan for 
usisto consider them as differences of experience ; because, 
though we err in so doing, our error is in the way of wis- 
dom, — as it will induce us to attempt making up any defi- 
ciency that we may have in ourselves. 

52. What terms does the author employ, to express the gener- 
al division of the suggested states of the mind ? 53. Why 

does he use these terms? 54. Whnt result would follow 

from a perfect analysis of these ? 55. What advantage might 

result from the experience of our senses ? 56. • Why would this 

analysis furnish us with the causes of all the diversities that are 

found in the human character ? 57. What is the safest way 

ill which we can consider the intellectual differences of man- 
kind ? 58. Wliat reason is assigned for this view of the subject ? 



216 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10. 



LESSON XI. 

Laws of simple suggestion — Its general nature depends on the habit 
of the individual — Circumstances that produce suggestions — Feel- 
ings mingle with it — Sympathy — Joy in adversity, fortune in pros- 
perity, may come in with suggestion, if their antecedents be in 
our past experience — Dreaming — Particular causes of suggestion. 

Dr, Herbert, Well, have you, since we last met, been 
thinking upon the subject of our last conversation ? 

Edioard, I have been thinking of it ; and though, after 
what we then heard, I cannot believe, or even imagine, 
that memory and imagination are anything more than mere 
modifications of mental states, over the occurrence of which 
we have no control, as we do not know them till they be 
actually suggested ; yet it is very singular, that an arrange- 
ment, so apparently simple as that of mere suggestion from 
past experience, should be our only guide in all that we 
know, and all that we feel. 

Charles, If it answer the purpose, Edward, we must not 
quarrel with the simplicity : for it is a maxim in mechan- 
ics, that the simpler the machine is that answers the pur- 
pose, the more skilful must have been the engineer who 
constructed it, and the less likely is the machine itself to 
get out of order. 

Mary, (1.) As the qualities of things as existing in 
space, and their phenomena as existing in time, are all 
that we can know; (2.) as a state of mind can have no 
qualities but in the other states by which it is preceded, 
and the emotions or other states by which it may be follow- 
ed ; (3.) and as we can have no knowledge of the causes 
of the successive changes, even of those external and ma- 
terial things that are the objects of our senses, but that of 
the order in which they succeed each other ; I do not see 
that, though we had had as many separate powers as there 
are words in the dictionary, each conveying knowledge to 
us in a different way, and of a different kind, we could 
have been either more wise or more happy than we ar« 
with this simple principle of suggestion, which produces 

1. What three particulars, which have already been establishe(i, 

are recapitulated .? 2. Can the simple principle of suggestion 

convey to us as much knowledge as a large number of separate pow- 
ers would ? 



Less. 10. intellectual philosophy. 217 

or alters none of the thoughts suggested, but merely pre- 
sents them to us in their own natural succession of causes 
and effects, the only one in which they could be of any use 
to us. 

Dr. Herbert. You are right, Mary ; and it gives me 
much pleasure to hope that we shall have more of the real- 
ity of philosophy in our thoughts, by confining ourselves to 
that which we can know, and describing it in plain words, 
than if we paraded all the phraseology of all the systems 
that ever were invented. This simple principle of sugges- 
tion has already done great things. It has educated man 
— from the condition of the helpless infant, that knows not 
that it has a body, or that there is any remedy for the pang 
of hunger or the piercing of cold — to work all those revolu- 
tions that we see upon the earth, to weigh the earth itself, 
to measure the paths and the velocities of planets, and to put 
suns and systems into the scale. It has enabled him to tell 
what were the positions of those vast and distant masses, 
at any past time, and what shall be their positions at any 
future time, however distant. Remote, beyond the pow- 
er of arithmetic, as are the stars in the sky, it has enabled 
man to make tiiem his beacons upon the deep, his unerr- 
ing pilots to any one point on the surface of the globe ; 
and it has not only fulfilled the original promise, in giving 
him dominion over the beasts of the field, the fowls of the 
air, and the fishes of the sea; but it has enabled him to 
make both sea and lan^ to give up their stores, and to make 
the wind, the water, and the wide-wasting fire, the servants 
of his will, the ministers of his pleasure. Above all, it has 
enabled him to profit by all the experience of his predeces- 
sors ; and while, as a sentient being, he is only of the pass- 
ing moment, and confined to a little space, as an intellec- 
tual being he lives everywhere, and at every time. 

Charles. But still, if we could recall the very thought 
that we wish when we wish it, and were able to know all 
antecedents and consequents, without experience, our labor 
would be much less. 

Matilda. But it does not follow that our enjoyment 
would be greater, Charles. The pleasure that we feel is 

3. What particulars in the education of man are mentioned as 

effected by the simple principle of suggestion ? 4. What is 

mentioned as the most important result of this principle ? 5. In 

what does the pleasure consist, which we feel in the pursuit of knowl- 
edge ? 

19* 



218 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10. 

not in the thing acquired, be it knowledge or be it pos- 
session ; it is in the acquisition : and when we have ac- 
quired it, we value it chiefiy as a means of acquiring more. 

Charles. No doubt, we should be contented as we arej 
but we cannot, at times, help wishing that we had been a 
little different. 

Dr, Herbert: The wish is given us for the very best 
purposes, Charles : and though we are not always able to 
trace our suggestions up to it, we may rest assured that in 
every new train of suggestion, there is some wish, though 
probably unheeded by us^ that rendered more vivid that 
link of the old chain at which the thoughts turned to the 
new. We sometimes speak of great discoveries, great ac- 
quirements, or great deeds^ as being the results of chance 
or accident; but as every consequent must have had an 
antecedent, and as the chance^ which is just a change or 
event^ must have had one too; so if we could pursue the 
train of succession up to it, we may be assured that, in 
every advance that we make as intellectual beings, there is 
always some wish, which, if we could come to it, would be 
the key to the whole train of suggestion. Newton did not 
establish the doctrine of gravitation, neither did Watt per- 
fect the steam-engine, without some fond desire upon the 
subject, however remote that desire may have been from 
the completion of the intellectual process, and however 
unlike that which was wished for may have been to that in 
which the value of the discovery or the invention lay. 

Edioard, Then would not the best way be to follow out 
the successions of thought to those wishes? 

Dr. Herbert. That would not always be possible, nor 
would it, in many cases, be profitable. The wish that gave 
the impulse, that strengthened the link, which drew the 
mind into the train of thought that led to wisdom, to great- 
ness, to brilliance, or to goodness, being in itself but a 
momentary impulse, and having ceased in its own gratifi- 
cation, may not be discernible in the long and splendid 

6. Of what may we rest assured, though we are not always able 

to trace our suggestions to their origin ? 7. Why may we not 

attribute discoveries or acquirements to chance ? 8. What is 

remarked in illustration of this, respecting Newton and Watt? 

9. Why is it not expedient, if it be possible, to follow up the suc- 
cessions of thought to the wishes, which are tke key to the whole 
train of suggestion ? 



Less. 10. intellectual philosophy. 2t9 

train that followed. To seek for it, would be to seek for 
the acorn in the giant oak ; and even though we got it, it 
would be the consequent of some other train, of which 
there might be no suggestion to recall the existence, just 
as the acorn that produced one oak might be the fruit of 
some former oak of which we could find no trace. 

Mary. Then have we nothing to guide us toward those 
suggestions? 

Dr. Herbert. We have guides, both general and par- 
ticular, and those very unerring ones. May I ask you in 
what the trains of thought, that are, or lead to, the suggest- 
ed states of mind, consist ? 

Charles. Our former knowledge. 

Mary. You mean our former experience, for when that 
which is past in perception is not present in suggestion, it 
is not knowledge. 

Dr. Herbert. We must not refine too much. That 
which is knowledge is experience, and that which is expe- 
rience is knowledge, whether it be the knowledge of good 
or of evil. But whatever we may call it, how do we get it, 
and in what does it consist ? 

Edward. We get it by the use of our senses in observ- 
ing, in our education, and from those with whom we asso- 
ciate and converse ; from all that exists and happens around 
us ; from all that we hear and read ; from all that we do, 
or try to do, whether we succeed in our trial or not ; and 
from all that we think. 

Matilda. Not if we merely think of what we know be- 
fore, without making any addition or alteration. 

Mary. I should think that the recurrence of perfect 
similarity in the state of our minds must be very rare ; and 
that to a person who is much accustomed to think, a thought 
will hardly occur twice, without something new the second 
time. 

Charles. There may also be differences in the original 
powers of the minds of different individuals. 

Dr. Herbert, We are sometimes accustomed to say so, 
Charles; but as we have denied that there are any pow- 

10. With what example does the author illustrate this, and what 

is the process of his reasoning? 11. Have we any thing to 

guide us toward those suggestions ? 12. In what do the trains 

of thought, which are our guides, consist ? 13. Is there any 

material difference between the terms, knowledge and experience .'' 
14. But how do we get this knowledge or experience .'' 



220 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10. 

ers of the mind but the simple and indivisible mind itself, 
known to itself only by the states that it is in, and to others 
only by the actions to which its desires and emotions give 
rise, or by the spoken or written communications of lan^ 
guage ; and further, as we are entirely ignorant of it until 
it be educated, and know it afterwards only as it is edu- 
cated, and so can never be certain that the difference is 
in the education, of itself or by others ; we had better 
leave the subject of original difference out of consideration, 
as it would encumber, but could not assist us. Nay, even 
though the original difference were as well established 
as the difference between one who has had the advantages 
of education and good society, and one who has not, it 
would be of little avail for our purpose, as the practical ap- 
plication, the most valuable part of all philosophy, applies 
only to the mind as susceptible of improvement by culture 
and discipline. 

Mary. I can easily perceive that the field whence our 
suggestions must come, will be narrow or wide according 
to the extent of our knowledge, and more or less valuable 
according to the kind. To those ivho are mostly engaged 
about trifles, trifles will be suggested ; while those who are 
occupied about more important pursuits, will have more im- 
portant suggestions. 

Edward. As farmers think and talk about crops, and 
cattle, and rents ; sportsmen about guns and dogs ; and the 
music-master about harps, and piano-fortes, and tunes, and 
crotchets. 

Charles. And yet among persons of the very same 
profession, there are wonderful differences, even in the 
telling of the same story. I have heard the same story, 
all about carts and horses, from farmer Hobson's Peter, 
and from our William ; and while Peter made it so dull, 
that one could hardly have patience to listen to it, Wil- 
liam made it so amusing that we got him to tell it over 
again. 

15. How is the existence of the mind known to itself, and also to 
others ? 16. Why can we not decide whether the difference, ob- 
servable in the minds of persons, is original or arises from difference 

of education? 17. Why would it be of little practical use, if it 

were established, that there is an original difference of native talent? 

• According to what will be the field whence our suggestions 

come .? — What may you learn from a person's conversation ^ 



Less. 10. intellectual philosophy. 221 

Matilda, Between one book and another, too, though 
there should not be very much difference in the subjects of 
them, one meets with a wonderful difference in the manner. 
The one, even when it is mentioning some serious misfor- 
tune, does it in such a drawling manner that one can hard- 
ly keep awake : while the mere mention of a generous or 
kind action in another, will make one cry. 

Mary. And there are some in which I can run over the 
words, page after page, without thinking even of that which 
I read ; while there are ofliers which 1 must lay down at 
every other sentence, till I have followed out the train of 
thought, that a single, and, as it were, a passitig remark, 
has sugfrested. 

Dr, Herbert, There can be no question, that it is by 
falling in with those subjects and those trains of succession 
which are most familiar to us in suggestion, that one friend 
or one book is more agreeable to us than another.; and 
that which gives the grand charm to delightful companions 
and delightful books, is their being so copious and varied, 
and yet so brief and shadowy in their allusions, that they 
do not degrade us to mere listeners or readers, who have 
to be lectured, and who con by rote that which is set be- 
fore us ; but, as it were, touch the former trains of our 
own thoughts, and make us appear to bring from the store- 
house of our own minds, that very information which they 
are communicating to us for the first time. We have 
mentioned that attention, and wish, and ivill — the pre- 
cursors of our stronger emotions, are but desires, modified 
by the results of experience ; and thus the art of keep- 
ing up our attention, and stimulating us to thous^ht and 
action, consists principally in setting those desires ever in 
motion, and passing rapidly from one to the other. If we 
read a book, in which the mind, in a state of emotion, is 
well delineated; if we listen to a public speaker, who 
moulds his audience as he pleases ; or if we listen even 
to the humblest individual, when the emotions are up, and 
the mind is acronizing in sorrow, or exulting in joy, we 
find a wonderful similarity of manner in them all. In each 
case, the mind, awakened and aroused, and putting on 

18. Why is one book or one fi-iend more agreeable to us than 

another ? 19. What is it that gives the ^rand charm to dehght- 

ful companions and dehghtful books? 20. What are attention, 

wish, and will, defined to be ? 21. In what does the art of keep- 
ing up the attention and stimulating to thought consist ? 



222 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 10. 

those energies that do not belong even to the sagest pur- 
suit of knowledge, flings its desires over the whole field 
of its experience, and, ever and anon, as they alight, sug- 
gestion after suggestion starts up, with brilliant though mo- 
mentary effect, till the whole mind of the author, the orator, 
or the addresser, is set before us ; and till we, blending 
our desires with his, and catching suggestion from sug- 
gestion, become the admirers, the partakers, the subjects 
of his emotion, and aijsolutely taste a sweeter pleasure, 
or feel a more acute pain, than if we were the principal 
actors in that of whicli we are spectators, and merely mental 
spectators. 

Charles. Then, in order to give proper effect to our con- 
versation, or to any thing in which we address mankind, 
we ought so to regulate our language, and especially our 
explanations and illustrations, thai they may have as much 
resemblance as possible to those subjects of which they have 
previously had experience. 

/ir. Herbert. Most unquestionably, if we wish that 
men should know any thing new, vi'e must find out the 
association that should link it to some train of their for- 
mer knowledge ; and the only general guides that we have 
to that, are their general habits and modes of life. Those 
who have always been in the city, could not understand 
the illustrations that are best adapted for those who have 
been always in the -country; and it would be of no avail 
to address the man of fashion and frivolity, whose sub- 
jects and habits of thought vary with the fashions of his 
coat, in the set forms of those permanent truths that are 
familiar to the student and the philosopher. Upon this 
principle, we all dislike pedantry; and upon it, too, is 
founded that dislike or indifference which all persons of 
sense feel to the assertions of mere party politicians, the 
wranglings of mere disputants, the dogmas of obscure 
philosophers, and the Vv^it of those microscopic individuals 
tliat play the bear and fiddle to little societies, and clubs, 
and coteries. 



22. In case that the mind is remarkably interested in the delin- 
eation of emotion eitiier of sorrow or joj^, what is the process of its 

excitement? 23. What must we do if we wish to communicate 

information ? 24. Will the same address equally interest the 

mere man of fashion and the philosopher? 25. What does the 

principle, involved in the preceding answers, induce us to dishke ? 



Less. 10. intkllectual imiilosophy. 223 

Man/. And yet I should think, that if we followed the 
former experiences of others too closely, we should not bo 
able long to command their attention. The tediousness of 
a thrice-told tale is proverbial ; and the succession of three 
tales, with all of which one is equally familiar, would not 
be much better. 

Dr. Herbert. Your remark is just. The result of gen- 
eral experience seems to be, that when any one addresses 
us, we look for something new. That is the desire which 
forms our first attention, and calls us from our own train 
of thought, to listen to the speaker : and if it be not 
gratified in some way or other, it soon subsides, and we 
are again captivated by some suggestion of our own, and 
follow the train which that originates, till we not only lose 
the seuse and connexion of that w'hich is uttered by the 
speaker, but absolutely the sound of his voice, as articu- 
late, or any thing else than a continued and monotonous 
sound. 

Edward. I suppose that is the cause why many 
public speakers succeed in lulling their audiences asleep. 
There is nothing that puts one asleep sooner than a 
continued humming sound, to which we can attach no 
meaning. 

Charles. The portion of the past that is suggested, and 
the force of vividness with which the suggestion comes, 
must vary with the circumstances that we were in at the 
time when the original perception becomes a portion of our 
experience, and also with the circumstances that we are in 
at the time when it is suggested. This must make our 
suggestions vary with our years. 

Matilda. We have a proof of that in the old sexton ; he 
can tell very plainly about the people that lived, and the 
events that happened, fifty or sixty years ago, though he 
hardly knows what he himself has been saying or doing the 
preceding moment. 

Dr. Herbert. The modifications of suggestion that are 
produced in this way, certainly demand our consideration, 
before we can venture upon the enumeration of any partic- 
ular laws in the succession of that important operation, for 
certainly our suggestions are modified, both in nature and 

26. What is the desire which first induces us to listen to a speak- 
er ? 27. If this desire be not gratified, what consequence will 

follow ? 28. How must the portion of the past that is suijcjested, 

and the force or vividness, with which it is suggested, vary ? 



224 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 10. 

intensity, by our years. The child lives in the day or 
the hour ; it reflects little upon yesterday, and cares as 
little for to-morrow ; the youth thinks little of the past, 
and cares as little about the future : in the vigor of life 
we look barkvvard upon a long train of sequences, and for- 
ward upon a projected one of equal length ; and in the 
decrepitude of years, we not only become children again in 
our immediate thoughts and perceptions, but we revert to 
the suggestions of our childhood. Not only this, but time 
seems to shorten as our years lengthen. The single holiday 
of play, is an age of pleasure to the boy ; to the man, the 
time is barely enough for his cares or his studies ; and 
to the aged, evening seems to overtake morn, and the win- 
ter returns almost before the intervening summer has been 
feh. 

Mary, It is singular that this should be the case, and 
yet 1 i|el the days and weeks shorter than I did when I 
first remember. 

Dr. Herbert, When you have lived longer, the difTer- 
eiice will appear to be still greater ; and yet it is neither 
singular nor difficult to be explained. Young as you all are, 
do you not find some old people among the uneducated 
labourers, that run after, gaze at, and describe as wonders, 
things about which you do not give yourselves the least 
concern ? 

Charles. They do that because they are ignorant of 
many things about which we are informed. 

Dr. Herbert. And that is the solution of the whole mat- 
ter. We measure any thing that is new against the whole 
mass of our experience; and as the mass increases, any 
individual portion must appear less. The first step that 
tlie child takes in walking, is really, to it, as compared with 
its former experience, as mighty an event as any one will 
appear in after life, even though it should command a 
victorious army, ascend a throne, be a Shakespeare among 
poets, or a Newton among philosophers. Considering the 
single acquirement in comparison with the whole stock, 



29. With what variety do the passing scenes appear to the child, 

to the youth, to the middle aged, and to the old ? 30. Against 

what do we measure any thing that is new ? How must any in- 
dividual portion appear ? 31. How is the first step that the child 

takes in walking, compared with its former experience ? 



Less. II. intellectual philosophy. 225 

doubling the latter will rob the former of half its interest; 
and thus, though there were no natural decay in the mem- 
bers and senses of the body, there would be a gradual de- 
crease in the interest of our successive experiences. But 
there is such a decay ; and when it has made considera- 
ble progress, the influence of the present impression hardly 
produces a wish, far less any of those glowing emotions 
that give to childhood its delights, and to the vigour of life 
its power. For this reason, the recent experiences of the 
decayed do not return in suggestion, though they do oc- 
casionally call forth that which happened in their early 
years ; and as that happened at a time of vigorous impres- 
sions, and when in itself it formed a considerable portion of 
the whole stock of experience, the suggestion has a corres- 
ponding vividness. 

Mary. Is it this which makes people speak and write 
with such fond affection of old scenes and old friends, es- 
pecially the playmates of their youth ? 

Dr. Herbert. No question of it ; and if there has been 
no adverse circumstance to imbitter the scene, and ob- 
literate the friendship, the return will be the more dear, 
and give the more pleasure, in proportion as it has been 
the longer delayed, and as the perceptions and hopes 
of the party have been blunted to the present and the 
future. 

Charles. In this manner those who have, as it were, 
ceased to live in the present, learn to live in the past, and 
have their enjoyments in suggestion, after they have become 
almost dead to the enjoyments of the senses. 

Dr. Herbert, Nor is this the only instance in which 
we live and are happy in the past, while the present is all 
bitterness and misery, and there is little apparent expecta- 
tion in the future. In the very depths of misfortune — cast 
down from a state of high and uninterrupted prosperity — 
bereft of all — deserted by flatterers, who are the concomit- 
ants and the curses of prosperity — deserted even by friends, 

32. How do our successive experiences vary in interest ? 

33. What is remarked of the impressions in advanced lite ' 

34. Why do the impressions of early life return with more vigour 

than those of a few years or months previous ? 35. How will 

the pleasure be increased which we leel in the recollection of the 
scenes of early life ? 

20 



226 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. II, 

(for the friends that will perish for, or even with, a friend^ 
are found chiefly in fictions) — confined in a dungeon, with 
the poorest and the scantiest fare — or without any fare at 
all, and under the certain impression that he must soon fall 
a victim to the slow-consuming of want,. — even then, man 
is not utterly miserable ; for one single desire, thrown as it 
were at random, upon the apparent vacuity of experience, 
may awaken a suggestion there, which may make exist- 
ence more pleasant than if the individual were in the actual 
enjoyment ot prosperity; and the famished eye may close 
upon the world in tears of exultation, and the last breathing 
of the parched lip may be in thankfulness to Him who had 
made life so sweet. 

Matilda. Then, is suggestion, under all circumstances, 
a certain source of pleasure ? 

Dr. Herbert. That depends upon the trains of experi- 
ence that can be suggested. If we transgress those laws 
which experience teaches ; if we seize the wrong link of 
the chain, and pursue the error till it deviate into crime, 
we prepare for ourselves a torment, against the visitation 
of which we are never safe, and which, when it does come, 
is just as much proof against present circumstances as that 
happiness of which we have spoken. The guilty man may 
be seated on a throne ; may be surrounded by fortifications 
that are impregnable, and watched by guards that are in- 
vincible in power, and incorruptible in fidelity ; and he 
may have about him all the pleasures that art can invent, 
or desire covet ; and yet the barbed and poisoned arrow 
of suggestion may come, with a power that no shield can 
turn aside, and fasten, and rankle, with a stubbornness 
which nothing can remove or mitigate, and its grief may 
turn power into weakness, and pleasure into gall, till the lot 
of the meanest beggar at the door, or the most hopeless 
captive in the prison-house, may be felicity and joy in com- 
parison. Therefore, if we wish to be happy in the enjoy- 
ment of suggestion, we must take care that nothing of an 
opposite character can be suggested ; for no state of the 
mind can never be so utterly forgotten, that it may not 

36. What instance is supposed as a possible case, in which the 

mind may exult amidst extreme bitterness and misery r -37. Is 

suggestion, under all circumstances, a source of pleasure ? 38. 

How does the author illustrate this ? 39. In order to avoid such 

consequences^ what must we do? 40. Why can no state of 

mind be so forgotten as not to be suggested again ? 



Less. 11. intellectual philosophy. 227 

again be suggested ; because no state stands singly, but is 
connected with otlicr states, and may return in the con- 
nexion, 

Mary. There seems to be a power of suggestion about 
places. When I go into a particular room, I remember 
w liat 1 liad formerly done in that room ; and when I go 
round a house that I have formerly visited, the company 
that were then there, come quite fresh to my memory ; 
and I recollect, not only how many there were of them, and 
what they were like, but w^hat they said, and what they 
did. 

Dr, Herbert. There is no doubt that place, as you 
term it, is one of the principal circumstances upon which 
suggestion depends. This is strongly felt by those who 
have been long absent from the scenes of their early years. 
The adventurer — who for many years has been following 
fame or fortune in foreign climes, or coursing information 
round the globe, and has been, while there, engrossed 
with the ardours of the battle, the profits of the bargain, or 
the wonders of nature and the diversity of her productions 
— sees the white cliffs of Albion, w^ith a warmer pulse and 
^ more glowing expectation, than he felt towards any or 
all that he has encountered in his years of absence. As 
he comes nearer and nearer to the scenes of his childhood, 
suggestion after suggestion is poured upon him, till the 
'U'hole scene, to the minutest twig that he touched, or the 
least flower that arrested his infant notice, with all the peo- 
ple, engaged and busy as they then were, rise to his mind. 
And even though, as is often the case, the old be in their 
graves, the young scattered, strancrers in possession, and 
every thing altered, the very contrast seems to impress him 
more strongly with the remembrance of that which he en- 
joyed when life was young, and care a stranger. As man 
turns to the recollections of infancy as he decays; so it 
is probable that, if the continuity be not broken, he, in 
the moment of dissolution, turns to the place of his birth, 
longs to resign his breath at the spot w^here he received it, 
and, in the emphatic language of Holy Writ, be borne *^ to 
sleep with his fathers.'' 

Thus we see, that by far the greater part of our enjoy- 
ment, as rational beings, depends on this very suggestion ; 

41. What is a principal circumstance on which suggestion de- 
pends? 42. By whom is this most strongly felt? 43. What 

is the author's illustration.? 44. On what does most of our en- 
joyment depend ? 



228 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 11. 

we have seen that it must come from our past experience, 
though we may mould and fashion it anew ; we have seen 
that it will be modified both in quantity and in kind by our 
pursuits and habits ; and that the readiness with which it 
returns depends upon the vividness of the original percep- 
tion, and on certain considerations in time and place. Thus 
we have some vague, general notion of it : and so let us see 
whether we can narrow our consideration by finding out 
some more particular laws. 

Edward. On such a subject, I do not exactly know what 
we mean by **laws/^ 

Dr, Herbert. The laws of nature are certainly very 
different from the laws that man makes for his own govern- 
ment. A law of nature is nothing but the phenomena of 
nature, considered in the order in which we invariably find 
them ; and if we saw pieces of lead flying, without any pre- 
ceding phenomenon or event consequent to which we had 
previously seen them fly, or if we saw an oak loaded with 
apples, we would call these contrary to, or breaches of, the 
law of nature, merely because, in ordinary experience, lead 
cannot be removed from the ground without some previous 
event ; and oaks bear not apples, but acorns. In the same 
manner, when we speak of a law of suggestion, we mean 
nothing more than the phenomena, in that order of suc- 
cession to which we are accustomed. 

Charles. In the sense of the word, I think similarity 
or resemblance must be one law of suggestion ; — as a pic- 
ture suggests the original to us, or when we see one book 
or object of any kind, we are apt to think on other books, 
or objects of the same kind that we have seen formerly, or 
wished to see. 

Dr, Herbert. And must this similarity, on which sug- 
gestion depends, extend to the whole of the subjects of 
thought if they be, as most subjects of thought are, com- 
pound ? 

Mary, I should think not. Similarity in one quality, 
or even in one circumstance, may be a cause of suggestion, 

45. From what does this come ? 46. How is it modified ? 

47. On what does the readiness with which it returns, depend ? 

48. What is meant by the laws of nature? 49. Give the illus- 
tration. What do we mean when we speak of a law of sug- 
gestion ? 50. What is mentioned as a law of suggestion ?- 51. 

Must this similarity extend to the whole of the subjects of thought 
in order to have its effect ? 



Less. 11. intellectual niiLosopiiY. 229 

— as if I were to hear any other person called Charles, I 
should most likely think of my brotlier. 

Edward. But the more perfect the similarity were, the 
more forcible would be the sug^^^estion, — as if I were to see 
a little pony exactly like ours that was sold, in size, colour, 
and every thing, our pony would be more forcibly suggested 
to me than if I saw a little pony of the same size, but not 
of the same colour. 

Di\ Herbert, Then, as there may be different degrees 
of resemblance, let us consider what a few of them m vy be. 

Charles, Similarity in sound, must necessarily be one of 
them ; for if I heard any sound, which I had found from ex- 
perience to proceed from any [)articular body, as from a 
violin or a harp, 1 coiUd not hear it again without thinking 
of that instrument, even though the body that produced the 
second sound were ever so different. 

Dr. Herbert, There is not the least doabt tiiat resem- 
blance of sound is always a means of suggestion. We re- 
member verses better than we remember prose, because of 
the recurrence of the pause at corresponding parts of the 
lines : and we also remember rhyme more easily than 
blank verse, on account of the similarity of sound in the 
final syllables. The recurrence of the same letter in the 
same part of certain words, makes the one of these words 
suggest the other ; and thus alliteration in language, which 
is one of the simplest kinds of resemblance, is agreeable, 
when not carried to too great an extent. These simple re- 
semblances do not, however, please us long ; and, therefore, 
an alliteration, which is a source of pleasure for a line or 
two, becomes exceedingly tedious when extended over even 
a paragraph or a page. 

Mary. Resemblance in smell or taste will also suggest 
any former substance. If I taste any thing which, in that 
respect resembles honey, I cannot help thinking of honey ; 
and if I smell a perfume, resembling that of a rose, I can- 
not help thinking of roses, even though the perfume should 
be merely in a handkerchief that is scented with rose- 
water. 

Matilda. There is not any resemblance whatever, but 
which, from its appearance in an object with which I am 

52. What is remarked respecting the resemblance of sound ? 

53. What will be the effect of any resemblance which we may dis- 
cover in an object, with which we are not familiar ^ 

20* 



230 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. ll. 

less familiar, will suggest to me some former object which 
I have known better. Any single quality, or appearance, 
or application, or use, even though all the rest may be to- 
tally different, will recall the former object to my mind. 

Charles. It is even more extensive than that. An India 
handkerchief will suggest to me all that I ever have read 
of the history and description of India ; and the mere sight 
of a little square of spotted cloth will enable me to see not 
only the simple Indian erecting his loom under the tree, 
and performing his labour; but send me a tour along the 
banks of the Ganges, enable me to look upon the wonders 
of Elephanta, or Elora, or enable me, in imagination, to 
cross the ridge of the Himaleh, and even traverse, in my 
mind, those countries of Central Asia w^hich no traveller 
has ever described. 

Edward. The resemblance of use, too, will suggest 
other things that are used for a like purpose. I cannot read 
of the chop sticks of the Chinese without thinking of knives 
and forks; of the stone hatchets of the South Sea islanders, 
without thinking of our axes and saws of iron ; or of any 
thing which is used for any purpose, without thinking of all 
other things, that I have fbrmierly seen, or been inibrmed 
of, as used for the same. 

Mary, In like manner, any object whicii resembles 
another that we have seen or thought of, as connected with 
or close beside a third, may suggest that third, or any other 
quality or circumstance connected with that third, without 
any apparent reference to that in which the similarity con- 
sists. Thus, a piece of stuff of the same color and pat- 
tern as that which a friend wore, when telling me a pleas- 
ant story, or playing a tune, or painting a landscape, will 
suggest the friend, or even the story, the tune, or the 
landscape ; and it will do this though the stuff be worn by 
a person every way unlike my friend, or even if it be dry- 
ing on a hedge, or in a web, and not made into a dress 
at all. 

Matilda. Any thing that we can consider as likeness, 
whether it be to that which one has actually perceived, to 

54. What is remarked respecting the effect of any single quality, 
or appearance, or application, or use ? 55. What might the In- 
dia handkerchief suggest to one acquainted with the history, man- 
ners and customs of India ? 56. What is remarked respecting 

the resemblance of use? 57. Under what circumstances may a 

piece of stuff suggest to us a story, or tune, or landscape ? 



Less. 11. intellectual philosopiiv. 231 

that which one has only thought of, or to that which one 
has dreamed of, will be suggested by another instance of 
the likeness, in perception, in thought, or in a dream. 

Charles. And it is not necessary that the suggested 
and the suggesting states should be both perceptions, both 
waking thoughts, or both dreams ; for if there be but 
the similarity, any one of these may suggest any of the 
others. 

Dr. Herbert. This reciprocity of suggestion between 
the actual perception of objects and events, and the mere 
mental conception of them, whether waking or in dreams, 
enables us to see how those last shadowy states of the mind 
are apt to impose themselves upon us as realities ; and when 
that illusion is coupled with the other consideration, equal- 
ly illusive, but still very general, that there is some myste- 
rious destiny intermediate between the antecedent and the 
consequent, whicii links them together, the belief in the 
reality of dreams,* as having a fulfilment, is by no means 
uncommon, even among persons who are by no means 
credulous in other matters. 

Mary, i think 1 can partly understand the reason of 
that. The dream could only be remembered, that is, sug- 
gested, by the recurrence of some state of mind, in percep- 
tion or in conception, that had a resemblance to the dream 
itself. If that state were a m.ere conception, we would 
only remember the dream as a dream ; but if it were a per- 
ception of external objects or occurrences, the mere fact 
of the dream being brought to the mind in immediate con- 
nexion with the real object or occurrence, would make it 
by no means unnatural to regard the one as a fulfilment of 
the other. 

Dr. Herbert. There is a good deal of justness in what 
you say ; and it becomes the more apparent when we con- 
sider that a real perception will never suggest the remem- 



*'' Dreams form a considerable part of our intellectual ex- 
])eriences, and all the knowledge of them which we acquiro 
is an accession to our knowledge of the principles of the mind 
in general." 

58. Why do dreams and reveries often impose themselves upon 

us as realities?. 59. Why have p<jople believed in the reality of 

dreams as having a fulfilment? What knowledge viay we acquire 

by an attention to dreams 7 60. What i» necessary in order that 

a real perception may suggest the remembrance of an antecedent 
dream ? 



232 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 11. 

brance of an antecedent dream, unless there be between 
them the same sort of resemblance, or other cause of sug- 
gestion, which would have made the perception of one re- 
ality suggest the resemblance of a former reality. If this 
were not the case, there would be no order in the succes- 
sion of our suggestions, and the past would be a mere 
chaos, from which we could borrow nothing that would be 
of any use to us in the regulation of the future. We must 
constantly bear in mind, that in successions, whether of 
external or of mental states, there is no knowledge in time, 
but the knowledge of the mere uniformity, closeness and 
constancy, of a recurrence of the same state following 
a preceding state, which was also the same ; and that, con- 
sequently, whether we speak of dreams, or waking thoughts, 
or the sensible perception of present objects, we must be 
very careful to confine ourselves to the mere succession, 
and not to fancy any imaginary connexion farther than we 
can know. 

Charles. Then, bearing this in mind, in every case 
where the remembrance of a dream is suggested by an ex- 
ternal object or event, there is a fulfilment of the dream. 

Dr. Herbert. Unquestionably there is, in as far as the 
resemblance between the suggesting and the suggested state 
is complete ; but both of these may be very complicated — 
consist of even thousands of parts, each of which connects 
itself with thousands of other successive states of mind : 
and there may be a suggestion arising from resemblance in 
a single point. Then, if the impression made by the for- 
mer state, whether that state was dreaming or reality, has 
been strong, it, in all its complicated parts, will recur to the 
mind, to the exclusion of the other complex state, which 
was altogether dissimilar, except in the single associating 
point, and thus, while the reality is a fulfilment only in that 
point, the dream itself recurs and becomes its own fulfilment 
in all the remainder. 

Edtvard. But if 1 shall have dreamed, that a man, 
dressed in a green coat, and riding on a white horse, ar- 
rived at a certain hour of the day, and if at any time 

61. Under what circumstances would the past be a mere chaos, 

and consequently useless to us ? 62. What must we constantly 

bear in mind in respect to the successions of external or mental 

states ? 63. If the impression made by a former state of mind be 

strong, whether that state was dreaming or reality, what will be the 
consequence .-' 



Less. 11. intellectual philosophy. 233 

afterwards, a man so dressed and mounted does arrive at 
the same hour, then that will be an exact fulfilment of the 
dream. 

Dr, Herbert. No doubt it will ; but it does not follow 
that the state of mind which suggested to you in sleep the 
supposed perception of the arrival of the horseman, had any 
connexion with, that is, belonged in any way to, the same 
succession of mental states which, as successive causes and 
effects, were antecedent to the arrival of the horseman — un- 
less, in consequence of your having dreamed it, you should 
have ordered the horseman to come at the time ; and then 
the whole matter would have ceased to be a dream, and be- 
longed to the ordinary course of events. Without this, you 
can easily see that the knowledge in the succession of 
states happening as causes and effects, which ended in the 
man's arrival, were not states of your mind at all, but states 
of that of the man himself, or of him and the party whose 
order he obeyed in coming ; and that, therefore, before you 
could establish any order of succession between the dream 
or the uncommunicated thought of one human being and 
another, you would require to establish between their 
minds a sort of mysterious intercourse, of which the exist- 
ence is denied in the very supposition ; or you would 
have to give them only one mind between the two, which 
would be a virtual denial of the oneness and identity of each 
of them, and a consequent denial of both their mental 
existences. 

Mary. I think I can understand that. The internal 
affections of the mind must arise from former states of that 
identical mind, and not directly from things externally per- 
ceived, or in any way from trains of thought that may have 
passed, or have been passing, in the minds of others, un- 
less they have been communicated in language, and then 
they would have presented themselves to the mind to which 
they were communicated, as external perceptions, and 
differing from the sensible perception of the objects to which 
they related, only as they describe those objects more or 
less clearly. 

64. Can it be supposed, that the state of mind, which suggests 
any particular dream, can have any connexion wiih what is called 
its fulfilment ? G5. But if there be such a connexion, what ab- 
surdity would it involve ? QQ>. From what must internal afFec» 

lions of the mind arise, and from what must they not arise ? 



2S4 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. II. 

Dr. Herbert. Undoubtedly : for, though we are accus- 
tomed to imagine that there is some connexion between 
existences that are similar, we can discover no connexion 
whatever, save mexQ juxtaposition in space, or succession in 
time ; and therefore the mind of one man is just as much 
external of the mind of another man, as the body of another 
man, or the earth, or the universe. Indeed it is more so, 
for we can come at the knowledge of another man's body, 
at a knowledge of the earth, and at a knowledge of every 
perceptible object in the universe, by our own mental per- 
ception, without any other mind aiding in it, or consenting 
to it ; but with regard to the mind of another man, of 
which we can know nothing as existing in space, we must 
remain forever ignorant, unless it shall please him to com- 
municate with us ; and even then, he can only communicate 
with us through subjects of external perception^ or the 
representations of those subjects, embodied, as it were, in 
language. 

Charles. Besides, similarity, or resemblance, in all the 
varieties in which it can exist or be perceived, is not near- 
ness both in place or in time, a likely cause of suggestion ; 
as that the thought of our church should suggest that of 
the yew-tree in our church-yard, rather than any yew-tree 
in another place ; or that my walking out into the field 
after reading a particular book, should suggest to me what 
was contained in that book, rather than a book which I 
had been reading, or any thing else that I had been doing 
formerly. 

Dr. Herbert. Proximity or nearness^ both in place and 
in time, is not only one means of suggestion ; but it is, in 
all probability, the only original means to which even like- 
ness in all its varieties could be referred. The perception 
of likeness, is not a primary state of the mind, but a second- 
ary state, arising from the comparison of the two subjects 
in which the likeness is found ; and though the mental 
transition from the state of knowing one subject to the state 
of finding a resemblance to another, be so rapid that the 
two states appear as one, on subjects with which we are 

67. What kind of a cnnnexion must that be, which takes place 
between existences which are similar? 68. What tlierefore fol- 
lows as the consequence ? 69. What is remarked of proximity, 

or nearness, as a means of suggestion? 70. How is it evident, 

that the perception of likeness is not a primary, but a secondary state 
oi mind ? 



Less. 11. intellectual piiilosopiiy. 235 

very familiar, yet there must be a knowledge of each of the 
subjects compared, anterior to tiie comparison : we must 
see the picture, before we can say that it is like the original, 
and we must hear some part of the succession of notes in 
an air, before w^e can take upon us to say that it is the 
same air to which we had formcily given a particular name, 
or which we had formerly heard played on a particular in- 
strument. 

Edward. Then the suggestions that arise from resem- 
blance, are not so properly simple suggestions, as sugges- 
tions of relation ? 

Dr. Herbert. We must guard against mistakes here, 
Edward. If you bear in mind, we formerly came to the 
conclusion, that the knowledge of every thing external is 
the result of comparison ; the smallest measurable distance 
is a comparison of successive points, or smaller distances ; 
and, in like manner, every thing to which we attribute any 
one property, as extended in space, or any two momentary 
states, as continued in duration, is known to us by a com- 
parison of the state of our own minds, as conscious of these 
in the succession ; and that between the original concep- 
tion of continuity in space, and continuity in succession, 
there is so very little difference, that, in every language, 
almost all the words that relate to the modification of one 
of these extensions, are perfectly understood without any 
verbal explanation, when applied to the other. As when 
we say a long road, and a long day, the notion of succes- 
sion of portions is contained in each, and the word in the 
one case is just as descriptive of a number of successive 
steps, as it is in the other of the number of successive sec- 
onds, during which these steps are taken. Therefore the 
difference between a simple suggestion and a relative sug- 
gestion does not consist in the one being immediate, and not 
the resultofany operation of comparison, and the other sez- 
ondary, and the result of such an operation ; for they are 
both founded on experience, wliich is only another name 
for comparison, and reasoning is only another name for 
that. But in simple suggestion we refer to the state of 

71. Of what is the knowledge of every thing external the result? 

72. How do we come to a knowledge of distance and duration.^ 

73. What is remarked respectin<^ the difference between sim- 
ple suggestion and relative suggestion 1 74. On what are 

they both founded .' 75. To what do we refer in simple sugges- 
tion } 



236 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 11. 

the mind as perceiving or conceiving the subject itself ; and 
in relative suggestion, we consider its state as contemplat- 
ing or conceiving the relation, not exclusively of the sub- 
jects of which it is a relation, but superior, and, as it were, 
secondary and successive, to our consideration of them. It 
is not easy to detach the one of these modes of a suggestion 
from the other, in any continued train of thought, because, 
in the very progress of that train, there arises a relative sug- 
gestion, contemplating, as it were, the relation of the differ- 
ent subjects or portions, of which the succession is made 
up. Thus, when we think of successive phenomena, of 
bringing a horse out of the stable, mounting it, and riding 
away, there is, between the horse standing quietly in the 
stable, the horse standing still at the door, the riding, get- 
ting on his back, and the trotting away, a certain relation 
that the mind perceives between every two, as being in the 
succession of cause and effect ; and there is a second sug- 
gestion of relation, which, though they were subdivided in- 
to ever so many smaller portions in the separate acts, 
unites them all together as the commencement of a ride ; 
a third one, which connects that ride with the story of a 
life; and a fourth, which connects that life with all time. 
Hence, the affection of relative suggestion is that which 
supplies to us the want of what the illiterate are constantly 
seeking, but which they never find, because they will not 
seek it here, where alone it is to be found — a connexion 
between successive events, which shall be different from 
all those events themselves — that is, in other words, some- 
thing mysterious existing in the universe, in addition to all 
that can by possibility exist in it. 

Mary. I think I have felt another cause of suggestion, 
which does not arise from similarity, or, so far as I can see, 
from proximity, either in space or in time. It is now nearly 
two years since I saw the stately buildings of York Minster ; 
and yet I can hardly look at our little church, without 
thinking of them, though, instead of there being any like- 
ness, they are an absolute contrast to each other. - 

Edward. They are both places of worship, though, Mary, 
and that is one resemblance between them ; and the one 

76. How do we consider the state of the mind in relative sugges- 
tion ? 77. Why is it not easy to detach one of those modes from 

the other ? 78. Give the example introduced for illustration. 

79. What does the affection oi relative suggestion supply to 

us.? 



Less. 11. intellectual philosophy. 237 

might be considered as suggesting the other from similar- 
ity of use. 

Dr. Herbert. So it might, in that particular instance ; 
but there are cases, in which objects that are, to every sense 
and for every purpose of utility, the very opposites of each 
other, and yet the perception or the conception of any one 
of them is immediately followed by that of the other.* A 
mind accustomed to reflection, can hardly look upon the 
pomp of kings, without tlie suggestion of the misery of cap- 
tives following close upon it ; neither can a mind so habit- 
uated, think of the luxury of the wealthy, without the pri- 
vations of the poor darkening the brighter picture like a 
shadow. In these cases, too, the greater the contrast is, 
the more readily does the suggestion arise. The percep- 
tion of a mite, makes me think more readily of that of an 
elephant or a planet, than the perception of a sheep or a 
tree ; and when we see a person of extreme corpulence, 
we are much more apt to think of skeleton exhaustion, than 
in the perception of a whole crowd of people in the ordina- 
ry condition of body.t 

Matilda. Even in the most dissimilar things, such as 
the mite and the elephant, there is, I think, a likeness or 
a resemblance, not in themselves, but in the states of mind 
to which the thou'^ht of them immediately leads. We won- 
der at the great size of the elephant ; and we also wonder 
at the great activity and perfect formation of so little a thing 
as a mite; and I should think, that if similarity in objects 



* " A ship tossed about in a storm, makes the spectator re- 
flect upon his own case and security." 

'• The opinion a man forms of his present distress is height- 
ened by contrasting it with his former happiness. 

Could I forget 
What I have been, I might the better bear 
What I am destined to. I'm not the first 
That have been wretched ; but to think how much 
I have been happier I" ^ 

t Payne thus arranges the laws of suggestion. 

1. Resemblance. 2. Contrast. 3. Contiguity. 

80. What is remarked respecting the influence of objects, which 

are the very opposite of each other, in producing suggestions? 

How are the laws of suggestion arranged by Mr, Payne P 

21 



238 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS, 1L 

be a cause of suggestion, so must similarity in the states of 
our mind, as produced by the co^itemplation of those objects. 

Dr. Herbert. You are perfectly right, Matilda : or, 
rather, the similarity, considered as a portion of intellectual 
philosophy, is similarity of states of the mind, and of noth- 
ing else. We say that the one hand is like the other, just 
because we are conscious of no difference in the state of the 
mind, contemplating the one and contemplating the other; 
and if there were a difference in the state of the mind while 
so contemplating, there would either, of necessity, be a 
corresponding difference in the subjects contemplated, or 
else the mind would be incapable of drawing any certain 
conclusions as to similarity or dissimilarity in the objects of 
its perception. 

Mary. Then from this it will follow, that not our merely 
intellectual states — those in which we simply know, with- 
out having our feelings interested in the objects of our 
knowledge — but in all the varied states of our feelings, in 
pleasure and pain, in joy and sorrow, in satisfaction and in 
anger, and in every emotion of which we are susceptible, 
similarity of emotion will be a cause of suggestion. 

Dr. Herbert. No doubt it is ; and as our emotions are 
those portions of our mental existence which, as it were, 
come the most home to us, make the most vivid, and, for 
that reason, the most lasting impressions upon us, the sug- 
gestions of emotion are in all probability much more fre- 
quent than the suggestions of mere knowledge. Not only 
are they probably much more frequent in every mind, than 
the suggestions of the other class, but we have every reason 
to conclude, that, in very many minds, they form the great- 
er portion of mental recollection, and in some minds near- 
ly the whole of it. To those who are under the necessity 
of toiling w^ith only intervals of refreshment or sleep, at 
laborious occupations, in which there is little to excite the 
desire of knowledge, — to those, for instance, who watch 
the spindles in a cotton manufactory, turn a potter's wheel, 
carry burthens, or move commodities from one place to 
another — nay, even those who are continually occupied in 

81. What is similarity, in reference to intellectual philosophy? 

. 82. Give the illustration. 83. How do the suggjestions of 

emotion and those of mere knowledge compare in regard to fre- 
quency ^ 84" With what classes of persons do they form the 

greater portion of mental recollection.'' Why do not such 



Less. II. intellectual philosophy. 239 

couiuing sums of money, or in any otlier way, in which 
number, or some consideration as simple as number, is 
the only thing to which they have to attend, in addition 
to the feeding and preservation of their bodies, — to those 
we cannot suppose that the suggestions of a purely in- 
tellectual kind, and having no reference to feeling or emo- 
tion, can be very many ; because there is little experience 
of an intellectual description from which suggestion can 
arise ; and ^ve have seen that the accumulated knowledge 
of the individual is the only stock from which suggestion 
can be drawn. 

Charles. But persons of this description will be limited 
also in the range of their feelings, because they will be ig- 
norant of many of those situations in life and occurrences 
in history, that are, to those who are acquainted with them, 
sources of very powerful emotions. 

Dr. Herbert. Still, though they cannot have those sec- 
ondary emotions which belong to what are, in well cultivat- 
ed society, called feeling minds, — though they cannot, by 
analogy, feel in the feelings of others, as observed, or as 
recounted, because they are not in possession of the obser- 
vation, or the tale, — they will feel for themselves in the 
range, at least, of their animal enjoyments ; and as their 
suggestions will be more exclusively confined to these, their 
recurrence will be the more frequent, the more strong, and 
the more satisfactory. The hope of a holiday will cheer a 
schoolboy during the study of a week ; the humble meal 
that he is to eat, or the equally humble couch on which he 
is to rest, may as one continuous suggestion, support the 
labourer in the very extreme of toil ; and the single thought 
that he shall again set his foot upon his native soil, may 
sustain the heart of the mariner, during the long, laborious, 
and, it may be, disastrous months, in which he is circum- 
navigating the globe. 

Thus we see, that while our experience is the only 
quarter from which suggestions or internal affections of the 
mind can arise ; and while the mode of their arising is a 
succession that can be known only by experience, and must 
vary with the experience of each particular individual ; 

persons have suggestions of a purely intellectual nature ? 85- 

To what are the feelings of this class confined, and what is 

remarked of their frequency? 8G. Give the illustration 

87. What must there be in the past conduct of every individ- 
ual ? 



240 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. II. 

there must be that in the past conduct of every individual, 
which stamps upon him that which we call his character, 
whether in reference to what he knows, or has the facuUy 
of knowing, or to what he does, or has the ability of doing. 
Consequently, it is by a careful observation and analysis of 
this same process of suggestion, in all its varied trains, 
that we are to seek the knowledge of others, and, what is 
more important, the knowledge of ourselves, in such a 
way as to be able to form a rational judgment how they, 
or how we, would conduct ourselves in any circumstance 
under which we could imagine them or us to be placed. 
In this consists the whole science of government, whether 
of ourselves or of our fellow-creatures ; and our conclu- 
sion with regard to those results or successions o^ knowing 
or of acting^ that have not yet taken place, will be valua- 
ble only in proportion as our experience of the past is ac- 
curate and extensive, and as our faculty of suggestion 
from it is ready, or, as it were, at the command of our de- 
sires. Now, as these two branches of this important 
knowledge — which it is convenient to make, and give 
names to, in order that we may understand the whole 
matter, just as we measure a continuous field by yards and 
poles, or anatomize an animal structure, muscle by muscle, 
and bone by bone, in order to obtain a knowledge of the 
whole as one compound external existence — are them- 
selves but other names for certain portions or certain modes 
in the succession of the very knowledge of which we per- 
suade ourselves they are the means of obtaining ; our 
whole study is narrowed to the simple operation of observ- 
ing carefully those objects that present themselves to our 
senses, in themselves, singly, in all their parts and qualities, 
and in all their relations to other objects, whether in 
space or in time ; and in the same manner observing, when 
our past experience returns to the mind, more vividly and 
more at our wish than another, what were the circumstances 
o^ accompaniment, succession, or duration, i\\''\i gave us a 
power over that experience which we do not possess over 
others. 

88. How can we best obtain a knowledge of the characters of 

others, and also of ourselves ? 89. What science is dependent 

on this knowledg;e of character ? 90. In what proportion are 

our conclusions, with regard to future contingences, valuable I— — 

91. To what may our whole study be reduced ? 92. But what 

further ought we to observe in the same manner ? 



Less. 11. intellectual philosophy. 241 

The results of this latter inquiry would no doubt be many, 
because the readiness and (\icility with which we remember 
different portions of experience, which were, as to exter- 
nal things, in the first perception of them, precisely the 
same, and varied almost without end. Thus the detail 
must be left to every individual : and all that we can notice 
is one or two circumstances of a general nature ; nor have 
I any doubt that some have already suggested themselves to 
you. 

Edward, I can think of one. If I look a long time at 
any object, as a tree, or a picture, I can recollect it much 
more easily than if 1 got a casual glance of it ; and I can 
go to a place where I have been very frequently, though it 
be dark, as if I felt the way to it with my feet. 

Cliarles, Another circumstance that will assist us in 
suggestion, is the frequency of observing two or more sub- 
jects of thought in the same order of place, or the same 
succession of time : — as a person who had been constant- 
ly in the habit of seeing horses in ploughs and carts, but 
had only once seen a horse rode or drawing a carriage, 
would have carts and ploughs suggested to him by the con- 
ception of horses, much more readily than horsemen and 
carriages. 

Dr. Herbert. There is no doubt of the fact in either of 
these cases, nor is there any difficulty in the understand- 
ing of it. A longer observation is neither less nor more 
than a greater number of experiences, arranged in the very 
way in which experience becomes knowledge at all — that 
is, in immediate and unbroken succession ; and a series of 
repetitions of the same succession of subjects in time or in 
space, is again nothing more than a repetition of the in- 
tuitive experience of cause and effect — the only circum- 
stance, again, by which our belief in the certainty of the 
same succession can be confirmed. From this we may 
derive some very valuable hints for the obtaining of what 
is called an artificial memory ; tor if we couple that which 
we wish to recollect several times in close juxtaposition 

93. Why would the results of this inquiry be many ? What 

two modes of suggestion are mentioned ? 94. Why does the con- 
tinued observation of an object, or the frequency of observing objects 
in the same order of place or succession of time, assist us in sugges- 
tion ? 95. What hints may we derive from this ? and in what 

manner assist our recollection '? 

21* 



242 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 11. 

with that which we know we recollect well before, we shall 
not in any way impair the recollection of what we remem- 
bered, but we shall effectually remember that which, with- 
out such an association, we should have been in danger of 
forgetting. 

Mary, I should suppose that any state of mind would be 
apt to return in suggestion more readily, if it had been, in 
a former instance, accompanied by feelings that were more 
keen and lively ; as I have a more ready recollection of the 
little boy that fell in the pond, and was nearly drowned, 
than I have of the folks that took him out. 

Matilda. I should think, too, that if I had very recently 
met with the same series of objects or succession of events,^ 
the recurrence of any one of them would more naturally 
suggest any of the others, than if the occurrence had been 
more distant; and more especially than if I had found the 
suggesting object or event in a different connexion during 
the intermediate time. 

/>r. Herbert. Of neither of these can there be any 
doubt. If we can couple any object or event whatever with 
strong feeling, it will return far more easily, and far more 
vividly, than if it were suggested only as a subject of calm 
contemplation ; and though the feeling may not be to us 
personally, or though there may be personal danger to no 
human being in that by which the mind is excited, still the 
very excitement will iji itself heighten every object and 
every event with which it can be connected. An eclipse 
of the sun or moon harms nobody, and, so far as we learn, 
interrupts not one of the general motions of the solar sys- 
tem, or the particular motion of any of its individual parts, 
farther than the interruption of a certain portion of solar 
light, that would otherwise fall upon the earth ; and yet 
when we look back to the page of history, we find, that, 
setting aside altogether the mysterious influence which 
was attributed to the uncomprehended conjunction of the 
two luminaries, eclipses have become the artificial memo- 
ries of other, and, in themselves, for more important events, 
which, but for the eclipses, would have gone out of re- 
membrance. 

96. If the observation of the same series of objects or succession 
of events, should recentiy have occurred, what will be the effect on 

suggestion ? 97. If an object or event be connected with strong 

feeling, how will it return ? 98. What is remarked respecting 

the recollection of events by the means of eclipses ? 



Less. 11. intellectual piiilosopiiy. 243 

Charles. Independently oftliese, I should suppose that 
people who are differently educated, have different disj)()si- 
lions, and follow different occupations, must not only have 
the subjects of their suggestions varied, but must have their 
general acuteness of suggestion modified by the difference 
of their circumstances. 

Dr. Herbert. There can be no question tliat these, and 
all circumstances that tend to vary the experience of indi- 
viduals, must, to the full extent of the variation, modify 
both the individual suggestions, and that succession of them 
to which, if we mean by it nothing els^e than the mind ex- 
isting in certain states, we may give the name of the /acwZ- 
ty of suggestion- We can hardly meet with two individ- 
uals, in whom there are not gr-eat differences, both as to 
quantity and as to quality ; as to quantity, in proportion as 
their observation has been extensive or limited, careful or 
listless ; and in quality in pro[)ortion as their wish has been 
merely to grasp at that which was old, or to mould it into 
something new. 

So remarkable is the difference in the latter respect, that 
in consequence of it, mankind have been distinguished into 
two classes, — the dull and the inspired, — men of fact and 
menof fancy ; and it has been supposed that those classes, 
(who are so different from each other in their phenomena, 
and also in the effects that they produce in the general 
train of human thinking or acting,) arise from certain spe- 
cific and original differences, either in the minds themselves, 
or in the state and structure of the organs of external per- 
ception, — which, as we have said, are not allocated to what 
are generally termed the organs of the senses, but extend, 
(in the feeling of external or internal resistance, as oppos- 
ing its motion, or disturbing its position,) to every sentient 
particle of the body. 

Now, though we know nothing about the mind, farther 
than the states that it is in — that is, the very differences 
which make one man dull and another fanciful — we can 
come to no conclusion with reference to an original differ- 
ence ; and where it is impossible to know, it would be 

99. What must be the effect of the circuniistances, that tend to 

vary the experience of individuals? 100. What is remarked in 

regard to the differences in this respect among individuals? 

101. Into what two classes has this difference distinguished 
mankind r 102. From what has it been supposed that these class- 
es arise ? 



244 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 1 I. 

folly to inquire. But we do find in the variations of the 
general tone and feeling of the body itself, as induced by 
changes of weather, changes of health, changes of for- 
tune, changes of occupation, changes of hope, changes 
of fear, and every variety to which it can be exposed, ex- 
ternally or internally, suggestions having certain resenn- 
blances to each other, which come in trains. The body 
which is in the buoyancy of health, sees nature around it 
all spring and elasticity — when to us there is no pain and 
no restraint, we feel that all is healthy and all is free. In 
like manner, the mind which is exulting in joy, be that 
joy what kind soever it may, flings its own magical color- 
ing every where about it, till, to it, pain and sorrow are 
for the time annihilated, and the world is one general ju- 
bilee of thanksgiving and gladness. On the other hand, 
if the frame is feeble, or racked with pain, the movements 
of nature seem to us to become heavy ; and the sun will 
not go down, or the dog-star arise, upon the sick man's 
pillow, with half the celerity as upon the pillow of him who 
is in health. We say that man is the creature of circum- 
stances, and so saying, we believe that we are accurate in 
the definition ; but though true, it is not close enough — 
man is not the child of circumstances, for in as far as he 
is a mental and a conscious being, he is those very circum- 
stances themselves, not moulded by them ; for they are 
to him the world. 

Mary. But I have often read of, and I think I have my- 
self, to a certain extent, noticed a difference between mem- 
ory and imagination ; and I have heard it remarked, that 
a very perfect memory of minute parts and occurrences, is 
not consistent with the exercise of that fancy which can 
please us by the novelty and the brilliance of its creations. 
Pope says : — 

'* Wits have short memories." 

Edward. So he does, Mary ; but he adds, in the very 

same line, 

" And dunces none." 



103. What do we find in the variations of the general tone and 

feeling of the body itself? 104. How do the^ objects about us 

appear, when the mind is exulting in joy ? 105. On the other 

hand, when the frame is feeble, or racked with pain, what appear- 
ances present themselves r 106. What is meant when it is said 

that man is the creature of circumstances ^ 



Less. 11. intellectual philosophy. 245 

So that if we arc t() take him as our authority, the dull fellows 
will not he (Treat gainers, even in mere memory. 

Dr. Herbert. Pope was a wit, hiniself; and, therefore, 
if his own definition of the memory of wits be correct, it 
excludes himself from the portion of reu^embrance which 
would be necessary for collecting all the elements from 
which so nice a conclusion could be drawn. Still there is 
no doubt that there is a remarkable difference, and that too, 
in the very respects that have been mentioned. Tiiey who 
never imagine, and hardly ever reason or compare, so as, 
out of two or more previous states of mind, to invent, as 
it were a third one, can repeat what they have seen or 
been told, with much more fidelity than those whose every 
expression gives a new colour, and even a new charm to 
that with which the hearer was formerly familiar. These 
differences, however, arise from the general mental habit 
of the parties. The one simply retails that which was 
formerly perceived by himself, or others ; and is, as it 
were, a mere pipe for the communication of knowledge. 
The other is constantly casting about for resemblances 
between subjects that are, even in their general aspects, 
wholly different : and the result of this is badinage, or 
wit, or poetry, or eloquence, according to the importance 
of the chains of succession to which tlie assimilated objects 
belong. If it be merely an unexpected coincidence of 
sound, or any other similarity, without a general corres- 
pondence, that can magnify either object, or lead to a 
train of continued discovery or emotion^ it is a mere pun. 
As when we ask the difference between '* a chestnut horse," 
and "a horse chestnut," the perfect correspondence of the 
words, to a very letter, the total dissimilarity of the ob- 
jects, and the utter impossibility of connecting the discov- 
ery of this incongruity with any reasoning, or any emo- 
tion, occasions a momentary laugh, much in the same 
way as we feel disposed to laugh at a human being in a 
situation which is alarming to him, without the smallest 
possibility of real danger, or at a caricature, in which 
enough of human figure is left to form a slight association, 

107. Is the memory of minute parts and occurrences often found 

in the person, who has a good imagination ? 108. From what 

do these intellectual (iifferences arise ? 109. And what are the 

mental habits of each .^ 110. What is the result of the latter 

habit? 111. What is the foundation of that species of wit called 

punning? Are puns permanent in their effect.^ 



246 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 11, 

and yet not so much as to make similarity perceptible in 
any one lineament. 

This discordant resemblance, the perception of which 
lasts only for a moment, is the foundation of that small 
species of wit which is called punning, and which is the 
occupation and business of wits of the very lowest order 
and most limited minds, and the occasional play of those 
that are of a more capacious and intellectual description. 
When addressed to the ear, it is usually called a pun ; but 
the momentary merriment that is produced by a ludicrous 
situation, or a whimsical picture, is of the very same de- 
scription. 

If, along with the unmixed absurdity which forms the es- 
sential characteristic of the pun, there be a moral maxim, 
or lesson of information of any kind, blended, so that the 
ludicrous comparison is more valuable for what it suggests 
than for w^hat it is in itself, it becomes genuine wit ; and 
though the real value of it consists in the information, the 
impression made by that is rendered more vivid, and the 
after suggestion of it more easy, by the excitement produced 
by that which, without the information, would have pro- 
duced only a momentary laugh. 

In proportion as the resemblance becomes more perfect 
and striking, the mere surprise and momentary amusement 
gives place to more prolonged emotions; and the train of 
tliought, the communication of which produces those emo- 
tions in the hearer, or imparts them to the thinker, be- 
comes poetry and eloquence, through all their varieties ; 
the comparisons being metaphors, similes, or allegories, 
chiefly according as they are more brief or more protracted 
in duration. The metaphor is the proper language of 
strong emotion. In the use of it, the awakened mind casts 
about rapidly over the whole extent of its knowledge, 
touching and illuminating all the points, and laboring to 
concentrate the whole into one single effort, by which it 
shall make the delineation of the present irresistible in its 
force. The simile, being more minute and prolonged, be- 

112. Of what order of wits is this the occupation ? 113. What 

is necessary that a pun may become genuine wit? 114. What 

change must the train of thought which is the foundation of wit 

undergo in order to become poetry and eloquence .'' 115. Of 

what is metaphor the language ? 116. Jn the use of metaphor, 

how may it be said that the awakened mind acts .' 117. What is 

remarked respecting the simile ? 



Less. 11. intellectual philosophy. 247 

longs 10 a milder mood of the mind ; and the allegory, from 
iis still greater length, though the niceness of its adapta- 
tion may be the cause of much pleasure, is yet more incon- 
sistent with strong emotion, and belongs rather to that tran- 
quil state of mind which results from the contemplation of 
mere beauty. 

Charles. Then I should think that, in all those methods 
of illustration, and indeed in all the parts of any train of 
suggestions, the more that the parts which come in imme- 
diate succession harmonize with each other, the more per- 
fect will be the effect of the whole. 

Mary. You forget that strong contrast is a source of 
suggestion, as well as similarity or resemblance ; or rather 
that similarity of emotion, as of wonder or surprise, is as 
effective a source of suggestion, as similarity of sound, or 
form, or anything else. 

Dr. Herbert. If we can succeed in producing the state 
of mental excitement which we wish to produce, either in 
ourselves or in others, or, if having produced it in others, 
we can continue it, and heighten it to the degree that we 
want, it matters little what are the means that we employ. 
There can be no question that if we become pedantic, and 
use allusions to subjects with which our hearers are utter- 
ly unacquainted, we must fail in producing the eflfect that 
we want. A very remarkable instance of this is report- 
ed of a learned member of one of the northern universities. 
He was a bachelor, and a miser, in addition to his pedant- 
ry. As such, one single chamber formed the whole of his 
accommodation ; and he had the coal-binn in the window- 
sill, the top of which served him occasionally both for a desk 
and a table. One day he went to a coal-merchant to or- 
der a bag of coals ; and when the porter had got the bag 
on his back, he inquired of the learned doctor where he 
should go, and how he should dispose of it. *' Proceed by 
rectilineal motion along the street, until you come opposite 
the seminary of learning; there cut the area at right an- 
gles ; knock Txi \\\Q foras ; ascend the gradus ; enter my 
cuhiculum; and below \\\q fenestra, you will perceive apzx, 
into which you are to evacuate the bag.'' ^^ But what is a 
fenestra, Sir ?" said the astonished porter. A fenestra ! — 
why, di fenestra is an orifice, cut out of an edifice, for the 

118. What respecting allegory ? When do we fail in produc- 
ing the effect that we desire ? Give the illustration. 



248 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 11. 

purpose of illuminalion." The porter turning from the 
learned man, utterly astonished, said to himself, ** 1 must 
ask somebody else, for it seems the gentlemen of the col- 
lege are too wise for knowing their way to their own coal- 
boxes/' 

Edward. That was a very odd speech, certainly ; but 
anybody that knew a little Latin, and some common-place 
phrases in mathematics, would have understood it perfectly. 
It was nothing more than, ^* Go straight along the street 
till you come to the college ; then cross the court, knock 
at the door, walk up the stairs, and go to my chamber, in 
the window of which there is a box, into which you |ire to 
put the coals." 

Dr, Herbert. There are many speeches, by other pre- 
tenders to wisdom, who, by a use of those words in one 
language, to which their hearers are not accustomed, make 
themselves every bit as unintelligible as this person was to 
the coal-porter. 

In like manner, if we introduce any illustration from a 
subject which is more mean than the subject under illus- 
tration, we shall degrade that subject, instead of heighten- 
ing it, and destroy the former impression, instead of 
strengthening it. So, also, if, in a grave and impassioned 
train of illustration, we introduce one link which is of a 
trifling nature, we shall effectually break the chain ; and 
so likewise will the chain be broken, and the effect destroy- 
ed, if we introduce any illustration of an opposite nature, 
in which there is no other contrast suggested, but the mere 
absurdity of its being there.* The consideration of these 
subjects belongs, however, rather to the philosophy of 
language, than to the philosophy of mind, though some 
notice of them be necessary, in order that we may under- 
stand the phenomena of suggestion, because all the knowl- 

^It is said, that a certain person, who was describing the 
treachery of Judas in betraying his Divine Master, in such 
appropriate language, as to command the entire attention of 
his hearers ; paused in his discourse, and reduced the thirty 
pieces of silver to English currency. The effect, which this 
had upon the audience, it is not necessary to mention. 

119. Why does the pedant fail of producing a favorable effect? 

120. What will the consequence of introducing an illustration 

from a subject, that is meaner than the subject to be illustrated .'' 



Less. 11. intellectual philosophy. 249 

edge we borrow from others, or, at least, the greater part of 
it, we receive through the medium of language ; and thus a 
certain portion of the philosophy of mind, and of language, 
must be so similar, that in the mode of treating them, at 
least, the one might be substituted for the other. In fact, 
some of the best treatises we have upon intellectual phi- 
losophy, could be changed into disquisitions on philosophical 
grammar, by the mere substitution of the term '' word" for 
the term ** idea," *' notion," or *' conception," or *' imag- 
ination." 

Mary. Then that points out to us another use of the 
study of intellectual philosophy , for if the study of mind and 
the study of languages be, in a great measure, the same, we 
cannot understand any of them completely without a knowl- 
edge of the other. 

Dr. Herbert. There can be no doubt that we can nev- 
er understand the full force and effect of language, nor 
can we make the proper impression upon others by that 
which we speak or write, unless we know something 
about the nature of the mind. Only we must be careful 
not to confound the subject itself with the words in which 
it has too often been concealed. If we do not attend to 
what others already know, and enable them to connect 
the new with the old, we must always speak to them in a 
tongue as unknown as that which the learned doctor used 
to the porter. 

Eckvard. But when men invent new fashions of ploughs, 
or mills, or furniture, or any thing else, is not that dif- 
ferent from the mere making of a new speech out of a dif- 
ferent combination of the portions of old speeches and re- 
collections ? 

Dr. Herbert. Not farther than the habits of the individ- 
ual, who makes those inventions, differ from the habits of 
those who are inventors of the other kind. For when we 
consider suggestion, with reference to former knowledge, 
and the successions or combinations of the different por- 
tions of that knowledge, there is in these former experi- 
ences enough to explain why one man advances in one 

121. Why are the philosophy of language and that of mind so 
intimately united ? 122. What i-s necessary that we may under- 
stand the full force and effect of language, and be able to speak or 
write with effect ? 

22 



250 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 11. 

way, and another man in another way ; and even though 
there were not enough, it would be idle to invent a partic- 
ular name, such as '^ mechanical genius,'' for a '^mechanical 
inventor," or a ** poetical genius," for a '* poetical inventor ;^' 
because these words would have nothing discoverable 
to stand for, except that very experience which led to the 
suggestions. Thus though, properly understood, there be 
not the smallest harm in saying that the genius of man- 
kind is as diversified among different individuals, as the 
experiences, and habits, and states of those individuals, 
and varies in a single individual, with his successive ex- 
perience, and habits, and states ; yet the general name 
which we use as expressing all those in which we find 
similarity, is not the name of any particular and separate 
existence, but a mere word, or arbitrary sign which has 
a different meaning, as applied to any two different indi- 
viduals. The mechanical genius of the village, who accu- 
mulates a number of unmeaning wheels, and levers, and 
springs, and threads, in quest of his impossible perpetual 
motion, would, among men of scientific information, be no 
genius at all, but a deceived fool, in the very depths of 
credulous simplicity. 

We must, however, bear in mind, that when we refer 
to a train of suggestions, simple suggestion is not the only 
consideration which comes before us; neither are we able 
to detach the different portions of the succession as single 
suggestions, following each other in order like trees in a row, 
or the successive spaces over which the index of the clock 
travels in its progress, minute after minute. Along with 
the simple suggestion, there is always a suggestion of re- 
lation to a greater or a less extent ; and as our trains of 
thought are never very long, or very vivid, without having 
some reference to our own condition or pursuits, or to those 
of persons in whom we are interested, there can hardly be 
a prolonged succession of thought without a considerable 
admixture of emotion. 

We must also bear in mind, that the suo^gestino^ state of 
mind may be an external perception , a simple suggestion^ a 
suggestion of relation, or an emotion ; and that from any 
one of these, the mind may pass so rapidly to any of the 

123. Since there is such a diversity of mental character among 
individuals, can general names be applied to them with propriety ? 
124. What is there which usually attends simple suggestion ? 



Less. 11. intellectual philosophy. 251 

rest, that the two states may be felt as almost co-existent. 
These four classes of suggesting state will, of course, 
produce farther modifications in the state that they sug- 
gest. We feel that the suggestion^ consequent upon an 
external perception, is more strong and vivid, and also 
more ready of recurrence than that of which the suggest- 
ing state is an internal affection. We may think on the 
friend we have lost for a time, or for ever, and run over 
his good qualities and our regrets, from an internal affec- 
tion, which we are unable to trace backward to any thing ; 
but if any memorial of him — the chair on which he sat, 
the book that he loved to read, the present he made us at 
parting, or the least trifle belonging to his person or dress, 
as the most insignificant trinket, or a few threads of his 
hair — be placed before our eyes, the effect is so instanta- 
neous, that it seems altogether magical. The reality of 
which we are conscious, though it be but the reality of a 
trifle, imparts that attribute to the whole trains of sugges- 
tion of our friend ; and as they arise, one after another, we 
almost feel that we enjoy, in the recollection of the moment, 
the whole circumstances and events that have endeared our 
former intercourse. 

Before we close this conversation, or rather before I re- 
lease you from listening to me, there is one other circum- 
stance which I must mention, in order that our view of 
the process of suggestion may be as complete as our time 
and our abilities will admit. It is this: — when we endeav- 
our to produce a certain state of mind in others, we are not 
always able to do it by that of which even we ourselves are 
informed. The chord in the bosom of another, which is 
to vibrate the respondent feeling to our appeal, may be in 
a train of recollection in the mind of the party addressed, 
which is veiled from us and from all the world. There 
may be a hidden joy, or a sorrow never told, which yet, 
if we could reach, would produce the most powerful emo- 
tion in the possessor ; and it may be, that some suggestion 
that we throw at random, may be linked into that hidden 
chain, and the emotion may arise, not by the direct effect 

125. What four classes of the suggesting state of mind are men- 
tioned, and how does the mind pass from one to the other ? 

126. What is said in relation to the suggestion attendant on an ex- 
ternal perception? 127. What illustration is given? 128. 

When we endeavour to produce in others a certain state of mind, 
why are we not always able to do it ? 



252 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 12. 

of our eloquence, but because of the latent knowledge of 
the party addressed : and yet, when this state of emotion 
is brought on, it may be continued in our appeal, and the 
storm which is thus raised in the breast of another, may 
be directed by us for the effecting of our own purpose, and 
may effect that purpose better than if we ourselves had 
directly excited the emotion. 



LESSON Xll. 

Suggestions of relations — Relations in space — In time — They are 
the only means by which we can acquire knowledge — Generaliza- 
tion precedes the use of general terms — Errors on this subject, 
Realism, Nominalism — Danger of mere verbal knowledge. 

Dr. Herbert. You remember, I presume, the remaining 
division of those internal affections of the mind, which 
we may consider as purely intellectual states without ne- 
cessarily involving the existence of emotions, though in 
their natural occurrence they may frequently be mingled 
with these. 

Edward. Suggestions of relation, as distinguished from 
suggestions of conception. 

Dr. Herbert. And what, do you recollect, may be the 
characteristic distinction between the two? 

Charles. That suggestion of conception is the state of 
the mind considered principally with reference to the sub- 
jects of the conceptions ; while relative suggestion is its 
state considered principally with reference to the relation 
between the subject of one conception and that of another, 
or those of other conceptions : as, of any two objects, as a 
house and a tree, I might have the perception or the con- 
ception of each singly, without any reference to them, as 
compared together ; and I might also make a comparison 
as to whether the tree placed in a particular situation, could 
be an ornament, and be reciprocally ornamented by it ; 
or I could compare the house with other houses, or the 

1. What is the distinction between the suggestion of conception 

^nd the suggestion of relation ? 2. How can this distinction be 

illustrated ? 



Less 12. intellectual philosophy. 253 

tree with other trees, real or imagined ; and I could so 
form my single house into relations with other houses, as 
to give me the conception of a town or city, and my tree 
into such relations with other trees, as to form a dark and 
tangled forest ; and I might contrast the bustle and activi- 
ty of the one, with the seclusion and loneliness of the other. 
These, at every step of the comparison, whether of the 
two different single objects, of the single object with other 
objects of its class, or of the combined group of houses 
with the combined group of trees, would be suggestions of 
comparison. 

Mary, Or we might simplify the matter, by compar- 
ing the height of the tree with the height of the house ; 
the beams of the house with the bole of the tree; oi, if 
the tree happened to be a hollow one, its cavity, as a re- 
treat, might be compared with the accommodation of the 
house. 

Matilda. There are indeed hardly any two subjects 
upon which I can think, whether they be present to my 
sight, or arise in suggestion, between which I do not, if 
I attend to them at all, make some sort of comparison ; 
and even in any two acts that I do, although some time 
intervene between the doing of them, I can hardly, if I 
attend to them, avoid making some comparison, as whether 
I played a piece of music better or worse to day, or on 
Thursday last ; whether the reading of one book, or the 
listening to one story, gave me more pleasure, or was more 
tiresome than another: and so on, through all the range 
of things, about which I can think, or imagine myself to 
think, when the thought extends to more than one of 
them. 

Dr. Herbert. I see it would be needless for us to 
waste time in repeating or amplifying the definition. We 
seem to be pretty nearly agreed as to what we call relative 
suggestion ; and so we may inquire into its phenomena 
and laws, in the same manner as we did into those of 
simple suggestion, and with the same precaution, that 
when we use the term laws, we do not mean any previous 
system of arrangement in the phenomena, but that ar- 

3. How can inquiries in relative suggestion be pursued ? 

4. What is meant by the term laios, when used in reference to this 
subject? 

22* 



254 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 12. 

rangement which we shall discover in the course of our in- 
vestigation. 

Edward. Our coming to an agreement on this, or on any 
other subject upon which we might differ, is the conse- 
quence of a relative suggestion. 

Dr. Herbert, Of course : and if our ac^jreement be 
founded on our own conviction, and not on mere verbal 
assent to that which we do not understand, it is a relative 
suggestion, in which we all felt in the same way as to the 
relation. 

Mary, As these suggestions of relation are complex or 
made up of parts, in as far as at least two subjects are al- 
ways concerned, though the state of the mind itself be only 
one, yet they more resemble our perceptions of external 
things, as existing in space, than the states of simple sug- 
gestion, considered with reference to their subjects. 

Dr, Herbert, Your remark is just : our simple sugges- 
tions, considered merely in themselves, can be properly 
considered, only in the succession of time, as they follow 
antecedent states, or are followed by consequent ones ; 
while the consideration of comparison itself in the case 
of a single comparison, involves the co-existence of the 
subjects compared, as it were, in space; w^iile two com- 
parisons being again suggested, as compared with each 
other, involve the consideration of succession in time. 
Thus, in the analysis of these relations ot suggestion, we 
shall simplify our process by considering them in two 
classes. 1. Relations of co-existence, or those in which 
there is no necessary reference to any portion of time be- 
fore or after the moment of comparison. 2. Relations of 
succession, in which there is a reference to the one set of 
subjects of comparison, as having been suggested to the 
mind before or after the other set. Let us then consider 
what are the subdivisions of relation in the comparison of 
co-existent subjects. 

Charles, They bear, I should think, a considerable re- 
semblance to those correspondences, and dissimilarities, 
and connexions, which we have formerly considered as 

5. In what manner only can oar simple su^sjestions be properly 
considered ? 6. What does the consideration of single com- 
parison involve ? 7. When two comparisons are suggested, 

what do they involve ? 8. In the analysis of relative suggestion, 

into what two classes is the subject divided ? 



Less. 12. intellectual riiiLosoniY. 255 

among the means of simple suggestion. In this view of 
the matter, resemblance will be one result of comparison ; 
and the want of resemblance, another; and this resem- 
blance may extend to only a single quality or circumstance, 
or it may extend to several, or to so many as may constitute 
what we formerly considered as similarity, or even same- 
ness ; for I remember that in things external, we have no 
means of distinguishing perfect similarity from absolute 
identity, unless it be that we are never absolutely certain of 
the identity of a person, or thing, external of our own minds, 
if that person or thing has not been all the time immediate- 
ly in our sight. 

Matilda. The very places in which the two subjects of 
comparison are situated, will make a similarity or a differ- 
ence, if we extend our comparison no farther than the mere 
position. Thus, when there is one of the drawing-room 
chairs in the parlour, and on the same side with one of the 
parlour chairs, these two chairs are similar in situation, 
though they be quite different in every thing else ; and 
the drawing-room chair, though it be like the other draw- 
ing-room chairs in every respect, is different in position or 
place, by being in the parlour, while the parlour chairs on 
the other side of the room, are in position different from 
those on this side. 

Edward. But when you turn round to look at the two 
chairs, at the same side of the room, they also are different 
in position, the one being on your right hand, the other on 
your left. 

Charles. That arises from you yourself having a dif- 
ferent position from what you had in the former case ; 
and before you can refer to any object, as being in a 
fixed position, or even changing its position in a particular 
direction, and at a particular rate, you must assum.e that 
your own position is all the while unaltered : so that 
position is in itself a suggestion of relation, and nothing 
else. 

Dr. Herbert. All the relations, or rather all those real 
or imaginary properties or circumstances which are the 
subjects or comparisons, are suggestions of relation, and of 
nothing else. All resemblances, all differences, all pro- 
portions in every respect, all degrees in similar things and 

9. What is enumerated as the suggestions of relation ? 10. 

What particulars are mentioned, which are found out by comparison ? 



256 FIRST LESSONS IN Less. 12. 

properties, or all comprehension of wholes, as made up of 
parts, matter definable by properties, and a complex state 
of mind as following different antecedent suggestions, are 
tound out by comparison ; and if we have never found or 
fancied two subjects to which the common quality or circum' 
stance, upon which the comparison turns, belong in com- 
mon, we should have had no knowledge of any such com- 
parison. Nay, we have discovered already, in our examina- 
tion of sentient perception, that without a succession of 
analogous feelings, and a suggestion of comparison, as the 
very foundation of the analogy, we could never have arrived 
at the knowledge even of the existence of a single finger ; 
but that although our bodies and every thing external had 
been constructed as they are now, and exhibited the very 
identical phenomena, our whole knowledge would have 
been confined to a series of pleasures or pains, of which we 
could have had no means of ascertaining the nature or fixing 
the locality. 

Many of the grounds of comparison are so simple and 
obvious, that it is unnecessary to take up any time in the 
consideration of them. Relation of total difference, and 
relations of place, fall under this description ; and so 
also do relations of jjroportion and degree, as well as the 
relation of a whole to the several parts of which it is 
made up, which is only a relation of proportion, considered 
in circumstances a little different, and under a different 
name. 

In relations of resemblance, whether in resemblance of 
qualities, or in resemblance of use and application, but 
especially in the former, there have, (though they do not 
appear necessarily any more difficult than the other,) 
been difficulties invented, which have introduced more ac- 
rimony among the writers on mental science, and retarded 
more the progress of that science, than perhaps the in- 
troduction of similar absurdities into any other part of the 
system. 

11. Under what circumstances should we never have had any 

such knowledge as results from comparison ? 12. What would 

have been the consequence, if we had been without a succession 
of analagous feelings, and a suggestion of comparison, as the founda- 
tion of a'nalogy ? 13. What are the relations, the grounds of 

which are so simple and obvious that they require not a distinct 
consideration .' 14. In what relations have difficulties been in- 
vented ? 



Less. J2. intellectual piiiLosopiiy. 257 

Edioard. T should think that as the comparison of things 
which resemble each other is more immediate and simple, 
than the finding out of the properties of particular things, it 
would give less occasion to dispute. It is much easier to 
find out that salt is not sugar, than that it is a compound of 
soda and muriatic acid. 

Dr. Herbert, The subject is certainly as simple as 
any other state or consciousness of the mind, which does 
not consist of a greater number of circumstances; for we 
have said, without being able to find in consciousness any 
contradiction of the saying, that all simple states of the mind 
are equally simple and equally difficult. But when we look 
into the volumes of philosophical controversy, and especially 
into those on this, the most voluminous of all controversies, 
we are tempted to draw the conclusion, that it is the mis- 
fortune of philosophers to find the greatest difficulty on 
points so simple, that other people find no difficulty in them 
at all, and to wage their most keen and intolerant wars 
where the object of their contention exists only in the delu- 
sion of their own minds. 

Mary. The suggestion of comparison appears to me so 
perfectly natural, and so ready in its recurrence, that I feel 
I am unable to think first of one thing, and then of anoth- 
er, or especially to have two objects in sight at the same 
time, without so instant a discovery of their resemblance or 
their difference, that it appears as immediate an operation 
as the perception of any object of sense ; as, for instance, I 
have no more difficulty in finding that a lily is a flower as 
well as a rose, though different in form, in colour, and in 
scent, or that a house is not a tree, or a tree a house, than 
I have in perceiving that any one of the objects before me 
is that which 1 have been accustomed to call by the same 
name. 

Dr. Herbert. The process is not only equally simple, 
but it is in both cases nearly the same, and acquired by 
the same application of experience. You recollect we 
found that the only way in which we could know the very 

15. But what is the fact in regard to the relations of resemblance ? 

16. What inference, in relation to this subject, might be drawn 

from the volumes of philosophical controversy? 17. Can we 

think first of one thing and then of another, or have two objects in 
sight at the same time, without instantly discovering their resem- 
blance or difference ? 18. How are the simplest subjects of ex- 
ternal perception known ? 



258 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 12. 

simplest subject of external perception is, by comparing 
one state of our minds with another antecedent or preced- 
ing state. Now, our being able to do so, involves the ex- 
istence of relative suggestion, or the perception of the rela- 
tion between two states of mind, as being the same, or dif- 
ferent; for it is in itself an instance of that suggestion, — 
and without that very faculty, or whatever else we may call 
it, we should have been in utter ignorance of all extended 
or continued existence, and our momentary states would 
have been our only knowledge. Hence we see that the 
suggestion of relations is included in the very simplest piece 
of information that we can obtain ; and before we know 
that w^e have a mouth to be fed, or a finger to touch it, we 
must have practised this suggestion, and this only, as an 
operation of the mind, independent of any external object 
or organ of sense, — not a result of them, but their real and 
only discoverer. 

Charles. As we can attribute any quality to a substance, 
only in consequence of our mind being in a particular 
state upon the external perception of that subject ; and 
as, when we consider the substance analytically, we must 
have as many separate states of mind respecting it as we 
have observed qualities^ which states will follow the same 
order of succession in which the qualities are observed ; so 
we must be able, in simple suggestion, to recall any one of 
those qualities, that is, the state of mind which is to us 
the consciousness of the quality, singly, or we may have 
the substance suggested to us as a whole. Now, if upon 
the perception or the conception of any other substance, 
our mind be conscious of the same state which any one of 
the form.er qualities occasioned, we must conclude that 
the quality of this other substance, v.^iich has excited in 
us the same state of mind, is the same as the correspond- 
ing quality of the former substance. For the very same 
reason, if the perception, or conception, of the same sub- 

19. What does this involve? 20. Without this, of what 

should we be ignorant.? 21. What conclusion necessarily fol- 
lows .? 22. On what ground can we attribute any quality to a 

substance? 23. W^hen we consider the substance analytically, 

how must the mind be affected ? -24. What order will these 

states follow .'' 25. In simple suggestion, what must we be able 

to do .? 26. What will lead us to conclude, that the quality of a 

substance we are examining, is the same as the corresponding qualU 
iy of a former substance ? 



Less. \2. intellectual philosophy. 259 

stance, gives us no consciousness similar to that produced 
in us by any quality of the first, we cannot help concluding, 
that the second substance has no quality like those of 
the first. 

Dr. Herbert. In this way, any one substance of a com- 
plex nature, when considered with reference to its several 
qualities, and component and constituent parts, is, as it 
were, an epitome of all that can be known ; and the man- 
ner in which we acquire our knowledge of it, whether gen- 
eral as a whole, or analytical or particular as made up of 
parts and having qualities, is a miniature of the whole men- 
tal process, which, in its extension, forms the vast power 
of a Bacon or a Newton ; and in this \'exy point of informa- 
tion we, as it were, concentrate the whole of the difficult 
ties that have bewildered and perplexed the philosophers. 
Let our substance be as simple as possible, — a single cubi- 
cal crystal, composed of an acid and an earth; and let us 
call it by its common name — simply a crystal. Let us ex- 
amine it : it has six faces : they are all of equal size, and 
each of them is a square. It has twelve edges where these 
faces meet; and it has eight points, or solid angles, at 
each meeting of every three edges. It has a certain trans- 
parency, a certain bulk, a certain weight, and is coloured 
or colourless, together with many other properties that 
might belong to it — as a scratch on one face, a speck on 
another, and an endless variety. Now, the crystal, to 
our perception, may be the little cube that we lay in the 
palm of our hand and look at, or we may examine it with 
reference to one, or to any number of its properties. But 
while we make all these inquiries about it, and state of 
our mind succeeds after state, all differing, the crystal 
itself undergoes not the least perceptible change in any 
one of its qualities. In this case, the name crystal does 
not stand for the faces, or their being squares, or for the 
number of edges or points, in any thing; because the 
edge resembles the edge of a knife more than it resem- 

27. When do we conclude that a second substance has no quality 

like those of the first? 28. What does ihe author represent as 

an epitome of all that can be known ? 29. What may the man- 
ner be said to be, in which we acquire our knowledge of a sub- 
stance of a complex nature ? 30. W hat do we concentrate in 

this point of information? 31. What illustration is given.'' 

32. Why, in the instance given, does not the name crystal stand for 
the faces or squares, or for the number of edges or points, in any 
thing ? 



260 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 12. 

bles any other appearance of the crystal, and the point 
has more resemblance to the point of a pin, than to any 
other part of the enumeration to which it belongs in the 
object under consideration. Still, however, all these qual- 
ities, much as they may differ, have one common re- 
semblance, in consequence of which it is impossible for 
us to confound them with any other qualities or properties, 
however similar they may be, if we find them in a different 
substance. 

Edward, They all have this in common, that they are 
the properties of that particular crystal ; and the word crystal 
is in that case a common or general name for that combina- 
tion or collection of qualities, each of which has a particu- 
lar name, which, taken singly, would not suggest the con- 
ception of a crystal at all, if the same quality had been found 
in any other substance, with which the mind bad been 
equally familiar. 

Dr. Herbert. That brings us very near to the difficulty 
which perplexed the philosophers. Is this crystal, consider- 
ed as a whole, any thing different from, and indepen- 
dent of, the existence of those qualities which we perceive 
in it, and which we could perceive as existing where it is, 
or obtain any knowledge of, without the occurrence of all 
of those qualities existing in the very combination in which 
we find them ? Or, if the qualities had never been percep- 
tible, or if their perceptibility was to be entirely destroyed, 
both from reality and from remembrance, would the crystal 
itself be altogether gone ? 

Matilda. These are questions which it is hardly ne- 
cessary to ask ; for they are much the same as asking 
whether, if any number of things be taken away one by 
one, until the vvhole are taken, there would any more of 
them remain than if the whole of them were taken away 
at once. 

Dr. Herbert. But still our notion or conception of the 
crystal, as a whole, is not formed of the union of the pre- 

33. Why is it impossible for us to confound these qualities with 
any others, whenever we find them in a different substance ? — — 
34. For what is the word crystal in this case a common or general 
name ? 35. Would these qualities taken single suggest the con- 
ception of a crystal ? -36. What answer should be given to the 

questions, which the author has introduced in relation to that view 
of the subject, which perplexed the philosophers of other times ? 

37. Why cannot the conception of the crystal, as a whole, be 

formed of the union of the previous perceptions of all its qualities .'' 



Less. 12. intellectual piiilosopiiy. 3ii 

vious perceptions of all its qualities, for many of them may 
be found by analysis, long after the crystal has been known ; 
so that the state of mind which we have when the crystal 
is perceived or suggested as a whole, cannot be the same 
as any or as all of the states that are occasioned by the per- 
ception of its qualities. 

Mar7j. The very name crystal^ which we use as totally 
distinct from face or edge, or any observed property of the 
crystal, is a proof that we have some state of mind relative 
to the whole crystal^ which is different from the states rel- 
ative to the qualities, whether singly or together. 

Dr. Herbert, Why should you think that the word 
crystal is a proof of a particular state of mind for the 
general body, distinct from those for its individual prop- 
erties ? 

Mary. Simply because it is the word crystal^ and not 
some other word ; because, if we were conscious of no 
state of mind that suggested that sound rather than any 
other sound, I think we would be just as likely to call a 
crystal a *' berry,'' or even an *^ elephant." 

Dr. Herbert, Then you believe that there is a state of 
mind corresponding to this word '* crystal" ; and at the 
same time you feel it impossible to believe that the crystal 
itself would remain, if all those qualities, (to none of which 
the word ** crystal" applies,) were taken away ; hence, are 
we not reduced to this difficulty — a state of mind to which 
a name is applied, and yet nothing answering to this state 
which could not be taken away by the removal of other 
things to which that word has no allusion whatever ? 

Edward. I cannot see that there is any difficulty in the 
matter ; for the same thing might happen to any sub- 
stance or person ; as, for example, to myself. Thus, if we 
were to come into the room singly, in the order of our ages, 
your mind would be towards me, in the state of perceiv- 
ing that I were the last ; in which state it could not be, 

38. What conclusion must we form in regard to the state of 
mind, which we have, when the crystal is perceived or sug:gested 

as a whole ? 39. What does the name crystal, which is used 

distinct from any observed property of the crystal, prove ? 

40. What reason can be given, that this proof is satisfactory ? 

41. What is the difficulty which the author brings forward as one 
which may be urged against his view of the subject, and it is a 
serious difficulty ^ 

23 



262 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 12. 

though I came at the very same minute, and in the very 
same manner, if Mary, and Charles, and Matilda, came 
after me. 

Charles, In the case of your coming into the room first 
or last, ihat is merely a relation of order ; and which order 
may of course be changed without the slightest alteration 
of the individuals, farther than their being next to different 
ones in consequence of the change. 

Dr, Herbert. If more learned and laborious folks than 
vire, Charles, had come to that conclusion, some six or seven 
hundred years ago, it would have spared the world many 
books and a great number of battles : for they would allow 
nothing for a mere state of mind, which we have seen is 
really the foundation of all knowledge ; and thus, whenever 
they came to a w^ord which they found mankind applying 
indiscriminately to more things than one, they insisted 
either that there was another ^/^z/jo- altogether imperceptible 
and totally different from the perceived ones, to which, 
and to which alone, that common name was applied; or 
else that the common name was a mere empty sound, the 
pronouncing of w'hich could suggest to the mind nothing 
whatever. 

Matilda. It is strange why they should have come to 
such conclusions as these. 

Dr. Herbert. The origin of them is a matter of little 
consequence, any farther than as it may guard us against 
coming to similar ones ourselves, of which there is more 
danger than we might at first be aware of — inasmuch 
as, down almost to the present time, the very ablest men 
who have treated of intellectual philosophy, have either 
had a strong leaning toward, or actually fallen into, the 
one or the other of those errors; and the contests which 
they had during those ages in which what was called phi- 
losophy, was blended into one mass with party feeling 
and what was called religion : the contests of the holders 
of these doctrines kept the world in a slate of constant 
turmoil. 

Charles. What could possibly have been the original 
cause of the dispute at all ? for the errors are not errors of 
mere ignorance ; because uninformed people do not fall in- 
to them. I never heard the gardener argue that there was 

42. What were the views of the more learned men of former 
^imesin relation to this §5ubject I 



Less. 12. intellfctual philosophy. 203 

a general, invisible, and nruliscovcrahle notliing which was 
called a flf)\v>r, mid which was alloireiher di?iiiict from 
the tulips and roses and dahlias that hloom in the border; 
neither did I ever hear him deny that there was any mean- 
ing in the \\on\ Jfitorr, or that any body who had seen the 
particular flowers I have fr.entioned, could find any difFicul- 
ly in knowing what was meant when the word Jloiccr was 
pronounced. 

Dr. Herbert. The errors in intellectual philosophy ap- 
pear all to have oriirinaled from the very same source ; and 
that very desire ol beinor wise beyond the vulgar, which 
led to the imagination f>f the visual figure as separate from 
the tangible one, and that the idea of any thing was some- 
thing se[)arale from the ihing perceived and the mind per- 
ceiving it^ led, almost of necessiiy, to the invention of an 
equally unp^rceivab!^ notldng, which yet had a real ex- 
istence totally distinct from each of the individuals to 
which that general name was a[)p!ied. Thus, as indepen- 
dently of the individual apple-tree upon which John had 
climbed, and from wl.ich he was pulling the apples, there 
was a real idea, apart from the apple-tree and the observer ; 
and as there was a similar idea of John, apart from him 
and from the observer, it became nece-sary, that if there 
happened to be a pear-tree beside the apple-tree, to which 
also the word "liee" was ap[)lied ; and also another in- 
dividual, Thomas, gathering the apples as John threw 
them down, to whom also the name man was applied, it be- 
came necessary, that as there was a particular idea for 
each of the trees, and for each of the men, there should be 
a general idea applicable equally U) both trees, and which 
therefore could not be an apple-tree or a pear-tree, and 
another ap.)licable to both men, which could neither be 
John nor Thomas. Nor was this all ; for if there had been 
a plum tree, or if George had also come^ the general idea 
would have required to be so niodified as to comprehend, 
and yet exclude the plum-tree in one case, and George in 
the other. This general icha^ or as they called it, in their 
jargon, ** the universal a parte reiy^ (that is, something 

43. To what did the desire of bein^ wise beyond the vulgar lead 
the le.irned r)f that d^^y ? 44. How can their views be illus- 
trated ? 4'>. ^y what name did they call this general idea ^ 

4G. What is meant by this term ** 



864 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 12' 

which represented and was all the objects of the class to 
which the word applied, and yet distinct from every one of 
them,) which was in fact nothing but a generalization of 
the particular ideas or images, was absolutely necessary ^ in 
order that there might be a consistency of absurdities in the 
system.* 

As the supposed idea of the apple-tree, usually called the 
visual image, could make its way into the eyes of all observers 
at the same time, and be different to them all if they hap- 
pened to see the tree in different lights, or from different 
positions, and get out again the moment the eyes were 
shut, or that the darkness of night came on ; so it could he 
corninunicated to other minds, in verbal description without 
any use of the eyes, or presence of an apple-tree at all ; 
and that could remain quiet and concealed in memory until 
remembrance should please to play the page in waiting for 
it, and introduce it to consciousness, which was necessary, 
in addition to the observer and the tree ; so when man 
had ranged over the garden and the grove, and had heard 
or read a description, and thereby increased his genera of 
trees to hundreds, with all their thousands of species, their 
ten thousand varieties, and their millions of individuals, it 
became essentially necessary^ either to dismiss the idea 
apart from the individual, or admit a universal, which 
should be at once the representative of all the trees, of which 
the party had any knowledge, and which was of so plastic 
and accommodating a nature, as that it could of itself in- 
stantly alter its appearance and dimensions, when one in- 



*"The Realists held, that general abstract ideas have a 
real and permanent existence, independent of the mind. Of 
a man, of a rose, of a circle, and of every species of things, 
they maintained, that there is one original form, or architype, 
which existed from eternity, before any individuals of the 
species were created. This original model or architype is 
the pattern, according to which the individuals of all species 
are in the most important respects formed. The architype, 
which is understood to embrace the outlines or generic 
features of things, becomes an object of perception to the 
human intellect, whenever, by due abstraction, we discern it 
to be one in all the individuals of the species." Upham. 

47. For what was this general idea necessary ? 48. Can you 

describe the progress of the supposed idea of the apple-tree till it 
becomes incorporated in the universal .'' 



Less. 12. intellectual philosophy. 265 

dividual was added to the perception, or another faded from 
the memory. 

The belief in this universal absurdity, which came in 
time to be denominated *^ Realism" — an absurd name, no 
doubt, for a general belief in that which had no reality — 
was universal for many ages; and so much identified with 
every portion of human knowledge and belief, that the de- 
nial of it was accounted as heretical as that of the most 
fundamental doctrine of religion, or the most intuitive per- 
ception of the human mind. It was first questioned, only 
about five hundred years ago, by Roselinus, and his cele- 
brated pupil, the accomplished and ill-fated Abelard. 
But, though the most acute and the most able men of their 
time, they were borne down by the orthodoxy of their op- 
ponents, who strangely contended that a denial of the ex- 
istence of nothing, necessarily involved the denial of every 
thing — universe, Creator, and all.* In the fourteenth cen- 
tury, Occam, on Englishman, again revived the supposed 
heresy, less elegantly, indeed, but he advanced it with 
more powerful arguments, and with a more determined 
mind, — so much so that the rulers of nations took part in 
the strife, the Emperor of Germany, siding with the English, 
and the King of France arranging himself and his army 



* " Roselinus, the founder of the sect of the JVominalists, 
maintained not only that there are no original forms or archi- 
types, such as had been asserted to exist by the Realists, 
but that there are no universal abstract ideas of any kind- 
He held, that nothing can be called general or universal, 
but names, and that even to them universality can be only 
ascribed virtually, and not in the strict and literal sense 
of the term. That is, the names are in the first instance 
given to individuals, but when any individuals are specified, 
the nature of the mind is such, that we naturally and imme- 
diately think of other individuals of the same kind." 

Upham, 

49. What was this universal absurdity denominated ? 50. 

How was the denial of this belief considered? 51. When and 

by whom was this belief first questioned ? 52. What did the ad- 
vocates of Realism contend that a denial of this doctrine involved ? 
53. What Englishman of the fourteenth century revived the phi- 
losophical heresy, and with what success ? 54. What rulers of 

nations took part in the strife, and what were the inmediate con- 
sequences ? 

23* 



266 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 12. 

under the banner of the universal a parte ret. Each party 
accused the other of heresy ; and while improvements in 
the arts stood still, and blood was shed, each consigned 
the other to endless reprobation, as having committed that 
sin against the Holy Ghost, which admits of no pardon. 
The first opponents of the absurdity of Realism were de- 
scribed as ** Nominalists ]^ from their, in fact, attaching 
no meaning whatever to general terms ; though it is pos- 
sible, that among men of sense, there was never a mere 
Nominalist, in the strict sense of the word ; but that, 
while they contended that there neither was nor could be 
any meaning correspondent to the word, they yet had a 
latent reference to an actual meaning, and that too not 
very different from the right one. One class* of these has 
been described as '^ Conceptualists,'' because they admit- 
ted that though there was no universal a parte rei, corres- 
ponding to the general term, there must be yet some con- 
trivance of the mind itself which had led it to the adoption 
of the term, and without which the term never could 
have been used. But this conception, originating in 
the mind itself, without any antecedent, was, in fact, 
only Realism under a different name; because as the 
idea of the particular subject, or the universal, never 
revealed itself -to the senses, but only to the mind, and 
revealed itself differently to all individuals, it was of no 
consequence whether it was a creation of the mind it- 
self, or whether it was created there without any external 
cause. 

Mary, The fact is, that the whole of the errors which 
you have now mentioned, seem to have arisen from inatten- 
tion to that suggestion of relations which you have shown 
us is necessary, not only to our knowledge of objects, as 
similar, or as different, but to our knowledge in its simplest 
states, and as restricted to a single object, be that object as 
simple as it may. 

*lt is said by other authors, that the Conceptualists hold 
to the actual existence of general abstract ideas, which are 
not permanent architypes independent of the mind. 

55. What name was given to the opponents of Realism, and was it 

justly apphed ? 56. What were the views of the Conceptualists ? 

57. How does it appear that their views were the same as those 

of the Realists? 58. From what did these errors arise J* 



Less. 12. intellectual philosophy. 267 

Dr. Herbert. That is exactly the cause of the error, 
whether that error be in the one direction, or in the other. 
We see two or more objects, in each of which we perceive 
one or more qualities or circumstances^ that are similar^ 
and tlience we learn to give one name to the sitnilarity^ as 
far as it extends, upon the very same principle that we 
give one name to that which excites any other state of 
mind, which occurring at two separate times, we yet feel 
to be exactly the same. Thus we perceive, that the ani- 
mal we call a horse has four legs, and cannot remain sus- 
pended in the air, except during a momentary leap ; and we 
observe the same circumstances in a number of other ani- 
mals; and from this resemblance we call them all quadru- 
peds, or four-legged animals ; and we conclude of them 
all, that they do not and cannot perfoim the operation, 
which we call flying. 

It is the very same with qualities and circumstances 
themselves. A white rose and a red one may have the 
same number of petals, all formed alike, and the same scent, 
and yet the difference between the single quality of colour 
in the one and the other is just as great, — that is, there is 
no more similarity or sameness in the mental perceptions 
of the white and the red, than there is in those of an 
acorn and an elephant. When the state of mind arising 
from the perception of any of those colours in the rose, 
returns again upon the perception of any thing else, — 
as the white in a flake of snow, or the red in a soldier's 
coat, we necessarily call it by the same name, and ** red,'* 
or *' white," which in the first perception was only the 
name of one of the many qualities of a single flower, be- 
comes the general name of a class of qualities, which has 
no reference w hatever to the other qualites of the substances 
by which the perception is excited ; and which in itself 
admits of an endless variety of degrees or shades, each of 
which gives us the notion of the individual difference, at 
the same time with that common suggestion of resemblance, 
which makes us call it red, and not green, or blue, or that 
which makes us call it a perception of sight, and not one of 
sound or smell. 

59. On what principle do we give one name to the similarity, 

which we discover in two or more objects? GO. With what 

example ig this illustrated .' 61. How is the sa?ne subject 

illustrated by the example of the white rosa and the red one ? 



268 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 12. 

Charles, Those who have held the doctrine which 
you have described as Realism^ appear to me to have re- 
versed the order of nature, and supposed that language 
was the first possession of mankind ; and that Adam had 
a name ready made for each creature, a common name 
for every genus, and class, and order, and the general 
name " creature,'' to stand for them all, as well as for any 
individual, before they were brought to him in order to be 
named. 

Mary. And also that every little baby has a language, 
and is, in fact, a grammarian, before it can notice, or speak, 
or do any thing but move its little hands, or feet, or cry 
when it is uneasy. 

Edward, If that were the case, 1 do not see how there 
could be any difference in language, or how w^e could find 
any diflSculty in telling what name any nation had given to 
any thing, the very first time that the thing itself was shown 
or described to us. 

Dr, Herbert, They have just reversed the operation ; 
and because the use of general terms, that is, of words that 
can be used as the common names of more objects than 
one, is of use to us in the extension of our knowledge — 
because those words are of service to us in the communi- 
cation of knowledge, they have considered them as the 
origin of knowledge — something with which we must be 
acquainted, before we can reason at all ; whereas the little 
philosopher, that sits smiling in the lap of its mother, 
unable yet to lisp her name, and attentive to words only 
as to other sounds that are not articulate, has already, to 
the full extent of its experience, been reasoning as closely 
and far more accurately, than those children of a larger 
growth, by whom the errors were maintained. But so 
far from having derived any advantage from language, 
either of its own as intuitive, or of other persons as com- 
municated, it cannot, by possibility, have the slightest per- 
ception of what language is ; and so far from having any 
knowledge of general names, that is, a knowledge that it 
could not acquire until it had actually performed the 

62. What conclusion did the Realists form, because general 

terms were useful in the extension of knowledge ? 63. Can the 

mind reason without the knowledge of language ? 64. What 

process must the mind perform before it can have any knowledge of 
general names? 



Less. 12. intellectual philosophy. 269 

process of generalization. If, instead of the endearing 
'* mamma/' which, after weeks of teaching, the infant 
comes at hist to lisp, and to apply indiscriminately to all 
females, it iiad heen taught to pronounce the word '' man," 
or *' animal," or "substance," or '* universe," at the 
same time that it was smiling with the smile, or to the 
caress of that invaluable and indispensable guardian of 
its helplessness, man, or animal, or substance, or universe 
itself, would have been to the intant no general term, but 
the simple name for the affection of one mother for one 
child, 

Charles. Then the whole process seems to be reduced 
to this : if I perceive two or more objects — or if two or 
more conceptions present themselves in suggestion — if they 
have any resemblance, I cannot help perceiving that resem- 
blance, as far as it goes, any more than I can help the per- 
ception of the objects themselves. If that relation be al- 
ready known to me, and I have a name to call it by, that 
name will be suggested by the relation itself; and if the 
relation be quite new, and in all respects unlike every oth- 
er relation of which I have had experience, 1 shall be una- 
ble to name it, until I have first invented a name. 

Mary. Every word that we use appears to me to be in 
some respect a general term, when it is used by more 
sneakers than one, or even when it is used by the same 
speaker under nitlerent circumsiancea. x Or iliolHr.CC 1; 
is hardly possible for any two of us to think in the very 
same way of the gardener, though we all call him John, 
and the suggestion of him absent, and the perception of him 
present, niuit be different to the same individual. John 
himself may also be different, as he may be digging, or 
planting, or pulling flowers, or resting himself, or eating 
liis dinner, or asleep ; and yet in these, and many other 
states in which he can be, we still call him John, and not 
Thomas or Richard. In this way, the single name John, 
may, as applied to the same gardener, stand for a thousand 
differences, whde there yet remains enough of general re- 



65. Give the illu.-tration. djQ. What seems to be the process 

when two or more objects are perceived, or two or more conceptions 

present themselves in suggestion? 07. What is rmiarked in 

regard tu the nanie or general term, in case the relation be already 

known, and also in cnse it be entirely new r^ QS. When does 

every word we use become a general term ? 



270 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 12. 

semblance, to let every body that knows him, perceive that 
John is Joiin all the time. 

Matilda. Yes; and we believe that he is John, just be- 
cause we find that, in all the varied states in which we can 
see or imagine him, there are as many similar qualities in 
him, as give sameness to our conception of him. 

Dr. Herbert. That is all we mean, or can mean, in the 
use of any term, even the most general ; and no name is 
striclly particular or proper, unless it be the name of a sin- 
gle quality that belongs to only one thing, and to nothing 
else ; and the particular names by which we designate the 
nicer qualities of things, as the value of a book, or the 
chemical composition and properties of a substance, are the 
result of a more careful examination, than the common 
names of classes. In every case, the notion or feeling to 
which the name is given, must precede the name; and 
those who are more conversant with things than with lan- 
guage, often made use of things, as a sort of artificial mem- 
ory of words, even though there should not be the least 
resemblance between the meaning which other people at- 
tach to the word, and the object with which it is associated 
for remen^hrance. 

Of this, I shall mention rather a whimsical instance. In 
a distant part of the Scottish Highlands, where the inhabit- 
ants are Catholics, the shepherds reside amono- ih^ "101111= 
tniliS ; uhu inougn they have abundant time for thought, 
they have few op[)ortunities of speaking, except to, or 
about, their dogs and flocks. The Catholics are enjoined 
to repeat the Pater Noster, or Lord's prayer, in Latin, 
whether they ijappen to understand one word of that lan- 
guage or not. A shepherd, who lived in the very fastness 
of the hills, was no apt scholar in the Pater Noster, and 
for that he was severely and publicly rebuked by the priest. 
When next called upon, he repeated the prayer, without 
one mistake, got much praise for his improvement, and 
continued to deserve it for many months. At last, howev- 
er, the Pater Noster was mutilated, by the omission of the 
words Sanctijicetur and Regnum. The omission was de- 

69. What is remarked respecting the particular names, by which 

we designate the nicer qualities of things -* 70. Which in the 

order of time must be the first, the name, or the notion, or feeling, 

to which the name is given ? 71. What has been used by some 

persons, as an artificial memory of words ^^. 72. Give the instance 

illustrating this. 



Less. 12. intellectual philosopht. 271 

tecled, and a second repetition was enjoined. Still the very 
same omission. *^ Where is Sanclificctur?" said the 
priest. ** Sancfificciur /" rejoined the shepherd : *' 1 have 
no Sanctijicdur now ; I sold her and her two lambs to pay 
the confession-money." ** And Rcgnitm?" '^ Oh, poor 
Rcgnum ! he fell down the black rock, and broke his 
neck ; but he was a reckless, climbing beast all the days 
of him." 

Finding that there was no state of his mind with which 
he could connect the Latin words, but the mere injunction 
of the priest, and that that would not suggest either the 
words themselves, or the order of their succession, the 
shepherd had made them names of as inany individuals of 
his flock ; while the flock remained entire, so did the Pater 
Nostcr ; but when the casualties to which he alluded, had 
deprived him of the realities, the names were forgotten; 
and the mention of them did not recall the Pater Noster, 
but the casualties that had deprived him of the sheep. 

Charles. There is in every case a suggestion of rela- 
tion between the object to which we apply the name, and 
that to which we have formerly applied it, before we can 
make the application ; and this is nothing more than the 
uniformity of succession, to which we give the name of 
cause and effect. 

Edward. And surely it should never have been the oc- 
casion of any difliculiy or dispute. 

Dr. Hirbert. Neither it would, nor could any part of 
the study of mind or of matter, if tliey had not come to it with 
the difficulty ready made. The use of the word idea, as 
expressing a mere state of the mind, is by no means so 
happy as could be wished, as it is very difficult not to con- 
sider it as some separate existence, resembling the thing 
of which we call it the idea. Even those who are aware 
that the belief is nonsense, can hardly refrain from believ- 
ing that the idea of a triangle must have three sides and 
three angles. Perception^ as expressive of the external af- 
fections of the mind, is less objectionable, because it sug- 
gests to us immediately a state of that which perceives. 
But in the internal aff'ections, where the percipient and 
the thing perceived arc the same, or, rather, where there 

73. Wliat objection is tliere to the use of the word idea? 

74. What is remarked respecting the word perception, and why it 
it not sufficiently definite ? 



272 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 12. 

is nothing but the state of perceiving, it is very difficult to 
make use of any term, which shall not, in a greater or a less 
degree, lead us to imat^ine that there is, in that very mind, 
of which absolute indivisibility forms the definition, a sort 
of shadowy separation into perceived subject and perceiving 
power. 

Mary. If we were to call that consciousness which 
we have of an object as actually present to the senses, 
external perception^ and that which we have of an object 
as present only in thought, internal perception^ should we 
not thereby avoid some part of the ambiguity of the ex- 
pression ? 

Dr. Herbert. That would certainly be a better term 
than the word *' idea," or even than the w^ord ** conception,'' 
which is very often used to denote our internal affections, 
but to which we are in some danger of attributing the same 
shadowy existence, as to ** idea." Yet still, as the real 
perception is in all cases inward — of the mind itself — 
whether the antecedent cause be sensation or suggestion ; 
the words external and internal do not apply to the state 
itself, but to the supposed locality of its immediate antece- 
dent or cause ; which cause again, in as far as the mind is 
concerned, is just as internal in the one case as in the oth- 
er. The word notiun, as not involving any necessary con- 
sideration, either of separate existence, or of locality in 
space, is perhaps preferable to any other. 

Charles. And it agrees well with our common modes of 
speech. We say that we have a '* general notion" of any 
thing, not when we have an intimate knowledge of all its 
particular appearances and qualities, but when we are con- 
scious of some resemblance that it has to other things with 
w^hich we are better acquainted. 

Dr. Herbert. We shall find, in whatever instance of 
the formation of the objects of our thoughts into classes, 
whether into the common classes, such as minerals, and veg- 
etables, and animals, or into those which the students of 
nature have formed from a more close and careful examina- 

75. Why are not the expressions external perception and internal 

perception sufficiently free from ambij^aity ? 76. What word is 

mentioned as preferable to any of ihe preceding* terms i^ 

77. What do we mean, when we say, that we have 2i general notion 

of anything? 78. What is remarked respecting this general 

notion in the formation of the objects of our thoughts into classes ? 



Less. 12. intellectual philosophy. 273 

ation, there is no need for going beyond this general notion 
— that it, or rather the relation by which it is suggested, is 
all that we know ; and that every thing that has been, or 
that can be attempted to be added, whether it be the V' uni- 
versal a parte rd^^ the ** general idea," or the ** general 
term," adds nothing to the knowledge ; though when it 
takes the latter form, and is used like all other parts of 
language, as an arbitrary sign by which knowledge may be 
communicated, it becomes one of the mo^i powerful instru- 
ments in the extension of knowledge ; and though it be 
nothing in itself but a sound, or a succession of sounds, 
which could impress those who had never met with it before 
with no notion save the mere perception of itself, yet it be- 
comes, in its proper use, the golden chain in which the wis- 
dom of all men and all generations is bound together, free 
to every one that chooses to examine it, and proof against 
destruction and decay. 

Edward. The attributing of the origin of knowledge to 
language, appears to me to be a mistake, very much of the 
same kind as if the inhabitants of a country like England, 
which profits so much by the use of tools and machines, 
were to ascribe their first invention to the machines them- 
selves, and not to the men who contrived them. 

Charles. It is singular that with such mistaken notions 
of the origin of knowledge, mankind should ever have made 
any progress in reasoning. 

Dr. Herbert. That it did encumber the reasonings of 
men, or rather the verbal expression of them, with idle 
forms, is true ; but upon the actual process of reasoning, 
it had little effect. During the existence of all those fan- 
ciful systems of astronomy and chemistry, in which spheres, 
and ethers, and essences, were set to do the whole, the 
motions of the planets, and the component parts of bodies, 
were just the same as they are now ; and even in the verjr 
adoration of Nominalism, the most devoted philosophic 
man never needed to have a keeper with him to call out 
**fire! fire!" or *' water ! water!" to prevent the man 
who had no key to former experience but the mere word, 

79. What is remarked respecting its usefulness when it takes the 

form of the general term? 80. What was the effect of the 

errors, into wnich the philosophers fell, on the actual process of 
reasoning f 

34 



274 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 13. 

from jumping into a furnace, or walking into a mill-pond. 
They made the comparison, and they acted on it, without 
ever thinking of the mere word, at the very time when 
they were worshipping the word and rejecting the reality. 
We shall, however, be better able to understand this pro- 
cess, which, to whatever extent it may be carried, is only 
a certain number of suggestions of relations, in considering 
the succession of relative suggestions. 



LESSON XIII. 

Limits of general names — Circumstances which suo^gest comparisons 
— Philosophy of education — Invention and discovery — Examples 
of the process of reasonino- — b}^ co-existent comparisons — by .com- 
parisons in succession — Talent and genius. 

Dr, Herbert. Of course I need hardly ask you if you 
remember the successive parts, into which those states of 
mind which enable us to apply to one object the same 
name that we have previously applied to another, can be 
resolved. 

3Iati(da, There are three of them : First, we must have 
a notion of each of the subjects; secondly, we must have a 
feeling of the resemblance ; and, thirdly, we m.ust, from that 
feeling, apply or reject the common name. 

Dr, Herbert. And what were the errors on this sub- 
ject which we mentioned had made so much noise in the 
world ? 

Edward. The error of the Realists, who considered that 
in every reference to a class of things, there was a certain 
mysterious standard — a '^ universal a parte rei^^ which was 
all the class, and not one of the class, at the same time ; 
and which, though it always made its mental appearance 
when a general term was used, and to every one using it — 
though there had been a million of them at once at any dis- 

1. Into what successive parts can those states of mind be resolv- 
ed, which enable us to apply to one object the same name, that we 
have previously applied to another? — —2. What was the error of 
the Realists t- 3. What was its peculiar character ? 



Less. 13. intellectual -PHiLObopiiY. 275 

tance from each — never upon any one occasion revealed 
itself to the senses of any one individual. 

Charles, There was also the error of the Nominalists, 
who really seem, to me, though probably they did not in- 
tend it, to have been Realists under another name; for the 
power wiiich the one attribute to the image, the others at- 
tribute to the word, when they su[)pose that it has, without 
any previous knowledge, the capacity of making us ac- 
quainted with its meaning. Now, if we get our informa- 
tion respecting the classes and classification of things, with- 
out any reference to our former knowledge and experience, 
it really seems to me to cofue precisely to the same thing, 
whether we attribute it to the *' universal a parte rei^' or 
the general term, a parte rei ; for as they are both supposed 
to represent that which has no existence, either as a 
state of the mind, or as external of the mind, they are both 
mere names : and the one leaves us as much without any 
principle to guide us in our classitications or comparisons 
as the other. 

31ar}j, You mentioned, also, the Idealists, or Concep- 
tualists, which seemed to me to be a sort of mixture of the 
former two. If the idea was a separate existence, not re- 
sulting from the comparison of the individuals, it was near- 
ly the same as Realism ; and if a conclusion drawn from 
the general name, then it was Nominalism. 

Charles. It appears to me, that if we could obtain a gen- 
eral notion of any class of things, such, for instance, as tri- 
angles, without any reference to, or comparison of, the in- 
dividual specimens that we had formerly known or examin- 
ed ; and if, from this general notion, we were enabled to 
affirm any thing of an individual, as an individual triangle, 
which we had not seen, or got described to us in some way 
or other ; then, 1 think, we would have to come to a very 
singular conclusion. 

Dr. Herbert. You are getting quite metaphysical, 
Charles, and would have had every chance of promotion in 
the army of Al)elard or Occam. Pray, what would this con- 
clusion have been ? 

4. What other error is mentioned r 5. Why have the views 

of the Realists and Nomintlists heen thought to differ more in name 

than inreaUty? 6. \Vh;it is remarked about the Ide.di-ts .^ 

7. On what condition would their views be the same as Realism? 
8. And on what, the same as Nominalism ? 



276 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 13. 

Charles, That we must have known any thing of 
which we were ignorant, — that we should have needed no 
book or teacher, or personal observation, — for all knowl- 
edge would have been communicated by the universal or 
the general term, and by the one, just as well as by the 
other. 

Dr. Ilerhtrt. What would have been the process ? 
Charles. There would have been no process, no effort of 
mind in the case. We should have had the general notion 
without experience, and if that had not made us acquainted 
with all those qualities, in the individuals which brought 
them within that class rather than any other, I do not see 
how it could be a general notion at all. 

Dr. Herbert. Singular as that conclusion is, there is 
not the least doubt that it would follow from the premises; 
for if we could get the knowledge ot any one external 
existence without any experience, or, which is the same 
thing, knuwledge of it, there is every reason to conclude, 
that we should get the knowledge of all others in the very 
same way. 

Mary. The great men, to whom you have alluded, 
could not possibly believe a doctrine that led to such con- 
clusions as that; and, therefore, they must have deceived 
themselves by a mere verbal misapprehension. 

Dr. Herbert. In the case of some of the greatest of 
them, those to whom the science is, in other respects, under 
the greatest obligations, the cause of error here seems to 
have been even less than verbal ; for it is nothing more than 
the misapplication of a single letter, and that the first letter 
of the alphabet. 

Edioard. What ! the letter a mislead philosophers ? 

Dr. Herbert. Yes; the very same; and to convince 
you of it, I shall read you one short extract from one of 
the very best works of one of our very best authors — a work 
which vve shall soon be in a condition for reading, and which, 
notwithstanding a few errors, we cannot fail to read with 
great pleasure as well as profit — the Essay on Human Un- 
derstanding, by Locke. In the ninth section of the seventh 

9. What conclusion must follow the adoption of the errors men- 
tioned ? 10. How could men of learninor possibly admit prem- 
ises, which would lead to such consequences ^ 11. What is ro- 

marked respecting Locke's Essay on Human Uuderstanding ? 



Less. 13. intellectual philosophy. 277 

chapter of the fourth book of that work, there are these 
words : — 

*' Does it not require some pains and skill to form the 
general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most 
abstract, comprehensive, and difficult), for it must be neither 
oblique nor retangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor 
scalene ; but all, and none of these at once. In effect, it 
is something imperfect that cannot exist ; an idea, in which 
some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are 
put together." — The whole error in this single combination 
of words, lies in the expression ** a triangle ;" and if that 
were changed to "the triangle," the confusion would have 
vanished, because we would have had only to go to 
**the triangle," and the comparison of its sides or its angles 
with that which made us fir^t arrange triangles into the 
classes of oblique or retangular, or equilateral, or equi- 
crural, or scalene, and the agreement ot its properties with 
those of the class, would have made us as easily refer it 
to that particular class, as its correspondence with those 
more general properties, which are common to all triangles, 
enabled us to class it with triangles, and not with squares 
or circles. 

In like manner, in every other case, the confusion has 
arisen from the use of the general term at one time, and 
the particular one at another. The three sides, or the 
three angles — for the one is a consequence of the other 
— are all the circumstances that are necessaiy to form the 
general notion of a triangle ; because they are the only 
ones common to all triangles ; and any thing further, such 
as the relations of the sides or angles to each other, or 
the absolute lengths of the sides, belong either to similar 
triangles, or to triangles of one determinate form or mag- 
nitude. 

All subjects of perception or suggestion which we can 
in any way arrange into classes, we classify upon exactly 

12. "What is the principal error pointed out in the quotation 

from Locke r 13. From what has confusion and obscurity arisen 

in every other case ? 14. What are the only circumstances, that 

are necessary to form the general notion of a triangle ^ 15. What 

reason can be given for this ? 16. How do we arrange into 

classes all subjects of perception and suggestion which admit of 
classltication ? 

2i* 



378 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 13. 

the same principle ; — as animal^ when we refer merely to 
the property or properties in which all aniinais agree; 
mammalia and avts,^ when we make a more minute divi- 
sion ; then come the orders and genera, the species, the 
varieties, and, lastly, the individuals. But though as we 
become more minute in our observations, we make each 
subdivision upon the discovery of properties which do not 
belong to the more general class, still they must not be in- 
consistent with these — must not exclude them ; for if in 
our minute investigation of triangles we come to a figure 
which had not three sides and three angles, that figure 
would not belong to the family of triangles at all, but would 
have to be transferred to the class with which it agreed ; or 
if there was no such class, a name entirely new would have 
to be given 1o it, 

Charles. Then all those qualities that belong to the whole 
class in common, are suggested by the general name, if 
that name has been properly applied. 

/>r. Herbert. All the known ones are; but many others 
equally general may be deduced from these by new instan- 
ces of comparison ; — as, in the case of the triangle, that the 
sum of the three angles is always equal to two right angles, 
however their relative proportions, as compared with each 
other, may be varied ; or that the area is always the same 
function^ of the three sides, whatever may be their absolute 
or their relative lengths. Our assertion must never exceed 
our knowledge ; and the assumption that we know all the 
properties of one subject, or all the common properties of a 
class, is assuming that which, by the assumption, we admit 
that we do not know. 



^Mammalia and aves^ are terms in zoology expressing two 
sorts of the animal kind. 

fin mathematics, the function of a variable quantity, is any 
algebraic expression into which that quantity enters mixt 
with other quantities that have invariable values. 

TVehster. 

17. What is the illustration of this principle? 18. What is 

suggested by the general name, when it is properly applied ? 

19. By what means may many other quahties, equally general, be 

deduced? 20. What examples illustrate this? 21. How 

should our a^ssertion always compare with our knowledge? 

22. When do we assume that, which, by the assumption, we admit 
we do not know ? 



Less. 13. intellectual niiLosopiiY. 279 

Echtard. But if our reasonings be only com[)iri<ons of 
that which uc already know, how can we come at any new 
knowledire ? 

Dr. llnbcrt. Just in the very same way that we came 
by the okl, — with this advantage, however, that the more 
we know already, the acquisition is the easier. We have 
seen already that one simple perception does not of itself 
constitute knowledge, and that though we were ever so 
conscious of the new state of mind, we would know noth- 
ing of its cause, or its certain or probable effect, unless 
some former state were suggested, and a comparison of 
them were instituted. To our own mind, this process is 
instantaneous : but when we communicate it to others, 
we must put it in that form which we call a proposition, 
or one step in a chain or process of reasoning; and that 
chain may be continued either by a series of perceptions, 
or of suggestions. Thus, at the farther end of a very long 
road, we see a dark coloured object ; it may be a bush, 
or a pedestrian, or a horseman. The visual angle under 
which it is seen remains the same — it is something station- 
ary ; that angle diminishes — it is moving from us ; the 
angle increases — it is moving tow^ards us; it approaches — 
and its outline becomes more defined — it is a horseman ; 
but though we have some shadowy notion that the whole is 
dark, we cannot tell whether the horse be black or brown, 
or the coat of the i ider green or blue. It comes still nearer 
— the horse is brown, and the coat green ; but we know 
not who the man is, or what is his business. It approach- 
es still nearer — the man is a friend, whom we love, but 
have not seen for some time, come unexpectedly to pay us 
a visit ; we arc delighted, and run with pleasure over 
thousands of associations, which, if the train of our succes- 
sive perceptions had been broken at any one link, would 
have remained unheeded. 

Mary. And we should have been equally unable to come 
at the last conclusion, if we had been icrnorant of anv of the 



23. How can we acquire any new knowledge if our rea-onings 

be only comparisons of what we already know ? 24. W'hi.t is 

remarked respectins: one single perception ; and also respecting- (he 

new state of nJnd. of which we may be conscious? 25. How ia 

this process to our own minds ? 26. But when we communi- 
cate it to others', what must we do.' 27. Give the illustration. 



1 



2S0 J'lRST LESSONS IN LesS. 13. 

portions of former experience, upon which the successive 
comparisons were founded, or if we had been wrong in the 
making of any of them. 

Matilda As if the former experience had not been sug- 
gested — as if the friend had been so long absent, or so alter- 
ed, that we could not recognize him. 

Dr. Herbert. In this very simple case we have the whole 
process of reasoning, with the principal errors and imperfec- 
tions, to which it is liable. There may be errors of obser- 
vation, errors in comparison — the suggestion may be a 
wrong one, or it may not come at all, — at least, it may not 
come at the time when we want it. 

Edward. If we have not the means of recalling the 
conceptions, and making the comparisons that we wish, how 
can one man be more sagacious, that is, a better reasoner, 
than another ? 

Dr. Herbert, That there are very great differences 
both in the readiness and the accuracy with which men 
reason, we cannot deny ; but still no separate principle, 
which we could call sagacity, or any wish on the part of 
the individual, has any thing to do with the occurrence or 
non-occurrence of the suggestions. If wishing would do it, 
the pauper would be as wealthy as Crcssus, and the fool as 
wise as the philosopher; and the former would be even an 
easier acquisition than the latter, — inasmuch, as we may 
know what wealth is, without possessing it, while the knowl- 
edge and the possession of wisdom are the same. Hence 
that we should wish to remember a particular and definite 
suggestion rather than another, supposes that we are already 
in possession of that which we are wishing to possess. In 
our trains of thought and feeling, a wish may arise as 
the consequent of a suggestion, as the slightest reference 
to the friend whom I love, suggested by the most trifling 
resemblance, may make me wish for the presence of the 
friend that I love ; and this wish may be followed by a 
thousand suggestions, which all have a reference to the 
same friend ; but even in that simple case, I cannot wish 

28. In this instance, what would have been the consequence, if 
we had besn ignorant of any of the portions of our former expe- 
rience, or had made our comparisons incorrectly ? 29. What are 

the errors to which we are liable in any process of reasoning ? 

80. What does the wish to remember a particular suggestion, rather 
than another, suppose } 



Less. 13. intellectual philosophy. 281 

precise knowledge even of that friend, for the very wish in* 
volves the possession of the knowledge itself When we 
cannot lenieniher, the mind is in precisely the same state 
of wonder as when, in perceptijn, it c;ninot understand; 
and the want of one subject of comparison to answer at the 
call of another, is the immediate source ot the embarrass- 
ment in both. 

Mary. But may not this very embarrassment, and the 
agitation of mind that results from it, be indirectly the means 
by which we at last arrive at the gralificaiion of our wish, 
whether the object of that wish be the knowledi^e of that 
of which we are ignorant, or the suggestion of that which 
we have forgotten ? 

Dr. Htrbcrt. Certainly it may ; for tlie excitement of 
the mind, even though we are not conscious of the imme- 
diate cause ol that excitement, is the first step toward the 
acquisition of all knowledge; and in the excitement, some 
analogy may arise, which shall lead to a train of successive 
conceptions and comparisons, which even thougii we do not 
at first [)erceive its tendency, may, in the end, conduct us 
to the solution of that which first excited our wonder. The 
successive states of mind ihat follow an excitement of 
this kind, are not improperly called rcjiections, because, 
in the course of them, the mind as it were withdraws from 
sensation altogether ; and in proportion as the desire of 
resolving the doubt or clearing up the difficulty is intense, 
the objects of all the senses are neglected, even though 
they be the very objects which, when the mind is so unoc- 
cupied with internal affection as to allow perception to fol- 
low in its fiill force, make the strongest impression upon 
the organs of sense. 

Mary. A very slight coincidence will lead to a train of 
this kind. I remember that, when we were in London, and 
you took us, one morning, to see the flowers in Convent 
Garden market, there was one little moss rose in a pot, so 
like one that I had planted, and tended, and Watered, at 

31. In what state is the mind, when we cannot remember .' 

32. In what way may the embarrassment and agitation of mind, 
which may ari-e from not being able to remember, he the means 

of sugges'ing what we have forgotten .' 33. What are the 

successive st^itps of mind, that follow an excitement of this kind 
called ; and why ? 



282 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 13. 

home, that I lost sight of all the other flowers, and the crowd, 
and the city itself, and was actually at home among our own 
flowers and shrubberies ; and might have been trampled 
down in the streets, if you had not held me by ihe hand ; 
and I did not leave home till we had got to the exhibition 
of pictures, at Somerset House. 

Dr. Herbert. 1'here can be no question that the resem- 
blance of that which has been dear to us, more especially 
in our early years, when our stojk of knowledge is small, 
when unexplored novelty lies every where around us, and 
when even the most trifling acquisition counts, is one of 
the most certain means of suggestion. Let a human being 
have been born in the most rude or desolate quarter of the 
world, — let his nurture there have been privation, want, 
— nay, direct injury and oppression, — let him be sent to 
the most distant part of the earth, and there let him, by 
one successful adventure after another, wax abundant in 
wealth ai]d great in power, — let the gold of the west, and 
the gems of the east, be poured upon him, — let nations bow 
down at his si^ht, and countless trains of attendants absolve 
him almost from motion, and luxury render a single wish 
superfluous; even there amid all the pomp of wealih, and 
all that those who have it not, would call the ecstacy of en- 
joyment, — let but the suggestion of the cottage, or the hovel, 
which he first called home, the wild flower which his little 
hand first cropped, or of that kind eye which first glowed 
at his infant consciousness, come across his mind, and the 
picture of youth will return in feelings of such ecstatic de- 
light, that an entire age of all his wealth, all his power, and 
all his luxury, would be cheerfully bartered for one single 
glance at the reality of that darling and imperishable re- 
membrance. 

Charles. Then it is of the utmost importance that the 
impressions that are associated with those times of early re- 
membrance should be those that are likely to be useful to 
us in our future life. Information which is blended with 
those scenes and subjects of easy suggestion, must be much 
more ready when we want it, than that which we acquire 
in after life. 



34. What is one of the most certain means of suggestion ? 

35. What instance, illustrating: this subject, is iniioduced ? 

36. What inference must we draw respecting the character of our 
early impressions ? 



Less. 13. intellectual philosophy. 283 

Dr. Herbert. That is the principle upon which all edu- 
cation proceeds ; but the profit, even when the intention of 
the instruction is the same, may be very different. We 
have had occasion more than once to notice the division 
of mankind into two remarkable classes — not the vulgar 
ones of the ignorant and the learned, but two, into which 
the learned and the ignorant may be pretty equally divided, 
— men in whose minds the suggestions of observation and 
instruction rise in simple succession, like the events of 
a chronology, with no relation save that of the mere order 
of succession ; and men in whom the comparison of every 
two suggestions is itself a new state of mind, an actual ad- 
dition to their knowledge, and wdio, by this comparison 
alone, add in the first instance a full half to all tiiatthey ob- 
serve or are told, and by repeating this comparison at every 
successive step of thought, learn to view all given states of 
external things as the effects of their former causes, or 
as the causes of future efTects. It is this faculty of com- 
parison, which being, like all exercises of the mind, the re- 
sult of experience, must be vigorous in proportion to the 
experience, which alone is worthy of cultivation. The eye 
can see, and the ear can hear, without any labour of the 
school-master ; and, therefore, his proper province is to point 
out the necessity/ of so comparing the subjects of observa- 
tion or information with e<ichoiher,ih3.i a. second perception 
or simple suggestion of them may suggest also their quali- 
ties^ as existing in space, and their origins and applications 
as existing in time. 

In the application of this principle there is a nominalism, 
which, as it is far more extensive than that nominalism 
of the philosophers, to which we have already directed our 
attention, is far more injurious — a nominalism which 
makes the knowledge of particular things consist as much 
in the mere names of them as the nominalism of the 
schools does the knowledge of the classes. There are 
many men who are great adepts in this verbal information — 

37. What is the first of the two jireat classes, into which man- 
kind may be said to be divided ? 38. What is tlie second class? 

39. What is remarked respecting this faculty of comparison ? 

40. What is the proper province of the schoolmaster ? 

41. What is there in the application of this principle, and what is 

its effect .' What are the characteristics of a nominalist of this 

class ? 



284 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 13. 

who can enumerate the events of history, or run over the 
vocabulary of the sciences, without one single deviation 
from the book ; but who, in consequence of the very 
abundance and accuracy of this remembrance, have really 
no more feeling of the resemblance or diversity on which 
classification is founded, than they have of the inhabitants 
of the planets, or of that law of nature which gives per- 
manent lustre to some of the stars, while others are contin- 
ually changing. 

Now, though in the use of knowledge after it has been 
acquired, the mind can vanquish both space and time, be 
at the remotest visible star as speedily as at the point of the 
finger, or over all time before the clock has beat one second, 
yet space has to be traversed, and time has to be spent in 
the acquisition of it. If, therefore, there be much of our 
knowledge acquired in such a way as shall lead only to the 
simple suggestion of it, the fact of simple memory must be- 
come the leading characteristic of the mind, to the exclu- 
sion of that comparison which suggests the uses of things 
in addition to the mere memory. It is this instantaneous 
perception of relations which constitutes that description of 
mind to which we give the general name o^ talent or abiliti/, 
and which, modified by the peculiar experience of the in- 
dividual, becomes talent in a particular science or for a 
particular art, and which, when it has been directed to 
many subjects, forms what we call a philosophic mind, that 
is, a mind that compares or reflects upon all the subjects of 
its perception and suggestion. 

Edivard, Then we have not the power of thinking what- 
ever we please, or of arriving at any conclusion we please in 
our reasonings 1 

Dr, Herbert, We cannot will even the smallest portion 
of knowledge of which we are ignorant; neither can we 
alter any one judgment which we derive from comparison. 
All that we have a complete and immediate control over, 
is our own actions. We can go where we believe informa-- 

42. In what respect is there a contrast between the use of knowl- 
edge after it has been acquired, and the acquisition of it? 43. 

What will be the consequence, if our knowledge be acquired in such 

a way, as shall lead only to the simple sugajestion of it ? 44. What 

constitutes that description of mind called talent, or ability ? - 

45. When we speak of a philosophic mind," what is meant? 

46. Have we the power of thinking whatever we please, or of 

coming to any conclusion we please in our reasonings ? 47. Of 

what have we the entire control ? 



Less. 13. intellectual riiiLOsopiiY. 285 

tioii is to be found, or we can abstain from goinir, and re- 
main in ignorance; and we may bring external substances 
together, liear the accounts of diflcrent narratives, or read 
the writings of diflferent authors; but the information that 
we get, and the conclusions to wliich we come, arc dis- 
coveries and not inventions; and all that we can obtain in 
any case is the properties of the substance, when we meet 
with it again, without any repetition of the physical analysis, 
or the consequent of the antecedent event, before it is actu- 
ally placed before us. We never make the knowledge of 
things but where we make the things that are known ; and 
to maintain the contrary, would be to invest man with the 
attributes of divinity. 

Charles, Then how is it that some men arrive at conclu- 
sions to which other men cannot leach ? There have been 
many makers of machines, but only one James Watt; and 
many astronomers, but only one Newton. 

Mary, There could not be two, in the particular con- 
clusions to which these great men came ; for, until the 
actual discovery by the one, and the actual invention by 
the other, these did not belong to knowledge at all. New- 
ton did not contrive the fall of the apple or the motions of 
the heavenly bodies ; he only compared the one with the 
other : and Watt did not contrive that property of steam upon 
which the improvement that he introduced into the engine 
depends; he only placed it in a new combination of ves- 
sels, without being sure of the effect until he had actually 
seen it. 

Dr, Herbert. That is the true distinction. Those ap- 
titudes of things which make their applications in certain 
ways the antecedents of those changes that we desire, are 
all the results of discovery ; and the only contrivance that 
we can make, even in the nicest investigation of science, 
or the most curious process of art, is the placing of the 

48. In what way may we use (his control so as to extend our in- 
formation? 49. Is the information we get, or the conclusion 

to which we come, a discovery or an invention ? 50. What re- 
mark is made respecting the discovery of gravitation by Newton, 

and the invention of the steam engine by Watt ? 51. What may 

be said to be t!ie results of discovery ? 52. What is the amount 

of the only contrivance, that we can make, even in the nicest ir - 
vestigation of science, or the most curious process of art .'' 

25 



286 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 13. 

implements and substances, made use of in the process, 
in those situations in which we know, from former ex- 
periment, or believe from analogy, that the result will be 
what we wish. Experiment may lead the half instruct- 
ed nation to find that kneaded clay may be more easily 
moulded into a circular vessel upon the potter's wheel, 
than by the mere action of the fingers; but there must 
be some knowledge that clay, or a substance having some 
resemblance to clay, can be moulded, before the ruder and 
more slow process of manipulation give place to the use of 
the wheel. 

Charles. Then all discoveries of results that are nev/ must 
be, to a certain extent, casual or accidental. 

Dr. Herbert. In extreme cases they may be entirely so : 
for the result of the experiment, may be that of which the 
experimenter himself had not previously the slightest knowl- 
edge, and regarding which, it was, therefore, impossible 
for him to form the least wish. But there is in mankind 
a general desire ol knowledge, as extensive as the race, 
which no indolence, and no misdirection, can altogether 
destroy, and which, probably, not the immediate prospect 
of dissolution can arrest ; for the mind at the last mo- 
ment of its earthly consciousness, may be busy in forming 
future plans for the conducting of those subjects, with 
which it has been most familiar, — and the pious expres- 
sions of the good, andthe blasphemings of the worthless, 
at the time when the external combination is dissolving, 
are perhaps among the most irrefragable proofs of the 
tendency of the mind to return, in suggestion, to those 
subjects with which it has been longest and most habitually 
familiar. 

Charles. This also agrees with the fact, that discoveries 
have generally been made by those whose attention has 
been long turned towards subjects similar to those upon 
which the improvements were made. Poets have seldom 
introduced improvements into machinery ; and those whose 
attention has been closely occupied with such subjects, 
have never been very remarkable for their poetical acquire- 
ments. It should seem, therefore, that, in order to attain 

53. Under what circumstances may the discoveries of results be 

accidental ? 54. What is remarked respecting the general desire 

of knowledge among mankind ? 55. How may the pious expres- 
sions of the good and the blasphemings of the worthless be considered ? 



Less. 13. intellectual niiLosopiiY. 287 

eminence in any one department of human study, the 
attention should be directed chiefly, or ahiiost exclusively, 
to that. 

Dr. Herbert. If tlie object be acquaintance with the 
niceties of a certain art, or with those technical details of a 
particular science, which are in some measure only an art 
under another name, the restriction may be necessary ; 
though even there, if the art regards more than one sub- 
stance, or one operation, or the science requires more 
than one mode of investigation, there is a limit, con- 
fined within which the individual success would be di- 
minished. But where any thing at all worthy of the 
name of philosophy, or even of that sound judgment which 
is essential to the conduct of life, is to be aimed at, 
the trains of thought must take a wider range ; because 
the objects in nature, and the phenomena to which they 
give rise, are so blended together, that we cannot know 
them, in all their aptitudes and relations, but in pro- 
portion as we know them all ; and this knowledge must 
extend to the events in the order of succession, just in the 
same manner as to those relations of which the conceptions 
are regarded as co-existent, when the feeling of relation 
arises. 

Matilda. In considering relations in the order of suc- 
cession, are we not in some danger of confounding mere 
succession in time with succession of antecedent and con- 
sequent, in that intimate and unvariable order to which we 
give the name of cause and effect? 

Dr. Herbert. In that which we perceive, or, as it were, 
make our own, in thought, we are not in much danger of 
committing these mistakes ; but when we content ourselves 
with sifnply remembering the knowledge of others, or, 
rather, the words in which they intended to communicate 
that knowledge, we are sometimes in danger of confound- 
ing mere proximity in time, or even in place, with that 
succession to which the nane and the common notion of 



5G. What will be the effect of confinino; the attention exclusively 

to one department of human study r 57. But why c;innot this 

exclusive attention to one department of human study furnish u.-^ with 

the knowledge worthy of the name of philosophy ? '58. Under 

what circumstances are we liable to confound mere succession ia 
time, with succession of antecedent and consequent? 



/288 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 13. 

cause and effect are applied. In all our misapplications 
of cause and effect — and they lead to the most frequent as 
well as the most fatal errors, both in judgment and in action 
— we are misled by deceptions of proximity, — by confound- 
ing, as we formerly said, one quality, or one succession, with 
another, 

Mary. It must be to the abuse, and not the simple 
possession, of memory, that these evils are to be attributed. 
We can find any object, as for instance, a book, better 
from its being in a particular room, than if we had to 
search all the house indiscriminately for it; and the mere 
dates in chronology lead us to the events of which they are 
the dates. 

Dr. Herhert. Any arrangement, even though we can 
trace it to no resemblance in the objects that are put in jux- 
taposition, must, after we have learned it, lead us to the dif- 
ferent parts of it, in their order. As, for example, any one 
letter of the alphabet suggests the letter next to it in the 
alphabetical order, rather than the one which most resem- 
bles it in form or sound, or position of the organs of speech 
in the pronouncing of it ; b has more resemblance in pro- 
nunciation to p or T, than to a or to c ; and yet the last 
are the letters which b naturally suggest. When, however, 
the principle of suggestion is of this vague and unmeaning 
nature, it is more difficult to learn, and less useful after it 
is learned, than if the principle were one of resemblance. 
Of those principles or means of suggestion, the relation of 
cause and effect is one of the most valuable, because it 
furnishes us with the object or event, and what we call the 
use of it, at one and the same time. 

Charles. In a single instance, it does not appear to me 
to differ much from any other relation of comparison. I 
perceive the succession of one event to another in time, by 
the same act of judgment that t perceive the agreement or 
the disagreement of two co-existent subjects ; and if I wish to 



59. By what are we misled in our misapplications of cause and 

effect? 60. What remark is made respecting an arrangement, 

as a principle of sugg:estion, which does not include the resemblance 

of objects? 61. What relation, as a means of sugoestion, is the 

most useful ; and why is it so .? 62. By what reasonin<; does it 

appear, that the act of judgment in the perception of the succession 
of one event to another in time is the same, as the perception of ths 
agreement or the disagreement ot two co-existent subjects? 



Less. 13. intellectual philosophy. 289 

pursue the investigation backward to a remote cause, or 
forward to a remote effect, 1 can only do it by a succession 
of judgments, or chain of reasoning, in the very same way 
tliat 1 arrive at the comparison of objects wfiich I cannot 
bring into immediate juxtaposition, and at once perceive 
their agreement, or their disagreement, by the means of 
other and intermediate comparisons, wiiich enable me, as 
it were, to carry the first of the original objects forward 
through the succession, till it came into juxtaposition with 
the last one. 

Dr. Herbert. Perhaps we shall be better able to under- 
stand you, if you give us an instance. 

Charles, Then let the comparison at which I wish to ar- 
rive be that of the relation of the square upon the longest 
side or hypotenuse, of a right-angled triangle, to the sum of 
the squares upon the other two sides ; and the ultimate ef- 
fect be that of the conversion of a portion of iron ore into 
any implement, as into a nail. 

Dr. Herbert, Your instances will do — only show us how 
you would analyse the process of reasoning. 

Cliarles. If I construct a square upon each of the three 
sides of the triangle, I cannot compare them, because they 
are not in any situation in which I have been able to per- 
ceive the equality or the inequality of figures. But still, 
in their construction, I have made one step, because I am 
able to perceive that each of the shorter sides of the triangle 
is a continuation of the side of the square upon the ad- 
jacent side, and, therefore, parallel to the opposite side of 
that square ; and from what I have already learned, I know 
that if there be two triangles, having the same portion of 
one of these parallel lines as their common base, and their 
vertices, in any two points of the other parallel, those two 
triangles must be equal to one another in surface. I 
also know, that if a squareor retangle and triangle be upon 
the same base, and terminate in the same parallel, the sur- 
face of the square or retangle must be double that of the 
triangle. 

Now if from the right angle of my triangle I draw a 
line intersecting the opposite side of the triangle, and par- 
allel to two sides of the square on that side, and if I draw 
other two lines from the same angle, to the opposite angles 
of the square, I shall have the square divided into two re- 
25* 



290 



FIRST LESSONS IN 



Less. 13, 



tangles; and I shall have two triangles upon the same 
bases as those retangles, and between the same parallels, 
and, therefore, each triangle will be half of the correspond- 
ing retangle, and the two triangles together will be equal 
to half the square, upon the longest side of my original 
triangle. 

After this, if I draw a line from each of the acute angles 
of my original triangle to the most distant angle of the 
square on the opposite side of the same, I shall be in pos- 
session of two triangles, which are upon the same bases 
and between the same parallels, each with one of the 
squares upon the shorter sides of my triangle, and which, 
together, will, therefore, be equal to the half of those 
squares taken together. Thus 1 have obtained two tri- 
angles, which are together equal to half the largest square, 
and other two, which are together equal to half the sum 
of the two small squares ; and, therefore, it is evident, that 
whatever relation 1 can establish between the former two 
triangles and the latter two, the very same relation must 
subsist between the large square and the sum of the two 
small ones. 

Now comparing that triangle of the former pair, which 
is equal to half the division of the large square, that lies 
toward the right hand of the parallel line which I drew 
from the right angle of my original triangle,— if 1 com- 
pare this triangle with that which is equal to half the small 
square, toward the same hand, I find that they have those 
properties from w'hich I have previously proved the per- 
fect quality of two triangles, — that is to say, two sides of 

63. Analyse the proposition by means of the diagram. 




Less. 13. intellectual niiLosopiiY. 291 

the one are respectively equal to two sides of the other — 
each of tlieni being respectively sides of the same square, 
and also, that the angle which they contain, in the one 
case, is exactly equal to that which they contain in the other ; 
being in each case a right angle with the very same addi- 
tion. By instituting a similar comparison of the other 
two triangles, I find that they are equal; and, therefore, 
I can no more refrain from believing that the large 
square is equal to the two small squares, than 1 can 
resist believing that equality is equality, or that one thing 
cannot be both greater and less than another at the same 
instant. 

Dr, Herbert. You have stated the analysis with perhaps 
as much perspicuity as the case admits ; and yet, important 
as is the resuh of this analysis, as the grand connexion be- 
tween tlie sciences of figure and number, there is really 
nothing in it farther than a series of successive comparisons, 
in which the judgment is made, not from any discovery or 
invention in any single step, but from the mere repetition of 
that which was formerly known to be true, and that the 
whole value of the conclusion — and it is one of the most 
ihiportant to science that ever was made — lies in the order 
in which tlie comparisons of simple truths, formerly known, 
are arranged. 

Echrard, But when we studied the forty-seventh 
proposition of Euclid's first book, we enunciated the theo- 
rem — asserted the equality of the large square to the 
two small ones — before we entered upon the demonstration. 

Dr. Herbert. That may be ; but you were not the dis- 
coverers of this beautiful instance of equality : and no man, 
though he may have wished, could have asserted that equal- 
ity, in any other way than as a conjecture, unless he had 
arrived at it through the medium of some such succes- 
sion of comparisons as that which has been analysed by our 
brother. 

Mary. I should now wish to know how Charles would 
proceed in making the nail out of the bit of iron ore. 

G4. What in fact is there in this analysis; and in what does the 

whole value of the conclusion lie ? 65. Could any one arrive at 

the trutli of this proposition otherwise, than by going through the 
successive steps of the comparison ? 



292 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 13. 

Charles, I am not actually to make it ; for I tried at 
the blacksmith's shop one day, and made but bungling 
work of it, although 1 had the iron ready prepared for me, 
and all the requisite tools. I can, however, shortly run 
over those successive operations which the ore must pass 
through, as causes and effects, before the nail can be pro- 
duced. 1 cannot go farther back than the ore, and point 
out the unknown causes in the earth which brought that 
quantity of iron together, instead of diffusing it in a mineral 
water, or tinting a crystal with it. But when we get 
the ore, we must melt it, — that is, place it in a very hot 
furnace along with charcoal and a portion of lime, by which 
means it is melted, separated from the impurities, and runs 
off in cast iron, in which state it is granular and brittle. 
The smelting being the operation which precedes, and cast 
iron the invariable consequent of that operation being per- 
formed, on the proper materials, and in the proper manner, 
we say that the change of the ore into cast iron is an effect 
of the smelting. 

Then, if the nail is to have the requisite degree of 
toughness, the cast iron must be changed to malleable iron, 
which is effected by subjecting it to repeated blows of ham- 
mers, or the continued pressure of cylinders, when it is at 
a high temperature. We call the malleable iron the effect 
of this operation, because when the operation is properly 
performed upon cast iron, malleable iron is the invariable 
consequence. 

If 1 wished to give the nail-maker as little trouble as 
possible, I would slit or draw the malleable iron into a rod, 
proportioned to the thickness of the intended nail, and in 
this state deliver it over unto him ; and thus the iron ore 
would be changed into a nail, by a succession of causes 
and effects, each of which might have been, at first, the 
result of accidental observation or of intended experiment; 
but which could not have formed part of the process of 
nail-making, until the trial had been made, and had suc- 
ceeded. 

QQ. What are the successive operations, through which iron ore 

must pass, before it can become a nail? 67. Why is the change 

of the ore into cast iron, called an effect of the smelting r 68. Why 

is the malleable iron called the effect of the hammerinoj ? 69. 

What is remarked respecting the causes and effects which have been 
traced out in this illustration ^ 



Less. 13. intellectual niiLosoniY. 293 

Dr, ITcrhcrt. In every continued process of tliouglit, 
whether the object be to discover the relations of things 
which cannot be brought together and compared immedi- 
ately, or to ascertain remote causes or eflects, the mode of 
proceeding is the same; and all the differences which are 
found in what are called the reasoning or judging facul- 
ties of diflferent individuals, are nothing more than differ- 
ences in the number and the readiness of their suggestions 
of conception and relation. All the varietiesof talent, and 
genius, and judgment, which so much diversify mankind, 
and which have, in all ages, enabled the few to give law and 
opinion to the many, have their foundation in this; and, 
therefore, as there can be no suggestion, even of invention, 
other than a new combination of parts that were formerly 
known, either singly or in former combinations, this is the 
sum of all knowledge. 

Thus when we consider the mind, not, as it is describ- 
ed in the volumes of the schoolmen, as an assemblage of 
contradictory and conflicting powers, but as one indivisi- 
ble existence, taking its successive states, like all other 
existences, from the circumstances in which it is placed, 
we find that, simple as are the ultimate laws of motion, 
as they have been established in the perfecting of mechan- 
ical science, and few as are the simple substances into which 
the chemist can resolve all those millions of objects of 
which the earth, the ocean, and the atmosphere, are made 
up, the science of mind is more simple and more beautiful 
than either. 

(1.) The perception of simple existence, whether 
through the medium of sensation, or in the internal sug- 
gestion of the mind, and ('2.) the perception of relation, 
whether of things co-existent, or in the order of cause and 
effect, — these are the simple catalogue to which all the 
long and formidable, but illusory, array of intellectual pow- 
ers are reduced; and all the fanciful subdivisions that 
have been made, relate not to the mirul itself, but to the 



70. In what cases must (lie niode of proceeding he the same ? 

71. What constitutes the differt'nces, wliich exist in the reasoning 

or judging faculties of different individujils ? 72. flow does the 

science of min<l compare with every other science ? 73. To what 

two states of mind can all tlie '* intellectual powers" he reduced ? 
■ — 74. To what do all the fanciful subdivisions, which have been 
made, relate ' 



V 



294 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 13. 

particular way in which it has been exercised by different 
individuals. When we speak of mechanical genius, we 
merely mean that the individual to whom we apply the 
epithet, has been attentive to the nature and combniation 
of machines: when we speak of poetical genius, we mean 
nothing more than that the individual of whom we speak 
is familiar with those combinations of circumstances, and 
that harmony in the expression of them to which we give 
the name of poetry ; and, in like manner, when we 
speak of sound judgment, or good taste, all that we can 
mean is, that the agreement or disagreement of objects and 
relations, to the minutest shades, readily suggest them- 
selves to the one party, or that similar agreements and dis- 
agreements with that which we call beauty, or propriety, 
or congruity, suggest themselves with equal readiness to the 
other. 

Charles. The error which led to these subdivisions ap- 
pears to me to have been something similar to that which 
perplexed Locke about the general idea of a triangle. He 
found that there were triangles which varied in the rela- 
tions of their sides and their angles, and he wished to have 
a triangle which should be all these, and none of them 
at the same time : and the intellectual philosophers, find- 
ing the minds of men as varied, both in tiiO nature and 
the extent of their information, and capacity ot being in- 
formed, as the individuals with whom they were acquainted, 
or respecting whom they were informed, would have 
man, in his simple and uneducated state, to possess, and, 
at the same time, to want all those varieties. And, as 
in the case of the triangle, the general properties of having 
three sides and three angles, are the whole that enter into 
the composition of that notion, to which Locke gives the 
name of the general idea of a triangle ; so those general 
relations that are common to all the race, and which 
equally exclude genius and duhness, greatness and mean- 
ness, and all the other specific and individual distinctions, 
are all that can properly belong to man, considered gener- 
ally, and, therefore, all that can be admitted into a system 
of intellectual philosophy, if that system has any pretension 
to accuracy. 

75. What do we mean, when we speak of mechanical genius, 
poetical genius, sound judgment, or good taste ? 



Less. 13. intellectual philosophy. 295 

Dr. Herbert. All mankind are born equally in a state 
of ignorance; and if the first exposure to the air should 
occasion pain, or the first inflation of the lungs in breath- 
ing relieve uneasiness, there is no consciousness, at least the 
feeling is never suggested in after life. And we have seen 
that the simple capacities which we have mentioned, are 
quite adequate to the production of all the differences that 
manifest themselves in after life,— all that is required in 
supplement being the circumstances under which the in- 
dividual is placed ; and as, in early life, his parents or 
guardians, and, in more advanced years, the man himself, 
have, in the great majority of cases, a certain control over 
these, they are responsible for the manner in which those 
simple, yet wonderful powers have been cultivated or necr- 
lected. ° 

Mart/. Then all the differences arise from education ? 

Dr. Herbert. If there be no bodily defect, percepti- 
ble or imperceptible, we have no reason to believe that 
there can be any natural diflference ; only we must take 
care not to confine edueation to mere schooling, which, in- 
stead of being education, properly so called, is\'ery often its 
counterfeit, and sometimes its opposite. We know that 
the body can be educated into health and strength, and we 
also know that the state of the body has a wonderful effect 
upon that of the mind ; and, therefore, we cannot be cer- 
tam what influence the education of the body, in health 
in strength, in form, or in the developement of certain parts 
of It more than others, may have upon the direction of the 
thoughts into that particular channel by which the intel- 
lectual character receives its individual cast. A certain 
modification of the organ of hearing, which we cannot dis- 
cover on dissection, or in the discrimination of any other 
than musical sounds, is yet known to constitute what is 
called an ear for music; and, in the same manner, a cer- 
tain modification of the organs of voice, which has nothincr 
to do with articulation, or even with emphasis in speaking'', 

76 What is observed respecting the simple capacities, which 
have been mentioned?— 77. What is requiiite for the develope- 
rnent ot the mind, in addition lo those simple capacities ?-_ 
/. How does It appear that men themselves, or their immediate 
guardiins. are responsible for the manner in which the mind is 

cultivated or neglected ? 79. In what sense may it be said, that 

me dilierences of mind among men arise from education ' 



296 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 13. 

gives that power of expression which enables the possessor 
to sing with feeling and effect ; and it is extremely proba- 
ble that, in like manner, certain modifications of perception 
in the eye, and in the structure of the hand, may predis-, 
pose the individual to those nice distinctions of colour, and 
those delicate manipulations that are essential to the form- 
ation of a tasteful painter, or an expert mechanic. Indeed, 
so intimate is the connexion between the mind and the 
body, and so uniformly is the body the organ through 
which all mental differences are made known, that though 
we can never hope to analyze so delicate a subject com- 
pletely, there is every reason to believe, that every situa- 
tion in which we are placed, with regard to climate, and 
country, and scenery, and living, and food, and clothing, 
and association, even in the simplest arts and occupations 
of life, impresses a specific difference upon the mind, by 
turning the thoughts to one class of subjects more than 
to another. When we glance over the map of the world, 
with the volume of the world's history open before us, we 
find that the human mind has expanded itself originally 
only at a very few favoured points. The rich plains at the 
confluence of the Nile, the Euphrates, the Ganges, and 
perhaps some of the rivers in China, (with the sea,) appear 
to have been the original and the only places, where, at 
very early periods, man was elevated to that rank of intel- 
lectual superiority which w^e are now disposed to assign 
him; and over the burning regions of the tropics, and 
amid the snows of the arctic lands, there seems to have 
been a stationariness of non-improvement, which, until the 
race was annihilated or blended with a new one, could not 
improve its condition. 

In a philosophical view of the species, with reference to 
that knowledge of the human intellect, the object and end 
of which is improvement, and which alone is worthy of the 
name of philosophy, this education from external circum- 
stances, which forms the characteristic difierence of nations 
and races, ought not to be overlooked ; because from it we 
find, that man, when he grows up, is not the same man 

80. What conclusion must we draw from the intimate connexion 
between the mind and the body ? ^81. Where are the few favour- 
ed spots in which the mind in early ages expanded itself and assum- 
ed the rank of intellectual superiority ? 82. Why ought not the 

education, which forms the characteristic difference of nations, to be 
overlooked ? 



Less. 13. intellectual niiLosopiiY. 297 

unless you place hirn in tlie same latitude, and expose him 
alike to the influence of the weallier. Tlie sky is every 
jot as cloudless in the central wilds of Asia, as upon the 
plain of the Euphrates; and the long evenings of the Lap- 
land or the Siberian winter, are to the full as much adapt- 
ed for astronomical observation, as the more brief periods 
of stellar appearance in the land of the south ; and yet, 
while the observations of the ancient Babylonians are ac- 
curate for nearly two thousand years before the Christian era, 
the other countries have not ever now produced what could 
be called a native astronomer ; and all that tlie people there 
have been able to deduce from the glories of the heavens, 
has been an accession of superstition, which has rivetted 
the chains, and continued the habits of their ignorance. 

Yet amid those general variations, and amid all the 
shades by which one individual of the human race differs 
from another, we are to seek the cause of the difference 
only in the circumstances in which the individual has been 
placed ; and were we carefully, in a sufficient number of 
cases, to analyze these circumstances, instead of vainly 
hunting after some supposed specific difference in that 
mind, of which, except in its phenomena, we can know 
nothing in other people, and except its states, feel nothing 
in ourselves, we should find in every instance a sufficient 
explanation of the difference; and an explanation which, if 
we were not spoiled by others, before we were suffered to 
be our own teachers, would enable us in all cases to avoid 
the evil, and make sure of the good, which is the primary 
instinct of our nature, — born with us, — the impulse upon 
which, right or wrong, we invariably act, and an unerring 
guide, if we did not make it lose its way, very often, in the 
dust which we raise in idle attempts to find the flowers of 
propriety and the fruit of truth ia the barren wilderness of 
absurdity and error. 

The various modifications of this instinct or feeling, if 
the name be considered more appropriate, will form the sub- 
ject of our future Conversations; and with a brief consid- 
eration of it, as under different names, and as affected by 

83. What should we probably find, if we were to analyze the 

circumstances, in which each individual is placed? 84. What 

advantages would the knowledge of this explanation confer on us ? 

26 



298 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 13. 

the apprehension, the perception, or the recollection of 
good or evil, we shall close our physiological examination 
of the human mind. 

Charles, There is one subject to which you have not 
called our attention, although it certainly be one which, in 
my opinion, forms part of the philosophy of mind, and that 
is, mental derangement. 

Dr. Herbert. The consideration of that melancholy 
subject belongs, strictly speaking, more to the philosophy 
of medicine than to the philosophy of mind : for though it 
appears in mental states in all its forms, we cannot consider 
it as having a mental origin, without, at the same time, ad- 
mitting that the mind is subject to disease, and thereby 
implying that the mind, to some extent, at least, is material. 
We know that every variety in the developement of the 
bodily organs, and every difference in the external circum- 
stances in which man can be placed, must produce, and 
certainly does produce, some difference in the state of the 
mind, which is temporary or permanent, accordingly as the 
bodily or circumstantial difference is so. But whether it 
be in that congenital imbecility or aberration of mind, 
which some persons unfortunately possess from their birth, 
or in those more varied, and often more dreadful cases, 
that come in after life, the study of this unfortunate portion 
of our species has not hitherto been sufficiently extended, 
and carefully enough investigated for becoming a portion 
of genuine philosophy ; nor can it probably ever become 
completely so, for the deficiency and the derangement 
alike tend to cut us off from our only source of information 
— the history which the patient himself can give us of his 
own experience. 

85. What is remarked respecting mental derangement ? 

86. If it be admitted to have a mental origin, what would such an 

admission imply ? 87. Why is it extremely difficult to arrive at 

any certain knowledge of this subject? 



Less. 14. intellectu.\l philosophy. 299 



LESSON XIV. 

Emol^ions — Emotions are antecedent to knowledc;e, and the cause 
of it — Emotions are simple, or moral — The classification of them — 
They are immediate, or retrospective, or prospective — Cheerful- 
ness, Melancholy, Wonder, Astonishment, Surprise. 

Dr. Herbert, In our former considerations of the hu- 
man mind, we have regarded it merely as a thinking ex- 
istence without associating with its thoughts those mysteri- 
ous relations of good and evil, pleasure or pain, happiness 
or misery, with which it is hardly possible for even the 
simplest thought not to be more or less mingled. We 
have looked upon it and described it, as a mere spectator 
of the grand drama of nature, which is every where, and 
at all times, enacting around it; and we have not even re- 
garded it as having that sympathy which makes the mul- 
titude follow after and feel with the mind^ when the con- 
test of nations, or the deeds of the exaltedly good, or the 
daringly wicked, are condensed within the four walls of a 
theatre. 

But the mind is no spectator, standing aloof to contem- 
plate the progress of events as a matter apart ; it is itself an 
actor : and whether its character be of a high or a low cast, 
it still has its part to sustain, and can sustain that part only 
in proportion as what it knows, as a mere conscious being, 
is properly directed by what it feels as a being whose fates 
and fortunes depend upon the succession of its acts. 

Those complex states which, as it were, link man to the 
rest of creation, and lead him to the Creator himself, we 
shall describe under the name of EAIOTIo^s. By the use 
of that general name, we shall avoid some errors, which 
others have fallen into by making use of more particular 
ones ; and we shall also have, in the name itself, a short 
definition of that general characteristic of the emotive af- 
fections, which distinguishes them from the aflfections that 
relate merely to the acquisition and the extension of knowl- 

1. In the considerations which have heen advanced, how has the 

author reo;nrded the human mind.^ 2. But is tlie mind a mere 

spectator of the events passing before it .' 3. How can it properly 

sustain that part which it has to act? 4. What name is ^ivea 

to the complex states of the mind, which link man to the rest of crea- 
tion ? 5. What advantages attend the use of so general a term? 

6. What is the tendency of ihc ciuutive affections ? 



300 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 14. 

edge. This quality always tends, as it were, " to move the 
mind," — to throw it into some peculiar succession of feel- 
ing ; — and, if that succession be powerful and prolonged 
enough, to cause it to demonstrate itself in the external ac- 
tion of the body, and even stamp upon the individual the 
greater part of that which constitutes his character. 

Mary, It seems to me that the state of mind which you 
have termed emotion, is antecedent to that of perception, 
and should therefore have formed the first part of the phi- 
losophy of the mind. 

Dr. Herbert, And if we had been to build up the mind, 
Feeling or Emotion would doubtless have been the corner- 
stone. But the mind has been built by another, and all 
that we can do is to pull it down by a virtual analysis ; and 
you know that, though the foundation-stone be the first laid 
in building, it is the last we arrive at in the process of 
regular demolition. 

Charles, If I remember rightly, we did consider feeling 
as necessarily the antecedent state of every mind ; and that 
before there was any consciousness, save that of mere exist- 
ence, and that only in the feeling, there must be a percep- 
tion somewhat analogous to pleasure or to pain, which pre- 
ceded and lay at the bottom of all knowledge whatever. 

Edward, Yes : and that which we call knowledge, as 
distinguished from feeling, is nothing more than the re- 
membrance or suggestion of feelings in a certain relation 
of co-existence or continuation, — as our knowledge of a 
level plain or a straight line consists in the uniformity or 
sameness of our feeling with regard to any two portions of 
it; and our knowledge of hills and vallies, or of lines that 
are crooked, consists in the want of this sameness. 

3Iatilda. Then before the baby can know its own fin- 
ger, or even direct its eyes to any object, it must possess 
feeling, and the power of comparing one feeling with anoth- 
er; in short, it must have all that seems necessary to make 
a philosopher. 

Dr. Herbert, We have implied that doctrine all along, 
and stated it expressly. The mind of an infant, while ac- 
quiring the first point of knowledge, is just as much a mind 

..« Se — 

7. Since emotion is antecedent, to perception, why does not the 
consideration of it form the first part of the philosophy of the mind? 

8. How far back can feelins; or emotion be traced ? 9. 

What remark is made respecting the mind of the infant? 



Less. J 4. intellectual philosophy. 301 

as that of the most laborious and the most successful phi- 
losopher, at the close of a long life of study — That which 
can learn that it has a finger, is capable of arriving at any 
given trutii that man can l;now ; and it is upon tbis prin- 
ciple that the whole, not only of education, but of the laws 
and .-tructure of society, proceeds. If we were to assign 
differences, we would need rules of conduct, codes of laws, 
and e\ery thing by which men are to be instructed or direct- 
ed, made by each individual for himself. 

Edward. Which would of course be no laws or regula- 
tions at all. It would be the state of savages, every one 
following his own inclinations, and consequently, the strong 
plundering and destroying the weak. 

Dr. Herbert, And it is to the prevention of that, more 
than to any thing else, that all our teaching and all our leg- 
islating tends. Farther than as it relates to man as a being 
accountable to his Maker in another state, all philosophy 
would be of little avail, did it not tend to leave every man 
to the exercise of his powers without being interfered with 
by any other man ; and in proportion only as this freedom 
is enjoyed by the average, the teaching, or governing, 
or whatever else you may call it, of any people, is Valuable. 

Mciry. But though the mind, as we have hitherto con- 
sidered it, had no reference to pleasure or pain, to happi- 
ness or misery, or to right or wrong ; and though we con- 
sidered the individual as acquiring a knowledge of things, 
and their relations and successions, without any reference 
to enjoyment; it seems impossible for the mind to exist in 
any one state of consciousness, unaccompanied by a feeling 
or emotion of some kind or other. 

Dr. Herbert. In every analysis of the mind, the process 
of separation is virtual only ; for be the antecedent states, 
that mingle in one consequent state, ever so numerous or 
ever so varied in their nature, the mind in that state is still 

10. Upon what does the whole of education, of the laws and struc- 
ture of society, proceed? -11. What should be the tendency of 

all teaching and legislating? 12. What should be the effect of 

all philosophy on man, as a social being ? 13. When is teach- 
ing, or governing, valuable to mankind ? 14. Can the mind exist 

in any one state of consciousness without feeling or emotion ? 

15. In the analysis of the mind, is the process of separation a real, 
or only a mental separation ? 

26* 



302 FIRST Lfis^ois^g 15? Less. 14. 

one and indivisible, and consequently our analysis of any 
state is nothing more than a mental separation of the pre- 
vious states which experience has taught us to consider as 
its causes; and we make that analysis complete, when we 
trace each branch of the compound up to the simple per- 
ceptions, or the simple suggestions, in which it originated. 
When we speak of the emotion that precedes or follows 
certain mental states, as different from the mental states 
themselves, we merely speak of one observed consequent 
rather than of another. 

Charles. Of the consequent that affects our enjoyment, 
rather than of that which affects our knowledge. 

Dr. Herbert. That is the proper definition of an emo- 
tion, and probably we should not make it more clear were 
we to labour at it during the whole evening. 

Mary. But there are pleasures and pains, which do not 
seem to me to be internal affections of the mind ; as when 
I am gratified by smelling a rose, and turn with aversion 
from assafoetida: or when I am pleased with the song of the 
nightintirale, or rendered melancholy by the hooting of the 
owl. So, also, when 1 feel a grateful warmth when my 
hand is at certain distance from the fire, but pain when I 
bring it too near. 

Dr. Herbert. It is very true, that the pleasures that re- 
sult immediately and simply from the external act of sen- 
sation, are necessarily external affections, and nothing but 
the sensation itself — not to be improved by any mental 
exercise : and, therefore, they do not properly fall within 
the class of emotions to which the attention of the intel- 
lectual philosopher should be directed. We are in the 
habit of classing them as the lowest gratifications of man : 
because they are gratifications which the savage enjoys in 
common with the sage, and, properly speaking, enjoys in 
a higher degree, inasmuch as they form the greater part 
of his enjoyments. They, how^ever, lead to nothing far- 
ther than a consciousness of their momentary existence, 

16. When do we make the analysis complete? 17. When 

the emotion, that precedes or follows certain mental states, is spoken 
of, as different from the mental states themselves, what is meant ? 

18. What is the best definition of an emotion ? 19. What 

is remarked respecting the pleasures, that result immediately and 

simply from the external act of sensation ? 20. Why do we class 

these pleasures as the lowest gratifications of man .? 



Less. 14. intellectual philosophy. 303 

or the sugp[estion of them after they have once hcen felt. 
In many instances, however, the nohler and more intel- 
lectnal emotions oi our minds arise from sutr^resiions of 
relation, connected with those simple pleasures of the 
senses, — and the huidscape, the picture, tlie poem, and, 
probahly, even the friend himself, if separated from that 
magical connexion, which gives it all its charms, might 
ultimately be resolved into a certain number of individual 
acts of sensual gratification. We have said again and again, 
that the mind makes nothing, and can make nothing, 
whether the thing be as known or as felt. It can, how- 
ever, combine the scattered elements of feeling, and the 
scattered point.-* of knowledge, into those groupings of sub- 
limity and beauty, from which emotions shall arise, and 
states of feeling be produced, in which totally unconscious 
to siglit and sound, and every thing external, the mind 
shall exult with ecstatic delight over a world of its own, and 
which world it may possess in the depth of external priva- 
tion, as fully and as exquisitely, as if all the external world 
were its own. 

On the other hand, it may so group the feelings of pain, 
and so couple them with the emotions to which in their 
connexion they give rise, that the couch of the Sybarite 
may become more agonizing than a bed of thorns ; and 
the possessor of kingdoms n.ay be more utterly miserable 
than the man who has not where to lay his head. Nor 
is this all ; for n^an cannot separate himself from that so- 
ciety, and that system with which he is connected. What- 
ever may be his words upon the subject, his feelings and 
his actions invariably demonstrate that he dares not deny 
the moral link that binds him to his kindred, his country, 
or the human race, or that more important, because more 
continually, acting chain, which binds him to his Crea- 
tor, and makes him feel, even in his utter inability to 
make any thing, that he himself must have been made. 



21. From what d.) the nobler and more intellectual emotions of 
our minds in many instances arise? 22. Wljat has been hereto- 
fore remarked in regard to the mind's creation o( any liiiiig, that 

can be known or lelt r 23. But, if it cannot create, what can it 

do ? 24. How will the mind stand affected with the emotions 

either of pleasure or pain, which arise from its own combinations? 
25. What do the leelings and actions of man invariably de- 
monstrate ? 



304 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 14. 

and that therefore he is indebted to a Being, possessing 
that power which he cannot reach, not only for all ob- 
jects of those emotions that deliuht him, but for the very 
emotions themselves. Theref ^e, in considering the emo- 
tions, we ought properly to consider them in one of three 
distinct points of views, or in any two, or in all of these 
blenaed together : — 

First, simply as they are felt ; 

Secondly, as they are felt with a moral relation ; and, 
Thirdly, as they are felt in relation to religion, or the re- 
sponsibility that there would be upon man if his Maker and 
himself were the only beings in existence. 

Charles. If it were not for our susceptibility of these 
emotions, the world would be nearly a blank to our minds. 
Dr. Herbert. Why do you think so ? 
Charles. Because our acquaintances, our neighbours, our 
friends, would stand to us in the relation only of so many 
figured, coloured, moving and occasionally sonorous sub- 
stances, not more interesting than the animals or the plants, 
or even masses of inorganic matter. We would then know 
a strong man only as we know an oak or a mass of granite ; 
and, so circumscribed, life would not be worth having. 
It is our feelings of emotion that give life and communi- 
cation to the scene, — that unite us with our friends — unite 
us with mankind — stimulate us on to courses of goodness, 
greatness or glory, — that call us back from that which is 
wrong, and torture us with remorse when we have done 
wickedly. 

Mary. I should think that in the emotions the whole 
good or evil consists; and that, therefore, the knowledge of 
them, and of the antecedents of which they are the invaria- 
ble consequents, is the most valuable portion of the knowl- 
edge of mind. But, then, they are so many, and so varied 
in different individuals, that I do not see how w^e shall be 
able to form any classification of them. 

Dr. Herbert. Those who have attempted to classify, 
them into ** Desires,'^ and ** Passions," and *^ Emotions,'' 

26. In how many distinct points of view mav the emotions be 

considered? 27. What is the first? 28." What is the 

second ? 29. What is the third ? 30. If we were not sus- 
ceptible of emotions, in what relation would our fellow men stand to 

us i* 31. What are some of the good effects which result to us 

from the feelings of emotion } 32. Why have the persons, who 

have endeavoured to classify the emotions, failed in their attempts ^ 



Less. 14. intellectual philosophy. 305 

and a variety of other supposed genera^ have failed ; be- 
cause, by taking a different part of the very same train, 
they find that it becomes a desire in one part, an emotion, 
in another, and a passion in a third. Nor fares it better 
when we attempt to connect them with the perceptions ot 
events and objects by which they are in succession pre- 
ceded, — inasmuch as with regard to the very same subject 
of excitement, the emotion may at once change into one 
of a very different class. As we have no control over 
the succession of events, and can only judge and predict 
of the future from the experience of the past ; and, far- 
ther, as we are never certain that we are in possession of 
all the circumstances of the antecedent, and, therefore, 
never able to be absolutely certain of the consequent, until 
it has arrived ; the most sanguine, and to our knowledge 
the best founded hope, may be followed by disappoint- 
ment ; and joy may be turned into sorrow, or sorrow into 
joy, in the successive vicissitudes of the very same object 
of desire. 

Charles. Then are there no means of classification by 
which we shall be enabled to form a sort of scientific ar- 
rangement of our emotions ? One, I think, may be into 
those that are pleasurable and those that are painful. 

Dr. Herbert. Pleasure and pain are, like heat and cold, 
and many other thinsfs, which w^e are accustomed to regard 
as opposites, only different portions — the opposite ends, as it 
were, — of the same chain of feeling. The most exquisite 
pleasure, if too long continued, degenerates into pain ; 
and pain itself, from tlie continuance of its endurance, be- 
comes a state of indifference, or even a pleasure ; and, 
therefore, a division, founded on this, or on any other sep- 
aration of the emotions, either with regard to their sub- 
jects, or with regard to their effects upon the mind, would 
lead us into error. 

Mary, You have mentioned, formerly, that desires or 
emotions arise either immediately, as a portion or modifi- 
cation of the existing state of the mind; that they arise in 
consequence of the suggestion of that which has been 

33. And why has not success attended the attempts to connect 
them with the perception of events and objects, l)y which they 

are preceded .'' 34. What objection may be urged against classi- 

fyin£C our emotions into those that are pleasurable, ai.d those that 
are painful.' 



306 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 14. 

formerly experienced ; or that they themselves are the 
commencements of other and future trains of thought. 
Might we not form them into three general classes accord- 
ing as thej belonged to one or another of these states ? 

Dr, Herbert. Perhaps some such division as that to 
which you alhide, might be the most adviseable ; because it 
would be simple, and would not lead us into error. 

Charles, In considering the emotions, would it be bet- 
ter to treat of the mere emotion itself, or of the complex 
state of mind of which the emotion is one of the constitu- 
ent parts? 

Dr. Herhert. In my opinion, it is preferable to take 
the complex state ; and for this reason I have directed 
your attention to the merely intellectual phenomena, be- 
fore we noticed those emotions that connect the individual 
with the subjects of his knowledge ; because it is in this 
complex form that the emotion affects the succeeding states 
of the mind. The elementary emotions into which these 
complex states, apart from the trains of thought in which 
they arise, might be reduced, are not very numerous. 
Leaving the feeling of religion out of consideration, they 
are, as respects the individual himself, all, perhaps, com- 
prehended under Astonishriient, Desire, Respect, Con- 
tempt, Joy and Grief, though, with regard to their intensity, 
and the objects by which they are excited, all of these ad- 
mit of innumerable modifications; and as res[)ects the feel- 
ings of mankind toward the rest of society, they might, 
perhaps, all be reduced to the two great n-oral classes of 
Virtuous and Vicious. These latter, however, are, prop- 
erly speaking, secondary emotions, the results of certain 
associations of relation in the emotion or action to which 
they refer. As these moral affections accompany some 
emotions and not others, according as these emotions 
may be connected with the injury or the advantage that 

35. What three general classes are mentioned, into which the 

emotions might be formed? 36. In considerinsj emotions, 

ought the mere emotion itself, or the complex state of mind 

connected with it, to be the object of our irjquiry ? 37. What 

is remarked respecting the eleinentary eniotions, into which the 
complex states may be reduced r 38. As respecting the in- 
dividual himself, under what terms may they all be comprehended? 

39, As respects the feelings of mankind toward the rest of 

society, how might they all be reduced ^, 40. Why is it 

necessary to subdivide each general division into emotions that 
are simple, and emotions that are accompanied by a moral feeling? 



Less. 14. intellectual thilosopiiy. 307 

we feel our conduct has occasioned to ourselves, or to oth- 
ers, it will be necessary in any airangement we make to 
subdivide each general division into emotions that are 
simple, and emotions that are accompanied by a moral 
feeling. 

In our emotions there are some that rise spontaneously 
upon a particular state of mind ; as, for example, there are 
certain objects and occurrences that excite admiration or 
aversion, in which we can trace no relation whatever, 
either to the past or to the future. These will form one 
class ; and we may give them the name of Immediate 
Emotions. 

When we survey our past conduct, there is always some 
emotion that arises. We cannot help exulting where sug- 
gestion tells us that we have done well ; and as little can we 
help feeling remorse and sorrow when it tell? us that we have 
done ill. Hence there is another general class of our emo- 
tions that relate to our past conduct, or to the past conduct 
of others towards us ; and to these we may give the general 
name of Retrospective Emotions. 

But we have seen already that man lives in the future 
as well as in the past; and the most limited mind forms 
some plan of action and enjoyment beyond the present 
instant. The only means, as we have again and again 
said, of judging of this future is the experience of the past ; 
and the accuracy of this experience is the measure of the 
pleasure that we shall derive from our expectations, or 
emotions, respecting the future, when the events to which 
they refer shall have become present or past. But still 
theie are, even in the worst regulated minds, some emo- 
tions that regard the future ; and, consequently, the divi- 
sion of Prospective Emotions is as common to the whole 
human race, as those that are Immediate, or those that are 
Retrospective. 

Echcard. Then our three divisions of this class of mental 
affections will be, 

I. Immediate Emotions. 

II. Retrospective Emotions. 

III. Prospective Emotions. • 

41. What are the emotions which are designated by the name 

of Immediate Emotions ? 42. What emotions arise on surveying 

our past conduct ? 43. What name is applied to this class of 

emotions ? 44. What name is applied to those emotions, which 

arise from looking fortvard into futurity ? 



30S FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 14. 

Dr. Herhert. And what are we to understand by each 
of these, so as to distinguish it from the others? 

Charles. By any immediate emotion I should suppose 
we meant a momentary feeling which accompanied a per- 
ception or a suggestion, as a co-existent part of that, and 
without any reference to the preceding cause or the antici- 
pated consequence. 

Mary. And such an emotion could only be momentary. 
As, if any object, remarkable for its novelty or singularity, 
were presented to me, I would admire or wonder only 
for an instant ; for that brief emotion would of itself sug- 
gest a wish to know its own cause, and that wish would be 
a prospective emotion with regard to future information 
that I desired. 

Matilda. The momentary emotion might also be follow- 
ed by one which was retrospective ; as, for example, if I 
had been laboring for a considerable time in order to pro- 
duce a certain effect, had believed that I was in the proper 
road to the accomplishment of it, and, all at once, found the 
result exactly the opposite of what I had expected, 1 would 
first wonder for a little at my disappointment, and then I 
would regret that I had wasted any time upon that which 
the result told me was either impracticable in itself, or im- 
properly pursued. 

Dr. Herhert. These are the distinctions ; and, perhaps, 
in every emotion which has a reference to time, that is, to 
the succession of events or states of the mind, either as past 
or as future, there is first a momentary emotion of surprise 
or wonder that the succession which w^e had confidently 
anticipated should be broken ; and this wonder will not be 
the less, though our anticipation has been entirely founded 
in error, because all that we believe is truth to us, until 
the fact has proved it the reverse. But let us see whether 
we can enumerate any particular emotions as belonging to 
this class, and not having any allusion to good or evil, any 
more than they have to cause and effect. 

Mary, I think I can mention two. Sometimes I feel 
more than usually cheerful, and can trace it to nothing 
either in what I have been doing, am doing, or expect to 

45. What is meant by an immediate emotion ? 46. What 

may result from an emotion of this class ? 47. Under what 

circumstances may a retrospective emotion follow an emotion of the 
first class ? 



Less. 14. intellectual philosophy. 309 

be doing myself, or in any thing that relates to others ; 
and at other times I feel gloomy or melancholy, with 
just as little knowledge of the cause. Now, in these 
cases, as the cheerfulness and the melancholy have no ref- 
erence to any thing external, or to any past or anticipated 
state of my own mind, they are necessarily immediate and 
simple. 

Dr. Herbert. The emotions of cheerfulness and mel- 
ancholy, or gaiety and gloom, certainly, independently of 
the acquirements or pursuits of the individual, do exert a 
powerful influence both upon the character and the hap- 
piness. The shades of them are almost endless; and 
while the one may rise up into tumultuous and ecstatic 
joy, the other may sink down to misery which is altogeth- 
er unsupportable, and from which the unhappy possessor 
may seek to escape by imbruing his hands in his own 
blood. 

Edward. But does notour cheerfulness or our melancholy 
depend very much upon the circumstances in which we are 
placed ? If we are always fortunate, I think we should 
always be happy; and if we are unfortunate, we cannot 
help being miserable. 

Mary. But the happiness that we feel from good fortune, 
and the misery that we feel from bad, are retrospective emo- 
tions, Edward, and not immediate ; because we obtain 
them from glancing back at our past state of mind, and 
finding that the anticipated consequence has or has not 
taken place. 

Charles. The scenery among which one is placed — the 
weather, the company, the occupation, and all the other 
things around us — have an effect upon the mood of our 
mind as to gaity or gloom. The frequenters of ruined cas- 
tles, and abbeys, and churchyards, and lonely places, must 
naturally be disposed to melancholy ; while those who are 
amid bustle, and glee, and activity, must be themselves 
cheerful. 

Dr, Herbert, The relation between one set of circum- 

48. What emotions are mentioned as belonging to the first class ? 
49. Since the gloom and the gaity, which arise from the cir- 
cumstances with which we are surrounded, are the suggestions of 
comparison, can tliey be called immediate emotions ^ 

27 



310 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 14. 

Stances and gloom, and between another set and gaity, are 
suggestions of comparisons ; and they are not more im- 
mediate emotions of the mind than the result of any other 
process of reasoning is an immediate emotion. We do as- 
sociate cheerfulness with certain scenes and operations, 
and melancholy with others ; but the association is not a 
simple and primary emotion, for there is nothing in a ruin- 
ed abbey or a churchyard to excite momentary melan- 
choly, any more than there is in an assembly of friends at 
dinner, or in a dance. If we did not compare the present 
state of the abbey in its desolation, with some former state 
of splendour, we should feel towards it precisely in the 
same way as towards a rock or a tree ; that is, we should 
judge of its beauty or deformity as a piece of landscape ; 
and, in like manner, if we did not associate the church- 
yard with the consideration that they who lie in silence 
there were once alive and active as we are now, and that 
the time must come when our activity shall be laid in the 
same silence, we would feel no other emotion at the sight 
or in the contemplation of a churchyard than of any other 
enclosure of the same extent and appearance. Nor is there 
in events themselves, be they successful or disastrous, any 
thing to excite immediately the one or the other of these 
emotions. The conditions of men are all relative : and 
not only does that which would produce misery to one, 
produce happiness to another ; but some are habitually 
miserable in situations which all men would envy or aspire 
to, and others are habitually cheerful in spite of the most 
severe and the most repeated reverses. 

Mary. It seems to me, however, that cheerfulness is 
the natural state of most, if not of all minds. 

Dr. Herbert. Upon what do you found that opinion ? 

Mary. People forget their griefs in time, even though 
they wish to cherish them : they are happy, contented, and 
even gay, without any remarkable advantage ; while they 

50. What is said of the association, which wakes within us the 
feelings of cheerfulness, or melancholy in connexion with certain 
scenes? 51. What would be our feelings, were we not to corn- 
pare the present state of an abbey in its desolation with its former 
state of splendour ? 52. Do events themselves immediately ex- 
cite the emotions either of cheerfulness or melancholy ? 

53. What follows from the fact, that the conditions of men are 
relative ^ 



Less. 14. intellectual philosophy. 311 

are never miserable and disconsolate, without something 
severe having happened, or being dreaded. 

Di\ Herbert. Tiiat the natural tendency of the mind is 
to cheerfuhiess is very true; because tlie avoiding of pain, 
or tlie altaclnnent of pleasure (for they are nearly the same 
thing,) is the grand impulse of the human mind, the very 
origin of its first consciousness of the existence of body and 
of the external world ; and, therefore, whenever the mind is 
in a state of pain, whether that pain consist in sensation, or 
in internal sugirestion, there must be a constant tendency 
to escape from it, whether that tendency be heeded, and 
torm the principal part of our suggestion, or not. In ex- 
cesses of that settled melancholy, which is sometimes con- 
sequent upon deep affliction, and where the mind is left to 
brood over its wo, without any change of scene, or of 
subject, there may be a protraction until the connection be- 
tween the body and the mind be impaired ; but, in gener- 
al, every return of the cause of sorrow is less and less faint, 
in consequence of the very nature of suggestion ; and by 
this means and from the necessity that most people have 
of mingling in society, and engaging in employment, there 
comes a healing upon the wings of time, which, though it 
cannot destroy the remembrance of those who were once 
dear to us, enables us so to conduct ourselves, as to prove 
that we were not unworthy of them. 

Matilda. You mentioned wonder ^ or astonishment, at 
what is new or strange, as being one of our immediate 
emotions. 

Dr. Herbert, Perhaps it is the most important of them 
all, as it is the one which suggests to us the necessity of 
being informed ; and it is in the tendency of the mind to 
turn this wonder to account, which, like all other modifi- 
cations of suggestion, is improved by experience, that the 
grand distinction between those minds which we call great, 

54. Why may we conclude, that the natural tendency of the 
mind is to cheertulness ? 55. Are extreme cases of settled mel- 
ancholy an objection to this conclusion ? 56. What may be said 

respecting the impression of every return of the cause of sorrow ? 

57. What other emotion is mentioned as belonging to the same 

class with cheerfulness and melancholy? 58. Why may wonder 

be considered the most important of the emotions of its own class? 
.59. \v^ith reference to this emotion, in what does the grand dis- 
tinction between those minds, which we call great, and those which 
we call trifling; chiefly consist ? 



312 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 14. 

and those which we call trifling, chiefly consists : — the one, 
from practice in suggestions of relation, works out the won- 
der till it become knowledge ; the other simply wonders at 
one thing, and then turns from that to wonder at another, 
and thus may walk over the world, wondering through the 
longest life, and yet go to the grave in ignorance. 

Edtvard, Are not astonishment and surprise nearly the 
same with wonder ? 

Dr. Herbert, They are emotions of the same class, in- 
asmuch as, like it, they are momentary ; but we have not 
time to settle nice distinctions, which in most cases only 
turn out to be verbal ones in the end. So far as I have 
considered the wording of the matter, I am inclined to 
think, that wonder is produced by unexpected relations of 
co-existence in thesubjectsof perception or suggestion, and 
surprise by unexpected succession of cause and effect. 
We would wonder if we saw a man fifty feet high^ and be 
surprised if we found him throwing his provisions into the 
river, if his family were perishing with hunger, and yet he 
professing to be very much attached to them. 

Mary. Surprise, as applied to the succession of events 
in this manner, seems to be useful as a stimulus to us, 
much in the same way as wonder ; and I sliould suppose 
that we make the proper use of the surprise at the unex- 
pected event, if we analyse the former part of the train to 
which it belongs, till we arrive at the misapplication of ex- 
perience, or the assumption of the knowledge of that which 
was not known, in which the error or the ignorance lay. 

Dr. Her^hert. No doubt, these emotions, as well as all 
the immediate emotions, tend to keep the mind in a state 
of activity, and guide it both to know and to do. Emotion, 
and the absence of emotion, seem to be balanced in a 
very nice manner. And tlie contmued application of those 
stimuli that produce emotions, and the total absence of 
them, produce ultimately, the same effect. If our ex- 
ertion, whether in thought or in action, be vigorous and 
continued, and especially if our feelings mingle much with 
it, we become exhausted ; and almost in the same manner 

60. What course does each of the two distinct characters pursue ? 

61. "What distinction is here made between iconder and sur- 

'prise ? 62. What is the tendency of all the immediate emotions ? 

63. How does it appear that the continued application of the 

stimuli, that produce emotions, and the total absence of them, pro- 
duce the same effect? 



Less. i4. intellectual piiiLosopiiy. 313 

do we become exhausted by that which produces languor 
and melancholy. There is a curtain drawn over this part 
of the subject, behind which man dares not look ; but it 
seems that whatever the medium is which connects the 
thinking principle with the external world, a continuance 
of the same state, either of the body or of the mind, so 
deranges it, as that its function is imperfectly performed. 
What is not a little singular too, those states of mind which 
are, one would think, the opposites of each other, lead us 
to very nearly the same result. Our wonder, our astonish- 
ment, and our surprise — or whatever w-e call that which 
startles us where we did not expect to be startled — if right- 
ly employed, send us in quest of new states of mind, which 
shall solve the mystery that we have met with, and the lan- 
guor which arises from the prolonged contemplation of any 
one subject, drives us equally to seek happiness in states that 
are new. So that, in our immediate emotions, we have, 
as it were, a watchman on the one side, and a watchman 
on the other ; the one to call our attention to the objects 
and events around us, and the other to make us withdraw 
that attention when we are bestowing it too long upon one 
object. 

Mary. Then the emotions belonging to this division of 
the simple, immediate class, may be regarded as having a 
more immediate reference to the increase and the accura- 
cy of our knowledge, than to our more complex feelings of 
pleasure and pain. 

Dr. Herbert. In all the emotions which we have nam- 
ed the desire that results is, at is commencement, a mere 
desire of a new stateof mind, that is, a desire of knowledge, 
rather than of the enjoyment to which knowledge leads ; 
and each of the primary emotions, when not followed by 
this desire, is nothing but a momentary impulse, which 
may more properly be described as being painful than as 
any thing else. It is, as it were, the mind's call to itself 
to be up and doing, — or a sort of intellectual spur, which 
is painful in the operation, whether followed by activity or 
not. 

64. What is remarked respecting the sameness of the tendency 
of those states of mind, which are apparently the opposites of each 

other ? 65. What is the desire, which results immediately from 

the emotions, which have been under consideration ? 66. When 

the primary emotion is not followed by this desire, what is it ? 

27* 



314 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 15, 



LESSON XV. 

Immediate emotions — Beauty — Deformity — Sublimity — Ludicrous- 

ness. 

Dr, Herbert, The next subdivision of the immediate 
emotions to which it will be proper for us to direct our at- 
tention, comprises feelings that are less simple than mere 
wonder or surprise; and they may be considered as hold- 
ing an intermediate place between those immediate emotions 
that are simple, and the others which are accompanied by 
a moral feeling of the goodness or the badness of the sub- 
ject of that perception or conception to which they are im- 
mediately consequent. All the emotions of this division 
are either pleasing or painful, immediately in themselves, 
and without any reference to action, or to any succession 
of events, as affecting the condition or interests of the par- 
ty feeling them. 

Mary. If they be attended either with pleasure or with 
pain, they must occur in pairs, each of which will to some 
extent, be the opposite of the other. 

Dr. Herhert. That we do so class them is true ; but 
then, as man is always the creature of the circumstances 
under which he is placed, there is no invariable standard 
as applicable to different individuals, or as applicable to 
the same individual at different periods of his life. So 
very vague is the line by which beauty is separated from 
deformity, and that which is sublime is separated from that 
which is perfectly ludicrous, that one nation derides or 
laughs at those fashions and customs which are the boast 
and the admiration of another : and while the man casts 
away, as perfectly indifferent, the playthings with which 
a child is delighted, the philosopher can find no beauty, 
no grandeur, and no interest, in those subjects about 
which nations have in all ages disputed, butchered each 
other by thousands, and filled the world with desolation and 
misery. 

1. What does the next subdivision, of the immediate emotions, 

comprise ? 2. What place do they hold ? 3. What is said 

of the emotions of this division ' 4. How are they classed ? 

^. What is remarked respecting the line, which separates beauty 
from deformity, and the sublime from the ludicrous } 



Less. 13. intellectual philosophy. 315 

Charles, I cannot see how it should be so difficult to de- 
fine beauty ; because I am never at a loss to deternune 
wliether an object be beautiful or not. The feeling is in- 
stantaneous ; and I no sooner look upon the morning land- 
scape, relieved by the alternations of light and shade, and 
glittering with dew-drops, which reflect every colour in the 
rainbow, than I feel it to be beautiful. 

Dr. Herbert. Tt is much easier, to feel what is, and 
what is not beautiful, than to find out in what the feeling 
consists, or how it arises. 

Matilda. All nature around us is beautiful. There is 
beauty in driving snow, as well as in bright sunshine ; 
and there is beauty in that which is even ruined and 
useless. 

Dr. Herbert. Were it not that the words have been 
so often used, and are found in every book that one can con- 
sult, it would be perhaps better if beauty and sublimity with 
the names of their opposites, were at once struck out of the 
vocabulary ; and the feelings of which we are speaking, 
arranged in the simple classes of pleasurable or painful ; be- 
cause while we are attempting to define, by reference to a 
state of mind, the meaning of a term so very general, and 
so very mutable as beauty, we are almost of necessity hunt- 
ing for a meaning to that, to which every former user has 
attached a different one. 

Mary. When we were conversing on the subject of the 
senses, we came to the conclusion, (1) that, to us, all the 
sound, all the colour, and all the other objects of sensation, 
with which the mind, in its exercise, clothes the external 
world, are, to that mind, states only of itself; (2) that the 
perception is wholly of the mind , (3) that it has nothing 
to do, in its individual instance, with any thing external ; 
and (4) that the knowledge of external things is a deduc- 
tion by experience from the suggested relations of the in- 
dividual perceptions. 

Dr. Herbert. And what conclusion do you mean to 
draw from this? 

6. Is there any difficulty in selecting what we individually con- 
sider beautiful? 7. But can we with the same ease tell what the 

feeling consists in, or how it rises ? fc. Why would it be better, 

that the words beauty and suhliinity with the names of their op- 
posites, were struck out of the vocabulary, and the feelings, which 
they are intended to expres?, arranged in the classes of pleasurable 
or painful ? 9. To what conclusions did we come, when the sub- 
ject of the senses was under consideration? 



316 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 15. 

Mary, Avery important one, in my opinion : as, (I) the 
whole of the sound, and colour, and other sentient appear- 
ances of the external world, are known to the mind only in 
the states which they excite ; and as (2) the external object, 
be it simple or compound, is arrived at by a process of 
comparison, and as, farther, you have shown us (3) that 
our suggestions are not under our own control, any far- 
ther than as we may have a control over the circumstan- 
ces in which we are placed, I think it must follow that the 
emotion of beauty, whatever perception or suggestion may 
excite it, must be in the mind and in the mind only ; that, 
therefore, it has nothing whatever to do w^ith external things; 
and can never be exactly the same in different individuals, 
or in the same individual under the least difference of cir- 
cumstances. 

Edward, But in those objects that are beautiful to the 
eye or to the ear, especially in the former case, I find it im- 
possible not to feel the emotion of beauty upon perceiving 
the object, or even upon thinking on it ; and there are many 
objects which all of us, and every body that 1 ever heard, 
agree in feeling to be beautiful. 

Dr. Herbert. It is just as difficult to separate, in a 
person that has tasted sugar, the sweetness of its taste from 
the sight of the substance, or of a substance which to ex- 
ternal perception is like it, even though it should be ever 
so different in taste, or in any other of its qualities. When 
children, who have been born in the East or the West 
Indies, where there is never any snow, are suddenly 
brought to this country at an inclement season ot the 
year, there are many instances ot their being in glee and 
exultation, at the covering of the deck of the vessel, 
or of the ground, as an inexhaustible supply of sugar or 
salt. 

The analysis of any compound state of mind is an ope- 
ration to which the mind has no natural tendency ; and 
as common language is formed by mankind themselves, 
and not made for them by philosophers, it does not make 
this analysis ; but joins the external object of perception, 

10. What three things, already established, make it evident that 
the emotion of beauty must be in the mind, and in the mind only ? 

11. What conclusion results from this ? \2. Has the mind 

a natural tendency to analyse its own compound state ? 13. 

What is remarked respecting common language ? 



Less. 15. intellectual philosophy. 31/ 

and the consequent feeling, as if they were one and indi- 
visible, just in the same manner as it joins the antecedent 
and the consequent in one action. By this means, the 
beauty, the sublimity, the deformity, or the ludicrousness 
which we feel, which exists no where but in our feeling, 
is given to the external object ; and not only this, but they 
who write upon the subject are obliged to invent an ad- 
ditional sense, as they call it — a sense without any organ 
or any apparent connexion with the sentient mass of the 
nerves, but which yet travels instantly to the most distant 
object that we can see, to settle whether that object be beau- 
tiful or not. 

C/iarlcs. But as all mankind have a feeling of beauty in 
some degree or other, and directed to some one class of ob- 
jects, it should seem that there must be some original feel- 
ing of beauty ; because it is so instantaneous, even the case 
of objects perfectly new to us, that it cannot well be the re- 
sult of any process of comparison. 

Dr. Herbert. About the number of objects, and the 
way in which they can excite that original and instinctive 
feeling, which forms, as it were, the connexion between the 
body and the mind, we must speak with great caution ; be- 
cause it must, in every case, be used for a considerable 
length of time before the user can tell us any thing about 
it, even by a muscular change, which appears to be Nature's 
earliest way of indicating pleasure or pain. Before the in- 
fant can smile to a smiling countenance, or shrink away 
from a surely and ill-natured one, it must have felt many 
instances of pleasure and pain. But as all these first and 
most important steps in the exercise of the feeling must be 
forever hidden from every inquirer, it is quite impossible for 
us to be sure whether the perception of pleasure and pain 
(for the emotions of which we are speaking resolve them- 
selves almost immediately into these,) be original and in- 
stinctive, or acquired by experience. Nor is it of much 



14. What two things does it join togf tiier, which in fact are en- 
tirely separate ? 15. What consequence follows this indiscrim- 
inate juniblinjj of things tocrether, which are in theniselve? entirely 

distinct ? 16. Why ought we to speak with caution respectino: 

the number of objects and the way in which they excite oriuinal 

and instinctive feeling.' 17 Why is it impossible foe u.s to be 

sure whether the perception of pleasure and pain be original and in- 
stinctive, or acquired by experience ? 



318 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 15. 

consequence what be the origin ; because from the moment 
that the child becomes capable of expressing the feeling, 
that feeling becomes a matter of education, and is just as 
much modified by circumstances as any other part of the 
intellectual character. 

Mary. Then we call objects beautiful or the reverse, 
when they excite in us that emotion which we call the per* 
ception of beauty ; and not from any thing that necessarily 
belongs to the object, and must excite the same state of 
feeling in every body else. 

Dr, Herbert. We do something even more than this. 
In every feeling of beauty we, as it were, give our feeling 
to the object ; and when that feeling is strong, we never 
doubt for a moment that other persons will feel an equal 
delight in the contemplation of it as we ourselves feel. 
But still, though we thus paint all nature with our own 
colours, and persuade ourselves that all mankind see it 
with our eyes, every object in nature is actually, to hu- 
man perception, as diversified as the emotions that it pro- 
duces in the millions that look upon it ; and, therefore, 
there cannot be in any one subject a necessary quality, 
corresponding with the feeling, because, then, that which, 
by the assumption, would necessarily be only one, would, 
by the very same assumption, be necessarily a million at the 
same time. 

Edward. How then can we get a general definition of 
'' beautiful V 

Dr. Herbert. The most general definition that we 
could possibly get, would not extend beyond our own expe- 
rience at the particular instant, and might not apply to that 
experience in the next instant. But perhaps, as convenient 
a general name as any is, whatever affords us pleasure in 
the contemplatio?if without any reference to good or evil, and 
without any very strong desire to elevate ourselves, follow- 
ing immediately upon it. 

18. And why is it not a matter of much consequence what be 

the origin ? 19. When do we call objects beautiful ? 20. If 

in every feeling of beauty, we give as it were our feeling to the 
object, when that feeling is strong, how do we regard other persons 

in relation to it? 21. Why can there not be in any one object 

a necessary quality corresponding with the feeling ? 22* What 

is remarked respecting the most general definition, that can be given 

of the ''beautiful.'"' 23. But what is the definition attempted 

to be given ? 



Less. 15. intellectual philosophy. 319 

Mary. Then the feeling of beauty, and all the feelings 
that belong to the same class, resolve themselves into sug- 
gestions of comparison. 

Dr, Herbert. Or, to speak more correctly, they are 
themselves instantly suggested by comparisons ; and as 
those comparisons are again the invariable consequents of 
certain earlier suggestions, we can no more help feeling that 
one object is beautiful and another deformed, than we can 
help feeling that one day is cold and another warm; and so 
wide and vague is our application of the word beauty^ that 
we apply it very generally to whatever communicates pleas- 
ure, — to landscapes, to buildings, to all productions of the 
arts, to compositions in literature, to musical airs, to pic- 
tures, to statues, to the weather, the season, and, in short, 
to every thing. The vulgar apply it even to the tastes of 
what they eat and drink. 

Matilda. But surely there are certain objects in which 
there is a fixed and determinate beauty. As, for example, 
the countenance of an European is more beautiful than 
that of an African ; and one who is straight and well-pro- 
portioned is more beautiful than one who is crooked and 
deformed. 

Dr. Herbert. Europeans, and handsome people, think 
so ; but 1 suspect a jury of Africans and Hunchbacks would 
come to a very different conclusion : and though people 
often express themselves courteously on the subject, 1 sus- 
pect that, upon a close analysis, it would be found that 
every human figure is, in the real opinion of the possessor, 
the beau ideal of perfection. We speak of models of form, 
of Apollos, and other productions of exquisite art ; and 
w^e fancy that the admiration of them to the neglect of 
other forms, is a natural feeling of the mind, and not an 
acquired one ; and yet other nations, different in manners 
from us, tumbled these specimens of art from their pedes- 
tals, killed the makers of them, and left the ruins unheed- 
ed for centuries. 



24. How are the immediate emotions suggested ? 25- And 

what result follows from these comparisons being tlie invariable con- 
sequents of certain earlier suggestions ? 26. What is remarked 

respecting the vagueness of the application of the word beauty ? 

27. How does every human figure probably appear to its possessor .? 

28. What circumstances ought to lead us to doubt, whether our 

admiration of the models of form left us by the ancients is a natural 
feehng, or an acquired one ^ 



320 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS, 15. 

Mary, Then, in beauty of form, have we no fixed princi- 
ple to guide us ? A regular curve is certainly more beauti- 
ful than a combination of lines that make angles; and a 
circle a much more graceful figure than a triangle. 

Dr. Herbert, Before we can come to that conclusion 
we must have a comparison. The curve makes us feel as 
if we go round it by a uniform and uninterrupted motion ; 
while the encompassing of the polygon is interrupted at 
each of the angles. Pain is, to a certain extent, always as- 
sociated with interruption or labour; and as we can form 
no notion of the figure but by an imaginary journey round 
the boundaries, w^e feel the most pleasure w^here the journey 
seems the easiest. 

Charles. There may be other associations, earlier than 
this: the sun and moon appear to be circles; there is hardly 
a straight line in any of the objects which must first attract 
the attention of a child ; and points and angles may suggest 
the idea of being pricked, at a much earlier period than we 
are aware of. 

Dr. Herbert. Your observations are just ; and were 
we to extend our analysis over the whole of those matters 
which produce emotions of beauty or sublimity, or their 
reverses, we would be able to find in respect of each 
of them, some former state of the perceiving mind itself, 
their relation to which alone clothed them with all their 
beauty. 

Your experience is yet too limited for enabling you to 
comprehend that range of circumstances, which, in the vi- 
cissitudes of human life, clothe with colours of the most ex- 
quisite beauty, objects that, to another person of probably 
keener perceptions, have no beauty whatever ; and, as we 
have had frequently occasion to remark, the actual presence 
of the object makes every suggestion, to which it is in any 
way related, start up with the same vividness and vigour as 
if they were all embodied in it. The man who traverses 
the plain of Marathon, if he has been an admirer of the arts, 
the arms, and the eloquence of Greece, will feel for a 
moment that he himself is a Greek ; and the comparative 

29. Why is a circle or a curve thought to be more graceful than 

a triangle ? 30. What v^rould probably be our couclusion were 

we to extend our analysis over the whole of those matters, v^hich 

produce emotions of beauty and sublimity? 31. What must be 

the feelings of the man, who traverses the plains of Marathon, if he 
has been an admirer of antiquity .? 



Less. 15. intellectual philosophy. 321 

barrenness of that memorable field will have more charms 
for him, than if he were in the most luxurious and aromatic 
scene in tlie oriental Archipelago. One strain of his nation- 
al music will make the wanderer, and even the slave, forget 
his absence, and his bonds ; and the association will carry 
him back to the land that he loves, and the friends that are 
dear to him. 

But unless there is a permanent interest, a perpetual re- 
currence of the relation, beauty soon ceases to be beauty ; 
and they who are captivated by mere novelty, or mere sur- 
face glitter, and take not the trouble of ascertaining wheth- 
er there be not some permanent source of delight, often 
feel, and ieel bitterly, that that which they considered as 
the very gem of the world, proves as fleeting as it seemed 
fair. 

Charles. There is a very remarkable instance of that in 
the successive fashions of clothes and furniture ; among 
which the newest is generally accounted the most beautiful, 
even though it is just the very opposite of that which was 
admired a few weeks before. 

Dr. Herbert. That is a farther proof that the beauty 
consists in the association by which the perception of the 
object is immediately followed. The pleasure arising 
from a new fashion in dress or furniture, depends chiefly 
upon the mere fact of novelty — at least it depends upon that 
in as far as the form is concerned ; for there are very 
many instances in which, instead of one form communi- 
cating more real pleasure than another, it confers less. 
We have often seen a lady endeavouring to go against 
the wind with a bonnet a yard in diameter, which required 
the exertion of both her hands to keep it on, doubling 
the resistance which her body opposed to the wind ; and 
in which she yet suffered pleasure just because it was 
fashionable. 

Mary. But though these matters be thus mutable, there 
are many subjects of beauty which do not change with the 
changes of fashion. The homes, and the friends, and even 

32. What effect on the wanderer will one strain of his national 

music have? 33. What will be the consequence, if there be 

not in an object a permanent interest, a perpetual recurrence of 

relation? 34. On what does the pleasure arising from a new 

fashion in dress or furniture depend; and of what does it furnish an 
additional proof? 

28 



322 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 15. 

the more trifling objects, to which we have long been at- 
tached, instead of becoming tiresome to us, become the more 
endeared, — give us the greater pleasure, and, therefore, 
have the more, as it were, of moral beauty, the longer that 
w^e enjoy them. 

Dr, Herhert, That is very true ; but still, it is an argu- 
ment in favour of that doctrine which attributes the emo- 
tion of beauty to a suggestion of relation to that, which ex- 
perience taught us had given pleasure. When this expe- 
rience has become considerable, there is hardly an external 
appearance with which we are familiar, that is not, as it 
were, invested with a faculty of speech ; and tells us as plain- 
ly of the existence of a mental feeling, as if we saw that feel- 
ing in operation, or heard it described in words. It is by 
this means that the pleasure of beauty, and the pain of its 
opposite, become something more to us than mere momenta- 
ry impulses. They warn us of what we are to desire, and 
what we are to avoid ; point out what we are to do, and 
what we are to shun ; diffuse our happiness and our aver- 
sion over the whole world of our acquaintance ; and, while 
we attend only to the aversion or the pleasure, they are 
philosophising for us unheeded, but as accurately as if we 
were in the schools, and busied with the words and the 
formulge of philosophy. 

Charles, Ought we to consider the feeling of sublimity 
as kindred to that of beauty ; or as in opposition to it ? 

Dr. Herbert, It often belongs to the very same chain ] 
and that which is, at the commencement, only a simple 
perception of beauty, may be followed out in suggestion, 
and relation after relation may combine with it, and work 
it into the highest effort of the sublime of which the mind 
is susceptible. Nor does the sublime belong only to those 
subjects which, in their less excited states, produce the 
emotion of beauty. Terror and destruction, and all the 
horrors that can be brought together, with any evidence of 

35. Why does the thought of our homes, our friends, and many 
trifling objects, v^ith which we have been long familiar, give us 

pleasure ? 36. After our experience has become considerable, 

how does every exteitial object, with which we are famihar, af- 
fect us ? 37. What advantageous effects result to us from this 

source ?— 38. What remarks are made, which show that beauty 

and sublimity are kindred feelings.? 39. But is the sublime 

always found in this conn-exion .? 40. What besides may mingle 

in the sublime .? 41. And what effect may the emotions arising 

from this source have on the mind which dwells intensely on them .'' 



Less. 15. intellectual philosophy. 323 

possibility, may mingle in the sublime; and on this branch 
of sublimities, the mind may so dwell, and be so tortured, 
that the delicate connexion between it and the body, which 
forms what we call the foundation of reason, may be shak- 
en, and the individual may become the victim of the in- 
tensity of his own emotion. 

But, in the sublimity, as well as in the beauty, the feel- 
ing belongs to the mind, and not to the combination of ob- 
jects. For the majority of mankind have, in all ages, treat- 
ed with indifference, or turned to purposes merely super- 
stitious, those appearances and those objects, which have 
been the means of suggesting, in others, all that is sublime 
in philosophy or in song : and, therefore, in none of this 
class of feelings, is there any universal a parte rei ; but the 
whole resolves itself into the emotions, which a perception, 
or combination of perceptions, may suggest to the mind of 
each individual ; and thus, in any one sublime considera- 
tion, there are just as many variations of sublimity as there 
are minds to contemplate it. The fall of the pippin, which 
guided Newton over the whole system of suns and planets, 
would have been only a sensual gratification of the lowest 
kind to a Norfolk peasant ; and, in the hands of one less 
endowed with information, and less habituated to splendid 
combinations, the '* Paradise Lost," which raised Milton to 
the very highest summit of poetry, might have been but a 
trite and tedious tale. 

Mary, Then we may consider the emotion of sublimi- 
ty as being, like that of beauty, imparted by the mind to 
that object, with the perception or contemplation of which 
it arises ; and that, in addition to the mere pleasure which 
forms the predominating, and almost the only feeling in the 
case of beauty, there mingles in that which is sublime, 
something apparently larger than the mind can comprehend, 
or darker than it can understand. Thus sublimity becomes 
a more compounded feeling than beauty. In sublimity there 
is a certain modification of admiration that mingles with the 
feeling of beauty, and which it may cause to become so 
much stronger, that the feeling of pleasure may have some 
resemblance to that of pain, by the mind being overcome 
by the shadowy grandeur which it cannot comprehend. 

42. What evidence is there that in sublimity the feeling belongs 

to the mind, and not to the combination of objects ? 43. What 

modification is there in sublimity, which renders it more of a com- 
pound feeling that beauty ? 



324 FIRST i.EssoNs IN Less. 15. 

Dr. Herbert, You must bear in mind, however, that 
this emotion of sublimity, even as arising from the most 
terrific of its object, is still an immediate feeling, having 
reference only to the object immediately perceived ; and 
in no way related to fear, or the apprehension of imminent 
or future danger, on the part of the individual by whom 
it is felt. Whenever there is danger dreaded, the subject 
of contemplation ceases to be sublime, and the emotion 
changes from immediate to perspective. 

Charles. The feelings of beauty and sublimity, seem to 
clothe the world with all its loveliness and its grandeur, and 
give to life all its sweets and enjoyments. 

Dr, Herbert, There is no doubt that, of the pleasure 
of the passing moment, much depends upon those feelings, 
and that the enjoyments of man are rich and varied, in 
proportion as his suggestions of relation consist in the 
recollections of what is beautiful or what is sublime ; but 
there is one other immediate emotion produced by sources 
totally different, which is perhaps more influential in 
clearing up the cloudy places of life, than the feelings of 
beauty and sublimity taken together. They are, if one 
may so speak, contemplative feelings ; and the tendency 
of them is to lead the mind into a long train of thoughts, 
in which desires may arise which cannot be gratified, and 
in consequence of which, the pleasure may be turned in- 
to pain. In their higher and more exquisite states, they 
are also confined to the few ; for though, to children of 
all denominations, occurrences and objects are nearly 
equally beautiful, or productive of pleasure, yet the cur- 
rent soon stagnates with those whose minds are not cul- 
tivated ; and in too many of these mere animal gratifica- 
tion usurps the place which should, of right, belong to 
intellectual pleasure. Or, if they do not become sensual, 
their minds too often become little and feeble ; and, in- 
stead of being able, or even attempting, to climb to the 
elevations where beauty and sublimity are found, they 

44. Can fear or apprehension of danger be associated with the 

emotion of sublimity ? 45. Into what would the dread of 

danger change this emotion? 46. How much influence do 

the feelings of beauty and sublimity have on the happiness of 

man ? 47. What other immediate emotion is more influential 

on the happiness of man than these already mentioned I 
48. Why are the pleasarable feelings of contemplation confined to 
the few ? 



Less. 15. intellectual philosophy. 325 

linger below, and seek for mental distinction in the 
triflings of wit. But the sparkle of wit is small ; and the 
humblest rustic derives equal if not keener relish and 
glee, from the pointless jest which beguiles the labour of 
the field, than the professed wit does from the happiest of his 
sayings. 

Mary. Wit consists in our meeting with something 
quite contrary from what we expected, does it not } 

Dr. Herbert. Not exactly in that, Mary, because then 
all discovery would be wit : for if any result be new, we 
could not possibly expect it — and, therefore, there are more 
elements that go to the making of a witticism, than to an 
equal portion of wisdom. In the first place, there must be 
some sort of levity, as it were, in the suggesting object or 
event, and also in that which it suggests ; for if the desire 
of knowledge, the desire of happiness, .or the apprehension 
of danger, to ourselves or to any one else, were to mingle 
with that which might otherwise be wit, the charm would 
be dissolved, and the emotion which, with sufficient levity, 
would have ended in a laugh, might produce a far more 
durable feeling. 

In the second place, there must be some change in the 
order of succession which we did not expect. An agree- 
ment, in one or more respects, between two things or oc- 
currences, which we had supposed were wholly different, 
or a difference, in some respects, between those which we 
supposed to be altogether alike. 

As instances of the simpler cases, may be mentioned, those 
humblest efforts of wit, puns, in which the incongruity may 
consist either in a similarity of sounds, and an opposition 
of meaning in two words, or a similarity of meaning and 
an opposition of sound. 

It may happen also in the order either of time or place, 
— as when subjects are arranged in juxtaposition, or in the 

49. Does wit consist in meeting with what is contrary to 

our expectation ? 50. What in the first place, must there be 

in the suggesting object, or in that which it suggests, that it may 

have the character of wit? 51. What would be the effect 

were the desire of knowledge, of happiness, or the apprehension 

of danger, to mingle with what might otherwise be wit? 

52. What, in the second place, must there be that the emotion of 

wit be produced ? 53. In what does the incongruity consist in 

instances of the humblest efforts of wit ? 54. In what else may 

it also happen ? 

28* 



326 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 15* 

order of cause and effect without any resemblance, or any 
reference to known succession. 

Charles. If we have not an expectation that the result 
will certainly be different from that which afterwards takes 
place, we do not feel that there is any ludicrousness.* The 
blunder of a known ignorant person does not make us laugh 
- — we rather pity him, and wish even to instruct him, though 
a much smaller blunder, on the part of a pretender, makes 
us merry. 

jDr. Herbert. The emotion to which you allude is not 
wit, but one of a higher order, and more valuable in the 
application. It is the emotion usually called the feeling of 
ludicrousness. That is an instructive emotion, while mere 
wit is an amusive one. In that which you have mentioned 
we have an instance of the feeling, and also of its use. 
One of the great advantages of the perception of the ludi- 
crous, being to teach us to avoid those things that appear 
ludicrous in others. 

Edward. I have somewhere read or heard a story, at 
the end of which I could not help laughing, although there 
was little to laugh at in the progress of it. " A labourer, who 



^ " Ludicrousness is that light mirth we feel on the unexpect- 
ed perception of a strange mixture of congruity and incon- 
gruity. The congruity or incongruity from which the emo- 
tion results may exist in the language merely; as in the case 
of puns, where there is an argreement of sound, and a disa- 
greement of sense ; — or in the thoughts and images which lan- 
guage expresses; as when it brings to lightsome unexpect- 
ed resemblances of objects or qualities, formerly regarded as 
incongruous — or some equally unexpected diversity among 
those, in which the resemblance had been supposed before to 
be complete ; or in many cases, in the very objects of our direct 
perception; as when a well-dressed person, walking along 
the street, falls into the mud of some splashy gutter, in this 
case the situation and the dirt, combined with the character 
and appearance of the unfortunate stumbler, form a sort of 
natural burlesque, or mock heroic, in which there is a mixture 
of the noble and the mean, as in any of the works of art to 
which those names are given." Payne. 

What is ludicrousness 9 From ichat three sources may it he said 

to arise? What is there in the last instance which gives it the 

character of the ludicrous f 55. Which ranks the highest, wit 

or ludicrousness ? 56. What advantage may we derive from the 

perception of the ludicrous ? 



Less. 15. intellectual philosophy. 327 

lived in a country that abounded with coal-pits, some of 
them of very great depth, and not always surrounded by 
fences, lost his way in returning home from his work, one 
very dark winter night ; and for hours he wandered about, 
groping forward with his hand, before he ventured to shift 
his foot an inch, lest that slight change of position should 
precipitate him into one of the deep and deserted chasms, 
in which any remnant of life that might have been left, 
would have been even more dreadful than death. After 
much anxiety and exertion in this way, he came to some 
bushes ; and holding by them, fancied he would get one 
step at least upon firm ground. His foot appeared to meet 
with no resistance ; he clung to the bushes, which were 
thorns ; and as the surface, against which his knees rest- 
ed, seemed a brink, he never doubted that it was one of 
the most deep and destructive of the pits. He pulled up 
his legs as far as ever he could, and grappled himself to 
the bushes, occasionally holding on with his teeth, to 
relieve his hands. In this way, each moment seemed 
an hour, and each hour a month ; and perhaps there 
never was a person in such mental agony before. The 
dawn came at last, and when he ventured to look around, 
he found he w^as sticking in the hedge by the roadside, 
within a few yards of his own door ; and with his feet 
so near the ground, that if he had stretched them down 
at any one instant, he would have felt that he was perfect- 
ly safe.'' 

Matilda. That was very ludicrous, certainly. 

Manj, Not half so ludicrous, in my opinion, as when we 
find a person pretending to support a character which we 
know well to be beyond his reach. 

Di\ Hcrhert. In our next conversation we shall attend 
a little to the general nature of those immediate feelings that 
have a moral tendency ; and, independently of the immedi- 
ate feeling, have an influence upon our future conduct, or 
a reference to the conduct of others. 

57. What is far more ludicrous and far more common than the 
case of the persoi- related in the story ^ 



328 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 16. 



LESSON XVI. 

Feeling of moral distinction, common to all men, but varied by their 
education and habits — Emotion of Love, Hatred, Sympathy, Pride, 
Humility — Distinction of moral good and evil in each. 

Dr, Herbert, The emotions which we noticed briefly 
in our last conversation, are those which people the exter- 
nal world with enjoyment, and upon which what is called 
Taste is formed. But there are other immediate emotions, 
which are probably yet more important, inasmuch as the 
suggestions to which they give rise, become more immedi- 
ately the rules of our conduct, and guide us in the way that 
conduces to moral happiness, in the same manner as the 
former emotions conduct us to intellectual pleasure. Con- 
nected with this part of the subject, there have been many 
disputes, upon which it would be premature for us to enter, 
until, upon some future occasion, we come to consider the 
foundation of moral obligation. Therefore, without any mi- 
nute inquiry into its foundation, we shall, in the meantime, 
take it for granted, that there is in the human mind a ca- 
pacity, for discriminating between right and wrong, or 
vice and virtue, just in the same manner as there is a ca- 
pacity for discriminating between sound and colour, or be- 
tween red and green, or sounds which are musical and 
sounds which are not. 

Mary, Is it not probable that the capacity of making 
this distinction may, like that which distinguishes beauty, 
be so early exercised that no sign of it is given, and no 
suggestion recalls the earliest impression ; and that, there* 
fore, it will be just as difficult to ascertain how far it is in- 
stinctive, and how far the result of experience, as it is in 
the case of those emotions about which we conversed last ? 

Dr, Herbert, Most likely that may be the case : but in- 
stead of occupying our time respecting it, it will be better 
— as we dare not in after life, at least, deny the fact of its 
existence — to read a piece of very eloquent pleading in its 
favour from the lectures of Dr. Thomas Brown, to which we 

1. Upon what is taste formed ? 2. Why are the other imme- 
diate emotions, which are now to be considered, more important than 
those which have already been noticed ? .3. In pursuing his sub- 
ject, what does the author take for granted } 



Less. 16. intellectual philosophy. 329 

were on a former occasion indebted ; and if Charles will 
bring the third volume, he may read the passage. 

Charles. *' Even the boldest sceptic, who denies all the 
ground of moral obligation, must still allow the existence 
of the feelings, which we are considering, (those of the dis- 
tinction of right and wrong,) as states or affections of the 
mind, indicative of certain susceptibilities in the mind of 
being so affected. Whether we have reason to approve or 
disapprove, or have no reason whatever, in tlie nature of 
their actions, to regard, with a different eye those whom, 
by some strange illusion, but by an illusion only, we now 
feel ourselves almost necessitated to love or abhor ; though 
it be an error of logic, to consider the homicide, who, in 
preparing to plunge the dagger, could hold his lamp un- 
moved, and, with no other apprehension than of the too 
early waking of his victim, look fixedly on the pale and 
gentle features of him whose very sleep was at that very 
moment, perhaps, made happy by some dream of happi* 
ness to his murderer, as less worthy, even in the slightest 
respect, of our esteem, than the son who rushes to inevita- 
ble death in defence of the grey hairs which he honours ; 
though it be not less an error of logic to extend our moral 
distinctions, and the love or hate which accompanies them, 
to those who make, not a few individuals only, but whole 
millions, wretched or happy ; to consider the usurping 
despot who dares to be a tyrant, in the land in which he 
was born a freeman, as a less glorious object of our admira- 
tion, than the last assertor of rights which seemed still to 
exist, while he existed to assert them; who, in that cause 
which allows no fear of peril, could see nothing in guilty 
power which a brave man could dread, but every thing 
which it would be a crime to obey, and who ennobled with 
his blood the scaffold, from which he rose to liberty and 
heaven, making it an altar of the richest and most gratify- 
ing sacrifice which man offers to the Great Being whom he 
serves ; even though we should be unfortunate enough to 
look on the tyrant with the same envy as on his victim, and 
could see no reason for those distinctive terms of vice and 
virtue in the two cases, the force of which we should feel 

4. What will the boldest sceptic allou^, though he deny all the 

grounds of moral obligation ? 5. Though sound logic would not 

allow us to make any distinction in the instances given, what would 
our feelings do ? 



330 . FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 16.^ 

equally, though we had not a word to express the mean- 
ing that is constantly in our hearts ; still the fact of the gen- 
eral approbation and disapprobation, we must admit, even 
in reserving for ourselves this privilege of indifference. 
They are phenomena of the mind, lo be ranked with the 
general mental phenomena, as much as our sensation or 
remembrances.'' 

31ary, But surely it is not necessary, even to make the 
assumption, that there is no moral obligation to incite us to 
virtue and restrain us from vice. 

Dr. Herbert, I am far from believing that, in this most 
important relation, with regard both to our present and 
our everlasting happiness, or our all-bountiful Author could 
have left us without a guide ; but when we consider the 
mind philosophically, we must not mingle our philosophy 
with even our religious feelings. If we be honest in our 
inquiries, — if we seek only to know that which the Al- 
mighty has been pleased to reveal in the formation of the 
human mind, we may rest assured that it will be found in 
perfect accordance with that revelation of his divine will 
which he has bestowed upon us for our spiritual guidance; 
and to doubt or suspect that there will be any discrepan- 
cy between the one and the other, would be to charge our 
Maker with inconsistency in the different parts of his own 
works. 

Mary, But the feeling of right and wrong is in 
the mind itself, and must vary with its education and ex- 
perience. 

Dr. Herbert. Certainly: there is no universal a parte rei 
in virtue or vice, any more than in any other source of 
knowledge or feeling. Before we can form a judgment, or 
even have the feeling, we must get an instance — a specific 
fact ; and possibly no two persons could come to tlie same 
conclusion, or have the same feeling of it. 

Charles. Out of this feeling of vice or virtue in hu- 
man conduct, there necessarily arise almost the whole 
of our incentives to the one, and our warnings against 
the other. 

6. Would the mingling of our philosophy with our religious 

feelings advance either the one or the other? 7. Have we any 

grounds to believe that there is any discrepancy between the one and 
the other ? 8. Where is this feeling of right and wrong, and ac- 
cording to what must it vary ? 9. From what must our incentives 

to virtue, and our warnings against vice, arise ' 



Less. 16. intellectual philosophy. 331 

Dr, Herbert. There arises a good deal more ; for in 
them, indirectly, lie the whole of the distinctions, be- 
tween mun who do their duty, and men who do not, in 
every situation in which they can be placed ; and all our 
loves and our hatreds, our attachments and oui dislikes, 
with the whole train of corresponding immediate emo- 
tions, and that conduct which they suggest, proceed from 
this as a source, or have it mixed with them in a compound 
state. 

Matilda, I have read, that love is a selfish feeling, and 
that hate is a malignant one ? 

Dr. Herbert. The one is selfish, or the other malignant, 
only when it arises without the suggestion of moral distinc- 
tion to which we have referred. Love may be selfish, and 
we may love to injure others ; but that is a perversion of 
the name, — a debasement of the emotion, and not the emo- 
tion itself The proper definition of love, or rather, the two 
feelings into which, whenever it is true, it may be imme- 
diately resolved, are a very ardent delight in the contem- 
plation of any object, accompanied by the desire of doing 
good to that object ; and when both these elements do not 
enter into the feeling, it is counterfeit. 

Charles. Then, as the delight, which is the earlier emo- 
tion, must be suggested by some previous feeling or percep- 
tion, the object that we love must, previous to the feeling 
of love, be known to us, or felt by us, as one capable of giv- 
ing pleasure. 

Dr. Herbert. And that suggesting feeling will, in gen- 
eral, be beauty in some of its varied classes, — external 
beauty, intellectual beauty — as a portion of knowledge, or 
moral beauty — virtue as distinguished from vice. In this 
suggesting feeling we may be wrong, because we have not 
a control over our suggestions; but as in all other cases, 
the only chance we have of being right in our suggestion 
is to have the trains of our observation and thought among 
the proper subjects. Thus, in the love that we feel, in 
all its variations, from the meanest production of creative 
power to that August Being who formed the whole, there 

10. And what besides these arise from the same source ?— 
11. Into what two feelings may love, whenever it is true, be re- 
solved ? 12. What is the suggesting feeling, which produces 

this emotion ? 13. Why may we sometimes be wrong in this 

suggesting feeling ? 14. Where lies our chance of being right ? 

15. Under what circumstances only can there be selfishness in 

love .? 



332 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 16. 

is, therefore, no selfishness, unless where the moral dis- 
tinction is lost sight of; and when exercised in this man- 
ner it binds ail the pleasing in external nature, all the 
amiable and the good in society, and all that is delightful 
in the mind itself, into one family of pure and holy at- 
tachment. While the moral distinction is vivid, and sym- 
pathy with the generous and the good — that unbidden 
impulse by which we spring forward to succour the op- 
pressed or to raise the fallen — that glow which we feel at 
the contemplation of noble and generous deeds, and even 
our very hatred itself, under proper regulation, puts on 
the resemblance of love, because it proceeds more upon 
sympathy with, and pity for, those who have received 
wrong, than upon any desire to take vengeance upon the 
wrong-doer. 

Charles, Then hatred, when properly regulated by moral 
feeling, is rather directed to the reparation of the injury by 
which it is excited, than by a desire to take vengeance on 
the party who is the cause of the injury. 

Dr. Herbert, In those who are not in the habit of 
analyzing their feelings, it is by no means easy to hate 
the offence, without hating the offender ; and, perhaps, 
they ought not altogether to be separated, because the 
very constitution of our nature tells us, that that which 
has alone done injury once, may do injury again ; but in all 
cases, the proper use of the hatred is to prevent the recur- 
rence of the injury. 

Mary, The emotion of hatred does not seem to be so 
natural a one, as the opposite ; there are many more objects 
to draw our affections than our dislike. 

Dr. Herbert. Something must, no doubt, be allowed 
for the differences of condition and success in life ; but as 
happiness is what all are seeking, it may be considered us 
the natural state of all. It abates not with time, while the 
painful feelings do ; and we consider those who cherish 
hatred, as persons who have had their associations with the 

16. But when exercised in conformity with this distinction, what 

is its effect? 17. When deeply influenced by this emotion, in 

what sense may it be said, that our hatred puts on the resemblance 

of love ? 18. Is it possible to hate the ofl:ence without hating the 

offender ? 19. Why is it best that they should not always be 

altogether separated ^ ^20. How do we consider those who cherish 

hatred P 



Less. 1G. intellectcal philosophy. 333 

wicked. Still, what are sometimes called our malevolent 
affections, are necessary as the guides and guardians, not 
only of our enjoyments, but of all tiiose benevolent emo- 
tions which we are capable of feeling towards others. Our 
aversion is as necessary, for telling us what we ought to shun, 
as our kindly affections are in telling us what we ought to 
seek. 

Charles. The sympathy that we feel for the sufferings of 
others, seems to me to be a feeling nearly allied to that by 
which we love them. 

Dr. Herbert. There is a considerable difference , love 
is always, when simple, pure, and under proper regulation, 
a pleasurable feeling ; and when we analyze those com- 
pound states of it, which, in their secondary effects, are 
often painful, v/e find that the primary emotion is one of 
pleasure. In love, too, the primary emotion is always ours, 
though it be preceded by an emotion of beauty ; while sym- 
pathy is often painful, and always an emotion of contagion, 
in which we become as it were partakers in the emotions 
of others, whether pleasurable or painful. The gentle gaie- 
ty of a friend, wins us from grief; and the sight of misery, 
or even of the expression of it, counterfeited skilfully, makes 
us forget our own advantages of fortune, in order that we 
may weep with those that weep. 

Mary. It seems to me that sympathy is a more direct 
and immediate feeling than love. Jf we see any creature 
in pain or danger, we sympathize with it, even though it be 
a creature to which we would feel an aversion, if it were 
not for the danger. 

Dr. Hcrhert. In minds that have been habituated to 
the benevolent feelings, sympathy is of so ready a suggestion, 
that it comes, and brings with it the secondary emotions of 
pity and comparison, or the desire of removing the danger 
or suffering that we see, even contrary to the moral con- 
sideration of the object. We may also, by the common 
laws of suggestion, sympathize with our own former or im- 
agined states, or with those of others ; and upon this princi- 
ple, we are often happy or miserable from the sympathies 

21. For what purpose are the malevolent affeciions necessary ? 

2*2. What is the difference between love and sympathy? 

23. What i3 remarked respecting sympathy in minds, that have 

been habituated to the benevolent teelino^s ? 24. On what prin- 

ciple are we often happy or miserable without knowing the cause ? 

39 



334 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 16. 

that arise ia a reverie, without exactly knowing the particu- 
lar portions of the reverie from which the change of emo- 
tion has arisen. 

Charles. Is not pride a sort of sympathy ? 

Dr. Herbert. Pride, as well as humility, is an imme- 
diate emotion^ which can hardly take place without some 
moral feeling ; but it is the very opposite of sympathy. 
In sympathy, we, as it were, identify ourselves with the 
object, and make its joy or its grief our own. But in the 
emotions of pride and humility we contrast ourselves 
either with others, or with what we have been at another 
time ; and the pride is an emotion of joy, and the humili- 
ty an emotion of sorrow, arising immediately upon the com- 
parison. 

Edward. I have often seen laid down as a maxim, that 
pride is a feeling that we ought to avoid, and humility one 
which we ought to cherish ; but if they be both natural 
susceptibilities of our minds, and as we have been shown 
that we cannot will our suggestions, we cannot prevent their 
occurrence. 

Dr. Herbert. All our emotions are given us for good ; 
and the blame, even in the strongest and most frequently 
censured of them, does not lie in the emotion itself, but in 
the causes by which it is excited, and the conduct by which 
it is followed. When the objects or the acquirements of 
which we are proud, are in themselves worthy, our pride 
is as innocent and valuable a feeling as our love of virtue, 
our love of our friends, or of our country ; because the pleas- 
ure that we feel in the possession of what is praise-worthy, 
is one of the chief inducements to the acquisition of it. 
There are, however, two corruptions or counterfeits of pride, 
which are improper, and ought to be avoided. The one, 
when we are proud of that which is not worthy of us, or 
when we are too forward to boast of our possessions and ac- 
quirements ; and the other, when, in order to enhance the 
value of what is ours, we labor to degrade that which be- 
longs to others. 

25. Is there any resemblance between pride and sympathy ? 

26. "What does the person, who is under the influence of sympathy, 
do ? — — 27. And in the emotions of pride and humility, wiiat does 
he do ? 28. Of what is pride, and of what is humility the emo- 
tion ? 29. Where does the blame, in any emotion, lie ? 

30. When is our pride an innocent and valuable feelings and for 
■what reason ought we so to consider it ? 31. What two corrup- 
tions or counterfeits of pride are mentioned ? 



Less. 17. intellectual philosophy. 335 

Mary. The first of these is, properly speaking, vanity; 
and the last, haiiglitiness. 

Di\ Herbert. These are the names by which they 
ought to be called ; but neither of them is, strictly speaking, 
pride : they are secondary feelings, suggested by the emo- 
tion of pride. They are both faults in comparison, vani- 
ty being a magnifying of what is ours, directly, beyond its 
proper dimensions ; and haughtiness an indirect attempt 
at the same, by diminishing that which belongs to others. 
By the former, we make ourselves ridiculous ; by the lat- 
ter, disagreeable ; and by both, we defeat that very ex- 
cellence which it is the object of honest pride to accom- 
plish. 



LESSON xvn. 

Retrospective emotions — From the conduct of others — Anger or grati- 
tude — From natural events — Simple regret, or simple gladness — 
From the review of our own conduct — Moral regret or gladness. 

Dr. Herbert. We are now to notice the second of those 
classes, into which we formerly proposed to arrange the emo- 
tions : Do you remember the general name and definition of 
the class? 

Edward. The emotions that arise from the contempla- 
tion of that which is past, or when we take a retrospect of 
our past conduct. 

Dr. Herbert. And think you that we can feel no emotion 
from the contemplation of any thing past but our own 
conduct ? 

Mary. There is, perhaps, not a single past action or event, 
which does not give rise to some emotion, even though 
that action or event had taken place thousands of years be- 
fore we were born ; and not only this, for we cannot hear 
or read a well told tale without being affected by it, although 

32. By what names are these known ? 33. What are the ef- 
fects of vanity and haughtiness on those who indulge them ? 

1. On the consideration of wliat subject do we now enter .^ 

2. Is this emotion confined to the contemplation of our own 

conduct .? 



336 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS» i7. 

we know quite well all the time that there is not one word 
of truth in the whole. 

Charles. Nor is it necessary that that which moves us 
should be the act of human beings at all ; for we feel pain 
in the contemplation of that which produced pain, and 
pleasure in that which produced pleasure, even though it 
had been the result of a natural occurrence, over which man 
had no control. 

Dr. Herbert. This will enable us to arrange our retro- 
spective emotions into three subdivisions : — 

1. Those that arise from reflection on the conduct of 
others. 

2. Those that arise from reflection on events that man- 
kind cannot control ; and, 

3.^ Those that arise on the review of our own past 
conduct. 

Edward, And will not approbation, or disapprobation, 
be the emotion in each case, according as we feel that the 
event has been productive of good, or of evil ? 

Dr. Herbert. In as far as the conduct of others is con- 
cerned, the whole of the varied emotions that arise in all 
their varieties of intenseness, may be reduced to the two gen- 
eral denominations of anger and gratitude. Anger at some 
evil, or gratitude for some good, that has been done to us, 
or to others, and which, in the latter instance, we make our 
own by sympathy. 

Matilda. But is not anger a passion, and not an emotion ? 
We so habitually regard it as such, that we describe one 
who is often angry, as being passionate. 

Dr. Herbert. All our emotions get the name of pas- 
sions, when they either recur so frequently, continue so 
long, or are so intense during their continuance, that they 
form permanently, or for the titne at least, a part of the 
characteristic distinction of the individual. But this ten- 
dency to frequent recurrence, protracted duration, or 
great intensity, does not alter the nature of the original 
emotion, though it may alter the consequences, both to 

3. Is it confined to the acts of human beings ? 4. Into what 

three subdivisions can our retro-pective emotions be divided ? 

5. In the fiist subdivision, to wh^t two general derioruinalions can 

our enriotions be reduced ? f>. How do emotions jj;et the name 

of passions ? 7. But if this tendency to frequent recurrences does 

not alter the nature of the original emotion, what does it affect ? 



Less. 17. intellectual MiiLosoPHy. 337 

the individual and to those with whom that individual as- 
sociates. 

C/iarlcs. The anger which we feel when we find tliat in- 
jury has been done, or intended, or good, which ought to 
have been done, neglected, leads us to wish that some re- 
tahation or revenge should be inflicted upon the party to 
whom we attribute the evil. 

Dr. Herbert. You do well to say that the anger leads 
to this desire to inflict retaliation or revenge; because, in- 
stead of its being the same emotion with the anger, it be- 
longs to a different class altogether, and is a prospective 
emotion, or desire, just as much as the desire of any thincr 
else that is future. In general, however, it follows the 
mere feeling of evil, and the dislike which constitutes the 
anger, so immediately, that we are not in the habit of sepa- 
rating them in comuion language. The anger itself is the 
emotion which arises from the retrospective glance at the 
past, and is, strictly speaking, the effect of the past; while 
in the order of succession, the same anger is the cause of 
the desire of retaliation, which desire looks forward to the 
future. 

Mary, Is not the emotion of anger one which we 
should upon all occasions repress? 

Dr. Herbert. All those emotions which involve a mor- 
al feeling ought to be regulated by a proper reference to 
that morality ; and before we follow our emotion of anger 
with any act which would fulfil the desire of retaliation, we 
ought to consider well whether the evil that occasioned the 
anger was well founded in itself, and intentional in the par- 
ty doing it; and we should, also, take care to measure the 
retaliation by the degree of evil ; but still we can no more 
resist the momentary feeling of anger, than we can resist 
any of our other emotions, that rise immediately upon sug- 
gestion or perception without any perceived wish on our 
part intervening between the perception and the emotion. 

Charles. Thus regulated, it appears to me, that the 
emotion of anger is necessary for the preservation, both of 

8. Why is there propriety in saying, that anger " leads''' to the de- 
sire to inflict retaliation? 9. How can this be more fully explain- 
ed ? ^10. How should all our emotions, which involve a moral 

feeling, be rei^ulated ? 11. What ought we to consider before we 

follow our emotion of anger with any act of retaliation ? 12. Can 

we resist the momentary feeling of anger ? 

29* 



338 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 17* 

individuals and of societies; and without it, there are 
many cases of danger, in which men could not defend them- 
selves, or nations protect their possessions and rights. 

Dr. Herbert. What we may call the sympathetic form 
of anger is, also, of great utility ; becau.se it instinctively 
brings mankind to the relief of the oppressed, vviihout any 
of that intermediate reasoning and weighing of circumstan- 
ces, which might delay the relief till too Lte. When inju- 
ry is directly done to an individual, when that individual 
feels that it was intended, and when it is in itself severe, 
perhaps the anger of the injured party always rises to that 
intensity which may be called a passion rather than an emo- 
tion : but when an atrocious act has been done, there is a 
sympathetic anger which diffiises itself over every honest 
mind, to whom the fact is made known ; and this sympa- 
thetic anger, which is not so intense as that of the immedi- 
ate sufferer, but admits of some pause and weighing of cir- 
cum?tances, is, perhaps, one of the best securities against 
aggression ; for though the vicious and the strong might 
not hesitate to do injury to the weak, yet an individual, 
standing alone, must be daring indeed, ere he make head 
against the aroused indignation of a community. 

Mary. When we read of any instance of cruelty, even 
though the parties be all dead, or probably never lived, we 
cannot repress our anger ; and when I saw the tragedy of 
** King Lear" acted, 1 could have taken arms myself in de- 
fence of the good old man, or of Gloster. 

Dr. Herbert. This is an emotion which we ought, per- 
ha})s, to cherish as much as any. In these long elapsed or 
ideal scenes, our selfish feelings do not enter to the cloud- 
ing of our reason, so much as when we are actors, or even 
immediate spectators: and, therefore, from them we derive 
lessons which enable us not only to keep the emotion alive 
and vigorous in all cases where it can be productive of 
good, but to check and subdue it, before it become either 
so strong or so continued, as to degenerate into evil, and 

13. What is the uUlity of the sympathetic form of an<jer ? 

14. What may be said of the anger ol" the man, who has been 
directly and severely injured, and feels that it was intended '' 

15. But if, in case of an atiocioiis art, a sj-mpathelic anger diffuses 
itself over every honest mind acquainted with the fact, what may be 

said of this sympathetic anger ? 16. What is remarked respecting 

the emotions which arises when readinir of any instance of cruelty ? 

17. What lessons may we derive from such scenes ? 



Less. 17. intellectual philosophy. 339 

prompt us to iiitlict more pain upon ourselves, or more ven- 
geance upon otiiers, than tlie justice of the case recjuires. 

Matilda. Some persons are, coniinually, not only fret- 
tinor and feeling emcjtions of anger, but breaking out into 
absolute passion, at trifles; now, surely, that is a mode of 
proceeding that ouglit to be repressed. 

Dr. Htrbcrt. Ccriainly it ought ; and yet, paradoxical 
as it may seem, it is sometimes much more difficult, even 
in people who are otherwise sensible and well educated, to 
prevLMit themselves being overcome by anger at tiifles, than 
at matters of very deep importance. 

Edward. That is very singular ; and certainly not in 
itself any proof of sense or good education. 

Dr. Hcrbtrt. It, however, leads us to a tact of very 
considerable importance in the management of all our emo- 
tions : and that is, that if the perception or suggestion that 
causes the emotion be insignificant in itself, and have noth- 
ing about it to excite a suggestion of intellectual states, the 
mere emotion, as it were, usurps the whole empire and 
governnient of the mind, and suggests desires which lead 
us to rash actions, that we would never have tliought of 
committing, if the event causing the emotion had been of 
sufficient importance to make us think upon itself, as a 
matter ot reasoning. 

Charles. May not one cause of our feeling more angry 
in one case than m another case, which is of greater con- 
sequence, be the unexpectedness of the cause of anger in 
the less important one? 

Dr. Herbert, Unquestionably ; and as trifling events, 
in those who have any tolerable regulation of their conduct, 
are always more unexpected than important ones, it is very 
possible, on this account alone, for the man who could meet 
the severest injury without emotion, to be vexed at a mere 
trifle. In great injuries, too, the very magnitude of the 
harm done becomes, (by a mysterious sort of sym[)athy that 
the mind has for itself, to a certain degree,) a source of 
pleasuie and exultation, by which the anger is mitigated, 
and to a considerable extent overcome. 



1 



18. How does it happen, that some persons will be aniiry at 
trifles, who in inatlers of deep iniportiince will remain ))eriecUy calm ? 

19. How far will the unexjiectedness of the cause acrounl for 

this fact ? 20. Wliat is there in great injuries, which lends to 

mitigate the emotioDs of anger ? 



340 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 17. 

Besides these, which may be considered as physiological 
causes of the improper management of anger, there are 
others which are more directly moral. (I.) The intensity 
of the emotion may lead the individual to confound the in- 
nocent with the guilty, by preventing that succession of 
reasoning by which the real author might be found out; 
(2.) it may lead to the imputation of intentional wrong, in 
cases where the injury is purely accidental; or, (3.) it 
may be followed up beyond a reasonable measure of retali- 
ation. All these are moral perversions of the natural feel- 
ing; and they have their several degrees of enormity, — 
the man who is implacable in his revenge being accounted 
among the very worst specimens of human depravity. 

Mary. The opposite feeling of gratitude is, on the o'ther 
hand, among the most delightful emotions of which the hu- 
man mind is susceptible. 

Dr. Herbert. Even in those individual and detached 
instances, in which the benefactor and the benefitted come 
but seldom into contact, the pleasure resulting from the 
feeling of gratitude is so pure and pleasant, and so prone to 
diffuse itself, that it is difficult to say whether it confers the 
more exquisite delight upon the giver or the receiver. But 
in those more close and delightful relations of life, in 
which benefit and gratitude are almost one continuous 
emotion, the exercise of this emotion constitute the chief 
charm ; and even after the connexion has been dissolved, 
the memory of gratitude has a charm about it, which be- 
longs to no other suggestion ; and when this emotion is re- 
fined and purified to its highest degree, it is one of the most 
abundant and most consoling elements in that veneration 
and worship which rational creatures feel toward their 
Creator. 

The next subdivision of our retrospective emotions are 
those which refer to events, in which we feel neither anger 
nor gratitude toward our fellow creatures ; nor do we con- 
gratulate or blame ourselves for any share that we have had , 

21. What three moral perversions of the natural feeling of anger 
are mentioned ? 22. Hovr is the man regarded, who is implaca- 
ble in his revenge ? 23. What is remarked respecting gratitude 

in individual and detached instances ? 24, What is remarked 

respecting it in the more close and delightful relations of life ? 

25. When this emotion is refined and purified to the highest degree, 
what is remarked respecting it? 26. What is the next subdivi- 
sion of the retrospective emotions .'' 



Less. 17. intellectual piiiLosopiiy. 341 

in them. The common casualties of life, our necessary 
separations from our friends, the accidents to which human 
life and liuman comfort are exposed, and those more dread- 
ful catastrophes in tlie economy of nature, occasion what 
we term simple regret ; while good health and good fortune 
to those whom we love, prosperity to our country, sunny 
days, fertile and healthy seasons, and all other natural 
causes of good, are the occasions on which we feel the emo- 
tion of simple gladness. 

31arij. Are not these emotions somewhat similar to the 
immediate emotions of melancholy and cheerfulness, which 
you formerly mentioned to us ? 

Dr. Herbert. Considered as states of mind, cheerful- 
ness and gladness differ rather in degree than in kind; 
and so do melancholy and regret. The immediate emo- 
tions are the more gentle ; and when time has taken off the 
first vividness of the retrospective emotion, it may soften 
down to the other. That which at its commencement was 
gladness, may subside into the more tranquil state of cheer- 
fulness ; and the pain of regret, which, in many instances, 
is among the most deep of our mental sufferings, may in 
time subside into the tranquil gloom of melancholy. But 
there is this distinction between them, that the gladness 
and the regret may, in general, if not always, be referred 
to some known events, as their causes, while the cheerful- 
ness and the melancholy often come over us, we know not 
how. 

Charles. These emotions seem more imnediately to 
interest us in the general history of the world, than those 
which we connect with our own actions, or with the ac- 
tions of our fellow men. There is hardly an occurrence, 
even down to a change of weather, a stoim, or a shower, 
which is not in some manner fraught with v\eal or wo, 
either to ourselves directly, or to us indirectly, through 
sympathy with some portion of the race, and therefore the 
simple gladness and regret which are then produced, 

27. From what does the ernolion, termed simple regret, arise ? 

2b. W lilt n)viy occasion the emotion of shnpJe gladness ? 

29. Considi^red as state^^ of mind do these emotions ditfer from 

cheerfulness and melancholy ? 30. Into what may ^l.idness, and 

also the pain of regret, gradually subside? 31. But what di-tinc- 

tion is there between these two classes of emotions ' 32. What 

remarks are made respecting the extent and licquent occurrence of 
the eiuotions of gladness and regret? 



342 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 17. 

seem to diversify our days with joy and sorrow, even 
when the current of our own lives, or that of those in 
whom our affections are interested, appears to run the 
smoothest. 

Dr, Herbert, These milder emotions, besides the pleas- 
ure and the interest which they directly communicate, 
appear to be, as it were, the play of the affections, — the 
exercise by which they are kept ready, until matters of 
deeper interest to ourselves personally, or to those Vv'hom 
we love, shall require more intense feeling. 

Of all our retrospective emotions, those which arise from 
moral retrospects of our past actions are probably, however, 
the strongest, as well as the ones that give the highest rel- 
ish to our enjoyment, or the deepest shade to our moral 
misery, in proportion as in the judgment which we take — 
and it is a judgment which, when once awakened, is sel- 
dom far wrong — leads us to the conclusion that we have 
done well or ill. 

It is in these emotions that the guilty find all that re- 
morse which arms even prosperity in this world with the 
agonies and horrors of the place of final retribution. (1) 
Hence springs that self-condemnation, from which no se- 
clusion and no darkness can hide, — (2) hence the anguish of 
that reniorse which nothing can remove, — and (3) hence 
that dreadful retribution of despair by which the very sum- 
mit of guilty prosperity is cast immeasurably below the 
very depths of simple adversity. Hence, too, that self-ap- 
probation^ which is a kingdom to the unfortunate, — a world 
to the destitute ; and which requires but small colouring 
from fancy, in order that, — as suggestion turns from this 
world to another and a belter, — it may glide into the ap- 
probation of Him, in whose sight, at every total desertion 
by the world, we find it will be still a delight and an enjoy- 
ment to be classed with those who, to the best measure 
of their ability, have fulfilled the intention of his sacred 
will. 

33. What is said of these milder emotions ^ 34. What gen- 
eral remarks are made on the third subdivison of the retrospective 

emotion? ? 35. What particulars are mentioned, as arising from 

the emotions of this classj and as overwhelming the guilty in the 

deepest misery ? 36. What remarks are made respecting the 

effect, which this class of retrospective emotions have on the virtu- 
ous man who is unfortunate .'* 



Less. 18. intellectual philosophy. 843 

Such are the names, and one or two of the leading char- 
acteristics, of the great divisions of our retrospective feel- 
ings — feelings which give rise to a great portion of the 
happiness and misery by wliich our lives are chequered. 
Neither they, however, nor, strictly speaking, any of the 
emotions, are very fit subjects of analysis in early youth. 
To the extent of their experience, it is true that the young 
feel more acutely — especially the pleasurable emotions — 
than those who are more advanced in years. (1) But in 
early youth, the world is too full of novelty, (2) the trains 
of thought are too much centered in the enjfeyment of the 
passing moment, (3) the frame is too elastic, and (4) there 
is, in the disposition, too much of buoyancy and of glee, 
for admitting of the analysis of the more intense emotions, 
— more especially as mere matters of knowledge, without 
the accompaniment of those moral lessons which are drawn 
from them, for the government of individuals, to themselves 
and in the various relations in which they are placed. It is 
the same, too, with those prospective emotions which form 
the remaining division of the physiology of the affections; 
and, so, until we subsequently return to moral obligation and 
to moral duty, as the principal subjects of our investigation, 
we shall content ourselves with a simple enumeration of 
those emotions which, at the same time that they call our 
attention to our future conduct, are intended by our benev- 
olent Creator to warn us against the evil, and allure us to 
the good,— to be the guides of our conduct where the ex- 
amples of our experience may fail, and save us, by the im- 
mediate impulse of nature, where our information is too 
feeble for being our guide. 



LESSON xviir. 

Prospective emotions — All our desires and fears generally — Some 
particular ones. 

Dr. Herbert, To our emotions of this class, there be- 
longs an importance of more keen and lively interest in it- 
self, and bearing more immediately upon our conduct, as 

37. Can the young take so deep an interest in the analysis of 

these emotions, as those, who have had more experience ? 38. 

What particulars are mentioned in confirmation of this ? 

1. What is said of the importance of the prospective emotions ? 



344 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 18. 

active and moral beings, than to any other of those classes 
into which, for the sake of something like an arrangement, 
we have divided the states, or phenomena, of the mind. 
Desire and fear are, as it were, the instruments by which 
we bring our past experiences to bear upon the future ; 
and into them, when they extend forward to action or re- 
straint, there enters the consideration of all our moral and 
intellectual judgments, and all our estimates, from experi- 
ence, as to the different degrees of probability, whether 
that which we desire, or that which we dread, may or may 
not come to pass. 

Mary. Then those prospective emotions are much 
more complex states of mind, than the emotions we have 
hitherto considered 1 

Dr. Herbert. In the mere emotion, there is probably 
little difference ; and a desire or a fear of the future may 
be just as transient, and have as little effect upon our con- 
duct as joy or sorrow at that which is passing or has pass- 
ed ; because the chain of secondary feelings may be inter- 
rupted by a new intellectual state, or a new desire or fear, 
that instantly arises more vividly in suggestion. But, still, 
as in all cases of what we call intentional action, there 
is an antecedent desire, followed, through some succes- 
sion or other, to the action itself. We have those chains 
of succession, unbroken, as it were, from the desire to 
the action ; and, therefore, though, in our order of consid- 
ering them, our prospective emotions are the last that we 
consider, they may take a two-fold or even a three-fold hold 
upon us, — the immediate ernotion upon the performance of 
the action, and a retrospective emotion ^x\s\n^^ from the con- 
sequences of that action, in addition to the prospective 
desire ov fear. 

CharUs. The desire of any object may exist at the very 
same time that there is a fear lest we should not possess it ; 
and, in many instances, of things for which I have been par- 
ticularly anxious, I have found the fear of not getting them 
render the desire very painful. 

2. What is remarked respecting desire and fear ? 3. When 

they extend forward to action or restraint, what consideration enters 

into them?- 4. Are the prospective emotions more complex 

states of mind than the other emo^ions, which have been considered? 

5. Why may a desire or fear be as transient as joy or sorrow? 

6. In what way may it be said, that our prospective emotions 

take a two-fold or even a three-fold hold upon us ? 



Less. 18. intellectual philosophy. 345 

Matilda. Is not hope something different from mere 
desire ? 

Di\ Herbert. There is no necessity for any distinc- 
tion ; for the same object mny excite every degree of de- 
sire, from the slightest momentary wish, tlirough the suc- 
cession of hope, which is a little str^jnger, and more dura- 
ble, and wiiich, when deserving ol the narne, always in- 
volves some probability that the object may be attained. 
When the evidence is still stronger, or more carefully ex- 
amined, hope rises to expectation ; and when the examin- 
ation has been so complete that all known circumstances 
are in tavour of the event, we give it the name of certainty, 
just in the same manner as we apply the same term to 
those successions in the external world, which, to our ob- 
servation, have never been interrupted. All these, how- 
ever, are only different degrees oi desire ; and the will, 
or volition, as it is called, which makes us follow, or at- 
tempt to follow, the desire by action, is nothing more than 
a cnnfdent belief that the action will follow the desire. 
In like manner, doubt as to the occurrence of an event, 
is nothing more than the absence of this experimental con- 
fidence. 

Charles. Are there not as many modifications of the op- 
osite emotion of fear 1 

Dr. Herbert. There are degrees of fears, as well asde* 
grees of hope : but as fear, when it becomes intense, unfits 
the mind more for those suggestions of comparison upon 
which evidence is weighed, the degrees of fear ha\e not got 
names so distinctive, though we use such words as appre- 
hension, fear, alarm, and terror, to express the different mod- 
ifications of this emotion, chiefly with regard to its intensity ^ 
h\n parthf , also, with regard to the nature and imminentness 
of its object. 

Mnnj. Have we any particular measure of the degree of 
fear ? 

7. Whai does the degree of desire, which is called hope, always 

involve? S. When does hope b.^come expectation ? 9. And 

when does expeclrition hecoaie cei tainty ? 10. What is meant by 

the wi!l,or voMtion, which makes u^ follow^ thedesireby actionf 

11, And what is doubt as to the occurrence of an event? 12. 

Why have not the degrees of t'eiir names as distincive as those of 

hope ? 13. With regard to what <lo the words apprehension, fear, 

alarm, and terror, express the different modi6cations of this emotion ' 

30 



346 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 18. 

Dr, Herhert. Of course, we must have some measure, 
otherwise we would not feel differently under different 
circumstances ; but in our desires, and, possibly, still more, 
in our fears, the intensity of emotion arising from differ- 
ences of probability, is modified by the nature of the object 
itself. If the good of which we fear the loss, be highly 
prized by us, or if the danger apprehended would be a 
severe one, the probability, in each case, is so greatly en- 
hanced, that, in very extreme cases, it is apt to be lost sight 
of altogether. Upon this principle, many persons who 
could stand on one foot on the margin of a shallow trench, 
without the slightest uneasiness, would quit their hold, 
turn giddy, and tumble, were they to attempt mounting a 
high ladder, or the shrouds of a vessel, even although both 
of these are very skilfully constructed for security, and 
though, with common precaution, it be hardly possible to 
tumble, except through the influence of fear alone. Fur- 
ther than this, it is hardly necessary for us to consider fears 
as distinct from desire, because it is scarcely possible for 
the one to be strong without the occurrence of the other. 
We cannot fear greatly the loss of any thing, unless we 
desire strongly to retain it ; and we cannot desire strongly 
to obtain possession of any thing, without a fear that we 
may lose it. 

Mary, But will not our fear of disappointment dimin- 
ish in the same proportion as our confidence of success in- 
creases ? 

D)\ Herhert, Not exactly ; because the increasing de- 
sire in itself magnifies the desired object, and 1 have men- 
tioned, that this augments our fear, independently of the 
probability altogether. 

Edward, But what is it that should make us desire to 
possess or to avoid one object, or one event, or action, rath- 
er than another ? 

Dr, Herhert. That is the question which is often put, 
and has been answered in many different ways. Those who 

14. By what is the intensity of emotion in our desires and in 
our fears modified ? 15. Under what circumstances is the proba- 
bility, in extreme cases, lost sight of altogether ? 16. What in- 
stance is given, which can be illustrated on this principle ^ 

17. Why is it not necessary to consider fear, farther than this, 
as distinct from desire ? 18. Why will not our fear of disap- 
pointment diminish in the same proportion, as our confidence of suc- 
cess increases } 



I 



Less. 18. intellectual puilosopiiy. 347 

have taken the extreme on one side, have loosed it from our 
suggestions of experience altogether, and made it depend 
upon a separate fac uhy, vvhicii they invented on purpose, 
called freedom of will. While those who have taken the 
very opposite extreme, have made it, in the case of all de- 
sire, good and bad, a matter of absolute necessity, — a com- 
mandment of God himself, as it were. 

C/iarks. Neither of these answers could surely have 
been the right one ; for if we are able to select one object 
as desirable rather than the other, without its desirability be- 
ing suggested by our former knowledge of it, or by the re- 
lation of some analogous object that we formerly knew, we 
would be independent of experience, which would amount 
to nearly the same thing as making all that we know, and 
all that we do, our own invention. On the other hand, 
if our choice depended upon a necessity that had no refer- 
ence to our former experience, or to the suggestions of 
analogy from that experience, the knowledge of the past 
would never be of any use to us as a guide to the future; 
and the child and the savage ought to know the result of 
any experiment, which they had never seen tried or even 
heard of, just as well as the philosopher, by whom it had 
been made a hundred times over. 

Dr Herbert. Yes; it would signify very little whether 
our desires arose from an intuitive volition, independent of 
experience, or from an external necessity, equally inde- 
pendent of it. In fact, though the use of these terms has 
occasioned very much and very keen dispute, they are 
almost synonymous to our comprehension ; for they are 
both names of supposed, but not described powers, sepa- 
rate from the perceiving mind, and from every object per* 
ceived ; and, therefore, they are names, and nothing but 
names. Every desire, as I have said, is a feeling arising 
from the perception or the suggestion of something that 
we believe will be for our good, — that is, the ungratified 
desire, while it remains so, is, to us, a pain or an evil ; 
and that desire, when we analyze it, will resolve itself into 

19. What answers have been given to the question, '' what is it 
that makes us desiie to possess, or to avoid any one thing, rather 

than anoiher?" 20. ^^ hy cannot the first answer be tlie right 

one? 21. What objection can be brought against the second 

answer ' 22. What remarks aie made about the terms, freedom 

of will and necessity ?■ 23. From wliat does every desire arise .' 

24. When we analyze that desire, into what will it resolve 

itself? 



34S FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 18. 

the anterior state of mind, perceived or sngaested, that 
are its causes. These causes will be the measure of the 
good ; and that good is resolvable into feelings that arise 
from three sources, — which feelings may go together, or 
anv one of them may be more vivid than the others, and 
increase that which we call volition, at the very time that 
-the others are — as monitors as it were — giving warning 
against it. 

Mary. Would it not seem from this, that there is more 
than one principle in operation at the same time ? 

Dr. Herbert. There is a complex state of mind, cer- 
tainly ; hut, as we have said already, the complexity is not 
to be resolved into separate powers or portions of the mind 
contending with one another, but to be attiibuted to the 
different or corresponding vividness of the suggestions out 
of which the state of emotion has arisen. 

The sources of goodness, con-^idered in this way, are, 
as I have said, three- fold. (1) That which is good for 
us under the immediate circumstances, as tending simply 
to gratify the wish ; ('2) that which is good for us, as we 
are acquainted with the causes and effects of physical oc- 
currence, to which the individual gratification may or 
may not lead ; and (3) that which is good for us as moral 
beings. 

They who are swayed by the first of these considerations 
of good, in preference to the others, are what we would prop- 
erly call sensualists ; for they gratify the immediate emo- 
tion without any regard to its effect upon their own future 
gratifications, or upon those feelings of right ar^.d wrong 
which constitute uiorality. They who are guided by the 
second to the exclusion of the other two, are what may be 
termed prudent men, who look forward to the continuation 
of their own enjoyments, and sacrifice present pleasure for 
the securing of these, but will not sacrifice these in the 
cause of virtue. They who are swayed by the third, to the 

25. Into what is the ^ood resolvable, of which those anterior 

state* of the mind are the mea«ute •* 26. What is remarked of 

the feelings which arise froin these sources.? 27. What is re- 
marked respectirig the complexity of the mind ? 28. What iue the 

three-fold sources of goodness mentioned ? -29. What are they 

called, who are wholly swayed by the first of these considerations of 

good; and why are they so called .' 30. What are they called, 

who are exclusively guided by the second of these considerations, and 
to what do they look forward ? 



Less. 18. intellectual niiLosopiiY. 349 

exclusion of the other two, are, properly, the only persons 
who, ill a moral sense, can be denominated good, because 
they sacrifice both their immediate and their expected en- 
joyments, lor the maintenance of the purity of their 
own minds, and the doing of justice and equity to their 
fellow-men. Even in cases of criminal sensuality, neither 
the feeling of prudence, nor the feeling of propriety, may 
be altogether destroyed, though their voices may be stifled 
for the time; and their being so stifled, is the cause of 
those retrospective emotions, which so torture the guilty 
when their own bad deeds arise in suggestion, condemn 
them by the evidence of the neglected moral feeling, and 
consign them over to an execution, which is more agoniz- 
ing than any torture or mode of death, that could be prac- 
tised upon the body. 

Thus you will perceive the great importance that there 
is in being intimately acquainted with external events, in 
the relation of cause and effect, in order that we may not, 
for the sake of a trifling present good, expose ourselves to 
a great physical evil in future ; and we ought to be equally, 
nay, much more, attentive to moral qualities and moral 
events, as causes and effects, in order to be prepared 
against moral evils, which, if incurred in an hour of incon- 
siderate desire, may be yet more fatal. 

Charles, Then all our prospective emotions — from the 
same considerations of future and moral good, which influ- 
ence our hopes or desires, must influence our fears, — all 
our prospective emotions should involve in them a consid- 
eration of future physical and moral advantage, as well as 
the immediate advantage at the time. 

Dr. Herbert. Unquestionably they should ; and it is 
these additions to the mere emotion of desire, which con- 
stitute all the differences of imprudent and prudent, and 
immoral and moral, among mankind. ^^ 

31. Wliat is remarked lespectinu- those who are swayed by the 

third consideration (o the exclusion ot tlie other two ? 32. I n cases 

of criminal sensuality, are the feelir)gs of prudence or propriety al- 
together destroyed ? 33. What are the effects of the reiro^^pec- 

tive emotions on the guilty, which are suggested by the stifled feel- 
ings of prudence or propriety ? 34. What inference may be 

drawn from these views, as a caution against future physical evil ? 
35. And why does this influence apply with more force to 
moral qualities and moral events^ 36. How must our prospec- 
tive emotions influence our fears ; and what should they involve in 

them ? 37. What constitutes all the differences of prudent and 

imprudent, moral and immoral, among mankind ? 
30* 



350 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 18. 

Mary, BtU among the objects of our desires, there are 
surely some in which we cannot be mistaken ; as, for exam- 
ple, when we desire good to others. 

Dr, Herbert. Even there, as much consideration is re- 
quired as in any other of our desires, even in those in which 
we^desire evil to others. (I) Tiie desire is a mere momen- 
tary feelinu[, and, as such, dependent as a conseqiient upon 
its antecedent sugoesiion, and is not in itselfeitlier nioraily 
good or morally evil; but depends wholly upon the thing 
desired, and the analysis of all the consequences of the ob- 
taining of it. (2) When we desire good to others, we 
must be sure thai that which we desire will really be good 
for tliem ; and as we cannot put ourselves exactly in the 
situation of others, the inquiry is by no means so easy as 
might at first be supposed. (3) Nor, thous^h we have col- 
lected and examined all the evidence on that point, is the 
inquiry complete ; for we owe a primary duty to ourselves ; 
and thou j;n it be not the case that most frequently happens, 
injuring ourselves, especially in a moral point of view, for 
the supposed, or even the real good of others, is a crime of 
no ordinary magnitude. 

31atilda. Our hopes and fears are, therefore, dangerous 
to us in the nmnagement. 

Dr. Herbert. They are dangerous, in as far as they de- 
mand a careful study of the consequences ; but we are safe 
in proportion to the extent and soundness of our informa- 
tion ; and when that is ample and sound enough, we can 
have no desire, but which may become a source of pleasure. 
Long before the probability be so strong as to give us an 
expectation, far less a confidence, hope is a sonrce of im- 
mediate delight, and a stimulus to future excellence ; and 
in our advancement to eminence, whether in knowledge, 
in goodness, or in greatness, if hope did not lead the way, 
in those beginnings, when we have as yet formed hardly 
any conjecture about the end, our progress would be slow, 
our advancement limited, and the pleasure of our course 
almost nothino^. 



38. What three considerations are presented which show in their 
connexio!), t'lat we are liable to be mistaken in the object of oup 

desires, even in the case we desire good to others ? 39. What is 

remarked about the usefulness of hope, before probability produces 
in us expectation, or confidence I 



I 



Less. 18. jntkllectual rHiLosoniv. 351 

It is hope which forms our guide, and the beacon-light 
of our march, — which cheers us ai every part of our prog- 
ress, however d'ffit'uh, and supports us under every reverse, 
however contrary to our expectations, — which '* becomes 
wealth to the destitute, heahh to the sick, freedom to the 
captive," and immortahty to the dying. 

Cliarles. But the objects of our desires and fears are so 
many, that I do not see how it is possible that we can make 
any classification of them ; and this, not only on account 
of their number in any one individual, but of their diversi- 
ty, accord inir to the diflferent experiences, pursuits, and op- 
erations c>f individuals. 

Dr. Herbert. To enumerate that which may excite hope 
and fear, would be to make a catalogue of all that we know, 
or can by possibility know ; and also, of all actions and 
events, both known and unknown, and theref»re it would 
be a task which no one could complete. But as each case 
must be determined on its own merits with regard to the 
individual, and as the study of the mind becomes at this 
point wholly practical, it requires to be considered in rela- 
tion to those successions of events which we call the laws 
of nature, — to the direct institutions of the society in which 
we live, though always with a view to the possibility and 
the necessity of their improvement, and adaptation to an 
increased state of knowledge, — and to what we feel to be 
the im^iiediate commandments of our Maker, as ex])ressed 
in his works, or declared in his word. 

Still there are certain classes ot desires which have a 
sort of resetnblance in all men : and though it would be 
rather premature in us to enter immediately upon the minute 
consideration of them, we may close this branch of our 
Conveisntions with a short enumeration. 

I. The desire uf life — of continued existence — is com- 
mon to all mankind ; so common, that when it is lost sight 
of, the yielding to the other ungratified desire, which pro- 
duces the act of quitting life, is now considered as insanity, 
and as taking the person guilty of it out of the class of 
those who are morally accountable. This desire continues 
with us through life ; and amid the decays of age, and the 

40. Wliat may be furtlier said of hope, as the attendant on man 
through the jnuiney of life ? 41. Would it be p()s>if)le to enu- 
merate all thrit can excite h^pe and fear ? 42. What is remarked 

respecting " the desire of hfe .'" 



352 FIRST LESSONS IN LesS. 18. 

pain of sickness, it is as vigorous as ever; and were it not 
for a hope of a future life, which then opens upon the good, 
the close of the present would be unsupportable. 

Charles. But are there not some cases in which even 
the love of life may become an improper desire ? The ob- 
ject ought not to be so much mere livmg, as livino- in a 
manner worthy of ourselves. 

Dr. Herbert. The physical and moral investigation 
ought to be attended to, in every case of desire j and when 
the freedom and the happiness of nations, the independence 
of the country that gave us birth, the exis^tence of those 
who are dear to us, or even the imminent peril of our fel- 
low creatures, call for the sacrifice, we cannot attribute 
either virtue or greatness to the man who stands back, from 
a cold calculation of his own danger. We do this, perhaps, 
not because we wish that the man should die in an attempt, 
however glorious, which is to be useless to others; but be- 
cause i\\e mind springs up in a momentary hope, imagines 
that he may succeed, and they may be saved. To die for 
no object but the getting rid of a painful feeling, is nev- 
er heroism ; it is that desperation attributed to cowards, 
and to cowards only, in which they 

*' Run away from death by dying." 

II. The desire of pleasure is a desire common to all 
mankind, it being the object of all to be happy, as well as 
to live. 

IlL The desire of action is also common to all mankind ; 
and, those who are idle are either rendered miserable by the 
listlessness of their condition, or tliey sink into a state bor- 
dering on stupidity. 

lY. The desire of knowledge is common to all mankind, 
and is the source of very much of the improvement that 
takes place in society. 

V. The desire of society seems to be inseparable from 
man ; for, even by the most careful training, it is hardly 
possible to be a recluse without being miserable. 

VI. Power is a desire common to mankind, whether it 

43. Under what circumstances may the desire of life be an im- 
proper desire .'* 44. What is remarked respecting the desire of 

pleasure ^ 45. What is remarked respectino- those in whom the 

desire of ac^tion does not predominate ? 46. What is observed 

respecting the desire of knowledge ^ 47. The desire of society .'' 

48. The desire of power? 



Less. 18. intellectual niiLosopiiY. 353 

consist in the power of command, the power of knowledge, 
the power of wealth, or the power of any thing eli?e, which 
we helieve vyjll elevate us ahove our fellows. 

Vn. The desire of the affection of those who are about 
us, is a desire common to all mankind ; though, perhaj)s, it 
may partly resolve itself into our desire of society ; in the 
safne manner as our desire of power resolves into the de- 
sire of those things which we believe contributes to the 
possession of power, or of those which the possession of 
power gives ns. 

VIII. There is in most men a desire of glory ^ that is, 
a desire of the s[)lendour of power, as presently or formerly 
displayed, rather than a desire for the exercise of it. 

IX. Our A;i'es and our hatreds oi mankind, which, we 
have seen, are emotions that we cannot resist, are, under 
peculiar circumstances, followed by the desire of good to 
those whom we love, or of evil to those whom we hate. 

Such are some of our prin(-i!)al desires ; and though they 
have very different objects, are suggested in a very differ- 
ent manner, and with different degrees of strengrth, in (uen 
of different habits and associations, ihey are all subject to 
the same laws in their proper government, and the abuse 
of them all is similar in kind to that which I have mention- 
ed as applying to desire in general. 



RETROSPECTIVE GLANCE. 

Dr. Herbert. We shall here close our outline of the 
Physiology of the Mind — that is, of its nature and opera- 
tion — without considering them as more immediately con- 
nected with our moral, our political, and our religious du- 
ties. But still, as even in the most abstracted analysis of 
mental action, it is not possible, or desirable, to detach 
man altogether from those grand objects of his being, I 
have been studious, at every step of our proirress, to point 
out how the knowledge of which we have been in quest, 

49. Into what may the desire of the affections of those ;ibout us 

be resolved? 50. What is remarked respectiiiic the desire of 

glory? 51. What is remarked re^pect'n^ our loves and our 

hatreds? 52. Recaptitulate the nine classes of desires which 

have been enumerated .'' 



354 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 18. 

may be turned to our practical advantage ; and thus, I 
trust, that we have in part seen the application along with 
the doctrine. Nor can we conclude better than by throw- 
ing a brief retrospective glance upon the principal outlines. 

Of the mind, then, in its substance or essence, we know 
nothing : and we need not inquire, as there is nothing 
to answer but the inquirer itself; and if it could return 
the answer, it would not need to make the inquiry. We 
can know nothing of the mind, as existing in space ; 
but we do know it in its successive states or affections : and 
it is utterly impossible for us to deny the existence of the 
mind in any one state, or its identity in any number of 
them, be they ever so varied. As the mind has no divisi- 
ble parts, or separate co-existing qualities, we cannot im- 
agine that it can, in its nature, be subject to tliat dissolu- 
tion which we call death , but that, being one and indivis- 
ible, it must be immortal. 

The belief of its own existence and identity, and its 
capahiUty of comparing one of its states with another, and 
deciding upon their sameness and difference with unerring 
accuracy, are anterior to all external knowledge, and are 
the means by which all knowledge is acquired. For we 
are ignorant not only of the rest of the material creation, 
but of the existence of our own bodies, till we learn it by 
changes, which are produced in our mental states, observ- 
ed immediately consequent upon changes of those. When 
one of two mental states has invariably followed the other 
immediately, experience forces us to believe that that will 
always be the case; and the m.ind passes from the former 
of them to the latter, by those simple and intuitive princi- 
ples, upon which alone it acquires knowledge ; and this is 
all that we mean, or can mean, by a mental feeling and 
belief in cause and effect. 

]. Why need we not inquire, what the substance or essence of 

the mind is ?- 2. Since we know nothing of the mind as existing 

in space, in what way can we know it ? 3. What in respect to 

the mind is it impossible for us to deny r 4. Why do we conclude 

that the mind cannot be subject to that dissolution, which we call 

death? 5 What three tbings, in regard to the mind, are said 

to be anterior to all external knowledge, and the means by which all 

knowledge is acquired? 6. Of what are we ignorant till we 

learn it by changes produced in our mental states ? 7. What is 

meant by a mental feeling and belief in cause and effect ^ 



Less. 18. intellectual philosophy. 355 

The same experience leads us to couple certain mental 
states, with the perception of external objects by the senses : 
and we in tiie same manner consider those objects as the 
ca(/.<ri of the mental states. The notion, or knowledo-c to 
which we thus give the name of the cause of a mental state 
or affection, may be produced by cxtmxal perception, or it 
may be suggested by any former state of mind, whether of 
immediate perception, or of suggestion, which experience 
had tauglit us to consider as its cause; thus, the inteilfctu- 
al state— the thought or knowledge of the moment— may 
be either by the senses from without, or by the suggestion 
ol former knowledge from within. 

Besides perception, or mere knowledge, produced in 
either of these ways, we have the feeling of pleasure or 
pain, which IS probably anterior to the former and the 
cause of it : and this produces the desire of enjoyinir the 
one. and avoiding the oti.er, by which our mere notions or 
knowledge, are rendered more vivid, and return more easi- 
ly in suggestion, or affect us more strongly upon the recur- 
rence of the external cause. This desire is the portion of 
our mental constitution which prompts us to exercise our 
bodily powers for our preservation and happiness ; and the 
pain or the pleasure that it occasions, is an emotion. Thus 
the great division of our mental phenomena, or affections 
is into intellectual states and emotions. ' 

Our intellectual states are either external,— immediately 
consequent upon sensation,— or they are internal suages- 
tions ; and the suggestions are either simple— the r'^tum of 
former states, or they are relative— the comparison of one 
slate with another. The comparison may be of states or the 
a ntecedent s tates, or the external objects which we call 

wWK ,1^^'''^" our experience leads ns to couple certain mental states 
w th the perceptions of external objects by the senses, to what con- 
clusion may we come ?— -9. In what tw-o wavs ma> the notion 
or knowled!;e, which is the cause of the mental slate or affection be 
fnTll"', 'rr^^; Wiat conclusion then follows in reo-ard to'the 
intellectual state ? J 1. What h.ve ,ve besides perception and is 

^13^ WbTeff ° h •^"- '''''' ''''' to- feeu!,,, produce 
14 VVh^tVff effect h,-,s this on our mere notions, or knowledo-e > 

14. What effect has a on our bodily powers? J5. W hat isthe 

patn or the pleasure it occasions called ? IG. What are the two 

great d.y.s.ons of mental phenomena, or affections?— -17 What 

are the two classes of our intellectu.il states ? 18. Of what two 

kinds are the suggestions ^—19. And what may the comparison 



356 FIRST LESSONS IN LeSS. 18. 

their causes, as co-existent, or without any reference to the 
past or Uie futiire ; or they be of tlK^se iu the succession of 
time, or tlie order of cause and effect. 

By tliese two forms or modes of suggestion, we can ex- 
tend our thoughts, iri chains of reasonings over all space, 
and over all tirue past, as well as forui plans for the future, 
more or less accurate according to the extent and correct- 
ness of our experience. We can also form new combina- 
tions, which may lead to discoveries in science, or inven- 
tion, in art; andthtse will be the more useful, and the 
more easily arrived at, iii proportion as we have been more 
conversant with the truths in the particular science, or the 
inventions of the [)articular art ; that to which tlie name of 
genius or talent is given, being n{)thin;^r more tlian the su- 
perior experience of the party to whom it is attributed. 
When it applies to a particular subject, we call it genius 
for that subject ; and when it applies to the sciences, or 
the arts generally, we say, that the individual is *' a man of 
talent.'' 

We are stimulated both to know and to do by our emo- 
tions, vvhicli are in themselves sim})ly feelings of pleasure 
or pnn. Those emotions may arise either upon the per- 
ception of external objects or events, upon the tale of those 
told in speech or iu wntiiYg, or upon our internal suggestions. 
They may or may not be mingled with a feeling of moral 
good or evil ; and they may also be mere feelings of the 
moment, or arise from reflection on the past, or anticipa- 
tion of the future. An emotion which arises in any of 
these ways, may be so weak that it lasts only for the mo- 
ment, and produces no influence either on the knowledge 
or the conduct : it may be sufficiently strong to make us 
reason, and then act, or refrain from acting according to 
the judgment that we form ; or it may be so vivid and im- 
petuous, as lo make us act without any {)revious judgment 

20. What cm we do by fh^se two wiodes of suggestion ? 

2l. In pioportron to what, will discoveries or iriveritioiis be the more 

useful or easily aUairii-d ? 22. To wliat is the tiatr.e of jrenius or 

talent ^iven ? 23. When it applies to a particular su'ject what 

do we call it ? 24. Wi en it applies to the sciences or aris, what 

do we say of the iiul'vidual ? 25. By what are we stimulated to 

knowledge and action ? 26 Upon what ni ty these emotions 

arise ^ 27. With what may th^y be niiuiiled .^ 28. What 

are the varieties of sttenglh with which an emotion may exert its in- 
fluence ? 



Less. 18. intellectual philosophy. 357 

of the consequences ; nay, it may become so very violent as 
to unfit us for acting altogether. 

As the ecnotions have much more the nature of intuitive 
instincts tlian the suggestions of the mind — especially when 
the emotion immediately follows a sensation or external 
perception — they require much more discij)line than our 
merely intellectual atlcctions. But as it is by reasoning 
alone that we can know good from evil, and as the correct- 
ness of the judgments that we form depends wholly upon 
our experierjce and the readiness of our suggestions, both 
simple and relative, the only means of rendering those emo- 
tions the sources of happiness, are an extensive observation 
of facts, a well exercised reasoning on those facts, and an 
experience so pure f om crime or folly, that no suggestion 
of the past can either torment us for the present, or darken 
our hopes of the future. 

Such is a brief outline of the leading phenomena of the 
human mind ; and though the capacity with which man 
comes into the world be apparently more feeble and less 
promising than that of many other creatures, we find, in 
a single point, that which in the end outstrips and sur- 
mounts them all, not in degree merely, but absolutely in 
kind. 

Were it possible for a being not conversant with the his- 
tory of the inhabitants of our globe — a dweller in one of 
the otiier planets, for instance — who was endowed with 
faculties of observation and comparison similar to those 
which we possess, — were it possible for such a being to 
visit this earth, and see the young of the animals, and the 
infant of thn human race, at the first moment of their exis- 
tence, and without any knowledge of their developement in 
after life ; the irresistible conclusion to which he would be 
forced to come, would be, that man was the most abject 
and the most hel[)less creature o^ the whole. The young 
quadiupfrls are almost all capable of locomotion, and they 
can all iustin tively find out the food that nature has pre- 
pared for thefn, the moment they are dropt. Some of the 
birds (as the partridges) run swiftly, and seek their sub- 

29 V'» hy d ) the eiiotion^ require more discipline than tlie intel- 
lectual alf ctufti- r 30. What are Uie means of r'rtderi-^i^ the 

emotirci' son c-s rjf ha|)pine>s ^ 31. How doe^ the infant of the 

human rjve compare with the young of other animals? 

31 



358 INTELLECTUAL PHlLO^O!PSy. Less. 18. 

sistence in the fields while a portion of the shell yet ad- 
heres to them. Instead of showing any paternal care, the 
fishes prey upon their own ofTspiing whenever ihey find 
them ; and the larvcb of insects are not produced till after 
the death of their parents, and so pass through all their 
singular changes of state and form, without instruction or 
assistance ; while the only instinct of the human infant 
is the feeling of pain; and if left to that feeling, it would 
very soon die. There is, however, one principle, a very 
simple one, to all appearance, which envolves out of that 
helpless creature, the lord of the world : — the human in- 
fant is teachable ; — every thing that it can experience 
brings a lesson with it ; and from a state of total ignorance 
and helplessness, it comes to extend its knowledge over the 
universe, to look back to the very commencement of history 
upward to Him from whom the whole emanated, and for- 
ward to a life that can know no end. Well may this be 
called the print of Heaven — the express image of the Cre- 
ator; for though it cannot make a world out of nothing, it 
has made a Bacon and a Newton out of that which once 
did not know its own finger. 

32. What is the simple principle, which raises man from a state 
of entire helplessness to be the lord of the world ? 



BOSTON 
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. PUBLISH Tin: FOLLOWING 

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